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2ABSTRACT
Agriculture occupies a very important place in the 
Zambian economy as a source of foreign exchange and as a 
source of food. Whatever the explanations that have been 
offered for low productivity - droughts, excessive rains 
etc., the legal framework for agriculture has been a 
relevant factor even though it has received the least 
attention from lawyers and economists alike. Law and 
development studies have only assumed importance in the last 
twenty years, that is, since the attainment of independence 
of many African countries. This thesis seeks to add to the 
growing literature on the effect of law on the agricultural 
development of Zambia. It is divided into five substantive 
chapters and a conclusion.
The thesis opens with a general introduction showing 
the manner in which the colonial government used the law to 
encourage the development of a viable agricultural base from 
the time it assumed control from the British South Africa 
Company, through the depression years to the period leading 
up to independence. Chapter Two examines the land tenure 
systems that relate to agricultural land on State Land 
(formerly Crown Land). After independence government 
intervention through the land reforms of 1975 was calculated 
to give the State greater powers of land control. While the 
government has taken active steps to ensure the development 
of State Land, it has avoided interference with customary 
systems of landholding in the Reserves and Trust Land.
Chapter Three, therefore, examines the systems of 
landholding in the Reserves and Trust Land and evaluates the
3same in the context of agricultural development. It also 
draws attention to the need for government to extend control 
to these areas and to provide a proper legal framework to 
enable those who are dissatisfied with customary land tenure 
to obtain documentary titles to land.
In order to speed up agricultural development, the role 
of the State has been extended to the provision of credit 
and marketing facilities. Chapter Four examines government 
credit policy as contained in policy statements as well as 
through the operation of its own specialised credit 
institutions and includes a discussion of the importance of 
various forms of security to all categories of farmers. 
Chapter Five examines the use by the government of statutory 
boards to control the production and marketing of 
agricultural commodities and the purposes of such control. 
The final chapter attempts to outline the reasons for the 
limited success of Zambian government policy in this area 
and demonstrates the limited role of law and legal solutions 
in promoting agricultural development.
The law is dated as of March, 1987.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION 
BRITISH LAND POLICY IN NORTHERN RHODESIA
A. GENERAL
1. Constitutional History
(a) The British South Africa Company and Northern Rhodesia 
The constitutional history of Northern Rhodesia (now 
Zambia) dates back to the 19th century when the British were 
in the process of expanding their influence through trade 
links with existing indigenous political structures in 
Africa. These trade links were forged by British merchants 
and entrepreneurs who entered into agreements with local 
chiefs. Thus, the British avoided ”the arduous and 
expensive task of direct administration” .1 This approach 
was susceptible to serious weaknesses, notably that trade
could be disrupted where a local chief might be incapable of
. . . . . 2maintaining effective control over his subjects. In the
last quarter of the century, therefore, the British resorted 
to establishing chartered companies which, although financed 
by private investors, were granted defined political and 
administrative powers to undertake the risks and expenses of 
colonisation. In the case of Northern Rhodesia the British 
South Africa Company (referred to, hereafter, as the BSA 
Company), was the chartered company responsible for the
20
administration of the country from 1890 to 1924.
The Royal Charter granted to the BSA Company on 29th of
October 1889 confined the Company's operation to "the region
of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British
Bechuanaland and the north and west of the South African
. . 3Republic and to the west of the Portuguese Dominions." But 
when the BSA Company secured from Lewanika, Chief of the 
Barotse the 1890 concession which gave the Company a 
monopoly of mining and commercial rights over Barotse 
territory (north of the Zambezi), the British government 
extended the area of operation of the Company to cover the 
area north of the Zambezi river, excepting Nyasaland.
(i) North-Western Rhodesia
In 1894, by agreement with the British government, the 
BSA Company undertook direct administration of the British 
sphere of influence north of the Zambezi, but it was only in 
1897 that Sir Robert Coryndon arrived in Barotseland as 
representative of the Company and British Resident. In 1899 
the BSA Company received statutory rights of administration 
under the Barotseland North-Western Order in Council. 
Although the BSA Company could administer the territory, 
they were responsible for its administration to the British 
High Commissioner for South Africa. This arrangement was 
necessary because of an international dispute with Portugal 
over the boundary with Angola. It was felt advisable in the 
circumstances that the British government exercise closer
control than would be the case if the Company was solely
4 •responsible. The BSA Company concluded further treaties or
21
concessions with the Barotse Chief in 1900 and 1909 under 
which apart from placing the whole of the territory of the 
Barotse nation including all subject and dependent territory 
under the protection of the imperial government, gave the 
BSA Company exclusive mineral and commercial rights while 
the Company agreed to pay annually a fixed sum of money to 
be used for the general purpose of developing the country.
(ii) North-Eastern Rhodesia
While North-Western Rhodesia was approached from the 
south, North-Eastern Rhodesia was approached from the east. 
Following increased missionary activity in Nyasaland and 
North-Eastern Rhodesia the African Lakes Company was formed 
to open up trade in conjunction with the Missions. The 
African Lakes Company obtained three land concessions from 
various Chiefs in North-Eastern Rhodesia, but ran into 
financial difficulties, which led to its being taken over by 
the British South Africa Company in 1893. The BSA Company 
received "Certificates of Claim" from Sir Harry Johnston, 
then Governor of Nyasaland, who had been instructed by the 
British government to enquire into all claims arising from 
concessions or treaties with indigenous chiefs within 
Nyasaland and in North-Eastern Rhodesia. Its claim to land 
other than that which it had obtained through the African 
Lakes Company was, however, challenged by the Mozambique 
Goldland and Concessions Company which had acquired 
concessions obtained from Chief Mpezeni of the Ngoni, from a 
German known as Karl Wiese. In settlement, the BSA Company 
conceded to the Mozambique company mineral and land rights 
to a block of ten thousand square miles around Fort Jameson
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(Chipata) in return for shares in a company known as the 
North Charterland Exploration Company, established to 
exploit the concession.
In 1894, the British government confirmed the 
concessions in respect of which "Certificates of Claim” had 
been issued. Six years later, the BSA Company received 
statutory powers of administration over North-Eastern 
Rhodesia, under the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order-in-Council 
of 1900. The Company could legislate for the territory, but 
such legislation was subject to the approval of Her 
Majesty*s Commissioner and Consul-General for Nyasaland.
This arrangement continued until 1909, when, on account of 
preparations which were being made to merge the two 
countries, the power of the Governor of Nyasaland was 
transferred to the High Commissioner for South Africa under 
the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order-in-Council of 1909.
In 1911, the two territories were amalgamated into 
Northern Rhodesia by the Northern Rhodesia Order-in-Council 
of 1911. The general administration was conferred on the 
BSA Company. The appointment by the Company of an 
administrator had to be approved by the Secretary of State 
for colonies. The High Commissioner for South Africa was 
authorised to make, alter or repeal proclamations for the 
administration of justice, but in exercising this function 
he was able to take into account any suggestions or requests 
of the BSA Company. The Order-in-Council had the effect of 
applying to Northern Rhodesia the common law of England, the 
doctrines of equity and the statute law in force in England 
on the 17th of August 1911, "except so far as such law may 
be inapplicable or may be modified by any other
23
Order-in-Council or Proclamation".6 The introduction of 
English law was in contrast to Southern Rhodesia where
7
Roman-Dutch law was imported from South Africa.
(b) Northern Rhodesia Protectorate
At the end of the war of 1914-1918, the termination of 
Company rule in both Southern and Northern Rhodesia came 
under consideration. The BSA Company had extended the 
railway line, along which the majority of European farmers 
were to settle, across the country and linked it to the 
Congo railway in 1909. But the few European settlers in the 
country felt that they had a right to participate in the 
running of government. An Advisory Council consisting of 
five members elected by settlers had been established in 
1917. This Council had neither legislative nor executive 
powers. When in 1920 the BSA Company sought to impose 
income tax the European settlers contended that taxation 
could not be rightfully imposed without the consent of the 
elected representatives of the settler community. They 
demanded from the British government a number of reforms by 
which greater powers would be vested in the Advisory
Q
Council. For its part, the Advisory Council, in a 
resolution passed in 1920, suggested that the question of 
the nature and extent of mineral and land rights claimed by 
the BSA Company should be referred to the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council.
The BSA Company which had previously been a party to a 
similar dispute with settlers in Southern Rhodesia had no 
desire to have the issue referred to the Privy Council.
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Under the Devonshire Agreement of 1923, the BSA Company 
agreed to receive half of the net proceeds of all 
alienations of land in North-Western Rhodesia until 1965.
The Company retained the three freehold areas acquired from 
the African Lakes Company in North-Eastern Rhodesia. The 
Company also retained, exclusively, all mineral royalties. 
Company rule ended in Northern Rhodesia on 1st April 1924 
and Northern Rhodesia became, like Nyasaland, a Protectorate 
administered by a Governor with the assistance of senior 
executive officials. A Legislative Council consisting of a 
minority of elected representatives of the settlers 
numbering five and a majority of officials, numbering nine, 
was established. Official control was thereby maintained.
Constitutional progress after the assumption of direct
administration by the Colonial Office reflected the
ascendancy of settler influence over British policy as
propounded by Lord Passfield in his Memorandum on Native
Policy in East Africa. In 1938 settler representation in
the Legislative Council was at par with the number of
officials, and by 1945, the settlers had attained a majority
9on the Legislative Council. The effect of this progress 
was to reduce the role of the British government as trustee 
of the African majority who had no franchise in the 
Protectorate, and boost the impetus of settlers to struggle 
for self-government. The power of the settlers was to be 
used effectively in the promulgation of certain legislation 
designed to thwart African advancement and forestall 
competition.
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(c) The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
As early as 1915, the idea of uniting Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia had been contemplated by the directors of 
the BSA Company. Such a union would, the BSA Company felt, 
reduce administrative costs. In November 1927, the 
Secretary of State appointed a Commission chaired by Sir E. 
Hilton Young to enquire into the desirability of federation 
or some other form of closer union, not with Southern 
Rhodesia, but with the three East African countries - 
Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika. In its report of 1929, the 
Commission stated that while closer union was possible among 
the three East African countries, Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland should not be included because of the absence of 
communication and trade links with the East African 
territories.10
Attention was thereafter focussed on closer association
of Northern Rhodesia to Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
The Bledisloe Commission of 1936 appointed to enquire
whether and if so what form of closer co-operation between
the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was desirable reported that all
the three territories would benefit from co-operation, but
ruled out amalgamation as Africans in the north feared that
the restrictive native policy in Southern Rhodesia would
apply to them.11 A meeting of delegates from the three
countries at the Victoria Falls in 1949 advocated a
federation but the Labour government in Britain was
reluctant to give their approval as they were doubtful as to
the extent to which a federal government would advance
12African interests. When the Conservatives came to power 
in 1951, the new Secretary of State, Mr. Oliver Lyttelton
was determined to have federation established. A series of 
conferences and discussions at which African objections were 
swept aside resulted in the passing of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order-in-Council of 
1953 and the Federation came into being on the 3rd of 
September, 1953.
(d) The Emergence of Zambia
In Northern Rhodesia, the economic benefits from
federation proved to be illusory. This was due to unequal
13distribution of wealth among the territories, and also to 
the fact that the country had no authority to fix its own 
rate of income tax. There was no means by which Northern 
Rhodesia could reduce the flow of mining royalties and
dividends which were invested in Southern Rhodesia and South
14 .Africa. During this period, African disenchantment
increased and political parties in both Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland acquired formidable support from their fellow
Africans. The pressure from African political parties
coupled with European agitation in Southern Rhodesia for
Dominion status thwarted the continuity of federation. The
elections held following the revision of the Constitution in
1962 brought self-government under an African majority, and
on 24th October 1964, Northern Rhodesia became independent
and officially assumed the name of Zambia.
2. Sources of Law
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There are four main sources, local statute law, English 
law, African customary law, and local and foreign case law.
(a) Local Statute Law
Local statute law consists of enactments formerly
referred to as ’'Ordinances” and "Proclamations” but since
independence called "Acts", passed by the National Assembly
15and assented to by the President. Local statute law also 
includes statutory instruments made by any person or 
authority to whom Parliament has, for specified purposes 
delegated legislative powers in terms of Article 81 of the 
Constitution of Zambia of 1973. Not all the laws in the 
Laws of Zambia were enacted by Zambia's National Assembly, 
many had already been in force as ordinances, but were 
continued in force after Zambia's independence in order to 
achieve a desirable level of stability.16 There can be no 
doubt that local statute law constitutes the major source of 
law. Measures which have been taken to promote new 
development ventures, whether in industry or agriculture, 
have found their legal expression in local legislation.
(b) English Law
English law has been introduced by the English Law
17 . .(Extent of Application) Act, the British Acts Extension
18 19Act, the High Court Act, and the Subordinate Courts
Act.20
The English Law (Extent of Application) Act provides
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that subject to the provisions of the Zambia Independence 
Order, 1964 and to any other written law, the common law, 
the doctrines of equity and the statutes which were in force 
in England on the 17th of August 1911, and any statutes in 
force in England passed after that date but applied to
21Zambia under any Act, shall be in force m  the Republic. 
Despite the generality with which English statutes are made 
applicable under the Act, both the High Court and the 
Subordinate Courts Act contain provisions which limit their
application to the extent that local circumstances permit.
The Courts are empowered to "construe the same with such 
verbal alterations, not affecting the substance, as may be
necessary to make the same applicable to the proceedings
22 . . .  before" them. There are other limitations to the
application of English statutes. Where an English statute,
in force prior to 1911, covers the same subject matter as a
local Act, the provisions of the local Act must prevail to
the extent of any inconsistency between the two. Further,
if a local Act purports to establish a comprehensive system,
the English Act may be wholly inapplicable even if it is not
. . . . . . . . 23specifically inconsistent in all its provisions.
Post-1911 statutes do not apply unless they are specifically
. . . 24adopted under the British Acts Extension Act. The
schedule to this Act specifically cites eleven British
25statutes which have been adopted.
Certain Acts also make British Acts applicable. Thus 
section 11(1) of the High Court Act provides that the High 
Court*s jurisdiction in matrimonial causes "shall, subject 
to this Act and any rules of court be exercised in 
substantial conformity with the law and practice for the
29
time being in force in England”.
2 6(c) Customary Law
Customary law plays a very significant part in the
resolution of disputes arising between and among Africans in
Zambia. It covers many aspects of human activity
particularly in the traditional sector, of which one of the
most important is the enjoyment of land rights. Original
jurisdiction is vested in the Local Courts and the
Subordinate Courts, but the higher courts - the High Court
and the Supreme Court - have appellate jurisdiction. In-
spite of the wide scope within which customary law
applies, there are some limitations imposed by statute.
Under both the Local and the Subordinate Courts Acts,
customary law should only be applied in civil cases to which
the parties are Africans. Even in such cases, moreover,
customary law will not be applied if it is contrary to any
written law or repugnant to "justice, equity and good
27conscience" under the Local Courts Act, or repugnant to
"natural justice or morality" under the Subordinate Courts 
2 8Act. The repugnancy test, intended to rid customary law
29of any abhorrent aspects, has rarely been used.
In terms of its contribution to modernization, 
customary law, although proven to have the flexibility to 
adapt to changing circumstances or social values, is still 
widely believed to be incapable of initiating development.
By its very nature it cannot form a basis for radical change 
in the social and economic order.
30
(d) Local and Foreign Case Law
As a common law country, Zambia has followed the 
doctrine of stare decisis with this limitation that 
decisions of colonial and Federal judges have been treated 
cautiously. With respect to post-independence decisions the 
only court not bound by any decision including its own is 
the Supreme Court for Zambia. The next in the hierarchy, 
the High Court for Zambia is bound by decisions of the 
Supreme Court. The lower courts - the Subordinate Courts 
and, at the base, the Local Courts are bound by all 
decisions of the higher courts. Foreign case law is not 
binding, but of persuasive authority only. Foreign case law 
has been instructive in many instances in which the 
interpretation of a similar local legislation, including the 
Constitution of Zambia, has been in issue.
Local and foreign case law, like customary law, does
not play any significant role as a means of initiating
economic change. Although judges may be said to make law,
their ability to use this power to initiate economic change
in the absence of a specific statute designed to achieve
. . 30particular development goals is very limited.
In conclusion, therefore, so far as agricultural 
development is concerned, the most important source is local 
statute law.
3. Geography
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(a) Location and Population
Zambia, a landlocked country totalling in extent
291,000 square miles (753,000 sq. km), lies within latitude
8 to 18 degrees south and 20 to 33 degrees west. It shares
its borders with seven countries: Botswana, Zimbabwe and
Mozambique in the South; Malawi and Tanzania in the east and
north-east; Zaire in the north and Angola in the west. The
1969 census recorded a total population of just over four
million people, but the 1975 projection for 1984 was above 
31five million. This population is unevenly distributed,
with large concentrations of people in the industrial
centres along the old line of rail, the agriculturally
favourable areas in the Southern and Eastern Provinces, and
along the lake shores in the Northern and Luapula 
32Provinces. Vast areas are, hence, sparsely populated.
(b) Soils
The spread of good agricultural soils is limited mainly 
comprising the larger tracts of fertile upper valley soils 
lying in the Kafue basin of the Central and Southern 
Provinces, and the valley areas of river tributaries feeding 
the Luangwa in the east. It is in these areas that 
commercial farming has developed. The sandy soils of the 
North-Western Province have little fertility except for the 
Zambezi flood plain. The soils on the lake shores and 
swamps in the Northern and Luapula Provinces support 
relatively heavy concentrations of population, but the rest 
of the plateau soils are poor on account of the leaching
32
33effect of heavy rainfall.
(c) Rainfall
The most notable feature of the distribution of mean
annual rainfall is the general decrease in amount from north
to south which is attributed to the shorter time the south
34is influenced by the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone.
Superimposed on this pattern are areas of higher rainfall
resulting from above average altitude or from proximity to
lakes and swamps. The northern half of the country has
annual totals ranging from 40 to 60 inches (1015-1520 mm),
35with the maximum, north-west of Lake Bangweulu. The
Southern half has totals between 25 to 40 inches (635 to
3 6
1015 mm). Rainfall coincides with the summer period -
October to April, and the length of the growing season
varies from an average of 170 days in the north to 130 days 
37in the south.
(d) Agricultural Systems and Land Use
These are two basic agricultural systems, the
commercial, and the traditional or peasant system of
production. Between the two is a growing number of the
so-called "emergent farmers", who are progressing from the
peasant system into the commercial system, but are not yet
38fully developed to qualify as commercial farmers. It is 
difficult, however, to distinguish between marketed peasant 
crop surpluses and small scale commercial production because 
records are inadequate. Official production figures refer
33
only to amounts sold to marketing organisations at their
collecting points and not what may have been sold 
39privately. Despite data limitations, a broad geographical
pattern, more or less consistent with agricultural State
Land (formerly Crown Land) has emerged as depicting areas of
40commercial production. In terms of land use, the total 
geographical area being used for commercial production 
represents only a tiny proportion of the total national 
area.41
The traditional sector accounts for roughly seventy per
cent of the population, which is mainly dependent on peasant
or subsistence agriculture. Shifting cultivation is
practised although the nature varies from the semi-permanent
system in the Southern, Eastern and Luapula where population
pressure in certain areas has engendered more permanent
settlement, and the more active system in the sparsely
populated areas in the Central and Northern Provinces. This
mode of production is being modified by crop rotation and
there is little evidence of villages being shifted to other
areas over a short span of time. On the assumption that
under the traditional systems, the average land requirement
is about one acre per head per annum, Siddle calculates the
total area used for subsistence agriculture as 5000 square
43miles or 14.5% of the country*s total area. In any given 
year, therefore, over 80% of the land is either lying fallow 
or being used for non-agricultural purposes such as mining, 
forestry, game reservation, etc.
(e) Crops
34
In the order of importance, maize is the most popular
crop, followed by sunflower, wheat, rice, soya beans and
ground nuts. The figures in official statistics only
reflect marketed produce and not what is locally consumed
particularly in the traditional sector. Virginia tobacco,
once a major foreign exchange earner, has dwindled. It is
still being promoted by the Tobacco Board of Zambia, but
current production is only sufficient for local 
44consumption. It is conceded that improvement of the
tobacco industry requires a considerable provision of
45agricultural credit and extension services.
It is difficult to specify the areas in which crops are
grown because, particularly in the case of the traditional
sector, a wide variety of crops are grown for consumption
notably maize, tobacco, rice and various kinds of
vegetables. But in the commercial sector, maize and tobacco
are grown largely along the old line of rail, sunflower in
the Southern and Eastern Provinces, and soyabeans in the
Southern, Central and Lusaka Provinces. In terms of
self-sufficiency, the country has been plagued by shortfalls
46on all the major crops. The recurring droughts have taken 
the major part of the blame, particularly in the case of 
maize, but many other factors account for low productivity, 
among them the policy relating to agricultural land and 
inadequacies of the credit and marketing infrastructure 
discussed in the following chapters.
As to which sector contributes the larger proportion of 
marketed produce, rationally the small commercial sector 
contributes comparatively more. But unlike the Colonial 
period in which the commercial sector occupied an
35
unassailable position, the present situation is that the
combined efforts of the small scale or emergent farmers, and
47the peasant farmers has resulted m  the reverse. This
could be explained by the fact that many commercial farmers
48left the country m  the wake of independence and after , 
but no less important has been the overall effect of 
government efforts through extension, road construction, and 
rural credit, although, not entirely successful.
B. THE DUAL SYSTEM OF LAND TENURE AND LAND ADMINISTRATION
1. General Policy: The Dual Economy
The Northern Rhodesia Protectorate, like other
Protectorates and Colonies in Africa produced raw materials
for British industry and served as a market for the finished 
49product. Investment was concentrated in the sector which 
produced raw materials whether as minerals or agricultural 
produce. This sector geographically comprised the copper 
belt, with its mineral deposits, and the agriculturally 
favourable areas along the old line of rail. This pattern 
of investment led to a truncated form of development by 
which a highly developed export-oriented economy flourished 
in urban areas at the expense of the rural economy which was
36
50largely neglected, if not positively impoverished.
As the mining sector began to dominate the economy, the
question of labour assumed great importance. It is true
that Africans in Northern Rhodesia had already been used to
migrating to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in search of
work, but their numbers were small compared to the exodus
which took place after the opening up of the mines in
Northern Rhodesia. Labour migration has largely been
attributed to taxation introduced in North-Eastern Rhodesia
in 1900 and in North-Western Rhodesia in 1901. There is a
general consensus that taxation served to induce Afrians to
take up wage labour. There were, however, some other pull
factors attracting Africans to urban areas. The desire for
economic gain played an equally important role in inducing
51men to leave their villages in search of work. That
taxation was the major cause is evident in that migration
was more intensive in areas which were not agriculturally
52viable, than the reverse. Whatever the causes of labour
migration, its effect was to deprive the villages of
necessary manpower and thus weaken the agricultural base in
53the rural economy.
The creation of two separate economies was not only the 
result of the pattern of investment but also the land policy 
pursued. Both the BSA Company and the Colonial government 
were interested in generating profits in the short-term, 
hence their perception that development could best be
54achieved through the encouragement of European settlers.
The land policy pursued resulted in the carving out of the 
best lands for the European settlers and, in some cases, the 
movement of Africans into land reserved for them which in
37
many cases were not economically viable. By so doing, the 
dual system of land tenure emerged. The settler community 
was governed by the English land tenure system, while the 
Africans continued to be governed by their own customary 
land tenure system. This land policy further reinforced the 
dual economy in the sense that the Colonial government could 
then clearly identify the areas where further investment in 
infrastructure to benefit European farmers could be 
directed.
With the emphasis on the mining industry, the role of
the agricultural sector was to provide sufficient food
55surplus to feed the mining community. Given this
restricted objective, it is no wonder that the emphasis,
prior to 1947, was on European farmers. Throughout the
pre-1947 period and in sjpttft of the theory of "paramountcy of
56native interests" espoused by Lord Passfield in 1930, 
government concern was with assisting European farmers.
With respect to African farmers, government attention was 
focussed on control of soil erosion and the prevention of 
depletion of soil fertility arising from increased 
population pressure.5^
The Ten-Year Development Plan approved by the 
Legislative Council in February 1947 signified the beginning 
of change in policy. It was acknowledged in this plan that 
the country had a small immigrant population with a high 
standard of living confined mainly to the old railway line 
and a much larger indigenous population scattered throughout 
the country but enjoying a low standard of living. In view 
of this disparity, it was felt that, while the aim of the 
Development Plan had to be the same for both sections -
38
maximum development possible within the plan period - the
methods to be employed in bringing about development would
have to be different as between the two sections. The
Development Plan had three major objectives: (i) to give on
a modest scale the bare essentials of social and economic
services to both communities? (ii) to encourage development
of the natural and potential assets of the country, and
(iii) to assist the African population to develop itself
under the Native Authorities through better health and
58increased industrial and agricultural skill.
To encourage African development each province was to 
have a provincial- team consisting of senior members of each 
department under the chairmanship of the Provincial 
Commissioner. Within each province were to be established 
"development areas" controlled by the Provincial team. 
Development Areas were in turn to have field staff to 
implement development schemes. The Plan also called for the 
establishment of an organisation, the Native Development 
Board, which was to monitor and supervise the implementation 
of the Development Plan.
The order of priority was the preservation of land, 
improvement of diet leading to an ultimate improvement in 
economic conditions and in time a more concentrated 
distribution of population. To cater for such diverse aims, 
Development Area Teams were to consist of an agricultural 
officer responsible for general direction of agricultural 
work and the supervision of agricultural experiments? 
agricultural supervisors, in charge of experimental stations 
and extension work? and at the bottom of the scale, African 
rural assistants to carry out instructions. Development
39
areas were to be selected on the basis of population
strength, consequently areas of sparse population were not
to be served. The Plan envisaged the establishment of ten
59development areas.
With regard to European agriculture, at the time of the 
plan, European farmers were already being served by an 
agricultural extension officer. By 1944 a research station 
had been opened near Lusaka to deal specifically with 
problems of European wheat farming.60 The planners believed 
that the European farming industry deserved wider 
agricultural services than werfcthen available and that "wise 
expenditure on European agriculture is likely to yield 
greater returns in the improvement of territorial finances 
than is equivalent expenditure on African agriculture".61 
It was generally accepted that the problems of the European 
farmer were more economic than agronomic and that the need 
for advice and assistance was greater in the pastoral than 
in the agricultural side of the industry. Provision was
62made for further expansion of research and advisory work.
The Ten-Year Development Plan was revised in 1948, 1951
and finally in 1953. The impact of these revisions and the
resulting ratio of agricultural expenditure to the overall
estimate of expenditure has been amply demonstrated by Dodge
who concludes that, although the planned expenditure
increased fourfold, the amount spent on agriculture,
63economic, and rural development decreased. The Federal 
governments five-year plan did not alter the trend in 
favour of agriculture. For all the three territories 
comprising the Federation, the sum allocated to agriculture 
and rural development amounted to only eight per cent of the
40
64total expenditure.
The creation of the dual economy and the emphasis on 
European agriculture explains the evolution of a dual system 
of land tenure. What follows is a brief account of the 
evolution of Colonial land policy conveniently divided into 
Colonial policy with regard to Native Lands and Colonial 
policy with regard to what, for lack of a better term, is 
designated as Alienated Lands, the land reserved for 
European settlement, and its bearing on agricultural 
development. As separate credit and marketing facilities 
were created to serve farmers in the two distinct areas, 
these two aspects, indispensable to agricultural 
development, are discussed under the two headings.
2. Native Lands
Colonial land policy was influenced by two major
factors. The most important was the power of the small
population of European settlers who exercised tremendous
influence through their representatives on the Legislative
Council. The other factor was, ironically, the experience
and personality of the encumbent governor. The contrast
between Sir Herbert Stanley and Sir Hubert Young stands out
clearly as having been the determining factor in the choice
between the Reserves and Trust land. Stanley who had been
Imperial Secretary for South Africa was known to be
65sympathetic to settlers. His experience m  South Africa, 
with its policy of racial segregation, influenced him not
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only in the choice of introducing native reserves on the
Southern Rhodesian and South African pattern, but also in
the manner in which this policy was implemented. Young,
whose experience was derived from Nyasaland, was more
inclined towards greater protection of African interests
through the concept of trustland. Due to the above
contrasts Colonial land policy in Northern Rhodesia followed
first, the example of Southern Rhodesia where under the Land
66Apportionment Act the best lands were allocated to
Euro pean settlers, and later the Nyasaland example, where
under the Native Trust Land Order-in-Council of 1936, the
whole of the unalienated land was declared Native Trust Land
67to be administered for the benefit of Africans.
(a) The Policy of Native Reserves
The policy of native reserves dates back to the period 
of the BSA Company administration. In the populated areas 
of Eastern Province (then referred to as the East Luangwa 
District) competition between European and African farmers 
forced the former to press the BSA Company to create native 
reserves. They were supported by the North Charterland 
Exploration Company which accused the BSA Company of 
hindering development by refusing to alienate land on which 
Africans were settled to European farmers. In 1913, after a 
meeting between BSA Company officials and local chiefs, it 
was agreed that reserves should be set up in the Fort 
Jameson area.68
The establishment of reserves obviously meant 
delineation of land between what was to be available for
42
European settlement and what would be recognised as
belonging to Africans. The chiefs in the Eastern Province
had agreed to the policy provided they got land of good
quality. According to Gann, the soil selected varied in
quality ranging from "very barren country to good,
cultivable land, the allocation being made on the basis of
11.75 to 34 acres per head of native population depending on
69the country selected." Three reserves were thus created,
but they were not backed by any Order-in-Council. In the
meantime, the demand for the creation of reserves also grew
on the railway belt where indigenous farmers were beginning
to compete with European farmers for the local market.
Palmer observes that the intention on the part of Europeans
was "to push Africans out and make way for incoming 
70Europeans".
The process was accelerated by Sir Herbert Stanley as 
the first governor after the country had become a 
Protectorate and the Colonial Office had assumed direct 
administration in 1924. Stanley believed that European 
settlement was indispensable to economic progress. European 
settlers should be welcomed because they offered employment 
to Africans who were thus enabled to pay taxes. They also 
provided an example of better methods of farming to the 
local Africans. He advocated immediate action to create 
reserves in the East Luangwa District (the Eastern Province) 
and along the old railway line in the supposed interests of 
both Europeans and Africans. Any further delay would be 
detrimental as, "the present uncertainty cannot but produce 
a feeling of insecurity among the natives and have an 
unsettling effect on their minds, since to them it is a
43
question of paramount importance to be assured of a
sufficiency of suitable land for their permanent 
71occupation”. He praised earlier efforts by the
North Charterland Exploration Company to set up reserves,
but these, he said, were insufficient. Between 1924-1927 he
set up reserves commissions in the three areas mainly
affected by European settlement - the line of rail, the
Northern Province and the Eastern Province. Under their
terms of reference, the Commissions were to make provision
for reserves "suitable and sufficient for the agricultural,
pastoral, industrial and other requirements of the natives
... including in all cases a fair and equitable proportion
72of springs, streams or permanent water.” The
Commissioners were also directed to have regard not only to
"the present requirements of the natives, but also to their
probable future necessities consequent upon the spread of
white settlement to areas now occupied by natives and upon
probable extension of those requirements by reason of the
73natural increase of population".
(i) The Native Reserves Commission (Railway Line)
The Native Reserves Commission for the Railway Line sat 
74m  1926. It framed its resolutions in accordance with the
following criteria:
"1. Reserves are to be situated in country 
away from the railway line, but where 
possible, with "lanes" or "corridors", 
giving access to it.
2. They are to be homogeneous and not 
intermingled with areas of European 
settlement.
3. They are to be tribal so that no part of a 
tribe is cut off by intervening land from 
the remainder.
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4. They are to be permanent and perpetual.
5. They are to be suitable and of sufficient 
size.
6. They shall be an indivisible part of a 
general scheme for the improvement and 
civilisation of the native.”75
The Commission estimated the African population to be
268,000 and proposed sixteen reserves totalling 24,874,000 
acres, thus giving ninety-three acres per head. The 
remaining twenty-three and half million acres was to be 
Crown Land. The Commission urged that government should 
immediately move Africans into the reserves instead of 
waiting until the Crown Land reserved for European 
settlement is taken up as this would encourage false hopes 
in Africans which might turn into bitterness when the time 
for their movement came. No provision was made for 
compensating Africans for their houses and fields on the 
grounds that they would be sufficiently compensated by the 
security they would gain in reserves. The proposed reserves 
were formerly designated in the Native Reserves (Railway 
Line) Order-in-Council of 1929.
(ii) The Tanganyika District Native Reserves Commission
What was once the Tanganyika District (now Mbala and
Isoka Districts) had been acquired by the British South
7 6Africa Company from the African Lakes Corporation. It 
comprised an area of close to three million acres. The tiny 
population of European settlers numbering forty three could 
be broken down into twelve missionaries, eleven women, nine 
male farmers, eight officials and three traders - with the 
farmers dependent mainly on cotton and coffee growing. The
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77Commission which sat in 1927 observed that:
"In selecting the reserves we are recommending 
we have endeavoured to adhere to the principle 
that they should be tribal or for a portion of 
a tribe. We have made them generous in size 
allowing for future economic development. We 
are causing as little movement of the natives 
as possible and have done our best to keep the 
Paramount Chief and more important chiefs on 
their own lands."78
The Commission proposed thirteen reserves totalling about
eight million acres for an African population of 106,513, a
ratio of roughly 74.8 acres per head. More than five
million acres were proposed as Crown Land for future
European settlement. No compulsion to move Africans into
reserves was proposed, however, but again compensation was
said to be unnecessary. The reserves were formally
designated in the Native Reserves (Tanganyika District)
Order-in-Council, 1929.
... . . . 79(in) The Native Reserves Commission, East Luangwa
At the time this Commission sat in 1924, some
"unofficial" or "provisional" reserves had already been
created by the BSA Company. These reserves, numbering
80thirteen, were taken into account by the Commission. The
Commission stated in its report that it had been guided by
the principles that the reserves would involve minimum
movement of the African population and that there should be
81little disorganisation in any single tribe or unit. The 
Commission recommended nine reserves totalling 2,149,120 
acres for an estimated African population of 151,364 (an 
average of 14.2 acres per ahead). Africans were given five 
years within which to move into the reserves. No 
compensation was payable. The Native Reserves (East
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Luangwa) Order-in-Council was made in 1928.
(iv) Evaluation of the Native Reserves Policy
The Colonial government had embarked upon a policy of 
native reserves "in conscious imitation” of the Southern
82Rhodesian practice, but in quite dissimilar circumstances.
The justification for the policy has been described either
as an effort to safeguard the interests of Africans in the
83wake of European immigration, or an attempt to deprive
Africans of their best lands and grant the same to European 
84farmers. The manner in which it was implemented -
immediate movement and denial of compensation, lend credit
to the latter argument. One must, in fact, bear in mind
that the motivation for the reserves policy was what Hellen
calls "the settler dream", that is, the expectation that one
fine day there would be an avalanche of European farmers,
85for whom provision had to be made in good time. But as 
Palmer has observed, contrary to expectations "the ‘settler 
dream1 remained but a dream, and the majority of Europeans
who entered the country after 1930 came as miners and not as
8 6farmers". In effect, the "wholesale" movement of Africans
from their lands into reserves was unjustified. Palmer
concludes: "as the Europeans failed to come, the reserves
became overcrowded and the 'silent lands' from which the
people had been removed simply attracted the tsetse fly.
Even official reports of a later vintage were highly
87critical of such an asinine policy".
Overcrowding in Reserves was a result of gross 
underestimation of African land requirements bearing in mind 
the varying types of traditional modes of farming. Perhaps
the Commissions were not to blame, but rather the hasty and 
cavalier fashion in which they were constituted. There was 
no professional agriculturist on any of the three 
commissions, and no comprehensive report on soils,
88vegetation or agricultural systems was then available.
The 1938 Commission of Inquiry into the Financial and
Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia was very critical of
the whole policy of native reserves. It reported that the
un
reserves were inadequate in size and inhabitable owing to,
either, the absence of water supplies, or the presence of 
89tsetse flies. This observation was shared by the Land
Commission of 1946 which laid stress on the fact that it was
unnecessary to move Africans into reserves when, in fact,
there was no demand on the part of Europeans, for the land
left vacant. The Commission stated:
"It is difficult to understand why in many 
parts of the country natives were compulsorily 
moved into the reserves in S^tie of the fact 
that there was no demand for occupation by 
Europeans of the areas left vacant. The 
result of this policy was to create a 
profoundly unsatisfactory situation in many of 
the reserves and to cause much unnecessary 
suffering and ill-will."9Q
It cited Mkushi (Central Province) as one of the areas where
unnecessary suffering had been caused. The three reserves
created in Mkushi had reduced the land available for African
occupation by 64%, and inspite of the European population
numbering only three in the whole district, nevertheless,
Africans had been forced to move into the reserves with
devastating consequences. In the words of the Commission:
"The result is what might have been 
anticipated. In some of the areas, there have 
been actual famine conditions, and in many 
others the land has degenerated to such an 
extent that it will be useless for many years 
to come."gi
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The Commission went on to criticise the Reserves
Commissions on the basis of the small size and the lack of
agricultural potential of the areas recommended as reserves.
With regard to the Lusaka district the Commission commented
that the area allocated as reserve had been too inadequate,
and expressed the fear that had Africans been moved into
them, their fate would have been sealed. A fitting example
of economic non-viability of the reserves cited by the
Commission was the Tonga Reserve in Mazabuka, which the
Commission described as "wild, stony, mountainous country
92with a few pockets of fertile soil in the valleys”. The
Africans in this particular reserve faced such hardship, due
to the absence of arable land, that they were subsequently
permitted to return home. The same gloomy picture was
painted of Northern and Eastern Provinces. In the Northern
Province, it was apparent to the Commission that the 1927
Reserves Commission had overestimated the carrying capacity
of the reserves and consequently the African land
requirements. By 1931, there were complaints of
overcrowding and some Africans began moving northwards into 
93Tanzania. In an attempt to alleviate land shortage, the
government added one million acres of BSA Company land to
94the existing reserves.
In the Eastern Province, conditions had so deteriorated 
with population densities of up to 240 per square mile in 
places, that drastic action was necessary. At the time, 
unfortunately, the government was involved in a dispute with 
the North Charter land Exploration Company over the price to 
be paid for the part of the Company’s land which had been
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turned into reserves. In 1940, the government was compelled
by the need to increase reserves to obtain powers of
compulsory acquisition, and the fear that the government
would use this power caused the Company to agree to a
settlement by which more than three and a half million acres
were purchased by the government and added to the existing 
95reserves.
(b) The Policy of Native Trust Land
The appointment of Sir Hubert Young to the governorship
of Northern Rhodesia in 1934 led to a swing in land policy
from Reserves to Trust Land. Young had been Governor of
Nyasaland (Malawi) where the concept of trusteeship was the
mainstay of Colonial land policy. The Pirn Commission stated
in 1938 that the policy of native reserves had been a
disaster. Young entertained the view that since, in respect
of land, Northern Rhodesia was more comparable to Nyasaland
than Southern Rhodesia, it should follow the example of the 
9 6former. In 1942, the Colonial Office agreed to accept
Young's argument in favour of native trust land. By
97Government notice all unalienated land was to be divided
into Crown Land and Native Trust Land. Crown Land was to
comprise all land "certified as a result of ecological
survey to be suitable for European development and all land
98known to contain mineral resources." Native Trust Land
was to be "set apart in perpetuity for the sole and
exclusive use and occupation of the Natives of Northern 
99Rhodesia". In future, if at all desirable, the Native 
Reserves might be merged with the Native Trust Land. The
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notice also proclaimed with the exception of land
already alienated, the whole of the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces and Serenje and Kasempa (districts) to be Native 
Trust Land "without further inquiry”.100 Palmer explains 
that these were areas which had all along been conceived as
African land as no concessions had been granted with respect
101 . . 102 to them. For the rest of the country a Commission was
set up to apportion land between Crown Land and Native Trust
Land.
The Land Commission preferred recommending large
homogeneous blocks to numerous scattered settlements and
disclosed that it had made every attempt to make full
provision for the agricultural requirements of Africans.
The Commission added:
"We cannot agree with the suggestion made by 
some European witnesses that the existing 
reserves would be adequate if properly used, 
though we appreciate that much could be done 
to increase the carrying capacity by improved 
methods of agriculture, water development and 
encouragement of early burning."103
The Commission felt strongly, that on account of the poor
quality of much of the land in Northern Rhodesia? the poor
methods of agriculture employed? and the need to provide for
future population growth? "without agricultural control and
adequate instruction in agricultural methods, no amount of
land which can be set aside will be permanently sufficient
104for the needs of the African population." The Commission 
in all allocated a hundred million acres of formerly 
unalienated Crown Land to Native Trust Land, and taking the 
cue from the earlier mistake of the Reserves Commissions, 
stipulated that Africans should not be moved from Crown Land 
unless such land immediately required for European
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occupation, unless their "presence is actually harmful to
the land” for example by widespread burning of forests.105
Thus, eventually Northern Rhodesia followed the Nyasaland
106example rather than Southern Rhodesian practice. The
1947 Native Trust Land Order-in-Council officially declaring 
Native Trust Land was a replica of the Nyasaland 
Order-in-Council of 1936.
(c) Position of Non-Natives
The issue as to whether or not non-natives should be 
permitted to occupy land in the Reserves and Trust Land had 
bothered Colonial officials and settlers alike. The 
presence of non-natives (Europeans, Asians, etc.) was not 
necessarily undesirable, after all, Africans could learn 
improved methods of farming from the example of European 
farmers. There was also the question of traders and 
missionaries whose activities would be greatly hampered if 
they were distanced from Africans they intended to serve. 
Some accommodation for the traders, evangelists and even 
some European farmers had to be found within the framework 
of the Reserves and Trust Land policies.
Under the policy of Native Reserves, although the real 
intention was to apportion land between Africans and 
Europeans, some limited provision was made for non-native 
settlement in reserves. While by Article 6(1) Native 
Reserves were vested in the Secretary of State for Colonies 
and "set apart for the sole and exclusive use of the natives 
of Northern Rhodesia", provision was made by which the 
Secretary of State could alienate land to non-natives for
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limited periods varying according to the purpose for which 
the land was required. Ninety-nine years was the maximum in 
the case of land required for public purposes? thirty-three 
years in the case of missionaries and charitable
107organisations, and five years in any other case. The
only safeguard was that such dispositions had to be made
after consultation with the rural council within whose area
the land was situated.
These limited provisions were adequate because there
was no demand by Europeans to be permitted to settle in the
Reserves. With respect to Trust Land the position was
different however. In the first place there was profound
opposition to the policy of native trust land by European
settlers who, through their representatives in the
Legislative Council argued that the land proposed was too
108big to be perpetually tied in African hands. In order to
placate the opposition, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, the
representative for African interests in the Legislative
Council, after discussions with the opposition, proposed to
the government that the opposition could be satisfied if a
clause to the effect that 6,000 acres in each province would
be made available for non-native occupation after
determination by the Secretary of State that such alienation
was in the general interests of the community as a whole,
109was included. The Governor, Sir Waddington, however,
objected to inserting any figures concerning acreage and the 
Order-in-Council of 1947 which empowered the Secretary of 
State, when it appeared to him to be in the general 
interests of the community to grant rights of occupancy to 
non-natives in Trust Land, omitted any mention of
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acreage.110 The rights of occupancy could be for a term of
111years but were not to exceed 99 years. A right of
occupancy could also be exchanged for a comparable piece of 
land in Crown Land. Despite these overtures, some European
settlers were still dissatisfied particularly with the
. . . . 112 limitation of the period to 99 years.
On the 3rd of December, 1947, the Secretary of State
issued directions under section 5(1) of the Native Trust
Land Order-in-Council to the effect that all applications
for rights of occupancy should be referred to him for
113 .approval. The Governor, Sir Gilbert Rennie, explained
that previously small areas (of what became native Trust
Land) not in excess of one acre had been let to non-natives
or to natives of other areas as trading plots. These leases
had usually been for periods of one month but renewable
automatically, with provision for termination by a month's
notice on either side. These leases were later converted to
114rights of occupancy. From 1936 to 1948, 140 such leases
115were granted throughout the country. On the 20th of
November, 1948, the Secretary of State made further 
directions permitting the grant of rights of occupancy for 
small holdings, not in excess of five acres, without 
reference to him so long as such grants had the approval of 
the relevant Native Authority.116
(d) Adjudication of Title Proposals
(i) The Native Land Tenure Committee Report
As non-natives were being granted leases in the
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Reserves and rights of occupancy in Trust Land, the need for
initiating reforms to customary land tenure and introducing
a registration of title system for Africans in these areas
was being considered. On the 27th February 1945, a Native
Land Tenure Committee chaired by Sir Stewart Gore-Browne,
the representative for African interests in the Legislative
117Council, was appointed by the Governor to:
"a) Investigate the systems of land tenure and 
inheritance prevailing in the native areas 
of the territory, with particular 
reference to their applicability to the 
conditions brought about by changes in the 
social, political and economic lives of 
the inhabitants;
b) Make recommendations as to any action 
which should be taken by government and 
Native Authorities, to adapt such systems 
to the present, and, so far as they can be 
foreseen, the future needs of the people? 
and
c) Make recommendations as to the machinery 
which it may be desirable to establish for 
the purpose of directing the future 
investigations into native land tenure and 
of advising government on policy with 
regard to native land tenure."llg
The Committee summarised customary land tenure in Northern
Rhodesia as "communal ownership by the tribe, vested in the
Chief, coupled with an intensely individual system of land
usage". Every individual member of the tribe, the Committee
found, had the right to as much arable land as he needed for
himself and his family, and so long as he made use of this
119land, he enjoyed "absolute legal security of tenure". A
more detailed discussion of customary land rights is 
contained in the third chapter, but what is necessary at 
this stage is to determine why the Committee was so 
concerned with customary land tenure at all after their 
finding that customary law offered "absolute legal security
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of tenure”.
The need arose from a desire to pacify ex-soldiers (or
ex-Askaris as they were called) and some educated Africans
who wished to break out of the traditional village system.
The Native Land Tenure Committee conceded that the demand
for farms by soldiers and educated Africans was not
necessarily based on a desire to adopt new methods of
agriculture, but the desire to establish permanent residence
"away from the noise and other inconveniences inseparable
from ordinary village life”, and possibly plant fruit trees
and keep livestock. This was interpreted as a desire for
improved living conditions which could not be realised by
Africans at the time because of a government rule (for
administrative convenience) that ten taxpayers constitute
the minimum number required to establish a village. The
Committee recommended the introduction of a "parish” system
where people would be permitted to reside within a given
area, a "parish", without necessarily having to get
120themselves together and form a village.
The Committee then addressed itself to the welfare of 
the few educated Africans and ex-soldiers whose desire was 
to enter commercial farming. Within their parishes,
Africans could, if they wanted, produce enough to sell, but 
with the exception of reserves within reach of the copper 
belt, such areas were generally too remote from markets for 
anything but subsistence agriculture. It therefore 
recommended the establishment of settlements near the copper 
belt, the old railway line towns and Eastern Province. Such 
settlements were to consist of blocks of farms properly 
demarcated and under strict agricultural control. Capital,
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of at least ten shillings per acre and adequate fanning
experience, were to be essential for those who were to be
121participants in these settlement schemes. In view of
their stringent qualifications, the demand for farms under 
these suggested schemes could not have been high. Strangely 
absent from the Committee's recommendations were comments on 
the nature of land rights to be offered in respect of the 
farms. It is perhaps for this reason that their 
recommendations as to parishes and settlements remained on 
paper.
(ii) The Native Land Tenure Sub-Committee of the Native 
Development Board Report
The above recommendation for separate settlements
echoed an earlier suggestion by the Native Land Tenure
Sub-Committee of the above Board appointed on October the
5th of 1942 to "consider the conditions under which Africans
122might hold land individually". This Sub-Committee had
gone further and considered the form of tenure in African
settlements. It felt that it was essential to lay down and
enforce definite conditions of tenure to ensure that land
alienated to Africans could be utilised to the best
advantage, and particularly, to guard against its misuse.
In the Sub-Committee's opinion "such conditions could best
be enforced under a form of leasehold tenancy in which the
right is reserved to the Crown to terminate occupancy in the
123event of non-compliance with the covenants". It then
proceeded to lay down the conditions which should be 
contained in the leases, but recommended a period of thirty
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years. The short leasehold period was desirable as "the 
prospective tenants are in a fairly primitive stage of 
development, but under the stimuli of individual tenure and
1 O A
European instruction will probably make rapid progress".
(iii) The Land Commission of 1946
Successive commissions drew attention to the need to
provide an alternative system of land tenure to cater for
the agriculturally progressive African. Although falling
outside its terms of reference, the 1946 Land Commission
commented that in some parts of the country, notably,
Southern Province, educated Africans were looking forward to
125land in tribal areas which they could occupy permanently.
As the Commission put it "one of the most difficult problems
... is that of the agriculturally progressive Africans who,
not unnaturally, resent being placed too rigidly under the
jurisdiction of a petty chief who may be much their inferior 
12 6in intellect". It went on to urge the government to
investigate the question of land tenure for Africans.
. . . . 127Similarly, another Commission disclosed that m  the
Eastern Province, an African district official had urged the
Commission to recommend the establishment of special
settlements in which retired Africans who did not wish to
128return to their villages could settle. The Commission
recommended that the Agricultural Department be instructed
to select and set aside two areas for African farms around
Fort Jameson (Chipata). Such land should be alienated to
carefully selected Africans under conditions that would
ensure adequate agricultural control and the prevention of 
129soil erosion.
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In none of these reports is there any discussion on the 
defects of customary land tenure. In fact, the impression 
is created that the Commissioners were more impressed by 
Africans whose only desire was to seek refuge from village 
life. Neither is there any detailed discussion as to what 
form of tenure should replace customary law. Some effort 
was made by the Native Land Tenure Sub-Committee to provide 
a guideline by suggesting leaseholds, but the other 
Commissions seem to have been motivated by the desire to 
have registered title without necessarily bringing about 
reform in existing systems of land tenure.
However, the Rural Development Working Party in its
report of 1960 went a step further by urging land tenure
reform where Africans demanded it. They argued that land
tenure reform "will contribute an incentive to the farmer,
stimulating necessary investment in agricultural
improvement, greater productivity, conservation and land 
130improvement". They cited two major defects which
rendered customary law inadequate for the purposes of
agricultural development: the prohibition against sales of
land (including the absence of formal title to land) and the
131rules of inheritance. The prohibition against sales of
land rendered less secure any transactions in land, 
presumably they had in mind mortgages. With respect to 
inheritance, as the argument went, under the matrilineal 
rules of inheritance (which applied and still apply to most 
communities in Zambia), the land passes on to the man's 
nephews, thus making it impossible for a farmer who has 
invested his capital to pass on the land to his son. They 
stated that the immediate concern was to grant formal title
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in those areas where there was a demand for it, to people 
who were already in possession of land but whose claim to it 
arose under customary law. As to the interest which should 
be offered, the Working Party suggested freehold or 
something "as near to it as possible", but also expressed 
the wish that there should be control over the sale of land
to people of different races or coming from different Native
. . . . 132Authorities, particularly in the early stages.
The government's reaction was to send two District
Officers, Mr. A.C. North and Mr. J.C. Mousley, and two
agricultural officers, Mr. P. Greening and Mr. I.H.
Muchangwe to Kenya and Uganda to study land tenure
developments there and advise it whether it should follow
133suit. In their report the officers pointed out that
conditions obtaining in certain parts of the country notably
Southern, Central and Eastern Provinces would lead to the
success of a system of registration of title. Among the
factors the officers cited as an indication of readiness for
registration were that a growing number of people were
calling for reform; agriculture was in the process of being
developed and marketing facilities were adequate;
fragmentation was becoming apparent; enclosure, (a sign of
individualism) had already began; and land sales were
134already taking place. Further development, the officers
argued, were "undoubtedly being handicapped by insecurity 
and a lack of capital, both of which could be remedied by 
registration of title and the creation of agencies to 
provide long and short-term credit on the security provided 
by title deeds".135
On the question of the mechanics for registration and
60
consolidation, although the officers found the Kenyan system
"excellent and thoroughly suited to Northern Rhodesia", they
nevertheless advised a departure from the system on the
136subject of survey standards. The officers felt that the
survey standards applied in Kenya, while necessary for urban
residential plots where precision was critical, need not be
applied in rural areas where land values and population
pressures were lower. Another important factor considered
by the officers (not emphasised in Kenya and Uganda) was the
need to introduce regional and farm planning at the time of,
137or immediately after registration of title. Planning was
to involve the selection of the areas of good arable land 
and parcelling of the same into economic units for 
alienation to interested farmers, and the reservation of the 
rest of the land as communal grazing land.
(iv) The Native Reserves and Native Trust Land
(Adjudication and Titles) Ordinance, 1962
As a response to the calls for land tenure reform by
various commissions and government officials, the government
passed the Native Reserves and Native Trust Land
138(Adjudication and Titles) Ordinance of 1962. The
Ordinance showed that the government was aware of the
difficulty of applying registration processes country-wide,
namely the disparity in levels of agricultural advancement;
population strength? and patterns of agricultural land use,
and thus followed the Kenyan example of making the
application of the Ordinance dependent on local native
authorities who were supposed to be in better touch with the
139feelings of their people. Under section 3, a "superior
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native authority” could recommend to the governor to apply 
the provisions of the Ordinance to its area, whereupon by 
notice in the gazette, the Governor would declare the area 
to be an adjudication area. The Minister would then appoint 
an adjudication committee consisting of nine members 
nominated by the relevant native authority. Thus local 
participation was encouraged. The Minister was also 
empowered to appoint advisers to the adjudication committee, 
if the native authority so requested, but they had no voting 
rights. It was then up to any individual African occupying 
land within the adjudication area to apply to the 
adjudication committee to "adjudicate upon his claim to have 
by native customary law sole and exclusive right to occupy 
such land" within one year of the date of publication in the
gazette of the notice declaring the area an adjudication
140area.
After the expiration of one year referred to above, the 
adjudication committee was required to give notice 
specifying the situation and limits of each area claimed by 
any person and fix a period (not less than two months) 
within which those with any adverse claims could make 
representations to it. Upon the Adjudication Committee 
being satisfied with any claim, it was to formally allocate 
the land to the applicant, and later when all claims had 
been considered, the Committee was to prepare a demarcation 
plan showing every parcel of land and the name of the person 
to whom it was allocated. On the basis of the demarcation 
plan, an Adjudication Record would be prepared and submitted 
to the Registrar of Lands and Deeds. The Governor would 
then grant certificates of title whose effect once granted,
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would be the same as the certificates issued under the Lands
141and Deeds Registry Ordinance, which applied to Crown
Land. The Committee was permitted to make adjustments to
boundaries to take into account access of certain parcels of
land to roads, or effect consolidation of separate parcels
142of land, or for purposes of farm planning. Any person
who suffered loss on account of these adjustments was to be
143compensated by the other who had gained.
With regard to the nature of rights conferted by the
Ordinance on customary land holders, the Ordinance was
silent. However, the provision that certificates of title
offered under the Ordinance would have the same effect as
the one issued under the Lands and Deed Registry Ordinance
read together with section 17 of the Native Reserves and
Native Trust Land Ordinance which says:
"Save for the purposes of section 12 of this 
Ordinance native customary law relating to the 
acquisition or creation of rights in land 
shall not apply to land the subject of a 
grant",
it is apparent that customary law was intended to be 
replaced. However, the absence of the term would seem to 
imply that in so far as it is concerned, the interest 
conveyed by a grant under the Act was customary, unless, the 
expression "sole and exclusive use" is interpreted as 
synonymous with the freehold estate. With a view to 
preventing parcellation under section 12 the rules 
applicable for ascertaining the heir were those of the 
relevant customary law, although, provision was made for the 
heir to compensate any person who had a competing claim 
arising out of customary law. What the Ordinance failed to 
do was to change the matrilineal system of inheritance under
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which the land passes on to people other than the son, a
defect emphasised by the Rural Economic Development Working
Party. Whatever the problems the Ordinance brought forth
however, they were of little consequence in so far as it was
never applied except in one area in Eastern Province and
when it was finally repealed under the Land (Conversion of
144Titles) Act of 1975, there was little, if any, outcry.
(e) Agricultural Credit for African Farmers
A brief mention of agricultural policy was made in the 
introduction to this chapter. It was emphasised there that 
the primary concern was land conservation, at least in the 
early stages of colonial administration and a broad-based 
programme of rural development which encompassed education, 
conservation and new and improved methods of cultivation.
In the early days, agricultural credit was not perceived as 
a factor which was crucial to African agriculture. The 
revisions of the Ten-Year Development Plan in 1948, 1949 and 
1951 reduced the overall allocation for agriculture and 
rural development in general. The establishment of the 
development centres planned became a slow, tortuous process. 
It was then decided to concentrate squarely on two schemes 
introduced in selected areas, in the Central, Eastern, and 
Southern Provinces - the Peasant Farming Scheme, and the 
African Improved Farmers* Scheme.
(i) The Peasant Farming Scheme
Early experiments in African peasant farming were 
started in 1948. The objects were to transform African
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cultivation from traditional, shifting agriculture to more
settled tenant farming? to introduce capital into African
agriculture? to settle the population on more fertile land
where agriculture was more promising? and to encourage
145co-operative effort. The loans which covered the cost of
clearing, purchase of oxen and ox-drawn implements were
146interest-free and repayable within ten years. The
original source of finance was a revolving fund of £500,000
financed jointly by the British government, through the
Colonial Development and Welfare funds, and the Northern
147Rhodesia government. It was co-ordinated through the
Peasant Farming Sub-Committee of the Board of African
148Agriculture chaired by the Director of Agriculture.
Under the Peasant Farming Scheme, a piece of land would be
divided into several units, cleared and then occupied by
African farmers under agreement with Native Authorities.
Since the progress depended on the pace at which suitable
areas were stumped and allocated to interested farmers, the
scheme did not spread at the same rate in the various
provinces. It was most popular in the Es§:ern Province and
Southern Province whereas in the North-Western, Luapula and
Northern Provinces, the schemes had marginal success.
By the end of 1963, there were 2,748 African farmers on
the scheme, but, by far the largest number of these were in
the Eastern Province - 2,337, followed by Southern 
149Province. In other provinces there was very slow
progress. In Northern Province the scheme was said not to
have been attracting many Africans, and an effort was made
to concentrate on demonstration farms to prove the relative
150merits of new methods. There was some limited response
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in 1956 when the number of farms increased from 105 to 158
151although the progress being made was admittedly slow. In
Western Province (Barotseland) too, the figures were
152 . .disappointing. Lack of supervision, due to shortage of
agricultural staff, was said to be the reason for the
153apparent failure of the scheme in Western Province.
In 1961, the Ministry of African Agriculture conducted
a survey of peasant farmers and their report showed that
almost two-thirds of one thousand farm households had
incomes less than £60 per annum, and given the fact that the
annual repayment required amounted to half of total income
received by the farmer, it is not surprising that many
154farmers had difficulty repaying the loans. Even in the
Eastern Province, where the scheme was attended with some
success, financial constraints prevented expansion of the
scheme. The Ministry of Agriculture urged a more vigorous
approach, until at least fifteen per cent of African farmers
were on the scheme firmly believing,
"It is only through the creation of a class of 
landed gentry farming on a commercial scale 
and producing the necessary cash crops that a 
solid foundation can be laid for the Eastern 
Province agricultural industry. Penny packet 
production from the crumbs of village 
subsistence agriculture cannot create any 
wealth of any kind."155
(ii) The African Improved Farmer Scheme
This scheme which was introduced in the 1946/4-7 season 
in the Southern Province and extended to Central Province in 
1952 was the governments major programme for African
i  c / r
agriculture. Farmers who wished to participate were
required to register their names at their local agricultural
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station and, thereafter, to adopt a recommended system of 
157crop rotation. The farmer was also expected to make
contour ridges, maintain conservation works, if any, and
adopt reasonable standards of cultivation and weed 
158control. The incentive to join the scheme was in the
full price of maize that improved farmers received instead
of the reduced price which African producers had been
offered since 1936 in areas of maize control, the difference
being used for price stabilisation and the financing of
159conservation works.
The programme was revised in 1949 in such a way that
the difference between the full price fixed by the Maize
Control Board and that paid to African farmers was,
thereafter, paid into the newly-established African Farming
Improvement Fund, administered by a committee on which
Africans were represented. The Fund was used for the
general improvement of farming in the area from which the
funds were contributed. Making's summation of the effect of
the scheme was that "it provided for an enforced
contribution to general improvement throughout the area from
all those who brought maize to the market? and it also
provided the means by which less efficient producers were
160required to subsidise more efficient producers”. In
addition, the fact that the same prices were given for those
close to the railway as those distant from it meant that
those farmers along the railway were subsidising the farmers
who were far from it.161 Apart from general improvement in
the provinces, the fund was also used for bonuses to those
who excelled in production figures. This provision of
162bonuses lasted until 1963 when it was discontinued.
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From 1955 loans became available to improved farmers.
During this year £4000 for each province was allocated to
provide farming capital. The loans were administered
provincially by small committees on which native authorities
were represented. There was great demand for loans, an
indication of the desire of the participants to enter
commercial farming. In Southern Province two hundred and
eighty-nine loans were granted accounting for £3,817 while
in the Central Province one hundred and forty-seven loans
were granted totalling £2,085. The loans were used
mainly for the purchase of carts, implements, spare parts,
fertilizer and seeds. The main security for the loans was
164the expected bonus. In the Eastern Province where the
scheme was not well-developed, the loans were used mainly 
for stumping and the purchase of hand-operated groundnut 
shellers.
In 1957 an Ordinance was passed which provided for the
establishment of boards to administer African Farming
Improvement Funds. The African Farming Improvement Fund
Ordinance provided that one of the functions of the Board
would be "to grant loans to, and guarantee bank accounts
for, on such conditions as it may think, African farmers
within the area for which the Board has been 
166established". In order to raise capital for these loans,
the Member for the Executive Council was empowered to impose
levies on agricultural products in areas where the Fund was 
167established. Such levies were recoverable as civil debt
by the Board.
In terms of the impact of the Improved Farmers' Scheme, 
there was no evidence that the improved farmer programme had
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resulted in higher maize yields for participating farmers.
In fact, some earlier reports on Central Province showed
that the average production per acre was actually higher for
168unimproved farmers than for improved farmers. In the
Southern Province, the improved farmers had better yields
but these have been inscribed to better extension
facilities, larger farms and greater access to implements.
As Baldwin concludes, it was advantageous for farmers to
join the scheme on account of the bonuses and loans
available but "from a national viewpoint the subsidy may not
have resulted in any greater output, especially when the
output-depressing effect of the levy on unimproved farmers
169is taken into account".
Makings points to four weaknesses of both the peasant 
farming and improved farming schemes, in addition to the 
"debateable method by which the improved farmer scheme was 
financed":
i) The tendency for the farmers to overreach 
themselves by cultivating more land than 
they could adequately manage?
ii) The limited ability to respond fully to 
the need for changes in approach and 
technique under new conditions?
iii) The inability of the extension services 
to provide enough aid to establish the 
farmers on a sound basis in their new 
patterns of farming.
iv) The load of debtQwith which peasant 
farmers began.
Baldwin observes:
"Too much emphasis also was placed upon the 
necessity for the immediate adoption of European 
methods of agriculture as the condition for 
raising income. Attempts to raise agricultural 
income would have been more successful if there 
had been greater efforts made to provide better 
marketing and transport facilities."171
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In conclusion one must have recourse to the 
recommendation of the Rural Economic Development Working 
Party that there must be credit institutions for both 
long term finance and seasonal credit. The Working Party 
felt that such credit must be provided on commercial terms, 
and subsidies must be restricted to interest rates. The 
Party observed that the approach to the provision of credit 
to the rural African had been ad hoc? resulting in 
multiplicity of government sources and some overlap in
certain cases while leaving some requirements unprovided
172 . . .for. The administration of numerous small credit schemes
constituted a burden on District Officers who were obliged
to cope with responsibilities beyond their normal duties.
The Working Party recommended a single agency, the Rural
Development Bank to be established to cater for government —
173sponsored credit and have branches in four regions. This
last recommendation was not followed, however.
(f) Marketing of African Produce
In the early colonial days, there was no organisation 
responsible for marketing of African agricultural produce. 
Marketing was solely by individual initiative. Africans 
were quick to take advantage of opportunities. Those in the 
Northern and Luapula Provinces found markets for their
cassava and rice in the Congo and Tanganyika
174 . . .respectively. But the reaction to market opportunities
was not the same elsewhere. For instance in Solwezi
(North-Western Province), where the Kansenshi mine with a
labour force of 1000 had been opened, and in Mongu (Western
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Province), where owing to increased demand, the price for
maize had increased, African farmers failed to respond by
175increasing their output. Marketing of African produce
became easier when private traders, seizing the opportunity,
began buying from Africans in rural areas and transporting
the produce to urban areas. This boost to African
production offset, to some extent, their disability arising
from the limitation of land available to Africans under the
policy of native reserves. With the development of copper
mines and the resultant increase in the market, African as
well as European production, rose sharply. In 1930 African
producers sold about 30,000 bags to traders, but by 1935 the
figure had risen to 100,000. European output increased only
176from 168,000 to 211,000 bags within the same period.
The rise in the African share of the market did not
alarm European farmers so long as domestic production was
insufficient to meet the internal demand at the prevailing
prices. But overproduction of maize in 1935, coupled by
reduction in the market due to recession in the copper
industry, and a pessimistic report concerning the future of
177European farming m  Northern Rhodesia, all led to
measures calculated to protect European farmers from African 
178competition.
(i) The Maize Control Board
179The Maize Control Ordinance of 1935 established the 
Maize Control Board (hereinafter abbreviated to MCB). The 
long title summarised the functions of the MCB as "the 
compulsory control of the sale of maize and maize meal”. To 
carry out this function the MCB was empowered to dispose of
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any maize or maize meal vested in it, enter into contracts 
in connection with the handling, milling, storage and the 
sale or export of maize and maize meal? to purchase maize 
from Africans? to require any person to furnish information 
as to his transactions in maize and stocks in his possession
or under his control? and the power to issue "participation"
. 180 certificates.
There were certain categories of maize and maize meal
which had to be surrendered to the MCB and over which it
acquired property on receipt. These were a) all maize in
excess of fifty bags held by any person other than a 
181producer for the purpose of sale as on May 1, 1936? b)
all maize and maize meal held by any producer as on May 1,
1936 or maize grown by him thereafter? and c) all maize
acquired by any trader after May 1, 1936.
Every person who held maize or maize meal required to
be surrendered to the MCB was under a duty to apply to it in
writing for instructions as to the delivery of the
commodities, and make the delivery at a time and place
directed by the MCB. The risk did not pass to the MCB until
it had issued a receipt for it. Except for deliveries made
by Africans, the MCB was to grant all producers and traders,
participation certificates in respect of all maize and maize
meal delivered to it.
The market was divided into an internal pool and an
export pool. The purpose of the division was to set the
domestic price above the international price and transfer
182the surplus from the internal pool to the export pool. 
African farmers were allocated one-quarter of the internal 
pool and European producers three-quarters. The African
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quota was determined by computing for the years 1933-1935
the average ratio of African grown grain sold to private
183traders to the sum of this amount plus European sales.
As the report of the 1938 Commission noted, this
procedure did not represent fairly, either, the amounts
available for sale by each group, or the amounts actually
184sold internally. The North-Western Rhodesia Farmers
Co-operative Society, which controlled eighty per cent of
European produced maize, had facilities for exporting maize,
but the traders in African-grown maize did not, as a result,
the quantity of African maize actually bought by traders did
not represent the surplus of African maize available for
sale, as, in the absence of facilities for export, the
traders could not buy more than they could hope to sell in
the local market.185
The Sub-Committee of the Agricultural Advisory Board
which decided on the quotas justified the allocation of
one-quarter to African farmers on the ground that African
efforts to compete with European producers resulted in their
using methods of farming which led to deterioration of soil
fertility. As the argument went, Africans could destroy the
European farming industry, but only at the expense of the
soil which would become so impoverished, that in the long
run it would fail to yield sufficient quantities of 
186grain.
Respite their small quota, African farmers, assured 
of a market, doubled their output, an indication of their 
willingness to respond positively to market opportunities. 
European farmers, instead, regularly fell short of their 
quota, a factor which prompted the Director of the Maize
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Control Board to remark in 1953:
"It is quaint to recall the object which it 
(MCB) was established, for it has never once 
had to carry it out. It was created to secure 
to the European growers of maize a proportion 
of the internal market at a time when 
over-production was threatened.
The MCB also took some measures to stabilise maize prices.
Fearful of operating at a loss the Board set a lower price
than it actually realised. While it was possible to
distribute the difference to European farmers, the same
could not be said of the thousands of African farmers. The
surplus was put into a stabilisation fund and from 1949
transferred into the African Farming Improvement Fund.
The importance of the Maize Control Board should not be
emphasised, however. It functioned only in certain
scheduled areas, which geographically coincided, more or
188less, with the old railway belt, spanning mostly European
agricultural areas. Further, it only dealt with maize until
1891954 when it began to handle groundnuts as well.
(ii) The Eastern Province Agricultural Produce Board
The Eastern Province Agricultural Produce Board (EPAPB)
was established In 1953 with similar functions and powers as
the MCB, to control the marketing of maize and groundnuts in
the Eastern Province. At this time the Eastern Province was
not covered by the operations of the MCB as the farmers were
discouraged from producing maize surpluses which had to be
transported to Lusaka, a distance of some 350 miles. The
Board was established under the Eastern Province
190Agricultural Produce Ordinance, but the Board was not
191operational until June 1953. Its powers and functions
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were a replica of the MCB.
The Board also established a price equalisation fund 
for each agricultural product. Whenever the proceeds from 
the sales of any produce were greater than the expenditure 
incurred by the Board, the difference was paid into the 
equalisation fund, and when the position was reversed, the 
difference was to be met from the fund. If the money from
this fund was insufficient, the balance could be met by an
advance from the Accountant-General out of parliamentary 
appropriations on such terms and conditions of repayment as 
the Financial Secretary would decide.
(iii) The Agricultural Rural Marketing Board
The Maize Control Board operated an organisation known
as the African Rural Buying Organisation for purposes of
192transporting African maize to their depots. This
organi ation operated in the Central and Southern Provinces
and was financed by levies for handling and transport, and
in the event of a deficit, the deficit was met by the
193African Farming Improvement Fund for both areas. When
the MCB was absorbed by the Federal Grain Marketing Board,
the Rural Buying Organisation was operated until 1960 by the
new Federal Board on behalf of the African Farming
Improvement Funds. In June 1960, the Department of
Co-operative and African Marketing of the Ministry of
African Agriculture took over the running of the Rural
Buying Organisation and renamed it the African Rural
Marketing Service and continued to administer it on behalf
193of the two improvement funds. The area of operation of
this Service was, therefore, limited to the areas served by
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the two funds, the Central and the Southern Provinces. By 
1962, there were suggestions that the operations of the 
Rural Marketing Service be separated from the two funds and 
a separate statutory body formed in its place. In July 
1964, three months before the date set for political 
independence, the government established the Agricultural 
Rural Marketing Board (ARMB), although the Service continued 
to operate in some rural parts of Zambia until March 1965
when the new Board decided to take over the entire
. . . 194responsibility.
(iv) Co-operative Marketing Unions
On the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland in 1953, marketing in both Northern and Southern
Rhodesia became the responsibility of the Federal
Government. The Federal Legislative List (the list of
matters with respect to which the Federal Government had
sole power to legislate), included the distribution,
disposal, purchase and sale of such commodities as the
195Governor-General could specify. By the Grain Marketing
196Act, the Federal Grain Marketing Board was established to
take possession of any controlled product and ensure the
orderly marketing of controlled products within any
197prescribed area. The Board was empowered to market both
European and African produced grain, but not many Africans 
were in a position to deliver their grain to the depots of 
the Board, because, unlike their European counterparts, who
had the means of transportation, the African farmers did
198 •not. In the main, therefore, Africans, particularly in
the Eastern Province, had to rely on Co-operative Marketing
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Unions for the marketing of their produce. Although there
were a number of marketing co-operatives, only in two
provinces were co-operatives significant and these were the
Eastern and Southern Provinces.
In the Eastern Province, tobacco, groundnuts and cotton
created the impetus in organising marketing co-operatives.
From an experiment begun in 1938 by the Department of
Agriculture, the Petauke African Tobacco Growers'
Co-operative was formed in 1948. Prior to the formation of
this co-operative, and the Petauke African Producers
Co-operative Society (dealing mainly in groundnuts), the
marketing of small surpluses was organised by the Department
of Agriculture. But from 1948, these two co-operatives
operated rural buying stations, and transported produce from
buying stations to depots from which they were dispatched to
199various consumers.
With increased agricultural development, the number of
primary co-operative marketing societies increased by 1952
to as many as thirty in the Petauke area.200 It was then
considered beneficial to the members of these societies if
they could be organised into one organisation, and in the
same year the Petauke Co-operative Marketing Union was 
201formed. It was to market produce in the Petauke and
Katete areas, but in 1956, a separate organisation, the 
Katete Co-operative Marketing Union, was formed to take care 
of its own district.
In the Chipata and Lundazi areas, the Alimi 
Co-operative Union was registered in 1956, but it was not as
well organised as the Petauke Co-operative Marketing
202 .Union. All these unions were loosely united into the
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Eastern Province Co-operative Marketing Association in 
1958.203
In the Southern Province, prior to the development of
marketing co-operatives, African farmers sold their surplus
maize in the Namwala area of Southern Province to traders
buying on behalf of the Maize Control Board. In 1951, four
primary producer co-operative marketing societies joined
together to form the Namwala Co-operative Marketing Union,
. . 204to control and co-ordinate marketing facilitites. By
1955 this union was the largest African-owned and -managed
business in Northern Rhodesia, although its interest was
205principally restricted to maize. In the same province,
the Southern Province Co-operative Marketing Union was 
established in 1960 to serve Choma and Kalomo districts.
Elsewhere marketing co-operatives were established, for 
instance in the Central and Northern Provinces, but they 
were not as successful as those in the Eastern and Southern 
Provinceswhich are still in business today.
(v) The Search for an Overall Marketing Policy
Discussion of marketing policy has been reserved until 
the end because statutory marketing boards and co-operative 
marketing unions had already become operative by the time 
serious consideration was made regarding overall marketing 
policy.
1. The Report of the East African Royal Commission
The choice colonial governments had to make was between 
adopting a laissez faire policy which would lead to the 
encouragement of private enterprise or establish statutory
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marketing boards responsible for marketing and pricing of
agricultural produce. While not wanting to see all
government price-support policies abandoned, the Commission
advocated a far greater reliance on private enterprise. The
Commission entertained the view that government—controlled
marketing was a policy based on a misconception - that there
was a conflict of interest between the trader and the
producer, and that it was therefore necessary to protect the
latter from the former. In the Commission's own words:
"In our opinion, this view is founded on a 
misapprehension of the functions of the 
ordinary marketing system. In particular, it 
fails to recognise the mutual dependence of 
producers and consumers which is effected 
through the price mechanism of the market and 
by the activities of specialised traders in 
developing new consumer wants and new markets 
for producers."206
The Commission also stressed the point that the basic
function of a marketing system was not merely the physical
movement of goods from the producer to the consumer, but
also the provision of a flexible mechanism for the
registration of prices whereby production and consumption
. , 207are equated.
These classical capitalist arguments were, however, 
rejected by governments of the East African territories 
affected. It was argued that government-controlled 
marketing was necessary "to foster the relatively weak and 
immature economy of the country, which is based on 
agriculture, and to cushion it to some extent from undue 
shocks, whether due to changes in overseas markets or to 
internal causes such as droughts, locusts, diseases, 
etc."208
The findings of the Commission and the response to
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their recommendations has been mentioned, although they did 
not have any direct bearing on policy in Northern Rhodesia 
because they did not escape the attention of policy makers 
in the country.
2. The Rural Economic Development Working Party
In its report published in 1961, the Working Party
discussed the relative advantages and disadvantages of
various approaches to marketing, namely (i) private
enterprise? (ii) government direct purchase schemes? (iii)
co-operative marketing unions, and (iv) government statutory
boards. The Working Party while acknowledging some
advantages of private enterprise (same as pointed out by the
Royal Commission), observed that there was the danger that
buyers would confine their operations to the areas where
their profits were highest and transport costs were minimal,
. . . 209thus leaving remoter areas without marketing facilities.
All in all, the Working Party recommended some element of 
control exercised through statutory boards. It was not 
necessary, the Working Party argued, that statutory boards 
should provide all the marketing facilities: "where private 
enterprise, co-operative societies or any other agencies can 
perform the primary marketing functions efficiently, they
can and should be employed under the umbrella of the
210 . . statutory board”. This suggestion would enable private
traders and co-operatives to function but only in the
capacity of agents of a statutory board. Although a period
in excess of twenty-five years has elasped since the idea
was proposed by the Working Party, the present government is
in the process of implementing a marketing arrangement on
the same pattern.
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(g) Summary of Changes over the Colonial Period
The colonial period saw the emergence of a dual system 
of land tenure; the mitigation of the evils created by the 
policy of native reserves by the policy of native trust 
land; a small but increasingly growing nucleus of African 
farmers under the African Improved Farmer Scheme and the 
Peasant Farming Scheme; a number of statutory marketing 
boards; and co-operative marketing unions. Customary land 
tenure continued to apply in Reserves and Trust Land in 
matters affecting Africans, while leases in Reserves and 
occupancy licences in Trust Land were issued to non-Africans 
who held land for the limited estates prescribed in the 
relevant Orders. Towards the close of the period a definite 
effort was made to institute adjudication of title measures 
to individualise land ownership. Although only one area was 
declared by the close of the period and the statute under 
which this measure was meant to be operative was repealed in 
the post-independence era, a process akin to adjudication 
has been continued under the Reserves and Trust Land Orders.
In the area of agricultural credit under the schemes 
the two most important funds established - the Southern 
Province African Farming Improvement Fund (SPAFIF) and the 
Eastern Province African Farming Improvement Fund (EPAFIF) 
are still in operation in their respective provinces 
although their importance is now minimal on account of the 
operation of other credit facilities established by the 
government. With marketing too, the two leading
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co-operative marketing unions, the SPMCU for the Southern 
Province, the EPCMU (now known as Eastern Co-operative Union 
- ECU), for the Eastern Province have been in operation and 
have in fact gained in importance on account of the problems 
which have plagued the main statutory marketing body, the 
National Agricultural Marketing Board.
3. Alienated Land
The alienated land comprised the Crown Land which was 
granted to European settlers. English land tenure applied 
to Alienated Land to the extent to which English law was 
formerly adopted under the reception statutes discussed in 
connection with sources of law. Having opted for English 
land tenure, the choice between freehold and leasehold was 
to haunt the colonial government until the close of the 
colonial era. The dilemma was how to encourage European 
farmers on Crown Land by offering them a system of tenure 
that offered maximum security but at the same time retain, 
in government hands, control over land utilization through 
the prescription of development covenants to ensure land 
development.
(a) Freehold versus Leasehold
Prior to the establishment of colonial rule, the 
British South Africa Company favoured freehold estates 
preceded by a leasehold period which could be converted to
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freehold upon fulfilment of development conditions.
Stanley, with his South African background, was a forceful
advocate of freehold tenure. The Europeans, he argued,
should be able:
"to make in Northern Rhodesia a permanent home 
for themselves and their children, and to 
become an integral part of the local 
population, socially superior to the natives, 
politically dominant, no doubt, but conscious 
of a more than temporary association with the 
country and all its inhabitants and obliged 
therefore, in the long run by the logic of 
facts to recognise the economic 
interdependence of the two races."211
He felt that it was inadvisable to follow the example of
Tanganyika where leasehold tenure had been introduced; that
this was done on the basis that Tanganyika was essentially
an "African" country in which European presence was merely
temporary. Such a system, he argued, would encourage the
European to exploit adversely the land as fast as he could
before returning home. He also argued that under a
leasehold system, settlers would borrow money on less
advantageous terms than if they could offer freehold as
security. He believed that permanent settlers would,
moreover, take a much more sympathetic view of Africans than
"birds of passage":
"the general attitude of the settlers in 
Northern Rhodesia towards proposals for the 
education of the native and his moral and 
material betterment need not fear comparison 
with the attitude in other East AFrican 
territories".212
The explanation, as Gann puts it, was to be found in the
213"psychological factor of security".
These views found favour with Sir Edward Grigg, then 
Governor of Kenya, but were unpopular with Sir Donald 
Cameron, Governor of Tanganyika and Sir James Maxwell,
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214Stanley's successor as Governor of Northern Rhodesia.
Maxwell argued that freehold tenure was opposed to the needs
of agricultural development, and would enable Europeans to
sell their farms in Crown Land to Africans, a practice which
would defeat the policy of separating African from European
land. Similar points were raised against the freehold
system in the Legislative Council. An additional reason
given was that freehold would encourage land speculators to
buy properties on easy terms for the purpose of getting an
unearned increment from improvements that were being made on
other adjacent farms. The more popular argument, however,
was that alienation of large areas in freehold led to loss
of governmental control which was particularly undesirable
in a country where European settlement was not yet
widespread, and where speculation was becoming rampant. In
North-Western Rhodesia, two million acres alienated to big
companies were not being utilised, presumably the companies
215held on to them for speculation purposes. Maxwell's
policy, although bitterly opposed, finally won the day in 
the Legislative Council in 1943. Nevertheless a compromise 
was reached by which the new policy of leaseholds would not 
apply to land which had already been alienated in freehold, 
but would apply to future grants of Crown Land.
(b) Land Control and Development
"We are unanimously agreed that land should be 
regarded as a national asset which it is the 
duty of government to protect, exercising 
control over its transfer and use and 
particularly guarding against its misuse.
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The above quotation which summarises the raison d*etre of
land control was used by the Land Tenure Committee of 1943
to support its case in favour of leaseholds. The Committee
further pointed out that three-quarters of a million acres
of alienated land was undeveloped, while in some places,
there was so much misuse that its destruction was only a
matter of time.
It was one thing to urge for some measure of land
control and another to determine what form that control must
take. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that
leaseholds were being granted in respect of agricultural
land situated away from the line of rail under conditions
meant to encourage land development. The most important of
these conditions, so far as land development is concerned,
was that the lessee, except with the consent of the Crown
was to use the land for agricultural purposes, to carry out
bona fide farming operations and have regard to principles
of good husbandry; to complete the minimum improvements set
out in a schedule within the specified period? not to make
any dealings in the land without the consent of the Crown?
and not to abandon the land or permit it to remain
unproductive for a period in excess of three years without
217the consent of the Crown.
In these conditions, however, many farms
remained undeveloped. The problem lay in the inefficient
system of monitoring compliance with development conditions.
As the Select Committee on the Constitution and Terms of
Reference of the Land Board reported, the inspection of
218farms was inadequate. Failure to carry out regular farm
inspections was attributed to manpower constraints. The
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Committee pointed out that since farm inspections were 
undertaken by one land settlement officer who was also 
required to see that all loans granted by the Land Board 
were being spent on the projects for which they had been 
made, there was a need to increase the establishment of the 
Land Board by increasing the number of settlement officers 
to three.219
The prescription of development conditions in leases 
was not the only method of ensuring the development of 
agricultural land. The process of selection of tenants, the 
control of dealings in land, and the charging of rent for 
undeveloped land were also used. One might also add the law 
regarding compensation for improvements made to the land by 
the tenant could have had the effect of encouraging the 
tenant. The impact of these measures was, however, limited 
because their application was restricted to leasehold farms 
which in 1954 constituted less than half of all available 
agricultural land for alienation to European farmers.
(i) Selection of Tenants
The process of selection was an important initial step
to achieve two things - first that the applicant for land
was genuinely interested in farming and, second, that he was
in a position to raise the initial capital necessary to
start farming operations. In 1946 the Land Board was
created as a separate administrative section of the Lands 
220Department. Its duty was mainly to promote new
settlement, but the Land Board played a very important role
in shaping much of the criteria taken into account in the
221allocation of land and control of transfers of land. The
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initial policies are clearly stated in the Land Board's
222annual report of 1950. With respect to applicants who
were resident abroad, the Board required that such
applicants should clearly indicate that they intended to
come and farm in person, and that they were prepared to
liquidate sufficient of their assets to secure adequate
development of their land. The Board also decided that they
were not prepared to hold land for applicants outside the
country unless they were convinced that the applicants
intended to come and take up farming personally, and the
maximum period the Board would hold such land was fixed at 
223one month. Later m  the year, it became a matter of
principle that, as far as possible, all applicants resident
224abroad should be interviewed. With respect to residents,
the most important requirement was that they should satisfy
the Board that they were genuinely interested in farming.
The Board did not insist that they should personally carry
out farming operations, in fact, "no objection would be
raised to the land being farmed through a satisfactory
225manager in the preliminary development stage". In
addition to the above, the Land Board required to be
satisfied, before granting a lease, that the applicant has
sufficient capital, knowledge, and experience to be capable
of using the land beneficially. There was also a capital
requirement of three thousand pounds, but suitable
applicants in possession of at least one and a half thousand
pounds were accepted, and a loan equal to the minimum
226capital was advanced to new settlers. After May 1946,
the Land Board was obliged to reject many applications which 
were not supported by the necessary qualifications or
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227farming experience. The following year the Board evolved
a rule to prevent land accumulation. Where an established
farmer who was in a position to purchase freehold land in
the open market, or who had not fully developed his holdings
applied for land which the Board considered suitable for new
settlement, he was informed that he would have to wait until
228the demand from those who had none abated. Most of these
rules were concretised in the Agricultural Lands Ordinances 
of 1956 and 1960 , discussed below.
(ii) Proposals for Taxation of Undeveloped Land
Prior to the Agricultural Lands Ordinances, the
possibility of introducing a tax on undeveloped land was
raised by the Governor himself. On his tour of Southern
Province in 1959, the Governor, Sir Arthur Benson,
discovered that fifty-seven farms were unoccupied and hence
"idle". In his minute addressed to the Secretary for Lands,
the Governor had additional reasons to account for the
231urgent need for land control. The Governor feared that
the farms would, in time, be occupied by squatters if they
were not put into production. He also argued that, apart
from making conservation measures more difficult, the sight
of so many large and vacant lands to the Africans who were
suffering from overcrowding, might trigger them into
creating serious political difficulties. In the light of
the foregoing, the Governor said:
"It seems to me that we ought to go very 
carefully into the question whether we ought 
not to introduce a fairly heavy 'unoccupied 
land tax"'.232
This suggestion was not a novel one in British colonies at
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the time. Some form or other of taxation existed in British
Columbia, South Africa, Australia, and Southern Rhodesia,
233with varying degrees of success. Although it was
generally believed that a tax on undeveloped land was
unnecessary whenever there were covenants in the grant to
the effect that the land should be beneficially used,234
this measure could, additionally, be used as a source of 
235revenue , after all, as the Governor pointed out, absentee 
owners were receiving benefits arising from conservation 
measures being undertaken by the government and adjacent 
farmers, apart from benefitting from the rise in land values
23 6resulting from improvements being made by other farmers.
There was considerable opposition within the Lands
Department to introduction of a land tax. Perhaps the time
was inopportune as such taxation had by then been abandoned
in Southern Rhodesia on the grounds inter alia, that it was
impracticable to enforce. The issue resolved itself to one
of the extent to which government's interference in private
affairs could be justified by the public interest. It was
argued by the secretary to the Agricultural Lands Board that
there was no shortage of agricultural land in the territory,
but a shortage of people with adequate capital to develop
it. This assertion was not supported by any evidence, but
it is clear that from 1954 the demand for farms,
particularly undeveloped farms, had fallen. Hence there
were few alienations of Crown Land farms and lessees who
wished to assign their farms are said to have had
"considerable difficulty in finding purchasers sufficiently
well qualified as regards capital and farming experience" to
237take over the land. Such a fall m  demand for land lent
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support to the secretary's argument that taxation, by 
itself, could not bring the land into production. As the 
argument went, taxation could have a marginal effect in some 
cases but there was a probability that a heavy land tax 
would merely result in the accumulation of a large debt owed 
by the landholder to the government, the liquidation of
which would vest the land in the government but the
government would also have the same problem of how to
, .. 238develop it.
Since there was little the government could do to bring 
unoccupied land into production, the government's only role 
was to prevent damage to natural resources on unoccupied 
land and to prevent nuisance from unoccupied land to
adjacent occupied land, and it was argued that the Natural
239 . . 240Resources Ordinance, the Noxious Weeds Ordinance, and
241the Control of Bush Fires Ordinance provided adequate
statutory control. The idea of an unoccupied land tax, thus
proved unpopular, was to surface under the guise of a rent
for undeveloped land. The Agricultural Lands Ordinances
242 243empowered the Minister to make regulations /rules to 
provide for the annual rent. The Minister used this power 
to peg the annual rent to the value of undeveloped land.
(iii) The Agricultural Lands Ordinance
The Agricultural Lands Ordinances sought to achieve two
objectives. The first and foremost was to afford tenants an
244opportunity to convert their leaseholds into freeholds.
The second was, as far as possible, to ensure that 
agricultural land was adequately developed by making the 
grant of a freehold interest dependent on fulfilment of
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specified minimum development goals. The Ordinances were
roundly welcomed by farmers who had, relentlessly been
245striving for freehold. The 1956 Ordinance was soon found
to be inadequate because it did not vest sufficient
decision-making power in the Agricultural Lands Board it
created. The government decided that powers of
decision-making in matters affecting individual applicants
for land could be better placed directly under the Board, so
constituted as to have a majority of non-governmental
officials who would provide knowledge and experience, both
of the practical side of farming, and of the numerous
246technical and administrative problems concerned. The
necessary changes were effected by passing another
Agricultural Lands Ordinance in 1960 and repealing the 
247previous one.
1. Establishment of the Agricultural Lands Board
Section four of the Ordinance established the
Agricultural Lands Board whose membership was, a Chairman,
who was to be a non-governmental officer appointed by the
Governor? three government officials, also appointed by the
Governor; two persons selected by the Governor from a panel
of not more than four names nominated by the Northern
248Council of the Rhodesia National Farmers' Union ? and such 
additional members, not exceeding two, appointed by the 
Governor in his discretion, provided that the Board was not 
to be so constituted as to have a majority of government or 
public officers. Members of the Legislative Council were 
barred from appointment to the Board. Although there was no 
indication of which government officers were eligible, it
became established that the Commissioner of Lands, the 
Director of Surveys and the Director of Agriculture were 
members.
Under section 8(1) the functions of the Board were 
stated to be as follows:
a) to keep under review the use that is 
being made by the Crown of Crown Land 
outside urban and peri-urban areas and to 
make such recommendations to the Minister 
thereon as it may deem fit?
b) to carry out such other duties in 
relation to the alienation of Crown Land 
outside urban and peri-urban areas as the 
governor may, on the recommendation of 
the Minister, place upon the Board? and,
c) to keep under review the general 
operation of this Ordinance and to make 
such recommendations to the Minister 
thereon, as it may deem fit.
2. Alienation of Land
Land control under the Agricultural Lands Ordinance was 
effected through the rules governing selection of those to 
whom land was to be alienated. Under section ten, the 
Governor was empowered to declare any area, by notice in the 
gazette, as falling under the Ordinance. Following such 
declaration, the Board was required to prepare allotment 
plans showing boundaries of each economic unit which would 
then be available for allocation to individual applicants. 
Landholders of leasehold property could also apply to have 
their leaseholds covered by the Ordinance. When allotment 
plans were approved by the Minister, the Board inserted a 
notice in the Gazette and in at least one newspaper 
published in the country. The notice called upon the 
members of the public to make applications in respect of 
vacant land for the parcels of land included in the
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allotment plan.
The Ordinance provided the Board with specific 
considerations to be taken into account in determining 
applications for land. Some of these criteria had been 
shaped earlier by the Land Board, and because of their 
significance in ensuring that only the required calibre of 
applicants were picked, they are quoted in full. Section 
17(2) reads: "In consideration of applications for holdings
the Board shall have regard to -
a) any direction of general policy given to 
it by the Minister;
b) the age of the applicant?
c) the character of the applicant;
d) whether the applicant is willing to make 
a declaration affirming his intention 
personally to occupy the holding and to 
work and develop it exclusively for the 
benefit of himself and the members of his 
family, if any?
e) whether the applicant possesses the 
capital necessary to ensure the 
beneficial occupation of the holding;
f) whether the applicant possesses the 
qualifications necessary for beneficial 
occupation of the holding? and,
g) any other facts which, in the opinion of 
the Board, are relevant to the individual 
application or to the holding."
From the records available at the Lands Department, there
does not seem to have been any directions from the Minister
regarding general policy, otherwise the rest of the criteria
had already been in use by the Lands Board prior to the
Ordinance. One ironical departure from the Land Board's
practice which had been firmly established was the omission
of a provision by which, in lieu of personal occupation and
in some cases extensive farming experience, the landholder
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was permitted by the Board to engage a farm manager whom
249they approved of. The Agricultural Lands Ordinance was
in force for too short a time to provide a fair assessment 
of whether it was well suited to promote agricultural 
development. In the past twenty years, the criteria for 
selection of applicants have undergone the test of time and 
changing circumstances to provide a fair assessment of their 
importance. In the post-independence period, problems of 
interpretation have arisen regarding, particularly, how much 
capital, or qualification should be demanded. The question 
of residence or non-residence in the territory has become 
one of citizenship, and the emergence of farming 
corporations has complicated the application of these 
criteria. Discussion of how the post-independence 
Agricultural Lands Board has applied these criteria is 
contained in Chapter Two, but it may be pointed out at this 
stage that the extent to which they are strictly applied 
must depend on the overall farming scene in the country, 
particularly, the demand for farm land and the availability 
of institutional credit.
3. Occupation of Holdings
One of the most important goals the Ordinance sought to
achieve was the promotion of agricultural development, at
250least, during the leasehold term of thirty years.
Section 21(5) provided that the lessee should use his 
holding primarily for agricultural and ancillary purposes, 
and for the personal residence of himself, his family and 
necessary staff, and "for no other purpose save with the 
prior consent of the Crown". This provision was nothing
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new, the leases granted prior to the Ordinance had always
insisted that the farmland must be used for agricultural 
251purposes only. Section 21(1) reads:
"Every lessee shall take up eff€§:ive personal 
residence on his holding within six months 
after the date of commencement of his lease or 
within such longer period as may be approved 
by the Board, and shall beneficially occupy 
his holding.
(2) Beneficial occupation in respect of any 
holding shall mean -
(a) from the date of taking up effective 
personal residence as required by 
subsection (1) of this section -
(i) in the case of an individual 
lessee personal residence on the 
holding, and in the case of a 
company, personal residence on the 
holding by a manager who is in 
charge of farming operations and 
who is approved for that purpose 
by the Board;
(ii) the practice of sound methods of 
good husbandry;
(iii) the proper care and maintenance of 
all improvements effected on the 
holding;
(b) before the expiration of a period of three 
years after the date of the lessee taking 
up effective personal residence as 
required by subsection (1) of this 
section.
(i) the annual cultivation of such 
proportion of the area of the 
holding as may be laid down by the 
Board;
(ii) the maintenance of stock as laid 
down by the Board;
(iii) the provision for the numbers of 
stock maintained under the 
provisions of sub-paragraph (ii) of 
this paragraph of dipping or stock 
spraying facilities, paddock fencing 
or ring fencing and water supplies 
in each case considered adequate by 
the Board;
(iv) the provision of a habitable house 
and such farm buildings as may be 
reasonably necessary for the 
purposes of the proper working of 
the holding;
(v) the provision2pf permanent 
improvements, whether required by 
or under the preceding provisions of
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this section or not, valued by the 
Board at not less than such sum as 
may have been laid down by the 
Board."
The provisions relating to beneficial occupation have been
reproduced in full because they are the most important in
relation to farm development and they have not been amended
after independence.
It was a difficult task for the Agricultural Lands
Board to see to it that these provisions were complied with
despite the fact that the number of farms declared to
fall under the Ordinance were fewer than those which did
not. The Lands Department enforced compliance through its
branches in the Eastern, Central and Southern Provinces in
all of which a limited number of personnel undertook farm
inspections for the purpose. But in the remaining five
provinces, which had neither the branches nor resident farm
inspectors, little was done to investigate the state of
development of the farms, until the landholder himself made
an application to exercise his option to purchase, a
253pre-requisite to the grant of freehold title.
4. Restraint on Alienation
A lessee was enjoined from assigning, sub-letting, 
mortgaging, charging or creating any interest in land or 
attempting to do any of the above or entering into any
partnership without the prior written consent of the
254 . . . .Crown. An application for consent had to be m  writing
and submitted to the Board for its approval. A
contravention of the provisions regarding consent being
obtained prior to the transfer of interests in land was to
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be regarded as a failure to comply with a requirement of the
Ordinance, and such a failure, like a failure to fulfil any
of the terms or conditions of the lease, empowered the Board
to serve a notice setting a period within which the lessee
255must remedy the breach. On the failure to comply with
the notice, the Crown was empowered to re-enter and thus 
determine the lease. Where consent was sought, the
Board, in exercising its power to approve or withhold 
consent, applied the same criteria in section 17 in 
determining the suitability for farming of the proposed 
assignee or sub lessee.
5. Compensation
The terms on which compensation may be paid to a tenant 
in respect of improvements may encourage or discourage the 
tenant from improving or developing his land. In this 
respect the Agricultural Lands Ordinance, while requiring 
the lessee to develop his land to the prescribed standard, 
was less reassuring as to compensation. Section 22(1) 
stated that on the determination of the lease by effluxion 
of time no compensation was payable in respect of buildings 
or improvements effected on his holding. It is only under a 
proviso to this subsection that the Minister could, on the 
recommendation of the Board, make an ex gratia payment to a 
lessee for the improvements on the land and only if the 
lessee had not failed "substantially to comply with the 
provisions” of the Ordinance. The amount of compensation 
was to reflect the difference between the sum received from 
the disposal of the holding and the administrative cost. At 
the same time, there was no duty requiring the Crown to
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dispose of the holding. Under subsection 2 in determining
whether or not to recommend to the Minister to make an ex
gratia payment, the Board was required to have regard to -
Ma) the value of the buildings or
improvements concerned and the date of 
the termination of the lease;
b) the economic state of the agricultural 
industry in the area in which the holding 
is situate at that date;
c) the value of any payments made from 
public funds towards the cost of 
permanent improvements on the holding.”
It is clear from the debate preceding the Agricultural
Lands Ordinance, 1956 that the making of payment of
compensation discretionary on the part of the Minister was
to save the government from being subjected to too many
claims, but there was concern that injustice should not be
caused by adopting the ex gratia system. As Mr. L. Tucker
put it:
"In other words, we want to be quite certain 
that somebody does not lose his rights for 
some minor breaches of the regulations and end 
up by losing everything that he has put into 
the land in the way of improvements without 
some form of recompense.”257
A similar anxiety was also expressed by Mr. J. Gaunt. It
was in response to such protestations that the government
made ex gratia payment available to every lessee who had
"not failed, substantially, to comply with the provisions"
of the Ordinance.
Instead of accepting compensation, the lessee could opt
for the right to remove all the improvements to the land
made at his own expense, and the Board was empowered to
recommend to the Minister that the lessee should have and
exercise this right so long as such exercise did not
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258materially damage the land. In spite of these provisions,
it would appear that compensation was not meant to be a 
factor which should induce farmers to develop their farms.
It appears the government was more interested in the person
who exercised the right to purchase and obtained a Crown
259 .grant, thus removing himself from the application of
development requirements. Once a Crown grant was made,
there was little the government could do to ensure that the
fee simple owner maintained the developments he had effected
during the leasehold period. There was, however, the
possibility that the government could compulsorily acquire
the land if it was abandoned.
6 . Abandonment and Compulsory Acquisition
To forestall deterioration of the land arising from 
abandonment, the Ordinance provided for a machinery by which 
the government could recover the land. The procedure for 
compulsory acquisition under the Ordinance was elaborate and 
deleterious, so much so that there is no record of the 
provisions having been used. First the Ordinance provided a 
definition of abandonment. Land was deemed to be abandoned 
if the owner either failed for a period exceeding three 
years, to maintain occupation of the land in person or 
through a tenant or manager, or failed to maintain on the 
land, to the satisfaction of the Board, a reasonable 
standard of agricultural production having regard to the 
character, extent and situation of the land and the general 
level of agricultural production being maintained on 
agricultural holdings of similar character in the 
neighbourhood.260
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In the event of abandonment, the Board could give
notice of the fact to the landowner and order him to
261reoccupy within, at least, twelve months. The notice was
to clearly indicate the steps that must be taken by the land
owner to comply with it. There was provision enabling the
landowner to appeal to the Minister against the notice,
whereupon the Minister was required to appoint three persons
(one of whom should have legal qualifications) as 
262referees. The land owner had a right to be heard by the
referees who were to report to the Minister informing him of
263their findings. The Minister could, after receiving the
report of the referees, decide whether the notice should 
stand or be withdrawn. Where the notice had been given to a 
landholder, it was incumbent on the Board to make an offer 
of compensation within six months from the date of expiry of 
the notice. If no offer had been made, the intention to 
acquire was deemed to have been abandoned. Disagreements as 
to the amount of compensation were to be settled by the High 
Court in the same manner as other disputes under the Public 
Lands Acquisition Ordinance, cap 87. It was also provided 
that in determining the valuation of the land the High Court 
was to have regard "only to its value as agricultural land
including the value of permanent improvements effected
264 . .thereon for farming purposes". These provisions were
rather cumbersome and time-consuming. There was no
provision prescribing the minimum period within which the
Minister was to appoint referees, or indeed the period
within which referees were to report. The process could
continue for so long as to enable the landowner to dispose
of it (which he could do since there was no prohibition) to
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any person of his choice, on terms quite different from
those the High Court was to take into account when
determining the value.
The number of farms declared to fall under the
Ordinance (indicated in the Schedule to the Agricultural 
265Lands Act ) taken together constitute a small part of
alienated agricultural land. Nevertheless, given the
brevity, the Ordinance was in force prior to independence,
its application was relatively extensive. A recurring
question relates to the criteria used by the government in
determining which farms should be declared and which should
not. The Ordinance is silent on this, but it has been
suggested that the areas declared were those in respect of
which the government had provided some services such as
2 66conservation work and access routes to markets.
An assessment of the impact of land control measures 
during the colonial period is practically difficult to make. 
Except for the denial of the right to compensation, the 
measures put in hand to ensure land development, coupled 
with adequate inspection of farms, would have improved the 
state of the farms falling under the Ordinance. The impact 
would however have been slight because of (1) the 
restriction of the application of the Ordinance to lands 
under leasehold; (2) the weaknesses in the provisions 
relating to abandonment; and (3) manpower constraints to 
enforce compliance with development conditions.
(c) Provision of Credit
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(i) Pre-1946
Agricultural credit was indispensable to the early
settlers who lacked both capital and, in some cases, farming
experience. The absence of initial loans for the purchase
and the clearance of land could have discouraged settlement.
As early as 1934, an Agricultural Loans Board was
established with a capital of 1 2 4,000. This institution had
a short life, its losses were written off in 1949 and the
one loan remaining on its books was handed over to the Land
267Board in the same year. Some loans were given by
commercial banks, but their insistence on first mortgages
reduced their popularity. Other bodies which helped were
the African Labour Corps and the Department of Water
268Development and Irrigation, but there was a need for a 
body clearly responsible for the grant of agricultural 
credit.
(ii) The Land Board and Credit
In 1946 the Land Board was created for two purposes - 
to administer agricultural land and to provide credit to 
farmers. The Land Board offered three kinds of loans. For 
new settlers the Board could advance a loan equal to the 
value of the amount the settler himself was prepared to 
invest into the farm, with the maximum fixed at £l,500. No 
short-term loans were granted by the Board in the early 
stages, but an established farmer could secure a medium term 
loan repayable within three years, on the security of a 
first mortgage on his farm. Long term or development loans, 
but for restricted purposes only, were granted. These 
purposes were ordinarily in the nature of long term
102
investments such as irrigation, farm buildings and
improvements, essential machinery, the purchase of land and
269the promotion of agricultural industries.
The Select Committee appointed on the 10th January 1950
to review the constitution and terms of reference of the
Land Board, particularly, with regard to loan facilities
made recommendations which strengthened the position of the 
270Land Board. The Committee recommended that
responsibility for all loans must rest with the Land Board 
and that no government department should involve itself in 
loan grants. The argument was that the multiplicity of loan 
agencies resulted in excessive indebtedness which was 
difficult to prevent in the absence of knowledge of the 
total sum of loans owed by an applicant. The Committee 
recommended that total indebtedness per farmer, so far as 
the Land Board was concerned, should not exceed £3,750 for 
all forms of credit.
On new settlement loans, the Committee recommended that 
the maximum figure should be increased to £2 ,000, so long as 
the farmer also invested an equal sum of money into his 
farm. This increase was not to be applied country-wide, 
however. In the tobacco growing areas of Eastern Province, 
initial loans had always been restricted to JlOOO and the 
Committee felt that bearing in mind that tobacco growing was 
cheaper and the financial return faster than mixed farming, 
the figure should not be altered. On medium term loans the 
Committee deprecated the insistence on first mortgages, 
particularly where only small amounts were needed. It 
recommended that a medium term loan of £750 should be 
granted to a farmer mainly for the purchase of farm
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implements, not necessarily on the security of a first 
mortgage, but alternatively, on the security of a bill of 
sale, or stop orders on successive crops, or promissory 
notes. The loans were to be repayable in three years 
subject to extension of period at the discretion of the 
Board for a further two years. The Committee also 
recommended the increase of the long term loans from £.2,000 
to £2,500.
The most important new forms of loans recommended by 
the Committee were short-term loans and loans for the 
purchase of freehold land. The Committee recommended that 
short-term loans, which were then being given by the African 
Labour Corps and the Department of Water Development whose 
loan functions were to cease, should be granted, either by 
government or the commercial banks, to co-operative 
societies for tWir members. But in respect of non-members of 
the farming co-operative societies, the Land Board should 
grant short-term loans of up to £500 to pay for labour and 
inputs on the security of a stop order against the sale of 
the farmer's planted crop. With regard to its 
recommendation for loans for the purchase of freehold land, 
the Committee felt that this was only to be a temporary 
measure, pending the establishment of a Land Bank. The 
Committee felt that such loans were necessary in order to 
afford financial assistance to intending settlers to develop 
freehold areas along the line of rail, some of which were 
lying idle.
By the end of 1952 the Land Board was owed over 
jt?42,000. This included the 1952 repayment instalments 
carried over from 1951 and a sum representing the
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outstanding interest at the end of the year. The 1951-52 
season was a particularly bad one owing to excessive rains. 
Government made special flood loans to farmers who, through 
no fault of their own, had incurred losses. A special 
committee comprising members of the Loans Committee of the 
Land Board and the representatives of farmers' associations
considered applications for flood loans and approved 132
C 272applicants for loans, totalling £169,610.
One important piece of legislation bearing on
agricultural credit during this time was the Farmers' Stop
Order Ordinance of 1950. The Select Committee disclosed in
its report that there was some demand, particularly, one
would assume, from lenders, that there must be a system for
the registration and publication of stop orders. Prior to
the Ordinance, therefore, stop orders were constantly used
without adequate protection for lenders in terms of priority
and even the knowledge that the farmer had executed a stop
order in favour of other financial institutions. The
Committee felt that there was no need to publish stop orders
in the government gazette, but did recommend that there be
legislation making it compulsory to have stop orders
registered with the Land Board, and such information
obtainable by anyone interested on payment of a search fee.
273The Farmers' Stop Order Ordinance of 1950 protected 
lenders by providing for the registration of Stop Orders, 
rendering stop orders null and void if not registered, and 
by making them rank in terms of priority according to the 
date of registration.
(iii) The Land and Agricultural Bank
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The Land and Agricultural Bank took over from the Land
Board which had had to cope both with the provision of loans
through its Loans Committee, and the supervision of
agricultural land through the Alienation Committee. The
Land Bank, which was established under the Land and
274Agricultural Bank Ordinance followed the reports of two
Select Committees of the Legislative Council. The first
committee headed by Mr. H. McDowell reported on the 1st 
275.June, 1951. The reports included draft legislation
concerning the constitution and operation of the Bank. In
•June, 1952 the Legislative Council considered a Bill
containing the recommendations of this committee but decided
to appoint a further select committee to re-examine the
matter. The report of the second committee was considered
and adopted during the fourth session of the 9th Legislative
Council and the Land Bank Ordinance became law on the 25th
276<pf October 1952. On the commencement of business on the
1st of August 1953, the Bank took over the loans and
277interest of the Land Board. It also took over the
securities held for these loans and discovered that in a 
number of cases such securities, although acceptable to the
Land Board under its terms of reference, were unsatisfactory
278from the Bank's standpoint.
Section 3 established the Land Bank as a body corporate
with perpetual succession and a common seal. The operation
of the Bank was put under a Board consisting of not less
than five nor more than seven members (later increased to
twelve), all of whom were appointed by the
279Governor-in-Council. Apart from monies given to it by
government, the Bank was empowered to raise funds through
1106
discounting with other banks? bills of exchange of
co-operative agricultural societies? overdrafts from other
banks? receiving money on deposit? and any other method
280which the Secretary for Finance might approve.
The business of the Bank was to lend money to farmers
to be used for the purchase, development and improvement of
land? and to lend to agricultural co-operatives, and
farmers' associations or unions for any purpose which, in
the opinion of the Bank, was likely to further the interests
281of the farming industry.
The emphasis in the definition of a "farmer" was on the 
carrying on of farming for a profit motive. Taken by 
itself, this did not exclude Africans as such, since African 
commercial farmers could qualify, but in 1952 few, if any 
Africans, were able to qualify as commercial farmers.
The scope of the security required by the Land and 
Agricultural Bank was so broad as to enable most European 
farmers to manage. They included:
a) mortgage on land?
b) charge on land secured as provided in 
section 31 of the Ordinance?2q2
c) stop orders on crops or other produce?
d) bills of sale?
e) any other security approved by the
Board.283
Loans to co-operative agricultural societies could be made
on the security of subscribed, but unpaid, capital and the
284amount of any debts owing to the society.
The Ordinance, however, prescribed certain limits on 
securities and loans. Loans made on the exclusive security 
of land were not to exceed sixty per cent "of the fair
107
agricultural or pastoral value of the land, as determined by 
285the Bank". Another limitation was that no loan exceeding
five thousand pounds could be made to any single farmer
except with the consent of the Financial Secretary. As to
the period within which the loans were to be repaid, the
Ordinance gave the Bank a wide discretion by only
prescribing the maximum period of thirty years, except that
for loans made on the security of informal charges evidenced
by a registered memorandum in accordance with section 31,
285"the maximum period was fixed at five years.
The Land and Agricultural Bank was a very successful
credit institution because of its insistence on adequate
security. A large part of its capital was spent on seasonal
loans but it also spent a sizeable proportion of its funds
on long term loans, with loans for the purchase of land the
redemption of mortgages, and the construction of buildings
287and dipping tanks respectively, being the most prominent.
Its prospects, however, varied in accordance with whether
the particular season was or was not favourable, a factor
which, to this day, makes agriculture such a perilous
investment in Zambia. The poor rains during the 1958-1959 
288season and the late arrival of rain in 1957-1958 
289season meant that many farmers were unable to keep up 
their payments. Notwithstanding these problems, however, 
the Bank had, by 1963 exercised its power of sale as 
mortgagee only in one hundred and nine cases.
As the Bank relied heavily on the security of land, it 
was vulnerable to changes in land values and indeed the 
question of marketability of land was to haunt the Bank 
towards the close of the colonial era. From 1959, when the
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constitutional future of the country began to cause anxiety
to many European farmers the Bank had difficulty finding
290buyers of the farms mortgaged to it. The land values
were also adversely affected. Nevertheless, this slump in
demand did not cause the Bank to reduce interest rates on
its loans. The Bank had steadily increased its interest
291rates from 5i% in June 1958 to 7% in 1962 on long term
292loans and 8% on seasonal loans.
(iv) The Agricultural Credits Ordinance, No. 28 of 1961
This Ordinance was passed to facilitate the borrowing
of money on the security of charges on farming stock and
other agricultural assets, and for the registration of such
charges. The Ordinance, therefore, enabled farmers to
borrow not only from the Land and Agricultural Bank but also
from other commercial banks by creating a charge on farming
stock. Farming stock was broadly defined to include "crops
or horticultural produce whether future growing or severed
from the land",29^
A fixed charge conferred on the lender, the right to
take possession of the property and, after five days, sell
the property either by auction or private treaty, and apply
the proceeds of sale towards the discharge of the debt
secured by the charge and pay the surplus, after reimbursing
294himself on the cost, to the borrower. The creation of a
fixed charge did not deprive the farmer of his right to
295dispose of the subject matter of the charge. But he was
accountable to the lender for the proceeds which, on receipt 
he was to apply towards discharging the borrower*s 
liabilities. At this point the protection of the lender
109
ended. Section 4(5) stated that if the proceeds of sale 
supposed to be paid to the lender were paid to some other 
person, "nothing in this Ordinance shall confer on the 
holder a right to recover such proceeds from that other 
person unless the holder proves that such other person knew 
that such proceeds were paid to him in breach of such 
obligation, but such other person shall not be deemed to 
have such knowledge by reason only that he has notice of the 
charge."
In other words, the lender had to show not only that 
the person to whom the borrower paid the money realised from 
the sale of property the subject of the charge, knew that 
there was a charge on the property owned by the borrower, 
but also that the money tendered was realised from the sale 
of the property under the charge. This provision, meant to 
protect third parties dealing with people whose property is 
under a charge, put lenders in a rather vulnerable position 
vis a vis third parties. For this reason, it is not 
surprising that mortgages remained more popular with banks 
than agricultural charges.
(d) The Marketing of European Grain
Like African producers, European farmers were greatly
encouraged by the expansion of the copper industry which led
296to increased demand. Marketing of European g r a m  did not
pose a problem because the majority of European farmers 
lived near the urban markets and major transport routes such 
as the line of rail. In the face of a depressed market, 
European farmers had the advantage of political power
no
exercised through their representatives in the Legislative
Council to pass laws which would thwart African competition.
The Maize Control Ordinance which established the Maize
Control Board and allocated seventy-five per cent of the
internal market to European farmers was one of the measures
calculated to discourage African production.
In 1957 the Maize Control Board and the Eastern
Province Agricultural Produce Board were merged with the
Grain Marketing Board of Southern Rhodesia to form the
Federal Grain Marketing Board under the Federal Grain 
297Marketing Act. The Grain Marketing Board had few depots
in rural areas, with the result that it mainly served 
European farmers. Even prior to the creation of these 
Boards, European farmers had powerful marketing and producer 
co-operatives which had access to foreign markets. The 
Northern Rhodesia Tobacco Co-operative specialised in 
encouraging the production and marketing of tobacco 
throughout the country, while the Abercorn Co-operative 
Society marketed coffee. In the case of maize, the 
North-Western Rhodesia Farmers* Co-operative Society, 
controlling a membership of eighty per cent of European 
maize growers, was responsible for the marketing of maize 
within and outside the territory.
(e) Summary of Changes Over the Colonial Period
The colonial period was characterised by the "settler 
dream". The conviction that the development of the country 
depended on attracting European settlers led to the adoption 
of policies relating to land, credit and marketing, geared
Ill
towards encouraging white settlers into the territory. The 
land declared to be Crown Land was the most fertile and 
accessible in terms of the existing transport 
infrastructure. But when it came to the choice of which 
system of tenure should be offered in respect of 
agricultural Crown Land there were marked shifts from 
freehold in the early days of European settlement to 
leaseholds in the late forties and then to freeholds as 
conceived in the late fifties, under the Agricultural Lands 
Ordinance. The shift from leaseholds to freeholds can only 
be understood in the context of growing political strength 
of European settlers in the Legislative Council.
Unable to prevent settler power in the Legislative 
Council, the colonial government was left only with the 
option of imposing development conditions as the 
pre-requisite for conversion of leaseholds to freeholds. 
Nothing, however, prevented the landowner, once he had the 
freehold grant, from holding on to the land purely for 
speculation purposes. Many farmers availed themselves of 
the opportunity and converted their leaseholds into 
freeholds.
With regard to credit and marketing, the colonial 
period witnessed the emergence of specialised statutory 
bodies to provide credit, and market agricultural produce. 
The Land and Agricultural Bank filled the gap left by 
commercial banks by widening the scope of acceptable 
security to include stop orders and agricultural charges.
In marketing, the efforts of marketing co-operatives were 
supplemented by the powerful Federal Grain Marketing Board.
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C. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS
The development of the copper mining industry at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century provided a market for 
agricultural production. The British South Africa Company 
decided to introduce European settlers to provide for this 
growing market. In the late 1920s, native reserves were set 
up, and the land adjacent to the line of rail was retained 
exclusively for European use. Due to the World Depression 
in the late 193 0s and the decline in the size of the 
domestic market, a government statutory marketing board, the 
Maize Control Board, was established for maize to ensure 
that African production did not take up an increasing share 
of the limited market. The quota system which was 
instituted had a depressing effect on the growth of African 
marketed produce, which was mitigated only by a rise in 
world prices and a growth in the internal market in the 
1940s.
Only after the Second World War was any notable 
attention given to agricultural development. Government 
policy toward African agriculture took the form of improved 
farming schemes and soil conservation, but was restricted to 
the line of rail and the Eastern Province.
The Maize Control Board had a monopoly on maize 
purchases and sales in the line of rail area and the Eastern
i
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Province. The price paid to African producers was less than 
that paid to European producers because of the obligatory 
contributions required of African farmers to various African 
Farming Improvement Funds. The government monopoly on 
marketing may have seriously impeded the development of 
private marketing, but it was necessary to encourage 
production.
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland did little to 
help African agriculture since it divided the 
responsibilities for European and African agriculture. 
European agriculture was a federal matter, while Afrian 
agriculture remained a territorial responsibility. This 
encouraged their separate and unequal treatment. Because 
marketing was a federal matter and the federal government 
was not responsible for African agriculture, it is not 
surprising that marketing of African produce did not receive 
much government support.
At independence the government was faced with two 
widely divergent agricultural systems - the European and 
African - and within the African system, two different 
levels of development: that of farmers along the line of 
rail and in the Eastern Province, and the farmers in the 
rest of the country. To compound the situation many 
European farmers left the country in the wake of political 
independence and shortly after.
The primary object of the thesis is to appraise the 
legal framework within which agricultural development is to 
be attained in Zambia. In this connection, three aspects 
are of primary importance - landholding, agricultural credit 
facilities, and the marketing of agricultural produce. In
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all these aspects, government has, since independence, 
introduced reforms to reflect its own agricultural policy by 
the use of law as a tool for achieving agricultural 
development.
The advent of independence has brought drastic changes 
in agricultural policy from that of reliance on commercial 
farmers to produce food in sufficient quantities to meet the 
demand at home and a surplus for export, pursued by the 
colonial government, to one of encouraging peasant farmers 
not only to be self-reliant in food production, but also to 
contribute towards exportable surpluses. This change in 
policy is not, however, calculated to discourage the 
commercial farmer, whose role has been and still remains 
very important. In fact, the reforms regarding landholding 
have been focussed, in part, on the portion of agricultural 
land largely used by commercial farmers.
On landholding, the reforms introduced broaden the 
scope of government control of all land in general, although 
the thesis concentrates on agricultural land. The thesis 
examines the nature of the reforms and their relevance to 
the development of agriculture on State Land (formerly known 
as Crown Land). The thesis also examines the means by which 
government exercises control over agricultural land and the 
effectiveness of those means. The conclusion drawn is that 
while the case for government control of agricultural land 
has been made out, the means by which such control was to be 
exercised were not properly conceived. Thus, it is argued, 
it is impossible to gauge the impact of these reforms on the 
development of agricultural land. The thesis also examines 
landholding in the Reserves and Trust Land - generally
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referred to as customary land. There are two systems of 
landholding in the Reserves and Trust Land - customary and 
statutory landholding. Originally, statutory tenure was 
introduced under the Reserves and the Trust Land 
Orders-in-Council to cater for, among others, European 
farmers who wished to settle in these areas, but since 
independence, statutory tenure has been granted to whoever 
does not wish to be governed by customary land tenure. The 
thesis evaluates customary land tenure in the context of 
agricultural development and examines the rights enjoyed by 
statutory landholders with a view to determining the 
suitability of statutory land tenure as an alternative to 
customary tenure. The conclusion that has been drawn is 
that while there is some evidence of the gradual adaptation 
of customary tenure to changing socio-economic factors, this 
change is too gradual and the need for State control of 
customary land is urgent.
The development of agricultural land depends not only 
on security of tenure and the means by which the State can 
compel proper land use, but also on the availability of 
capital. As such capital has been scarce for most farmers, 
credit facilities have assumed great importance. The thesis 
examines various aspects of the law relating to credit in 
terms of whether they facilitate access by peasant farmers 
to agricultural credit. Of special importance is the role 
of government-controlled credit institutions and the place 
for private banking institutions in the dispensation of 
loans to the agricultural sector. The conclusion reached is 
that credit is a double-edged sword and should only be 
granted where either adequate security is available, or
there is proven ability of the farmer to use it 
productively. It is also demonstrated that land reforms 
have diminished the use of land as security, leaving stop 
orders (whose legal force is questionable), as the most 
widely-used form of security.
While agricultural credit may be seen as a stimulant to 
production, there is evidence to support the view that some 
increase in production may be achieved even in the absence 
of credit if there are adequate marketing arrangements. 
Without organised marketing increased production cannot be 
sustained. Zambia inherited two statutory marketing bodies 
and since then the idea of a statutory marketing body has 
enjoyed popularity. Due to the difficulties that such 
statutory bodies have faced, however, government has shifted 
its emphasis from such bodies to marketing co-operatives and 
specialised companies for individual crops. The poor 
performance of the Zambian statutory marketing body, the 
National Agricultural Marketing Board, has been attributed 
to the broadly-defined functions it had to perform and the 
questionable role of government in its operations. The 
thesis examines the case for specialised marketing 
institutions in the context of the experience gained from 
the operation of the National Agricultural Marketing Board 
of Zambia. The powers of the Board and its relationship 
with government are spelt out in the Act creating the Board 
and provide a further instance in which government is 
utilising law to achieve its policy objectives.
The thesis ends with general conclusions regarding law 
and development, and, in particular, the extent to which 
various aspects of the law relevant to the pursuit of
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agricultural development have promoted or hindered the 
attainment of government development objectives, and makes 
proposals for further reforms.
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CHAPTER TWO
LAND LAW AND THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LAND
A. INTRODUCTION
The pursuit of agricultural development in 
underdeveloped countries is a complex and multi-faceted 
problem. It is not contended in this chapter that land 
tenure reform is the sole key to agricultural development.
As James has rightly observed, "land tenure rules by 
themselves grow no rice, build no houses, create no goods", 
but they, nevertheless, "create the framework within which 
the economic, social and other energies of a country may be 
most fruitfully mobilized".1 Land law is no less important 
to the stability of the country, because the well-being of 
its citizens depends on the rules which regulate the manner 
in which land can be owned and used. In developing 
countries, the recurrence of famine has drawn the attention 
of agriculturists and lawyers alike. A great deal of 
attention, particularly from lawyers and other students of 
land tenure, has been focussed upon the customary land 
tenure systems which have been perceived as inhibitive of 
agricultural modernization, an argument examined in the 
succeeding chapter. Little seems to have been done to 
examine local statute law in the context of its suitability 
to promote land development.
Chapter One has shown that through the policy of native 
reserves, the colonial government dispossessed many Africans
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of land which was subsequently alienated to European
settlers. A similar policy was pursued in the then Southern
2Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Kenya. But, unlike Kenya, Zambia
has not instituted any comprehensive programme for the
re-settlement of Africans on the lands from which they had 
3been removed. Instead, the President promised the land
owners that there would be no interference with their
property rights, unless the land was not being properly
exploited in accordance with existing law. At the time,
this interference could only be legally justified in
respect of agricultural land held on leasehold tenure, but
not to undeveloped freehold land. Government was powerless
to deprive a freeholder of land because the only legislation
under which compulsory acquisition could be effected, the
5Public Lands Acquisition Act, permitted such acquisition 
only in cases where the State required the land to be used 
for public purposes, as statutorily defined. Nevertheless, 
the change in the personnel of land allocating authorities, 
local authorities, and the Lands Department ensured that the 
division of land along racial lines ceased.6 In 1970, the
government replaced the Public Lands Acquisition Act with
7 .the Lands Acquisition Act which broadened the scope within
which, and the purpose for which, land could be compulsorily
acquired. The motive was to enable the State to re-possess
land which was either not being utilised, or developed so
that it could alienate the same to developers. It was also
hoped that the threat of compulsory acquisition would
motivate the owners of freehold land to develop it.
By contrast, leasehold land could be controlled by
government through terms and covenants in the lease. There
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were two types of land held on leasehold tenure - scheduled 
and non-scheduled. Scheduled leasehold land comprised farms 
or portions of farms which had been declared as falling 
under the Agricultural Lands Act. Non-scheduled leasehold 
land comprised farms which had not been so declared.
Further control over land use is now provided by the Land
Q
(Conversion of Titles) Act, 1975 which converted all 
existing estates to leasehold estates of a term of a hundred 
years, thereby extending State control to all categories of 
land. Although the land reforms introduced by the Land 
(Conversion of Titles) Act, 1975 are, in theory, applicable 
to all categories of land, it is difficult to see how they 
can, in practice, be realised in the Reserves and Trust 
Land, where land tenure continues to be governed, largely, 
by customary laws.
By making title to land and, therefore, security of
tenure dependent on land use, Zambia, like Tanzania has not
followed the Kenyan policy which, while continuing the
freehold system, did, by separate legislation, impose on
landholders development requirements, the non-compliance
9with which might lead to dispossession. Which is the 
better system is a moot point since both systems provide, 
ultimately, for dispossession, but the Kenyan system, by 
allowing market value to be included in the amount of 
compensation payable, does not seriously address the problem 
of land speculation.10
This chapter attempts to examine the legislation under 
which the State has sought to gain or maintain control over 
land utilisation with a view to ensuring the development of 
agricultural land on State Land. It opens with a discussion
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of the practical significance of the Agricultural Lands Act 
as a land control measure, and then examines the suitability 
of the legislation on compulsory acquisition as a means of 
releasing undeveloped land for the use of genuine farmers. 
The discussion then centres on the background and effect of 
the land tenure reforms introduced in 1975 under the Land 
(Conversion of Titles) Act. Attention is also drawn to the 
practical difficulties that confront the enforcement of land 
control legislation and the possible measures that should be 
taken to alleviate some of the problems that have arisen.
The combined effect of the Agricultural Lands Act and the 
Land (Conversion of Titles) Act is to encourage the 
development of agricultural land through (1) the 
prescription of minimum development requirements? (2) the 
imposition of development covenants in leases of . 
agricultural land? and, (3) the prescription of criteria to 
be taken into account in determining whether consent to deal 
in land should be granted or withheld.
Prior to discussing land control under the Agricultural 
Lands Act, a brief mention must be made of the structure of 
land administration which has resulted in the existence of 
two parallel systems of review and control of leases and
leasehold transactions concerning agricultural State Land.
11Following the vesting of all land m  the President, the
President is the titular owner of all land. Land 
administration, however, falls under the Ministry of Lands 
and Natural Resources comprising the Department of Natural 
Resources (which for the present does not concern us), and 
the Department of Lands. The Lands Department is 
responsible for both customary land (Reserves and Trust
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Land) and State Land, although the department exercises
little control over the former. The department is headed by
the Commissioner of Lands, to whom the President has
delegated his authority under the Land (Conversion of 
12Titles) Act. While the Commissioner of Lands is
responsible for all land, an exception exists in the case of
land falling under the Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter
13referred to as "scheduled land" ). This category of land 
is administered by the Agricultural Lands Board established 
under the Act and directly responsible to the Minister of 
Lands. The Commissioner of Lands, although a member of the 
Agricultural Lands Board, has no more power than the other 
members of the Board. The Board exercises its own system of 
control but its powers are restricted to scheduled land. 
Nonetheless, because the Board does not have administrative 
facilities it has to rely on the Department of Lands and, 
hence, the Commissioner of Lands, for the day to day 
performance of the Board's functions, notably, the 
inspection of farms.
The enactment of the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act 
has led to the existence of another system of control, 
relating to both non-scheduled land, and scheduled land.
With respect to non-scheduled land, the Commissioner of 
Lands, acting on behalf of the President is the sole 
controlling authority subject, generally, to appeals being 
made to the Minister and, subsequently, the President. For 
scheduled land, the Agricultural Lands Board will exercise 
control under the Agricultural Lands Act in the first 
instance, and then the Commissioner of Lands will also 
exercise control under the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act.
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Conflicts are bound to occur in many cases of double control 
owing to conflicting criteria and also inconvenience caused 
through delay. One serious limitation on the Department of 
Lands is that while they have on their staff land officers, 
the establishment does not provide for valuers. The task of 
valuation is passed on to the Ministry of Provincial and 
Local Government which is equally hard pressed for manpower.
B. CONTROL UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS ACT
As already mentioned, this Act only applies to land
which has been declared to fall under it, referred to as
scheduled land. No figures are available to indicate the
ratio of scheduled land to non-scheduled land, but there is
general agreement in the Department of Lands that the total
area of scheduled land is considerably less than the total
14area of non-scheduled land. As the Agricultural Lands Act 
is a legacy of the colonial government, the discussion 
relating to the statutory provisions prescribing the 
functions and powers of the Agricultural Lands Board is 
contained in the previous chapter. The first chapter also 
discussed the statutory requirement of beneficial 
occupation, including personal residence.
The Agricultural Lands Act had only been in force for 
four years at the time Zambia gained independence. In that
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short time, it is difficult to gauge the impact of the Act 
on land development. The discussion that follows examines 
the impact of the Act as administered by the Agricultural 
Lands Board. Of crucial importance are (1) the relationship 
between the Minister and the Board? and (2) the way in which 
the Board interprets the Act and the criteria it uses in 
alienating land and in granting consent to dealings in land. 
Further, attention is drawn to problems relating to the 
discharge by the Board of its functions under the Act. The 
criteria provided in the Act for the selection of those to 
whom land should be alienated reflect a particular set of 
values which may not be shared by all the members of the 
Board. Their values, therefore, have a bearing on how 
seriously they will treat these guidelines or requirements. 
Attention, must also be focussed on the composition of the 
Board, in so far as there might be wide differences of 
opinion between members who are public officers and members 
who are private individuals. In such an event, the 
proportion of public officers to private members of the 
Board assumes great importance.
1. Composition of the Agricultural Lands Board
Under section 4(2) the composition of the Board is as 
follows:
"a) a chairman appointed by the Minister to 
be other than a public officer?
b) three public officers appointed by the 
Minister?
c) two persons selected by the Minister from 
a panel of not more than four names, 
submitted to him by the Commercial 
Farmers Union (now renamed Commercial 
Farmers Bureau)?
d) such additional members, not exceeding
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five in number, appointed by the Minister 
as the Minister may deem desirable:
Provided that at no time shall the 
Board be so constituted as to have 
a majority of public officers.”
While public officers may be appointed either by name or
office, private members are appointed by name only. The
tenure of membership is three years for the chairman and two
years for the other members with provision for
15re-appointment for a second term.
The public officers who ordinarily serve on the Board 
are the Commissioner of Lands? the Director of Agriculture; 
and the Conservator of Natural Resources. Confusion is 
brought into the system, however, when the Minister appoints 
heads of parastatal bodies as members of the Board under 
(d) . The expression "public office" is not defined by the 
Act. Perhaps it was unnecessary at the time the Act was 
being considered because the colonial government created no 
parastatal bodies. The post-independence era, however, has 
seen the emergence of parastatal bodies with company 
administrators handling public funds. The directors and 
general managers of these semi-public institutions are 
performing public duties and are thus public officers in the 
literal sense. The General Manager of the Agricultural 
Finance Company, a parastatal body, has, at different 
periods, been a member of the Board. Even when he is not 
appointed a member, he attends meetings of the Board but 
without the power to cast a vote. His attendance is 
important because in most cases, the land which is the 
subject of the application for consent is mortgaged to the 
Agricultural Finance Company, and thus the company must have 
some say in the selection of the person who will take it
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over.16 When he is a member, the problem is whether he is
appearing as a public officer or as a private member.
The position of a head of a parastatal body as a member
is important not only with respect to compliance with
section 4(2), but also section 6(2) which states that four
members of whom at least two, are not public officers shall
constitute a quorum. An appeal may lie, therefore, to the
Minister on the grounds that the Board was not properly
constituted because there were more public officers than
17non-public officers. The majority of non-public officers
who have been members of the Board have been successful
farmers. Their experience is, no doubt, invaluable to the
Board, and hence, the commercial farming community at large.
The provision for the compulsory appointment of, at least,
two members from a selection of four names proposed by the
Commercial Farmers Bureau ensures the continued
representation of commercial farmers. But the requirement
that the number of non-public officers must, invariably, be
at par or even in excess of the number of public officers
has the effect of putting scheduled land under the control
of private farmers. This could have been used in the
colonial days to keep scheduled agricultural land squarely
under the control of the European farming community who
were, by far, in the majority on State Land. In fact, the
original 1960 version of the Act provided for the Governor
(in place of the Minister) to appoint only two additional
members. These were the Manager of the Land and
Agricultural Bank, and one African. In June 1963, the
Minister proposed to delete the limitation to two members to
18"encourage wider African settlement on Crown Land". But
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under the Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1963,
the limitation was preserved, but the number was increased
19from two to five.
With the attainment of independence and Zambianization 
of the Board, the underlying rationale for the composition 
of the Board must be reviewed. There is no doubt regarding 
the need for the representation of the commercial farmers 
through nominees of the Commercial Farmer's Bureau, but it 
is also important that the representation of farmers be 
organised on a provincial basis so as to promote the even 
development of agricultural land in all the provinces.
With regard to the requirement that the Board be 
composed of fewer public officials than non-public 
officials, although its rationale, the control of 
agricultural land by the European settler community, no 
longer holds good, it should be retained for different 
reasons. Agricultural land has become a burning national 
issue and, in such circumstances, the possibility of 
accusations of partiality in the grant of land is likely to 
arise. Suspicions may be easily aroused where only one 
individual, be it a government official or otherwise, makes 
all the decisions. This is not the case where decisions are 
made by a board, especially, if it is so constituted as to 
have a majority of non-public officials.
2. Distribution of Power Between the Board and the Minister 
The general functions and powers of the Board are
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contained in section 8 of the Act, briefly covered in the 
first chapter. No problems relating to the relationship 
between the Board and the Minister arose during the colonial 
period perhaps because there was too little time within 
which to implement the Ordinance. After independence, the 
issues which have arisen are, (a) whether the Board operates 
only in an advisory capacity and the Minister is the primary 
authority and, (b) if not, what the scope of the Minister's 
appellate jurisdiction is.
Section 9 of the Act provides:
"(1) Subject to the provisions of this section 
the decision of the Board shall be final 
in respect of any matter on which the 
Board is by or under this Act empowered 
to decide.
(2) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the 
Board may at any time, but not later than 
twenty-eight days after the service upon 
him of formal notice thereof, appeal to 
the Minister against the decision on any 
of the following grounds but not 
otherwise:
a) that the decision is contrary to the 
provisions of this Act?
b) that the decision is contrary to 
public policy or to the public 
interest ?
c) that the decision is an improper 
exercise of a discretion entrusted 
to the Board?
d) that the decision is against the 
weight of the evidence submitted to 
the Board.
(3) The Minister may, upon an appeal under 
subsection (2) or of his own instance 
review any decision of the Board on any 
of the grounds set out in subsection (2), 
or on the ground that such decision is 
contrary to any directions of policy 
given by the Minister to the Board."
Section 9(1) shows that there are certain matters on 
which the Board has the exclusive power to make decisions 
and others on which the Board can only make recommendations.
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The power to decide whose application for land is to be 
approved under section 17 and the grant of consent to 
assignments or dealings in land under section 24 are 
specifically vested in the Board. One would, therefore, 
regard the Board's decisions on the above matters as final. 
Between 1974 and 1975, however, many of the Board's 
decisions on the above matters were reversed. The three 
cases cited below illustrate the numerous occasions when 
ministerial interference checked the Board's exercise of its 
powers under the Act.
The first case was an application for consent to assign
20a farm situated in Lusaka. The Board approved the 
application inspite of the fact that the proposed assignee 
had already taken possession of the farm prior to securing 
the consent of the Board. The Board took the view that the 
proposed assignee was not to blame because he had taken 
possession of the farm as a caretaker, while awaiting the 
consent of the Board through his solicitors, who had, 
apparently, delayed submitting the application for consent. 
The Board was also apprehensive that the proposed assignee 
would suffer hardship if consent was refused since he had 
already spent a substantial sum renovating the farm.
The second case was also an application for consent to
, 21
assign a farm, in Mkushi. According to the Board, the 
proposed assignee had been granted a one-year sublease by 
the Board in 1970 at the end of which he applied for consent 
to purchase the farm. His solicitors, however, failed to 
bring the application before the Board. Meanwhile, the 
proposed assignee continued to use the farm, having already 
deposited the purchase price with his solicitors.
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The third case, also an application to assign a farm,
in Kabwe was similar to the first in that the proposed
assignee had been in possession of the farm for three
consecutive seasons on a caretaker basis at the end of which
22the farm owner agreed to sell the farm to him.
In all the three cases, the Minister for Lands and
Natural Resources disapproved on the ground that it was
against government policy for leasehold land to be occupied
23prior to authority being granted by the government. In
their Minutes of the 9th and 10th of July 1974, the
Agricultural Lands Board noted:
"Although members expressed their appreciation 
for the Honourable Minister's decisions on the 
Board's recommendations, the Board was, 
however, surprised to note that some 
applications which had passed through it had 
been turned down even when the Board was fully 
satisfied with a particular applicant.
Members felt that if the Honourable Minister 
was not fully satisfied with any application, 
he should ask the Board for clarification or 
further information on certain of the points 
he may not be happy about before rejecting the 
application.”24
The Acting Commissioner of Lands had the occasion to
address the Board on Tuesday the 28th January 1975 regarding
the manner in which the Board had carried out its duties.
Interpreting section 9(1), he said the Board was entitled to
make final decision in respect of any matter which the Board
was, under the Act, empowered to decide. It was, therefore,
he continued, not in accordance with the Act for the Board
merely to recommend any matter to the Minister for final
decision. He concluded:
"There was in fact no policy directive to the 
effect that the Minister would give final 
decision on any matters on which the Board has 
made recommendation or decision, as the case 
may be.”25
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After mentioning the grounds on which an appeal to the 
Minister may lie against the decision of the Board under 
section 9(2), the Commissioner of Lands added that the 
provisions in the Act were conflicting and needed amendment.
It is pertinent to point out that although the Minister 
is empowered under section 8(2) to make directives on 
matters of policy to the Board, no Minister responsible for 
lands has ever availed himself of this opportunity, unless 
ministerial intervention on an ad hoc basis can be said to 
be a policy directive. There were, therefore, no policy 
directives which the Board could be said to have ignored in 
their consideration of the three cases reversed by the 
Minister, so as to justify his intervention. But the legal 
opinion expressed by the Acting Commissioner of Lands 
ignores the impact of section 9(3) which empowers the 
Minister "upon an appeal under subsection (2) or of his own 
instance" to review any decision of the Board on the grounds 
stated in subsection (2).
It would be stretching the meaning of section 9(3), 
however, to require the Board to submit its decisions to the 
Minister in every instance for purposes of review as is the 
practice at present. Section 9(3) would, it is submitted, 
cover an improper exercise of the Board's functions where 
there is no formal appeal by an aggrieved applicant or 
proposed assignee but there is sufficient evidence, or there 
has been a discovery of new facts to warrant review. The 
present practice of submitting all the decisions of the 
Board to the Minister for approval renders the expression 
"final" under section 9(1) meaningless. This view can be 
supported on the basis of the Minister's address to the
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Legislative Council when he introduced the Agricultural 
Lands Ordinance of 1960. Commenting on the improvements 
made by this Ordinance over the 1956 Ordinance the Minister 
said:
"Certain provisions have, therefore, been 
re-drafted in order to place the powers of 
decision firmly with the Board ... As the 
Minister responsible, I shall have powers of 
direction on matters of general or special 
government policy, but I shall not have the 
power to intervene in individual cases except 
when the Board has overlooked some provision 
in the Ordinance or some direction of 
policy."26
The Minister went on to state that as a precaution against
the remote possibility of a serious error, he should be
given the power to intervene if the Board makes a decision
which is "so obviously wrong on the facts that the decision
27cannot reasonably be allowed to stand". It is submitted, 
therefore, that the power of the Minister is merely a 
reserve power to be used in exceptional circumstances, 
unless there is an appeal against the decision of the Board. 
But the Act is not as clear as one would like. Hence, the 
Commissioner of Land's lament that the provisions were 
conflicting and needed amendment is justified. Such an 
amendment could also clarify the issue as to who is the 
final authority and in what matters. One may also suggest 
that the Board be represented or asked to explain its 
decisions to the Minister when the latter is hearing an 
appeal against or reviewing the Board's decision.
In sjslte of the call by the Board that it be consulted 
by the Minister so that it has the opportunity to defend its 
decisions, no notice has been taken. As late as August 1982 
the Minister's exercise of appellate authority was
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deprecated. At its meeting held on the 12th and 13th August
1982 the Board rejected an application for permission to
assign three farms in Chisamba to Dar Farms and Transport
Ltd. Dar Farms successfully appealed against the decision
on the ground that it was already in occupation of the farms
28and had since made considerable improvements thereon. The 
Board took the view that it was very unfair for its 
decisions to be rescinded by the Minister after it had 
scrutinised all the cases. The danger, as the Board saw it, 
was that its position would be made difficult as people,
whom the Board had denied land or consent, would flock to
. . . . 29the Minister's office for assistance. The Board also
reiterated its earlier plea that the Minister should
"whenever there is an appeal before him, ensure that he is
fully briefed by either the Commissioner of Lands or the
Agricultural Lands Board, before making a decision on the
appeal".30
Section 9(4) states: "When exercising his powers under 
this section, the Minister may make such order as in the 
circumstances he may consider just, and such order shall be 
final". The finality of the Minister's decision has not 
prevented what has been seen as political intrigue from 
undermining the administration of scheduled agricultural 
land. This can best be illustrated by the case of farm no. 
2109 in Petauke. The facts of this case were that the 
Tobacco Board of Zambia (TBZ), the lessees, advertised the 
farm for purposes of assignment. After considering the 
applicants, TBZ approved one application and, thereafter, 
applied to the Agricultural Lands Board for consent to 
assign to the successful applicant which the Board approved.
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But Petauke District Council whose application was rejected 
by TBZ on the grounds that it had been received after the 
closing date for receiving applications, appealed to the 
Minister against the decision of the Board. The Council's 
only contention was that they were prevented from applying 
for the farm to the TBZ by the management of TBZ. The 
Minister considered the appeal and directed that the farm 
should be reserved by the government for the use of the 
Council.
It subsequently became known to the Board, however,
that the Council's appeal had been made known to members of
the Central Committee of UNIP, the Party's policy-making
body, and to the Prime Minister, both of whom may have made
such representations as to affect the Minister's decision.
The Board noted in its minutes that it was appointed by the
Minister "and the Minister should, therefore, respect its 
31decisions". After further consultations between the
Minister and the Commissioner of Lands, the farm was finally
32alienated to the successful applicant and not the Council.
In s)Diie of the Minister's decision, Petauke District Council
lodged a further appeal to State House. In the meantime,
the Prime Minister informed the Board Chairman that he
33"would not rest until the Council acquired the farm". The 
possibility of political pressure being brought to bear on 
the Minister, from above, will not only lead to further 
negation of the Board's autonomy, but also will throw open 
to doubt the extent to which the decisions of both the Board 
and the Minister can be regarded as final. Another 
pertinent question on the effect of the word "final" in 
section 9(4) is whether the jurisdiction of the courts is
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excluded. In most legislation where the courts' 
jurisdiction has been excluded, the exclusionary clause has 
been express. In the absence of an express exclusionary 
clause, the implication must be that while the court may not 
adjudicate on the merit of the decision, it may adjudicate 
on compliance with procedure and the common law principles 
of natural justice. On none of these grounds, however, 
would Petauke District Council have been successful.
3. The Agricultural Lands Board and the Criteria for Land 
Alienation
The process of land allocation provides one of the most 
important opportunities for the Board to control 
agricultural land. The Board exercises its control in two 
respects: one is where an individual applies for vacant land 
falling under the Act, and the other is where a holder of 
leasehold land, who wishes to assign such land together with 
improvements on it, applies to the Board for consent to do 
so. The extent to which the Board can control land in these 
two respects depends on the procedure followed in making 
applications for consent.
Where an individual farmer wishes to sell his farm, he 
advertises the sale and all the applicants for the farm 
attend the interview whereby the Board determines who is the 
best qualified for the farm and then consents to the farm 
being assigned to him. This is not so with interested 
parties such as the Tobacco Board of Zambia and the
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Agricultural Finance Company. Under its schemes the Tobacco 
Board is the lessee which sublets to participants whowit 
assists financially so that they can promote the production 
of tobacco. In the case of the Agricultural Finance 
Company, it will have lent money for the development of the 
farm on the security of a mortgage. In both cases the two 
institutions are interested in who will be the approved 
tenant of the farm. They, therefore, advertise their farms 
and make their choice as to which applicant is suitable and 
then apply for consent of the Board to assign to the 
applicant of their choice. In some cases, such an applicant 
will already have paid them the purchase price which they 
will have inflated to cover loans outstanding on the farm. 
While such an applicant may be financially suitable, he may 
not be suitable in other respects, but by presenting only 
one applicant to the Board, the TBZ and the AFC will have 
robbed the Board of the opportunity to examine the other 
applicants.
In 1981, the Board of Directors of the Tobacco Board of
Zambia resolved to allocate its farms to sitting tenants,
and one of these tenants was given three farms, contrary to
the policy of the Agricultural Lands Board regarding land
accumulation. In view of the resolution of the TBZ Board of
Directors, the Agricultural Lands Board felt it had to 
34consent. Thereupon the Agricultural Lands Board took the 
view that the Tobacco Board of Zambia should be advised to 
recommend more than one application on each farm to be 
considered by it so that it does not appear as if it is a 
mere rubber stamp of the Tobacco Board. At its meeting held 
on the 3rd of December, 1981, the Agricultural Lands Board
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decided to introduce the rule that the Agricultural Finance
Company and the Tobacco Board of Zambia should submit at
least three applicants for the Agricultural Lands Board's
consideration. The General Manager for the Agricultural
Finance Company objected saying that the Agricultural Lands
Board had no power to direct the operations of other Boards.
He explained that it was part of his task to minimise the
operational costs of his company such as by submitting one
35competent applicant rather than the lot. The Agricultural
Lands Board, nonetheless, resolved that the two institutions
should submit at least three applicants. The Board's
decision would be meaningful if, to all advertisements of
farms, there were at least three applications, but not
otherwise. Indeed, as the AFC representative pointed out in
February 1985, it was not always possible to submit the
required number of applicants because there were some areas
which did not attract many people even after advertising the
3 6availability of farms. The Board then directed the 
Agricultural Finance Company in the future to send minutes 
of its Farms Committee meetings to the Board. The only 
problem with this procedure is that while the Board may, 
from the minutes, learn the qualities of the other 
applicants who were turned down, only the applicant chosen 
by the AFC will have been called for the interview, and if 
the Board is not satisfied with this particular applicant, 
the farm would have to be re-advertised. If the Board 
Meetings were more regular, the Board could deal with all 
these applications itself, knowing, fully well, that no 
injustice will be caused to the AFC as it is always 
represented either by its General Manager or the Deputy.
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Owing to the infrequency of the Board's meetings, however, 
the submission by the AFC of three applicants, where 
practicable, and if not, the single or both applicants 
together with the minutes of the meeting at which the 
applications were considered will have to suffice.
The Agricultural Lands Act prescribes the criteria to
be taken into account when considering applications for
undeveloped land or consent to assign scheduled land. The
rationale for these criteria is to ensure that scheduled
farms are not given to individuals who are incapable of
either developing them or maintaining their production
levels on account of age, impecuniousness, ignorance of
proper farming methods, or speculation. These criteria have
been reproduced in Chapter One and need only be repeated
here by way of summary. The Board must take into account
any general policy directive made by the Minister? the age
of the applicant or proposed assignee; the character of the
applicant or proposed assignee? whether he is willing to
affirm that he will personally occupy the holding? whether
he has the necessary capital? whether he possesses the
necessary qualifications? and any other facts which, in the
opinion of the Board, are relevant to the individual
37application or to the holding. In the case of companies, 
the company must undertake that it will occupy the farm 
through the agency of a manager who should himself reside on 
the farm. Evidence of sufficient capital is also required. 
In order to acquaint applicants with the above requirements 
gazette notices of meetings of the Board inform applicants 
that they should be able to show (i) sound financial 
standing with documentary proof? (ii) two years of farming
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experience or employment as farm manager, with relevant
references; and (iii) possession of the whole range of
implements. It is also indicated expressly that
"application forms which do not contain information relating
3 8to the above three conditions will not be accepted". In 
practice, however, serious problems have arisen with regard 
to the application of the above criteria, and discrepancies 
do occur from time to time. Their application is also made 
difficult by various factors including the demand for farms, 
and the overall economic situation in the country. For the 
above reasons, the Board has sometimes \jgcillated. To 
illustrate the problems of the Board it is necessary to 
examine the application of these criteria, over the years, 
through an examination of the numerous instances which have 
come before the Board.
(a) Age and Character of Applicant
Age and character have not featured prominently in the
cases that have come before the Board. In only one case has
age been considered, and on this occasion, as an advantage.
In this case, one of the applicants was close to retiring
age, and among the reasons why the Board chose him in
preference to the other three applicants for the same farm
39was that "he was the most aged of them all". In no other 
case has age ever been relevant. Obviously, age must be 
crucial to farming. Farm management requires a degree of 
maturity. The rigorous application of the requirement of 
experience would eliminate all young persons, but it would 
not, however, eliminate the most elderly, who may have the
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experience. The separate existence of age as a criterion is 
necessary. Similarly, little can be said about character. 
Presumably, an applicant who has been in the habit of 
abandoning land, or committing crimes, would be excluded 
from serious consideration. But broadly speaking, character 
might include one's mental condition, so that persons of 
proven unsound mind can be excluded. If they are not 
excluded under character however, they may still be excluded 
under "any other facts".
(b) Affirmation of Personal Occupation
The affirmation of personal occupation should give the 
Board advance knowledge as to whether the applicant will be 
able to comply with section 21 which requires him to 
"beneficially occupy" the holding which, by definition, 
includes personal residence or, in the case of a company, 
the residence of a manager on behalf of the company.
The requirement of personal residence has never been 
taken seriously by the Board. The rationale for its 
inclusion was that the colonial government depended on 
settler immigration to develop farming, and personal 
occupation was very important to ensure the arrival of more 
settlers. The larger the number of settlers, the greater 
the control of the settler community over agricultural land 
and, consequently, the greater their political control.
Since independence, this requirement has largely been 
ignored. Under the Act, only companies may employ a 
manager. There is no such provision for individual farmers. 
The normal practice, however, has been that individuals who
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lack experience or fanning qualifications have been
permitted to employ managers to run their farms, and there
really seems to be no reason to preclude people from
employing the services of more experienced and better
qualified people to run farms in their place.
The proposed manager must appear together with the
proposed assignee so that the manager can be examined as to
his experience in farming and the plans he intends to
implement for the farm. It is not sufficient, however, to
employ someone as a farm manager if he will be in full-time
employment and will only be able to visit the farm on
40week-ends, even if he may, otherwise, qualify. But the
Board has not been consistent in the treatment of applicants
who fail to bring the farm managers to be interviewed or
those whose managers do not satisfy the Board as to their
qualifications.
In one 1979 application the proposed assignees were
involved in the transport business and had no farming
experience. They did, however, promise, that if they
purchased the farm they would employ a farm manager who, at
the time, was a teacher of agricultural science in the
Ministry of Education. The manager did not attend the
interview to be examined as to his capacity to manage the
farm of the size to be assigned to the two brothers. The
Board, nevertheless, had no difficulty in giving its
consent, albeit, on the condition that they employ a farm 
41manager. In one 1985 application, the proposed manager 
attended. He purported to have graduated from the Natural 
Resources Development College (NRDC) and worked with the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development in the
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Department of Veterinary and Tsetse Control, but he could
produce no documentary proof of his academic qualifications
relevant to farming and was unable to satisfy the Board
regarding his proposed use of the farm for grazing. In
of the Board acknowledging its dissatisfaction with the
proposed manager, it still consented to the application and
imposed no condition to the effect that another manager
42should be engaged. But in 1982, an undertaking by an
inexperienced applicant that he would employ a suitable
43manager to run the farm was not taken seriously. The 
application was rejected in of the fact that none of
the other persons applying attended. Fresh notices to 
attend were sent and again only one turned up and he was 
allocated the farm by default.
(c) Financial Standing
"Though agriculture is both an art and a way 
of life, it yet remains a business and like 
other businesses cannot be carried on, much 
less expanded, unless funds are available for 
the maintenance, replacement and improvement 
of its capital equipment and for the working 
expenses of its production."44
Although the above quotation is more relevant to problems of
securing agricultural credit, it is also very important to
the Agricultural Lands Board which is duty bound to ensure
that land is given only to those who have the capital or
assets to develop it. The problems relating to the
provision of agricultural credit are discussed elsewhere,
here attention is focussed on capital as a pre-requisite to
the acquisition of land. The colonial government had placed
a lot of emphasis on capital investment and this legacy has
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remained an important one, but, unlike the colonial 
government which was very specific in terms of how much was 
required, the post-independence government has not placed 
any specific figure of capital or equipment. Perhaps this 
default is an advantage which permits the Board a certain 
degree of flexibility to allow for differences in farm size, 
proposed farm use, and in general, the availability of 
credit at a given time in the country. It has also raised 
problems, however, such as how much is "necessary" under the 
Act? what proof is required as evidence of financial 
standing? whether mere expectation of credit being made 
available from a financial institution is sufficient? and 
foremost, whether absence of "necessary" capital is totally 
fatal to an application or whether adequacy of capital must 
be linked to the relative experience of the applicant or 
proposed assignee. A highly experienced farmer may achieve 
more, with less money than an inexperienced farmer.
Where an applicant or proposed assignee has adequate 
money saved up for purchasing the unexhausted improvements 
on the land or equipment for farm development, the problem 
does not arise. But, in reality, few such applicants come 
before the Board. The majority are dependent on some 
financial institution or other for a loan, and since the 
provision of loans is not synchronised with the meetings of 
the Board, the Board has to make a decision as regards 
finance on the basis of documents from financial 
institutions which appear to show that there is a strong 
probability that the applicant's loan application will be 
approved. In the early seventies, the Board appeared to be 
very flexible and in many cases, a mere expression of
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intention to apply for a loan from the Agricultural Finance
Company, even after the period within which applications for
45loans were to be received had expired, was sufficient. In 
most cases, however, some documentary proof had to be 
produced and by the late seventies a mere expression of 
intention to apply to a financial institution for a loan was 
insufficient.
Nevertheless, reliance on documents is also fraught
with serious problems. A certified bank statement is
self-explanatory, but letters purporting to come from credit
managers of financial institutions may be forgeries. At a
meeting of the Board held in 1978, the Chairman noted that a
lot of people had come before the Board with claims that
they would get financial assistance from the Agricultural
Finance Company and in most cases ambiguous letters had been
produced. The general manager of the Agricultural Finance
Company, who was in attendance, asked the Board not to
accept any letter promising financial assistance from his
company unless it was written and signed by him,
46personally. But again in the early eighties, the
requirement of financial standing was in some cases
seemingly relaxed, so much so that in one case in which the
proposed assignee told the Board that he relied on a loan
from a financial institution in the absence of which he was
prepared to sell some of his stock to raise the money, the
47Board consented to the farm being assigned to him. And in 
one, rather odd case, in of the proposed assignee
having insufficient experience and insufficient capital, the 
Board is said to have approved solely on the ground that it 
was impressed by the proposed assignee's determination to go
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48into farming. In terms of capital, therefore, the general 
principles are that (1) where the applicant or proposed 
assignee does not have sufficient funds at his disposal, a 
promissory letter from a financial institution will suffice; 
(2) in the absence of such a letter, the availability of 
assets, such as stock, which he can convert into cash, is 
adequate? (3) if he has sufficient experience, even though 
his financial standing is low, the Board may approve.
Outside the above three principles, there is little 
likelihood that the Board will approve an application to 
assign the farm to a proposed assignee.
(d) Qualifications or Experience
As in the case of capital, there are no hard and fast 
rules regarding what qualifications are necessary. A 
diploma from any of the farming institutions has been held 
to be sufficient. In the absence of such or similar 
qualification, experience has been substituted. In the 
seventies, the Board appears to have strictly applied the 
requirement of experience even to the extent where, in one 
case, in of the applicant undertaking to employ a
manager, the application was refused. The nature of the 
experience required has been related to commercial farming. 
The Board recognises, however, that insistence on experience 
acquired on a commercial farm would mean the permanent 
entrenchment of commercial farmers and the prevention of 
semi-commercial farmers progressing into fully-fledged 
commercial farmers. As a result, experience gathered on 
traditional land in the Reserves and Trust Land has been
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accepted. However, there must be evidence to show that his
production level indicates that he is capable of handling a
large farm. In one case an applicant was turned down on the
basis that, inter alia, he had no commercial experience, but
the Minister reversed this decision of the Board on the
grounds that the applicant showed enterprise in developing
his customary land from which he raised a substantial sum of
49money and stock. Since then the Board has taken the
performance of an applicant on customary land into account
in determining whether the applicant can develop a
commercial farm to a satisfactory extent.
In a recent case, the applicant, even though lacking
academic qualifications, showed he had some practical
knowledge of farming, having produced two hundred bags of
50maize and five of sunflower seed on customary land.
Experience can off-set financial deficiency. In one 1981
application the Board decided that they would give an
impecunious applicant a chance on the grounds that he had
51experience m  farming. But once the applicant or his
proposed manager proves that he has adequate experience,
then it is, apparently, irrelevant where it was gained.
This appears to be a serious oversight because farming in
one geographic and climatic region may be different from
farming in another, for instance the tropics. In one case
the proposed manager had twenty-three years of experience
acquired in Sri Lanka and this factor greatly impressed the 
52Board. It never occurred to any member of the Board to 
compare farming in Sri Lanka with that in Zambia so as to 
show the relevance of the experience gained in that country. 
In some instances where substantial capital will be
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required to put the farm under production and the proposed
assignee has proof of the necessary capital, the Board may
overlook the need for farming experience. In one such case
the Board was aware that the proposed assignee had no
adequate experience, but the Board consented to the farm
being assigned to him because he was "prepared to sink his
53own capital to develop the farm". What the Board meant 
was that the proposed assignee was taking a risk with his 
finances and that would, presumably, cause him to apply 
reasonable standards of cultivation. In this particular 
case the decision of the Board was not unreasonable because 
the applicant had agreed to remain on the farm and help the 
assignee to develop it.
In general, therefore, qualifications or, in their 
place, farming experience have been a very important factor 
in securing consent. An applicant who has no experience is 
unlikely to secure a farm from the Board unless he can 
engage a manager whose qualifications the Board is satisfied 
with. Experience is also related to the farm size, hence, 
although, generally, experience gained on traditional land 
may be taken into account, it may not be adequate for the 
proper management of a large farm running into hundreds of 
acres.
(e) Other Facts
The Board may take into account "any other facts which
in the opinion of the Board, are relevant to the individual
54application or to the holding". The Board is permitted 
under this head to take into account such matters as the
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status of the proposed assignee - whether he is not a
citizen but a resident or otherwise. In September 1973, the
Board entertained the view that applications by expatriates
on contract must be cautiously considered, and decided that
among the factors to be considered before the Board approved
the proposed assignee were (a) whether the applicant had a
valid resident's permit and farming experience, and (b)
whether he was bringing into the country sufficient capital 
55of his own. By 1984, however, the Board conceded that
there was a popular feeling among politicians that more
foreigners got farms as opposed to indigenous Zambians, but
it further noted that "foreigners are more ready to go into
farming and (thus) feed the nation than indigenous 
56Zambians". The question of the ownership of land by
non-Zambians is one matter over which there was at the time
no decided policy. In an attempt to give the Board some
direction the Minister said:
"I wish it would be proper here to state that 
land can be owned by people without permanent 
residential status. Each case, of course, has 
got to be dealt with purely and simply on its 
own merit."-
D /
The Minister, however, confessed that it was difficult to
58give an overall ruling on such matters.
Another factor which has come up before the Board is 
the question of mortgages. Representatives of financial 
institutions have pleaded with the Board to block any 
attempts by their mortgagors to transfer or assign their 
interests to others - who may not, in the opinion of the 
Bank, be suitable. At a meeting of the Agricultural Lands 
Board of 10 February 1983, the General Manager of the 
Agricultural Finance Company appealed to the Board to assist
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the company in recovering outstanding loans by blocking the 
assignment of farms in cases where the vendors owe money to 
organisations such as the AFC. He explained that some loans 
were given on no security at all due to political pressure. 
The Chairman of the Board, however, replied that there was 
little the Board could do to assist the AFC in such cases 
because its criteria centred on the quality of the proposed 
assignee and not that of the applicant. It is submitted 
that this is one instance in which the Board is not as 
helpless as the chairman would seem to imply because under 
"any other facts relevant to the individual applicant or to 
the holding", the Board is empowered to take into account 
the circumstances surrounding the particular farm.
In one case the Board did, in fact, consent to a farm
being assigned to a person who owed the Agricultural Finance
Company a sum in excess of one million kwacha despite the
objection from the Manager of the AFC that the proposed
assignee was not a good farmer having been perpetually in
arrears with his payments. The Board, however, considered
that the grant of the farm to the proposed assignee would
59afford him the means with which to repay the loan. 
Ordinarily, therefore, an outstanding loan to the AFC is no 
bar to an assignment where the loanee's assets exceed his 
liabilities, but in a subsequent case the Board denied 
consent on the ground that the farm was too heavily 
mortgaged to the AFC and, in their view, it was "unfair to 
transfer such a burden to the proposed assignee".60 
Admittedly, the financial position of either the applicant 
or the proposed assignee is very crucial to lending 
institutions such as the AFC. Where it has lent money on a
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mortgage its position might be secure because it can sell 
the farm and recover its money, irrespective of whether the 
proposed assignee is impecunious. The difficulty arises 
where the loan was inadequately secured or not at all. In 
such cases it is in the interests of the AFC that its debtor 
does not dispose of his farm and disappear. Hence its 
objections to the Board consenting to the disposal of farms 
by such applicants. This is an important aspect which the 
Board should take into account, as it is empowered to do.
The other problem which does not seem to have been
settled by the Board is whether or not it should consent to
an application to assign a farm on which a caveat has been
registered. In one application which came before the Board
in 1982, the Board resolved that the "caveat registered on
the property cannot hinder the Board from approving the
application"61 and accordingly approved. In a subsequent
case, however, the Board declined. The facts of the case
were that the proposed assignee, according to his testimony,
had bought the farm six years previously and had since been
farming on the land. He explained that the original owner,
the applicant did not operate on the farm. He appealed to
the Board for the removal of the caveat registered on the
property by Zambia-Tanzania Railways for undisclosed
reasons. The Board, after due consideration, felt that the
fact that a caveat had been registered was an indication of
the existence of an interest in the property and decided to
withhold consent until such time as an investigation could
be conducted and the nature of the interest protected by the
62caveat discovered. It is submitted that the decision in 
the latter case is proper because as long as a caveat
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remains in force the registrar is precluded from making any
#
entry in the Register having the effect of "charging or
transferring or otherwise affecting the estate or interest
63protected by such caveat".
(f) Land Accumulation
Section 18(2) states:
"In allocating any holding the Board shall, 
all other things being equal, give preference 
to an applicant who is not already the owner 
of agricultural land."
This section permits the Board to take steps to prevent land
falling into the hands of a few individuals who are
financially well-off. It is also possible that even in the
absence of this section, land accumulation could have been
prevented under "any other facts". Nevertheless, an express
provision of this nature gives the Board greater confidence
in the discharge of its responsibilities under the Act.
Nonetheless, in inserting this provision, the colonial
government envisaged a very restricted scope within which
the egalitarian policy of equal access to land could play a
significant role. The provision does not go far enough
because: (1) it must be applied only where there is
competition between two or more people for a given farm, and
(2) the competitors for the farm must be of equal standing.
It is in very rare circumstances where a number of
competitors will be equal to the degree envisaged by the
phrase "all other things being equal". The weakness of this
provision led to the Board, prior to 1973, to adopt a very
64flexible approach regarding land accumulation.
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In three cases that came before the Board in 1973 the
Agricultural Lands Board approved the applications for
consent to assign farms to three proposed assignees, all of
whom already owned scheduled leasehold farms. Reviewing one
of these cases, the Minister said:
"This will mean that Mr (X) will be entitled 
to two viable units which according to present 
policy is contrary to what is expected of us 
in the assignment of land portions. Why don't 
we let another capable farmer take over this 
unit if possible?"65
The Minister's reference to "present policy" which he and
the Board were expected to carry out can only mean section
18(2) which, as already pointed out, is of little assistance
to the Board. It is clear, however, from the record that
the competitors for the three farms were not of equal
standing. Consequently, the Minister's decision was, in
fact, an extension of the meaning of section 18(2), and can
only be justified as a policy direction. In view of the
ruling in the three cases, the Board was forced to create
exceptions in cases which merited its sympathy. In one
application where the applicant wished to acquire a farm
adjacent to his present holding with a view to amalgamating
the two, the Board approved saying:
"It was the Board's opinion that although it 
is present policy not to allow an individual 
to own more than one farm it felt that the 
application merited sympathy as a) the farm 
being acquired was generally poor and would 
require a lot of capital to make a viable unit 
of its own and b) the applicant was to sink a 
lot of capital into the new farm."66
This exception was, however, not applied consistently, 
particularly between 1977 and 1979. In 1977 the Board 
rejected one application submitted by an applicant whose 
farm was adjacent to the farm the subject of the
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application. According to the applicant the farm could not 
be used as a viable unit on its own, and his intention was 
to use it as a grazing extension of his present farm. The 
Board "unanimously rejected" the application on the ground
6*7
that his present farm was very good. By contrast, in
another application that was made two years later, the Board
approved "though from records it was seemingly clear that
68(X) had enough land to develop". On the facts, there was
nothing to distinguish the two cases and the Board made no
attempt to refer to its previous decision and give reasons
for not following it. Such inconsistency is also
discernible in the decisions made by the Board in 1982. In
an application by Dar Farms and Transport Ltd, a limited
company engaged in ranching and growing crops, the company
already owned three farms and, for that reason, the Board
refused arguing that it was its duty to ensure that no
individuals or companies acquired more farms than others.
The Board concluded "since the company was not selling any
69of its other farms, consent would not be granted".
The strict application of the rule against land 
accumulation may pose a serious constraint on companies that 
wish to invest in farming. While the restriction of one 
farm per person is perhaps meaningful as regards private 
individuals, it is not appropriate for a company with 
several shareholders, who, if they were to apply for farms 
individually would, on satisfying the required criteria, be 
each entitled to a farm. As a company, however, the Board 
will on the basis of the case of Dar Farms Ltd, prevent it 
from owning more farms even if it has the resources to 
develop them. Farming is, therefore, less attractive to
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companies than other business, an outcome which could hardly 
have been contemplated by the government. At a time when 
the government is struggling to encourage agriculture, this 
restriction on companies appears to be a retrogressive step. 
A simple solution would, therefore, be to permit a company 
to have as many farms as the number of its shareholders who 
would individually qualify for a farm.
4. Enforcement of Compliance with the Conditions
The control of scheduled farms is not limited to the
exercise of consent to land transfers by the Board. The
Agricultural Lands Act requires the tenant to occupy the
70land and satisfy the required development standards, and
the Agricultural Lands Board not only to monitor the use
being made of agricultural land but also to enforce
development requirements. This the Board does through the
Office of the Commissioner of Lands. However, the problem
of farm inspection has plagued the Office of the
Commissioner of Lands since the establishment of the Board.
Since 1977, the Board has repeatedly expressed
dissatisfaction at the failure of the Lands Department to
carry out systematic inspections of all scheduled farms. In
1977, one of the members of the Board reported to the Board
that many farms, especially in Chisamba (Central Province),
were either not being utilised by their owners, or had been
allowed by the owners to be occupied by villagers who had no 
71title to them. At the time, the explanation of the
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Commissioner of Lands was that his department was facing 
dire transport problems which prevented it from carrying out 
tours of farms. Further reports of squatters on scheduled 
farms were made by members of the Board in 1979, with the
addition that villagers were indiscriminately cutting wood
72 . . . . .for charcoal. Such complaints against inactivity by the
Office of the Commissioner of Lands were repeated in the
73 . . 74same year, and subsequently m  the following year. The
Board noted that some farms were out of production while
others were completely abandoned. On each of these
occasions, the Commissioner of Lands pointed out that the
problem was that of transport.
Some structural changes have, however, been cited as
being, in part, responsible. During the colonial era, there
was a category of land officers designated as "farm rangers"
who resided in various districts for purposes of monitoring
75farm development within their respective local districts.
After independence, these officers rushed to the capital in
the expectation of better opportunities. Although the Lands
Department has three provincial offices - in the Southern,
Eastern and Copperbelt Provinces, it has no offices in the
remaining six provinces. It was explained, moreover, that
even in the provinces, where these offices exist, vehicles
for farm inspection have broken down and not been repaired
7 6for lack of spare parts. Farm inspections in Mkushi area 
(Central Province) where farmers had applied for extension 
of their leases from thirty years to ninety-nine years, were 
carried out because the farmers themselves provided 
transport for land officers from Lusaka to Mkushi.
Faced with transport problems, the Lands Department has
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resorted to asking those who come for inquiries about land
to carry out a search and report to the department if there
is any farm which, to their knowledge, has been abandoned,
. . 77or is not being utilised. By such means, the Commissioner
of Lands is made aware of the location of undeveloped land.
The only problem with this means of information is that if
the person who has "discovered" it is unsuitable under the
various criteria, then the Board is placed in the
embarrassing position of having to refuse its consent to the
alienation of the farm to the individual even if he has been
put to such trouble. The Lands Department has sought to
take advantage of the governments decentralisation policy
by requesting local authorities to co-operate with the
department by monitoring the progress of farms within their
respective districts, but the response from local
78authorities has not been encouraging.
5. Evaluation
The reasons for passing the Agricultural Lands Act have 
been discussed in Chapter One. The impact of the Act after 
twenty-five years is decidedly small. This arises from the 
relatively small number of farms which fall under the Act. 
The exercise of control even for scheduled land is fraught 
with various difficulties. The Agricultural Lands Act is a 
colonial legacy based on a different mode of agricultural 
production. It seeks to base agriculture on those who have 
financial resources and a decided element of experience of
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commercial farming. Only in those cases where there are 
more than one applicant who are of equal standing can the 
Board give preference to the competitor who is not already 
the holder of agricultural land. Agricultural development 
was to be attained by a small elite of commercial farmers. 
With the coming of independence, and a change in emphasis 
from production by a small elite class to the masses, the 
Act is inappropriate.
In order to permit access to scheduled land to Zambians 
whose qualifications and financial position is not sound, 
the Board has been forced to gloss over some of the 
provisions of the Act - to the extent of permitting the 
employment of farm managers, when the Act only permits this 
in respect of companies. Where, as in this case, the 
provisions of an Act are not in keeping with existing 
values, there are bound to be inconsistencies in its 
application. The Board has, in the application of the Act, 
shown strictness in some cases and flexibility in others. 
Perhaps this is inevitable for a body such as the 
Agricultural Lands Board, and indeed it may be argued that 
the seriousness with which the Board should take the various 
considerations must depend on such factors as the demand for 
farm land and the economic and political environment at any 
given time. In the mid-1970s political pressure was brought 
to bear on the Agricultural Lands Board to give farms to 
those Zambians who did not have any, hence the relaxation of 
conditions - for instance the acceptance of experience 
acquired on a farm in Reserves or Trustland (tribal lands) 
as adequate "qualifications". But towards the close of the 
seventies the government was more interested in production
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figures rather than equal opportunity - hence the greater 
emphasis on experience and capital.
It is also important to add that the economic situation 
prevailing in the country plays an important role on whether 
or not land is being properly utilised. The availability of 
agricultural credit, the cost of agricultural inputs, and 
the producer prices offered to farmers will determine not 
only whether a farmer grows crops or goes into ranching, but 
also the degree or extent to which he will develop his farm. 
Hence farm inspections on their own accompanied by the 
threat of deprivation of the farm may not necessarily lead 
to farm development, unless the farmer was not interested in 
farming in the first place.
Nevertheless, if agricultural development is to be 
achieved, a rational approach to land allocation must be 
worked out. Scheduled land is not the only agricultural 
land. It is not socially unfair, therefore, to exclude 
unsuitable or incompetent people from them. A realistic 
approach would be to encourage applicants who are suitable, 
in terms of capital and experience, to have these farms 
irrespective of whether they already own a farm. Companies 
in this respect need special consideration to free them from 
the rule against land accumulation. Constant monitoring of 
farms is necessary to ensure that those without the means 
who presumably wanted a farm as future security or merely 
for housing themselves can be forced out and encouraged to 
try elsewhere, for instance on tribal land. Farm 
inspections have been hampered by the absence of transport 
facilities. The solution would appear to be the residence 
in various districts of land officers through the
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decentralisation of the Lands Department. This may permit 
the Agricultural Lands Board, which meets only quarterly, to 
monitor farm development in various districts.
C. COMPULSORY ACQUISITION AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
1. Compulsory Acquisition Prior to 1970
While scheduled agricultural land could be controlled 
by the Agricultural Lands Board government was powerless to 
control agricultural land under freehold tenure, prior to 
1975. In the meantime the need for such control had become 
more urgent, as numerous farms had been either vacated or 
left undeveloped by European landholders who had opted to 
leave the country following independence. What was needed 
was new legislation that would enable the government to take 
over vacant and undeveloped land for alienation to the 
public.
Before the enactment of the Lands Acquisition Act,
7 9
1970 the governments power to acquire land compulsorily
8 0was very limited. Section 18 of the constitution provided
"(1) No property of any description shall be 
compulsorily taken possession of, and no 
interest in or right over property of any 
description shall be compulsorily 
acquired except where the following 
conditions are satisfied, that is to 
say -
a) the taking of possession or 
acquisition is necessary or 
expedient -
Ill
i) in the interests of defence, 
public safety, public order, 
public morality, public health, 
town and country planning or 
land settlement;
ii) in order to secure the develop­
ment or utilization of that, or 
other property for a purpose 
beneficial to the community; 
and
b) provision is made by a law applicable 
to that taking of possession or 
acquisition -
i) for the prompt payment of 
adequate compensation; and
ii) securing to any person having an 
interest in or right over the 
property a right of access to a 
court or other authority for the 
determination of his interest or 
right, the legality of the taking 
of possession or acquisition of 
the property, interest or right 
and the amount of any 
compensation to which he is 
entitled, and for the purpose of 
obtaining prompt payment of that 
compensation.”
Subsection (2) provided, further, that if the above
conditions were satisfied, any person who was entitled to
compensation under it was not to be prevented from remitting
the whole compensation within reasonable time of receiving
it to any country of his choice outside Zambia. As part of
Chapter III of the constitution which dealt with the
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, section 18
81could not be amended without a referendum being held.
Section 18 was seen as yet another obstacle which the
British had introduced primarily to protect the interests of
82the white minority under a black government. As James 
puts it "obviously these entrenched provisions were an 
attempt by the outgoing British government to secure the 
continued exploitation of independent Zambia by the settlers 
and to protect their rights to property although many of
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83them had already left the country permanently”. The
President was, therefore, expressing the general opinion
when in 1969 he told the General Council of UNIP: "As
humanists we are dedicated to the upholding of the
protection of fundamental rights and the freedom of the
individual. However, property rights must be subject to the
common good and to the general interests of the community.
The existing section 18 of the constitution must be examined
84and replaced by more realistic provisions".
Like the constitution, the colonial Public Lands
Acquisition Ordinance (which at independence became an Act)
was too restrictive with regard to the purposes for which
compulsory acquisition could be effected. This ordinance
contained the limitation that land could only be acquired
85for "public purposes" as statutorily defined. The 
government was, therefore, handicapped both under the 
constitution whose conditions did not include alienatio to 
other private farmers and the ordinance which also failed to 
permit acquisition of land which was either vacant or 
undeveloped.
Governments first step was to mount a campaign and hold
a referendum which would have the effect of amending section
18 as well as section 72 itself under which fundamental
freedoms were entrenched so that in future further
amendments could be introduced without further referenda.
In his campaign, the then Minister for Information,
Broadcasting and Tourism, Mr Sikota Wina explained:
"Armed by Parliament with powers to acquire 
land, Government will be in a position to take 
possession of vast amounts of good 
agricultural land which is now neither worked 
nor occupied by the registered owners.*' -
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He stated that in Southern and Central Provinces there were
4 00,000 acres of such land. In the Chisamba area there were
14 such farms, Mazabuka had four, Mwomboshi, two. Some
unused farms were also to be found in the Eastern, Northern
and Western Provinces which, according to him, government
87could take over.
On the 17th of June 1969 the government secured the
desired majority vote in the referendum and subsequently
introduced five amendments to the constitution. Section 72
was amended by the deletion of subsection 3, thereby
88removing the requirement of referendum. By another
amendment, the orginal section 18 was repealed and replaced
89by a new section 18. This section enabled government to
acquire land compulsorily under a law relating to, inter 
alia "abandoned, unoccupied, unutilised or undeveloped land"
and a law relating to "absent or non-resident owners" as
90defined in such law. Following the constitutional
91amendments, the Lands Acquisition Act was passed and
92became law on the 10th of February, 1970.
2. The Lands Acquisition Act, 1970
(a) Procedure for Acquisition
Section 3 of the Lands Acquisition Act states that the 
President may "whenever he is of the opinion that it is 
desirable or expedient in the interests of the Republic so 
to do compulsorily acquire any property of any description".
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The expression "in the opinion" of the President would seem 
to confer a discretionary power in the President so that his 
determination whether or not the acquisition is in the 
interests of the Republic cannot be contested in a law 
court. This was the view taken by the Supreme Court of
Zambia in the case of Nkumbula v. The Attorney-General for
93 . . . .Zambia. In this case, deliverying judgement, Baron, J.P.,
said:
"the words 'in the opinion of the President' 
clearly make the matter one for the subjective 
decision of the President and it has never 
been doubted that a decision made under a 
power expressed in such terms cannot be 
challenged unless it can be shown that the 
person vested with the power acted in bad 
faith or from improper motives or extraneous 
considerations or under a view of the facts or 
the law which could not reasonably be
entertained." .94
Although the above reasoning would appear to have
settled the issue, some doubt has been expressed by the
Commissioner of Lands regarding the extent of the
discretionary power conferred on the President under section
3. In a minute to the Permanent Secretary the Commissioner
of Lands said:
"In my view it is not proper to use section 3 
of the Lands Acquisition Act when you are not 
of the opinion it is desirable so to do and 
when your real and dominant intention is 
merely to alienate land to an individual. And 
any person with a locus standi in matters of 
this nature and who would show that the real 
and dominant purpose of acquiring the property 
is merely to facilitate alienation of property 
to an individual for private purposes and no 
more, is likely to succeed in court in 
invalidating the Presidential declaration of 
opinion under section 3 of the Lands 
Acquisition Act CAP 296."95
In other words, the relevant section has failed to express
fully the intention of the government as expressed by the
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President in his address to the National Council and the
Minister to the National Assembly when introducing the Bill.
With the greatest respect to the Commissioner of Lands his
views cannot be supported. He seems to have equated the
expression "in the interest of the Republic" with the
expression "public purposes", so that the land acquired must
be used for specific government projects. Further, one
might well argue that it is "in the interest(s) of the
Republic" that farms which are not productive must be
acquired for purposes of alienation to members of the public
who wish to develop them for the common good. As it
happens, in of the views of the Commissioner of Lands,
government has compulsorily acquired farms which have been
turned over to individuals to develop.
Once the President has resolved that it is "desirable
or expedient in the interests of the Republic" to acquire a
given property, the Minister serves a notice referred to as
a "Notice of Intention to Acquire Property" to the persons
9 6interested in such property. This notice invites 
interested persons to submit their claim to the Minister
within four weeks of the publication of the notice in the
97 .Gazette. Section 7 relates to the service of notices.
The notice can be served either personally on the interested
parties or by leaving it at their last usual place of
residence or business. If any of the interested parties is
outside the country, or where he or his last usual place of
residence or business cannot be traced after a reasonable
inquiry, it is sufficient to serve the notice on the
occupier of the property and, where there is none, to affix
it on some conspicuous part of such property. It is also
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provided that every notice should be published in the
Gazette "as soon as may be practicable" after service in the
manner prescribed regarding the service of notices. So long
as the notice has been published in the Gazette, the
acquisition of the property is not invalidated on account of
any irregularity in the service of the notice to any
interested parties or its publication prior to it being
98served on interested parties.
If the President wishes to take possession of the
property, the Minister serves a "Notice to Yield up
Possession" on the parties entitled to the property under
section 5, within such period, not less than two months from
99the date of service of the notice, as he may determine.
The President may, however, certify that the property in
question is urgently required, in which case the party
served with the notice has to yield up possession within
such shorter period as the President may direct. On the
expiration of such period, the President or any person
authorised by him may take possession of the property.
Where a notice to acquire property has been published
in the Gazette the persons on whom the notice has been
served must, "notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law or in any order of any court
otherwise than under such notice, transfer the same to the
President".100 In default of such transfer the Minister may
make an application (in the prescribed form) to the
Registrar of Lands and Deeds for an entry to be made in the
Register recording the compulsory acquisition of the 
101land. The Minister must then execute an affidavit to the
effect that the procedure for acquisition was complied with,
183
whereupon the Registrar, if so satisfied, will then record
. . . 102the compulsory acquisition of the land.
Where a transfer to the President has been registered 
or the Registrar has made an entry in the register recording 
the compulsory acquisition "such transfer or entry shall 
vest the land in question in the President free from all 
adverse or competing rights, title, trust, charges, claims
or demands whatsoever, but subject to any terms and
. . . . 103conditions contained m  such transfer or entry".
(b) Compensation
Under section 10, where any property is acquired by the 
President in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the 
Minister must (out of money provided by Parliamentary vote), 
pay such compensation in money as may be agreed between the 
government and the party and, in default of agreement, a sum 
determined in accordance with provisions in the Act. There 
is a proviso permitting the President, with the agreement of 
the party entitled to compensation, to substitute a parcel 
of State Land of, at least, the same value as the land 
acquired. No advantage, however, has been taken of this 
proviso.
The Act also prescribes the principles for assessing 
104compensation. In brief, these principles are that no
allowance should be made on account of the acquisition being 
compulsory; the value of the property is that which it might 
be expected to realise if sold on the open market; the 
special suitability or adaptability of the property for any 
purpose should not be taken into account if such purpose is
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one to which it could be applied only in pursuance of 
statutory powers, or for which there is no market apart from 
the special needs of a particular purchaser; no allowance 
should be made on account of improvements effected after the 
publication of the notice to yield up possession; and no 
allowance is to be made for any probable enhancement in the 
future of the value of the land to be acquired.
Compensation is not payable in all cases, however. The 
Act draws a distinction between land for which compensation 
is payable and that for which it is not. Section 15(1) 
states:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
Act or any other law, but subject to 
subsection (2 ), no compensation shall be 
payable in respect of undeveloped land or 
unutilised land."
Under subsection (2), except where the land required is
105 .unutilised land to which an "absentee owner" is 
beneficially entitled, compensation is payable in respect of 
all the unexhausted i m p r o v e m e n t s . T h i s  is one provision 
which is intended to hit absentee landlords severely. 
Notwithstanding that an absentee landlord has effected 
unexhausted improvements on his land, so long as he is not 
utilising it, no compensation is payable to him. To those 
who are not absentee owners compensation is payable to the 
value of the unexhausted improvements.
Of great importance to the owner must be the meaning of 
the term "unutilised" in relation to land. In so far as it 
relates to land in a rural area, land is deemed to be 
unutilised "if, having regard to the character and situation 
of the land and all other relevant circumstances, the 
exploitation of the land is not in accordance with good
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107 . . . .estate management". This definition would seem to imply
that the government has to examine the land in question in
terms of actual agricultural potential and compare its use
with the use being made of other land in the same location,
and also determine whether, given its potential, the land is
being used properly. It might be easier to tell, on
visiting the farm, whether it is being properly utilised or
not, rather than attempt a definition of what amounts to
'good estate management'. If only a small proportion of the
land, being ideal for arable farming, is under cultivation
while the rest is used for grazing, it would be "unutilised"
within subsection 4. It must be conceded, however, that it
is a very difficult test to apply and must, therefore,
require the services of qualified land use officers.
Compensation is not payable for undeveloped land 
irrespective of whether the owner is an absentee owner, as 
defined in the statute, or is resident in the country. As a 
general principle, land is deemed to be undeveloped if it is
"inadequately developed bearing in mind the national need
108...". There is no definition of national need, thus, the
government has a wide scope within which to determine 
whether land is developed or undeveloped. Some guidelines 
are, however, provided. Land does not cease to be 
undeveloped by reason only, (a) that it has been fenced or 
hedged? or (b) that it has been cleared, levelled or 
ploughed? or (c) that it consists of a cleared or partially 
cleared site of some former development; or (d) that it is 
being used otherwise than as ancillary to adjacent land 
which is not undeveloped or unutilised. A proviso, which 
applies exclusively to land in a rural area, however,
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states:
"Provided that in the case of land in a rural 
area which is being used for agricultural, 
pastoral, or mixed agricultural and pastoral 
purposes, the land shall not be deemed to be 
undeveloped unless such land has not been used 
for cultivation or pastorage ... at any time 
during the period of two years immediately 
preceding the publication of the notice to 
yield up possession.
The effect of this proviso is to make rural agricultural
land which has been cleared, or ploughed attract
compensation unless it has not been utilised for a period of
two years immediately preceding the notice to yield up
possession. It must be borne in mind, however, that the
amplification of the definition of "undeveloped" does not
derogate from the generality of the broad definition which
involves "national need". The import of these provisions is
to give the government limitless power to withhold
compensation. It is, obviously, unfair that those who have
expended their capital on clearing and fencing land should
not be compensated, particularly that government will make a
charge for such improvements when it disposes of the land.
On the other hand, owners of unutilised land on which there
are unexhausted improvements whose definition includes
clearing and fencing are entitled to compensation. There
appears to be no logical reason to treat the two cases
differently.
(c) Settlement of Disputes
The Act provides two different avenues for the 
settlement of disputes. Disputes are divided into two 
categories - those which do not involve the quantum of
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compensation and those that do. Under section 11 if, within
six weeks after the publication in the Gazette of the notice
to yield up possession, there remains outstanding any
dispute relating to or in connection with the property
(other than a dispute as to the amount of compensation), the
Minister or any person claiming any interest in the
property, may institute proceedings in the court for the
determination of such dispute. Such a dispute might relate
to the acquisition procedure, in particular, to whether
compensation is payable or not. In view of the wide scope
of interpretation of expressions such as "unutilised" and
"undeveloped" the likelihood of such disputes arising is
very minimal. There is provision, however, that the
existence of any dispute does not affect the right of the
President to take possession of the property, provided that
where the dispute relates to whether compensation is payable
or not, possession may be taken only after the Minister has
paid into court an amount he regards as "just 
110compensation".
Any dispute pertaining to the amount of compensation 
jS expressly outside the jurisdiction of the courts. It 
must be referred either by the Minister or the party 
disputing the sum, to the National Assembly whose 
determination is final. Similarly, such a dispute does not 
prevent the President from taking possession of the property 
provided the Minister pays into court compensation deemed to 
be just.
The above brief description comprises the framework of 
the legislation for compulsory acquisition of land meant to 
enable the government to acquire all undeveloped and
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unutilised land for re-alienation to persons who will 
develop it.
(d) Implementation
In s|a»te. of the publicity attending the need for a new 
legislation on compulsory acquisition, the Lands Acquisition 
Act has proved to be a cumbersome and difficult one to 
implement. In terms of achieving its original object, the 
Act has been a failure. The problems which have been
encountered are divisible into legal constraints and 
practical constraints.
(i) Legal constraints
The problem often facing the Lands Department arising 
from the inadequacy of the law relates to marking off. 
Section 8 of the Lands Acquisition Act allows the government 
to acquire a portion of land as opposed to the entire land 
owned by the individual. Section 8 makes no provision for 
the legal means to carry out this type of acquisition. When 
government wishes to acquire compulsorily part of an 
individual's land, there is no legal machinery by which the 
President can become the registered proprietor of the 
required piece. For the President to obtain title to only a 
portion of the property, it is necessary to mark off the 
required portion from the rest of the land. There is no 
provision, however, compelling the registered proprietor to 
surrender his title documents for purposes of marking off. 
This inadequacy in the law has frustrated attempts by the 
government to acquire a part only of the land, particularly
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where such part would not attract compensation.
In practice, partial acquisition has had to be 
abandoned in some cases. This has been in instances where 
an individual owns a large farm, with a building erected in 
one corner of the farm. The remainder of the farm would be 
unutilised and undeveloped, thus falling under the category 
of land for which compensation would not be payable. When 
no funds have been available to enable the government to 
acquire the whole property and pay compensation in respect 
of the buildings in one corner of the farm, acquisition has 
had to be abandoned. There is, therefore, an urgent need to 
amend the Lands Acquisition Act to facilitate the 
acquisition of portions by the government.
Moreover, there is an apparent conflict between
sections 2 and 20. Section 2 defines land as including "any
interest in or right over land but shall not include a
mortgage or other charge", but under section 20 where a
transfer to the President is registered under section 19
such transfer or entry will vest the land in the President
free from adverse or competing rights or charges. The
Registrar of Lands and Deeds is, therefore, reluctant to
register the President as the owner of land which has
112an outstanding mortgage on it. Registration would
have the effect of defeating the mortgage and leave the 
mortgagee unsecured and thus look only to the mortgagor for 
the repayment of the loan or sue the mortgagor on the 
personal covenant to repay. Hence the reluctance on the 
part of the Registrar to register the President as owner.
One significant case where the Registrar has declined is
113that of the Mumbwa Concession area, discussed by Mvunga.
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Concessionaires in this area, who had since left the country 
had obtained mortgages from various money lending 
institutions in the hope of exploiting minerals. Mineral 
prospects, however, revealed no minerals and subsequently 
the owners abandoned the area. When the same land became 
subject to compulsory acquisition, the Lands Department was 
constrained by the outstanding mortgages on it.
(ii) Practical constraints
The practical constraints which have inhibited the 
application of the Lands Acquisition Act are;
i) the multiplicity of land administration agencies;
ii) the absence of or shortage of skilled manpower;
iii) procedural delays; and
iv) lack of funds for compensation.
1) Multiplicity of land adminitration agencies
The Lands Department is forced to work in conjunction 
with several other government departments to effect 
compulsory acquisition. It depends on the co-operation of 
the Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Water Development to assess the state of agricultural 
land. Land use officers must, therefore, be available for 
the use of the Lands Department. These officers cannot be 
compelled to help because they are outside the 
administrative control of the Lands Department.
The Lands Department also depends on the services of 
valuers in the Department of Valuation in the Ministry of 
Provincial and Local Government. Their services are 
invaluable, because the amount of compensation depends on
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114their valuation. The Valuation Department, for its part,
is facing acute shortage of skilled staff. As a result 
these are not always available to the Lands Department to 
determine the value of properties to be acquired. This also 
results in delays in the compulsory acquisition 
procedure.115
The Lands Department also depends on the officers of
the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources to issue notices
of acquisitions to the persons interested in the property
inviting them to submit their claims to the Minister within
116four weeks of publication in the Gazette. In some cases
the claims of interested parties sent to the Minister’s 
Office have not been promptly forwarded to the Lands 
Department. In such instances the Lands Department may 
proceed to acquire under the impression that all interested 
persons have had notices but have chosen not to respond when 
in fact their claims have been held up by red tape. When it 
later transpires that the responses of the interested 
parties have not been taken into account, the process of 
acquisition must be recommenced. To take an example, when 
the Lands Department was acquiring land for a Site and 
Service Scheme financed by the World Bank Housing Project in 
Lusaka, one of the interested parties who had submitted his 
claim to the Minister’s Office discovered that in fact his 
claim was never forwarded to the Lands Department.
Eventually the claimant raised the issue, the entire 
exercise had to be recommenced. Amendments to the Act could 
be made so that interested parties do not have to forward 
their claims to the Minister, but to the Department of Lands 
directly. In this way, the possibility of claims being lost
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or delayed through red tape could be eliminated.
2) Lack of skilled manpower
The Lands Department has no surveyors attached to it.
As a result of this handicap, it sometimes resorts to using
its own unskilled staff to do a surveyor’s job. The need
for skilled manpower was brought to light in January 1976.
On the 30th June 1975, the President in his "watershed
speech" instructed that all undeveloped land in and around
cities, and municipal townships should be compulsorily
acquired and alienated to people interested in developing 
117the same. In an attempt to implement this directive, the
Lands Department sent its field officers to locate all 
vacant and undeveloped land. What was actually needed was 
for the surveyors to locate the plots and then clearly mark 
out the boundaries. The field officers that were sent 
muddled up the exercise. As they were not certain about the 
boundaries, they recommended the acquisition of some farms 
under the mistaken impression that they were undeveloped 
when, in fact, there were some buildings situated in the 
corners of the farms. The Assistant Commissioner of Lands 
was forced to verify each and every report for himself. The
problem of lack of skilled staff is compounded by the 
complex provisions in the Lands Acquisition Act itself 
whose definitions of "undeveloped" or "unutilised" are not 
easy to apply in practice. One initial step to minimise the 
effects arising from the absence of skilled manpower would 
be to give on-the-job training to land officers. A more 
helpful suggestion would be to simplify the definitions of 
"undeveloped" land by imposing a minimum value of
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improvements that must be met if the land is to be said to 
be developed. In this way, with the help of valuation 
officers, the question of whether compensation should be 
paid would be easier to determine and the quantum of such 
compensation easier to assess.
3) Delays
Under the Act, the procedure for acquisition is 
supposed to be set in motion by the President's decision 
that "it is desirable or expedient in the interests of the 
Republic to acquire" any property. The President's decision 
is communicated to the Lands Department through the Minister 
of Lands and Natural Resources, and upon such communication, 
the Department proceeds to acquire the property in question. 
The common practice, however, is that the decision to 
acquire property does not emanate from the President but 
from government ministries and parastatal bodies which might 
need land for development projects. Such ministries and 
bodies inform the Commissioner of Lands of their interest in 
certain property and the use to which they intend to put it. 
Thereupon the Commissioner of Lands communicates the request 
to the Minister who, for his part, will seek the 
Presidential resolution. Invariably, this is the procedure 
in cases where the government wishes to acquire unutilised 
or undeveloped land because the President is in no position 
to know which property is undeveloped or vacant. Because 
the initiative is from the bottom and not from the top there 
has been delay in securing the decision of the President.
Delay is also caused by the cumbersome procedure for 
compulsory acquisition. Under section 5 a "Notice of
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Intention" must first be served, and thereafter published in 
the Gazette "as soon as practicable". Then there is a 
"Notice to Yield up Possession" which must undergo the same 
process. It has sometimes happened that as soon as the 
interested party is served with the notice of intention to 
acquire, he has proceeded to make improvements which will 
attract compensation in the hope that government will, being 
short of money, be deterred. Such a course is possible 
because under section 12 relating to the assessment of 
compensation, the rule that the assessing body should not 
take into account improvements on the property is restricted 
to those improvements effected after publication in the 
Gazette of the "Notice to Yield up Possession". Between the 
service and publications of the two notices there is time 
for an owner of agricultural land to make a few improvements 
for which compensation must be paid. It is, of course, 
possible to combine the two notices required and there is a 
prescribed form for such a combined notice, but in such 
cases the President must certify that the land is urgently 
required and there may be a delay in obtaining such a 
certificate just as there is, often, a delay in obtaining 
the Presidential decision.
As, in practice, the President does not initiate the
process of acquisition and his role is purely a mechanical
one, delay could be eliminated if he could delegate his
powers under the Act to the Minister. This is not possible
in the present form of the Act as the President's
determination is a discretionary one and, at common law, a
118discretionary power cannot be delegated. A possible 
solution would be to recast section 3 of the Act and vest
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the powers in the Minister, so that he, and the Commissioner 
of Lands, between them, can compulsorily acquire property 
without reference to the President.
4) Financial constraints
The Lands Department requires money to pay out as
compensation for property acquired. To this end, Parliament
allocates funds which go into the Compensation Fund of the
Department. This money is required in two specific
situations. The first is where there is no dispute as to
the amount of compensation in which case the money must be
paid to the claimant. The second is when there is a dispute
either as to the amount of compensation or whether or not
compensation is payable. In such a situation the Minister
119must pay into court an amount he considers as "just".
The government has, from time to time, made allocations for 
this purpose, but such allocations have, often, been 
inadequate. This does not, of course, impede the 
acquisition of undeveloped land which, in any event, is not 
the subject of compensation, but will impede the acquisition 
of unutilised land on which there are improvements unless 
the land is owned by absentee owners. But even where there 
is a dispute as to whether land is developed, money has to 
be paid into court, pending the determination of this 
question by the court.
In the face of financial constraints, the Lands 
Department has, largely, confined its acquisitions to
undeveloped land or unutilised land held by absentee land
120 . . owners. Where a government ministry or parastatal body
has shown interest in a particular property for a given
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project, they have been asked to provide the funds with 
which to compensate the property owners. Presumably the 
same could be extended to private individuals interested in 
unutilised land for which compensation is required.
The available figures in the Lands Department have been 
compiled on the basis of the total number of acquisitions in 
each province. There is no breakdown showing the 
distribution of acquired properties over districts and the 
use to which the properties have been put. In general, 
however, it may be asserted that acquisition has been 
concentrated (over properties) in Lusaka Province, followed 
by the Eastern and the Southern Provinces. Between January 
1975 and December 1980 a total of 439 properties were 
compulsorily acquired, and by far the largest number was in 
Lusaka Province. In the order of importance the uses to 
which these properties have been put are residential, 
industrial and commercial, and agricultural. Properties 
acquired for agricultural use have, however, been limited to 
the establishment of settlements under various schemes. 
Little use seems to have been made of the Act to release 
land and alienate it to productive farmers. The reason 
could be the problem of funds to compensate owners of 
unutilised farms, and the practical difficulties which have 
faced the Lands Department.
The importance of the Lands Acquisition Act as a means 
of enabling government to control the use of agricultural
land has largely been superseded by the Land (Conversion of
121 . .Titles) Act, 1975 which abolished freeholds, and in their
place, introduced a system of statutory leases with
development covenants, the non-compliance with which leads
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to forfeiture, attached to it.
D. THE LAND TENURE REFORMS OF 1975 AND LAND CONTROL
1. Genesis of Land Tenure Reforms
(a) The Land Commission of 1965
On the 24th of November, 1964 a Cabinet Land Policy
Committee was established "to review all aspects of land
policy which were inherited on independence and to submit
122recommendations on a comprehensive Zambian land policy".
It was also decided that better results would be achieved in
this exercise if this Committee could appoint a commission
under an independent chairman to collect data for the use of
the Committee. In June 1965, the Land Commission was
appointed to collect information on various aspects of land
law, in particular land tenure and report to the Cabinet
123Committee together with recommendations. The Commission
was well-briefed regarding government views on land policy
that it must be geared towards confining the use of
agricultural land to agricultural uses; controlling the
quantity of land that may be held by a single person?
enforcement of proper land use; and securing, for the
benefit of the community, any increments realised through
124public expenditure.
The Commission submitted its report in 1967. In 
general terms, the Commission recommended inter alia that
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the Orders-in-Council should be revoked and replaced by a
Land Administration Act which would regulate the making of
original grants of title, and provide for the unification of
land administration and an integrated land tenure system;
that the law applicable to land held under statutory tenure
should be amended, simplified and enacted as part of the
legislation of the country rather than the received law; and
that a system of registered title should be introduced and
made applicable to land held under both statutory tenure and
125customary land tenure.
Appended to the Report are draft bills to effectuate
the Commission's recommendations. These draft bills have
been the subject of serious criticism. The proposed
legislation is said to be an indication of the failure of
the Commission to grapple with the issues involved in long 
126term reform. The draft Property and Conveyancing Bill is
a renumbered version of the English Law of Property Act,
1925 with its emphasis on the protection of property rights.
While the Commission supported the existing practice of
urban grants on leasehold tenure" with no option to
convert", it advocated the extension and protection of
grants in fee simple in agricultural lands. The inclination
of the members of the Commission towards the English law of
real property may be attributed to the fact that they had
been trained exclusively in Anglo-American law. James's
review of the Commission's Report is highly critical:
"Having regard to the Reports of Commissioner 
Troup and the 1943 Land Tenure Committee a 
strong case needs to be argued to support 
freehold tenure. No case was argued by the 
Commission, which seems to have been totally 
unaware of the vast sums spent over the years 
to devise a system necessary to stimulate and 
sustain agricultural development in
199
Zambia."127
The Commission's Report was neither officially rejected nor 
adopted by government, but later legislation has shown total 
disregard for its recommendations. For example, the Trust 
Restrictions Act, 1970128, despite the Commission's 
recommendations of elaborate trust for sale provisions 
abolished (except in a few cases) the creation of 
settlements and trusts.
(b) The Land Reform Proposals of 1970
In 1970 there was a move to introduce some reform in
the tenure of agricultural land the effect of which would
have been the repeal of the Agricultural Lands Act and its
replacement with another. The main purpose was to prevent
the selling of agricultural land "at a higher price than
129originally bought". Alienation, whether by sale or gift,
of freehold land, without the consent of the Minister was to 
be prohibited. Freehold title would no longer be granted.
In his draft speech to the Cabinet, the then Minister for 
Lands, Mr Kalulu explained the rationale of the reform as 
being that the Agricultural Lands Act contained a loop hole
which frustrated efforts to control transfers of
13 0agricultural land. Under the Agricultural Lands Act
consent is required for any transfer of land, but the Act 
also permitted the lessee of scheduled land to purchase the 
freehold from the State, the option to purchase, and a 
leaseholder who was desirous of circumventing the 
requirement of consent to assign, merely exercised the 
option to purchase, and with his freehold tenure he could
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transfer his land to whom he wished.
These proposals did not, however, prove popular in the 
Lands Department. The then Acting Commissioner of Lands,
Mr. D.I. McDougal was concerned with the limitation of the 
sale price to "no higher than originally bought". He 
expressed the view that this limitation would produce absurd 
results:
"For instance, if Mr Banda paid K3,000 for 
1,500 acres of unimproved land in 1967, is he 
to be restricted to selling in 1977 to the K50 
originally paid to the B.S.A. Company in 1907? 
Similarly, one cannot expect C.O.Z. or any 
other source of finance to welcome legislation 
which will deflate the security of their 
mortgages in this way-Mi3i
He argued, further, that the prohibition of the profit
motive would have the effect of stifling development because
a landholder would not want to sell an undeveloped portion
of his farm if he was not going to gain, financially, from
so doing. In any event, as the Attorney-General pointed
out, freehold tenure, by its very nature, granted the
landholder the right to dispose of his property as he
wished. The solution, therefore, lay in abolishing freehold
tenure altogether, and the Minister proposed to make the
132following recommendations to Cabinet:
i) All freehold should be converted to 
leasehold;
ii) The Cabinet should authorise the 
Minister for Lands and Natural Resources 
to pay compensation to persons losing 
their freehold title?
iii) Leases should be for any number of years 
not exceeding 100 years;
iv) The right to convert leasehold land to 
freehold should be discontinued?
v) Developers of land in the Reserves 
should be given leasehold titles to 
State land if they so desire.
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All these recommendations (except that relating to
compensation) were incorporated in the land reforms of 1975
133under the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act, 1975. They
were also consistent with the policy of the ruling Party 
which had, from time to time, been announced by the 
President. Before discussing the reforms, Party policy on 
land tenure needs to be addressed as it throws some light on 
the nature of reforms that should have been expected.
(c) Party Policy on Land Tenure
The land tenure reforms of 1975 should be seen in the 
light of economic reforms which began with the President's 
announcement to the United National Independence Party's
, , , 134
National Council at Mulungushi in 1968. In April, 1968,
the President invited a number of companies with strong ties
with Rhodesia and South Africa to offer, at least, 51% of
135their shares to the government. The following year, the 
President extended the invitation to mining companies. In 
1970, the President asked foreign companies to transfer 
their businesses to the government, or offer 51% of their 
shares to the Industrial Development Corporation, a 
parastatal body. Foreign insurance companies were directed 
to wind up their affairs so as to leave room for the Zambia 
State Insurance Corporation. The President also directed 
expatriates in the retail trading industry to transfer their 
businesses to Zambians as their trading licences would not 
be renewed.136
It was soon realised, however, that these economic
202
reforms would encourage the emergence of a separate economic
class which would exploit the less fortunate masses.
Against this background, the President directed his
attention to positive actions for the implementation of his
philosophy of humanism. In his paper entitled "Exploitation
of Man by Man" read at the Mulungushi conference of 1970 he
analysed the impending problems and laid down guidelines for
legislative reform. One major concern was the enunciation
of a "Leadership Code", to prevent a leader from, inter
alia, letting his private house, while continuing to occupy
government housing. Another concern of the paper was a
programme of land reform aimed at preventing the trend of
137land accumulation by affluent Zambians. At the same
time, the new land tenure system must be capable of
138promoting proper land utilisation and conservation.
To those who were familiar with Party policy on land
matters, the land tenure reforms could not have come as a
complete surprise, but, in so far as these policies did not
take any concrete legal form, they could not dispel the
insecurity felt by many European farmers, a factor which had
139a considerable effect on agricultural production. The
Party's land policy was contained in the President's own
policy document, Humanism in Zambia and A Guide to its
140Implementation. It is clear from this document that land
policy was influenced by cultural and economic factors. It
is stated that land must remain the property of the State.
It conceded that this is no departure from the society's
traditional values:
"Land was never bought. It came to belong to 
individuals through usage and the passage of 
time. Even then, the Chief and the elders had 
overall control although ... this was done on
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behalf of all the people."141
Reform was necessary to ensure that agricultural land was
productive for the benefit of the economy. This could not
be done under a capitalist system which permitted land
speculation.
While committing himself not to interfere with
individual property rights, the President, in the same
document, expressed his abhorrence of what he called
142"absentee landlordism", an expression used to refer to 
ownership of land by persons not ordinarily resident in the 
country. Although not expressly mentioned in the document, 
the evil in "absentee landlordism" is not necessarily the 
fact that the landholder is resident outside the country, 
but that he is holding on to the land, not with the 
intention of putting it under production, but for purposes 
of speculation. The freehold system enables land 
speculation and rather than the security it confers 
encouraging the landholder to develop his land, robs him of 
the incentive to do so with the full knowledge that there
i j ^
will be no interference with his hxndL rights. This
argument is antithetical to the classic argument that
security of tenure which the freehold system confers will
encourage landholders to invest their capital in the
144development of their land.
In his address to the UNIP National Council at Matero 
in August 1969, the President reiterated his land policy. 
One additional justification mentioned was that land reform 
was necessary to ensure that all citizens had access to 
land, particularly in the future when, owing to population 
growth, wage employment would be scarce. In this respect,
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it was important to encourage agriculture to develop on the
basis of small family units rather than huge commercial
farms run exclusively for the benefit of a few 
145individuals. Land policy must be geared towards
discouraging land accumulation. While property rights would
continue to be respected,
"thought must be given to what is a desirable 
maximum size of land which an individual may 
own to ensure maximum utilisation. This is a 
matter which I want the Minister of Rural 
Development to study very closely using 
economic advantages as the main yardstick.
At the time, the Lands Acquisition Bill was being debated in
Parliament, but compulsory acquisition could not be used to
prevent land accumulation. Inspite of Party policy
pronouncements, it is surprising that land tenure reforms
were not immediately put in hand and five years were to
elapse before the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act was
enacted.
(d) The "Watershed Speech", 1975
In his address to the National Council of the Party
made between June 30th and July 3rd, 1975 the President
announced the land tenure reforms effected in the Land
147(Conversion of Titles) Act, 1975. While the 1970 land
reform proposals of the Minister of Lands and Natural 
Resources may have been relevant, it is difficult to tell 
whether there was any significance in the timing for 
introducing the reforms. What seems to have triggered the 
announcement was the attempt by the Development Bank of 
Zambia to purchase a piece of land at an inflated price.
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The facts surrounding this transaction emerge from the 
President's speech.
The facts are that by a conveyance dated 3rd April 
1975, a Mr. Lipschild sold to a company known as Solar 
Investments (Zambia) Ltd., three properties: (1) subdivision 
A of plot no. 29 (size 0.100 of an acre); (2) the remaining 
extent of subdivision A of subdivision no. 29 (size 0.177 of 
an acre); (3) the remaining extent of plot no. 29 (size 
0.229 of an acre). These three properties cost Solar 
Investment Ltd., K150,000. On the same day of 3rd April 
1975, by another conveyance made between Solar Investments 
Ltd., and the Development Bank of Zambia, the third plot was 
sold to the Development Bank of Zambia for K100,000. Of 
these properties, only one was developed in the sense that 
there was an antique shop; the other two, including one sold 
to the Development Bank of Zambia did not have any buildings 
on them and were, therefore, undeveloped. The President 
directed that Solar Investments Ltd., should refund the 
money and castigated the Development Bank of Zambia for 
throwing away public funds.
It was, therefore, because of land speculation that the
reforms were introduced. The President stated that people
who had bought land cheaply earlier on were demanding
astronomical prices for it a few years later. He reiterated
the Party's consistent stand on land polcy that "land is a
gift from God and cannot be sold and especially be made the
146subject of speculation by inhuman exploiters". The
nature of the reforms announced were that with effect from 
1st July 1975, all freehold titles to land were abolished 
and all land held by commercial farmers under freehold title
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converted to leaseholds for a period of 100 years. Since
the policy of the Party "is that all land must be fully and
effectively productive, unutilised tracts of farm land will,
with immediate effect, be taken over by the State. We
149cannot afford to have large tracts of land idle". The
President also announced that all vacant plots and all
vacant and undeveloped land in and around Lusaka and all
other cities and towns would be taken over by local 
150authorities. Although lacking in detail, the "Watershed"
speech spelt out the major focus of the reform and it was
left to the legislature to work out and state the statutory
provisions which would effectuate the broad principles
151expressed by the President.
2. The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act, 1975
The purpose of the Act is summarised in its long title 
as the vesting of all land in the President; the conversion 
of titles to land; the imposition of restrictions on the 
extent of agricultural holdings; the abolition of sale, 
transfer and other alienation for value; and other 
incidental matters.
(a) Application
The Act was made to have retrospective effect. Having 
become law on the 18th of August 1975, section 2 made its 
application retrospective to 1st July 1975. This date
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coincides with the day on which the President announced the 
land reforms in the "Watershed Speech" to the ruling Party's 
National Council. The practice of giving legislative Acts 
retrospective force is generally deprecated because of 
unfairness to those who had conducted their affairs knowing 
that such conduct was within the law. In this particular 
case the unfairness may have been reduced by the President's 
ample notice of the impending reforms.
Whether or not the Act applies to all categories of 
land, in particular to the Reserves and Trust Land is of 
utmost importance, if control is to be extended to land 
under customary tenure. Section 2 states that, unless a 
contrary intention appears, land includes "land of any 
tenure". This broad definition would seem to include land 
under customary tenure. Nevertheless, most of the 
provisions in the Act do not apply to land governed by 
customary land tenure. Moreover, in the absence of 
registered title, as is the case under customary land 
tenure, it is not easy to control dealings in land.
(b) Conversion of Freeholds into Leaseholds
To enable the State to acquire the power of control
over land hitherto held in freehold, it was necessary to
convert freeholds into leaseholds. Section 5 meant to
achieve this purpose reads:
"Every piece or parcel of land which 
immediately before the commencement of this 
Act was vested in or held by any person -
a) absolutely or as freehold or in fee simple 
or in any manner implying absolute rights 
in perpetuity; or
b) as a leasehold under any lease granted or 
deemed to be granted by or held of the
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President for a term of years extending 
beyond the expiration of one hundred years 
from the date of the commencement of this 
Act
is hereby converted to a statutory leasehold 
and shall be deemed to have been so converted 
with effect from the 1st day of July, 1975."
The conversion, therefore, only applied to freehold estates
and leases granted for periods in excess of one hundred
years. Landholders who enjoyed freehold estates were to be
found along the line of rail in what, during the colonial
days was referred to as North-Western Rhodesia. Elsewhere
in North-Western Rhodesia, agricultural land had been
alienated in leasehold for periods of 999 years. These too
were, under section 5, reduced to statutory leases of a
hundred years. Similarly, those who had taken advantage of
the Agricultural Lands Act and converted their leaseholds
into freeholds, suffered like the rest, in the diminution of
their estates. Section 5 did not affect landholders in the
Eastern Province where, as part of the North-Eastern
Rhodesia land policy, leases of only 99 years had been
granted.
It is submitted that an opportunity to rationalise the 
land tenure structure was missed, as section 5 resulted in 
the existence of three types of leases, the thirty year 
leases under the Agricultural Lands Act, the 99 year leases 
in the Eastern Province and urban areas elsewhere, and the 
statutory leases of a hundred years. Further, the 
opportunity of converting leaseholds into freeholds under 
the Agricultural Lands Act, which provided an incentive to 
develop agricultural land falling under the Act, has been 
extinguished.
Section 5 also had an adverse effect on the interests
209
of lending institutions. The Troup report of 1954 had
advocated leases of 99 years for urban land and 999 years
for agricultural land. The possibility of re-zoning and
re-developing an area in the course of time would seem to
suggest that a 999 year lease is too long for a developing
152country whereas a hundred year lease is more reasonable.
The crucial determining factor which may have influenced
Troup in proposing 999 year leases for agricultural land was
the attitude of lending institutions at the time. Private
commercial banks were interested basically, in providing
credit mainly on the security of either a first mortgage of
freehold property or an assignment of a long lease. This
consideration, although still prevalent in the private
commercial banking sector is less crucial at present than it
used to be before because of the growing role of government
institutions in the dispensation of loans. Loan facilities
are more and more becoming the obligation of government.
This change in the role of government was succinctly
heralded by the President who said:
"The question of security for obtaining loans 
from banking and other credit institutions 
will pose no problems as it is the intention 
of government to make adequate arrangements to 
meet this contingency in future."^53
Since 1979, the government has been operating two such
154special institutions to cater for farmers. The Act
provides for the renewal of leases for further terms of one
hundred years except where the tenant has "failed to comply
with or observe any term, condition or covenant of the lease
where the non-compliance or non-observance is such as
155renders the lease liable to forfeiture". It is clear
from this provision that a distinction is drawn between
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those terms and covenants, non-compliayxcG. with which may 
lead to forfeiture and those where it may not. But the Act 
does not shed any light on which covenants fall into which 
category. Resort must, therefore, be had to the common law.
(c) Compensation
The issue of whether or not compensation is paid is not 
only important as part of a fundamental property right, but 
it is also important as an incentive permitting an investor 
to recoup what he has expended in the development of 
agricultural land. In the proposals put forward by the 
Minister in 1970, compensation was to be paid for the 
conversion of freeholds to leaseholds and in his 
announcement of the reforms of 1975 the President said that 
compensation would be paid. By the time the Act was passed, 
the idea of such compensation had been dropped. Instead it 
was enacted that no compensation would be paid by the 
President or any other person by reason of the conversion of 
the nature of the title to land or "in respect of the 
extinguishment, restriction or abridgement of any rights or 
interests in or over land resulting from the operation of 
the provisions of this Act".156
Compensation is, however, payable in a case where the 
statutory lease has expired by effluxion of time, but has 
not been renewed. In this case "just and fair compensation" 
must be paid in respect of the "unexhausted improvements" 
defined as:
"anything resulting from the expenditure of 
capital or labour and includes carrying out of 
any building, engineering or other operations 
in, on, over or under land, or the making of
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any material change in the use of any building 
or land."157
The provisions relating to compensation raise two specific 
issues - the law relating to fixtures, and the nature or 
scope of unexhausted improvements. Fixtures are chattels 
which have been so affixed to the land as to become, in law,
part of the land. The common law rule is quicquid plantatur
solo solo cedit - that which is affixed to the soil becomes 
part of the soil. It is always a question of law whether an 
article is a fixture or not. The test which has been
evolved through the cases is that of the degree and purpose
of annexation. The degree of annexation is explained by 
Megarry and Wade in terms of "substantial connection with 
the land or a building on it".158
At common law, the tenant was entitled to the chattels 
while articles which had by annexation become fixtures 
remained on the premises and were the property of the
159landlord. The English Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908 
permits tenants to remove agricultural fixtures which would 
otherwise pass on to the landlord. The Land (Conversion of 
Titles) Act is silent as regards the right of the statutory 
lessee to remove agricultural fixtures. Instead, it 
provides for compensation to be paid to the statutory lessee 
in respect of unexhausted improvements whose definition 
would seem to include fixtures.
Moreover, it has been argued that the definition of 
"unexhausted improvements" in section 3 does not cover the 
cost of servicing a plot with the effect that such cost 
would not be included in the amount of compensation. In a 
paper submitted to the Law Development Commission, the Chief
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Valuation Officer in the government's Department of
Valuation stated that the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act:
"hampers development in that the cost of 
servicing a plot cannot be recouped; this is 
not to be confused with the development value 
which is conferred on land by society as a 
whole."i6o
He suggested that the cost incurred in servicing a plot
would be recoverable if the definition of unexhausted
improvements could be amended so that to "operations in, on,
over or under land" could be added "or thereto" or some
similar phrase. Responding to this observation the
Commissioner of Lands argued, however, that the definition
was wide enough to cover service costs, and indeed, any
161money expended in developing the plot.
While no authority was cited by the Commissioner in 
support of his interpretation, it would, nevertheless, seem 
to be the literal meaning of the definition. Further 
support for this view lies in the parliamentary debates that 
preceded the Act, in particular, the contribution of the 
Minister of State for Legal Affairs and Solicitor-General 
who said:
"Therefore, Mr Speaker, Sir, there is no need 
for fear that people, who, through their 
labour or money, have improved land will not 
be compensated for such labour or money. All 
that this Bill says is that there will be no 
value placed on such land on which no labour 
or money has been spent.''
XOZ
Nonetheless, some members of the Law Development Commission 
pointed out that, in practice, service charges were not 
recoverable. They also emphasised that even after a vendor 
has serviced a plot, for instance, if he subdivided a piece 
of land, paid surveyors' fees, and built roads, he could not 
sell such a plot because it was regarded as undeveloped.
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This being the case, the Law Development Commission, while 
expressing satisfaction that the definition would cover 
service costs, nevertheless felt that, for the purposes of 
the administration of the Act, the definition should be 
clarified. It recommended that the definition of the term 
"unexhausted improvements" should be amended to allow, 
expressly, the recovery of service charges and other 
expenses actually incurred in the development of the
3. Land Control under the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act, 
1975
The importance of the Act lies primarily in its 
provisions relating to the control of land. The Act enables 
the government to control land in two ways - one is by 
restricting the right of the leaseholder to transfer land 
and making the consent of the President mandatory to any 
such transaction, and the other, by the imposition of 
covenants regarding, inter alia, the use of agricultural 
land. The Act also empowers the government to impose a 
maximum area of agricultural land which a person may hold, 
at any given time. It is also important to point out at the 
outset that the application of the Act is so broad as to 
encompass scheduled agricultural land falling under the 
Agricultural Lands Act, a factor which makes scheduled land 
subject to two systems of control, that under the 
Agricultural Lands Act, and the other, under the Land
214
(Conversion of Titles) Act. Whether these two systems are 
compatible with one another is an issue that requires 
attention.
(a) Restriction on Subdivision and Alienation of Land
Section 13(1) states that no person shall "subdivide, 
sell, transfer, assign, sublet, mortgage, charge, or in any 
manner whatsoever encumber or part with the possession" of 
his land without the prior consent, in writing, of the 
President. The Act does not mention the consequence of 
failure to secure the requisite consent. There has been 
little judicial pronouncement, but the case of Hina
164Furnishing Lusaka Ltd. v. Mwaiseni Properties Ltd., 
throws some light on the matter. In this case the plaintiff 
sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from 
interruption of the plaintiff's peaceful and quiet enjoyment 
of its occupancy of demised premises. The premises were 
demised under a contract to lease which was neither executed
nor entered into with the consent of the President. The
action arose out of the defendant's re-entry and possession 
upon the plaintiff falling into several months' rent 
arrears. Interpreting section 13(1), Kakad, J., found that 
the defendant was strictly restricted from subletting the 
premises to the plaintiff without consent of the President 
and said:
"I, therefore, consider that in the absence of 
the written consent of the President, there
was no legal estate or interest on the
premises conveyed to the plaintiff".
The Court reviewed cases where an equitable remedy of either
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specific performance or an injunction has been granted and 
decided that since a condition precedent, namely, the 
obtaining of Presidential consent, had not been fulfilled, 
the application for an injunction must be refused.166 This 
case, therefore, is authority for the proposition that 
failure to obtain consent reduces the agreement or 
transaction to one without any legal or equitable effect 
whatsoever.
On the grant of his consent, the President is empowered
167to impose such terms and conditions as he thinks fit. 
Subsection 3 provides a breakdown of the nature of the terms 
the President may impose. As much of the controversy 
surrounding the Act has arisen from the exercise of the 
President's authority under section 13(3) it has been 
reproduced:
Without prejudice to the generality of 
subsection 2, the President may, in granting consent <px 
the amount that may be received, recovered or 
secured -
*a) in the case of a disposition by sale, 
transfer or assignment, as the price, 
premium or consideration?
b) in the case of a disposition by way of a 
sublease, as premium, consideration or 
rent?
c) in the case of a licence to occupy, by way 
of premium, consideration or rent or, as 
the case may be, by way of periodical 
payments for use and occupation?
d) in the case of a mortgage or charge, as a 
debt or advance:
Provided that in fixing any amount under this 
subsection no regard shall be had to the value 
of the land apart from the unexhausted 
improvements thereon".
Section 13 has raised numerous problems since the 
enactment of the Act. These problems arise from defects 
pertaining to the application of section 13, but at the 
centre, is the effect that section 13 has had on
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agricultural land. These defects are (i) the lack of 
regulations governing the determination of prices, premiums 
or rent? (ii) the absence of an appellate system such as a 
land tribunal to which aggrieved parties could appeal 
against decisions of the Commissioner of Lands in matters 
pertaining to land? (iii) the absence of enforcement 
provisions for contravening the section, as with the rest? 
and (iv) administrative delays in processing applications 
for consent.
(i) Lack of Criteria for Determining Prices
This defect has manifested itself in two situations -
one of these is when the Minister reviews the prices fixed
by the Commissioner of Lands (acting on behalf of the
President), and the other is when valuers undertake the
valuation of the property. The Working Party of the Law
Development Commission allege that the absence of principles
168for price determination has encouraged corruption. The
Working Party found that at the end of 1975 and early 1976
"a situation prevailed where the Minister could alter prices
169on a massive scale". It was feared that such alteration
of prices created opportunities for corruption because of 
the absence of regulations as to the procedures to be 
followed in such an exercise.
In fact, during the period referred to, there was in 
existence the Lands Disposition Advisory Committee which 
advised the Commissioner of Lands on the prices that should 
be fixed, or rent to be charged. At the time, the problem 
had to be faced that not all the members could conceive of 
land "without market value", and it is unfortunate that the
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Act itself does not define "market value". Reviewing the
work of the Committee in 1976, the Minister took a strong
exception to one of the Committee's comments in defence of
its determination, to the effect that the property under
consideration was situated in a populous area. This comment
gave the Minister the impression that, in coming to its
decision, the Committee had been influenced by the location
and environment of the property, considerations which, in
the Minister's view, meant taking into account the "market
170 . .value" of the property. The Minister himself, although
empowered to make regulations under section 21, complained
against what he saw as the lack of any principles or
171formulae upon which consents were given.
In practice, where the sum demanded by the vendor is
lower than the value of the improvements, consent is given
as a matter of course and there is no insistence that the
figure recommended by the government valuers bind the 
172parties. But where the sum demanded is in excess of the
figure of government valuers, then the figure determined by
government valuers must prevail, irrespective of the
agreement of the parties. In the early days of the Act,
there appears to have been some suspicion in the mind of the
Minister, that market value was unconsciously being taken
into account. This suspicion led him to ignore the
recommendations of the Advisory Committee. Inspite of the
fact that the recommendations were based on government
valuation, the Minister, seemingly indiscriminately, altered
the figures downward, without showing any cause for so
doing. In some cases the reduction was by forty-five
173percent of the proposed price. Part of the blame must,
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however, be borne by the applicants themselves, who, in the
hope that when the figure is reduced, the final figure would
be close to what they want, deliberately inflated the asking
price. Moreover, the present practice where a round figure
is proposed for the whole property makes it difficult for
the government to tell how much reflects the value of
movables - where the property includes furniture etc., and
how much is for buildings and fittings. Hence the
suggestion by the Law Development Commission that any
application for consent to assign be accompanied by a
breakdown of the values of various kinds of property
174included in the proposed assignment.
The control exercised by the President under section 13 
appears to be restricted to the imposition of terms and 
conditions upon which consent will be given. It does not 
extend, however, to the person of the proposed assignee, as 
is required under the Agricultural Act. If, for 
agricultural land, the quality of the proposed assignee was 
expressly included, this would have ensured that there is 
uniformity in the control of both scheduled and unscheduled 
agricultural land, and that all agricultural land is 
alienated to interested potential farmers. It is for this 
reason, among others, that since 1978 the Agricultural Lands 
Board has been calling for all agricultural land to be 
brought under its supervision. At its meeting held on 
Thursday, 4th May, 1978, the Board accused the Lands 
Department of allocating unscheduled land without assessing 
the proposed assignee's ability to utilise it, and described 
the process of the exercise of consent as a mockery. It 
proposed that all agricultural land should be brought under
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its jurisdiction. This proposition was repeated in 1982
when it also observed that unscheduled farms were not being
utilised because the Lands Department was failing to enforce
175development requirements. That same y e a r , the same
demand was pressed upon the Commissioner of Lands who
responded that he, personally, had no objection and promised
176to take up the matter with the Minister. But at its
meeting held on the 10th of February, 1983, the Board 
qualified its demand to farms of between forty to fifty 
hectares.
Asked as to why, inspite of the repeated requests the 
government had not yet placed unscheduled agricultural land 
under the Board, the Deputy Commissioner of Lands explained 
that, officially, there was no objection to placing 
unscheduled land under the Board. The problem, as he saw
it, was that the Board would not cope with additional
. . . 177responsibility.
(ii) Absence of an Appellate System
The Act does not provide for any appeal by a vendor who
is dissatisfied with the figure which the President has
determined as a condition for giving his consent. The
present practice, in cases of disagreement over the maximum
price, is that applicants are advised to withdraw their
applications and submit fresh applications for consent so
178that valuation can be repeated. This practice is very
inconvenient and time-consuming. An appellate system, which 
would involve the engagement of independent valuers would 
appear to be a more satisfactory solution.
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(iii) Absence of Enforcement Provisions
The Working Party of the Law Development Commission saw
the absence of provisions for enforcement as a serious flaw.
The Land (Conversion of Titles) Act provides no penalties
for persons who contravene its provisions. Persons who sell
or sub-let land without the consent of the Commissioner of
Lands contrary to section 13(1) cannot be prosecuted. The
Law Development Commission felt that "this serious omission
should be remedied by amending the Act so that there should
179be provisions specifying offences and their penalties".
(iv) Delays in Processing Applications for Consent 
Delay in processing applications for consent is an
administrative problem which has caused an outcry from those
involved in property transactions - vendors, sublessors,
180purchasers, legal practitioners, etc. The Commissioner
of Lands is said to have attributed the delay to shortage of
181valuation surveyors in his department. His proposal is
said to be the creation of five new posts of valuation 
surveyors who should be deployed in the Copperbelt, Southern 
and Eastern Provinces and the Lands Department in Lusaka.
The information supplied to the Law Development Commission 
by the Law Association of Zambia and the Valuation 
Department show that delays could be reduced considerably if 
the proposals to increase the number of professional staff 
at the Lands Department and the Valuation Department is 
accepted and implemented. As a temporary measure, the Law 
Development Commission suggested that the Lands Department 
could make use of private valuers to clear the backlog. It 
is also interesting to note that the Law Development
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Commission felt that section 13 is too wide in scope since
182it also includes tenancies for short periods. It
recommended that the requirement of consent be limited to
transactions which must be registered under section 4 of the
183Lands and Deeds Registry Act. Such a step will reduce
the number of applications for consent and thereby ease the 
pressure on the Valuation Department.
(v) The Concept of Land Without Value
The proviso under section 13 that in fixing any amount 
under this subsection no "regard shall be had to the value 
of the land apart from the unexhausted improvements thereon" 
has led to the conclusion that undeveloped land is 
valueless. When the government alienates undeveloped land, 
it is only the cost of servicing and a year*s rent in 
advance which is required from the successful tenant 
irrespective of whether the land is in an urban or rural 
area. The fall in the cost of virgin land has had the 
effect of increasing the demand for land. In his Memorandum 
on Land Administration, the Commissioner of Lands attributes 
scarcity of land to the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act 
saying:
"As virgin land is regarded as having no 
value, the direct consequence has been that 
the demand for it has increased since even 
those who would not have thought of acquiring 
it now compete with the well-to-do who, before 
the enactment of the said Act, were able to 
deal in land.1*184
Bruce and Dorner have pointed out that land as a free 
commodity is more suited to a purely subsistence economy or 
where all land is owned by the State and used under 
collective management or State farm system because in such
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systems incentives for agricultural production are provided
by central planning authorities through a variety of
non-market mechanisms, while individuals are rewarded
through a standardised system of payments for efficient
185tasks performed. They observe that "it is much more
difficult to conceive of land as a free good and without
value in a system such as that of Zambia, relying on private
entrepreneurs operating in a mixed economy and presumably
motivated mainly by the prospect of earning a living from
the production on their individual leaseholds and their own
improvements-.186
Moreover, they argue, whenever there is scarcity of a
given commodity which is more highly valued by individuals
than its actual cost, there arises a need for some system of
rationing and in any rationing system, the setting exists
for a possible dual market - the publicised and the
unpublicised, in which government officials who have to
ration the land participate. While conceding that this does
not actually happen in Zambia, they do warn, however, that
the environment exists where this may occur.
The possibility of corruption has already been
acknowledged by the government and one of the terms of
reference of the Law Development Commission was that it
should investigate the "alleged misuse of certain sections
of the Act for the personal benefit of officials in the
187Ministry of Lands and Agriculture". The Commission felt,
however, that since it lacked statutory power to compel and 
receive evidence, it could not perform such a task. The Law 
Development Commission proposed the establishment of a land 
tribunal to hear appeals relating to, inter alia, the
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exercise by the President or his delegate, the Commissioner 
of Lands, of the powers under the Land (Conversion of 
Titles) Act.
Bruce and Dorner see the solution to corruption in land
allocation as the introduction of a tax or rent, the
increase of which, would effectively reduce the demand for
agricultural land. Further, they argue that the
infrastructure which makes particular land preferable is the
result of investment of public funds, therefore, the public
and not only those who succeed in securing the land, must
also benefit from such investment. This can be done by the
introduction of differential rentals based on the value of
the infrastructure.
Anxiety concerning corruption has been partially
eliminated by the new procedure for land alienation. The
new procedure seeks to effectuate the decentralisation of
land administration. To this effect:
"all District Councils will be responsible, 
for and on behalf of the Commissioner of 
Lands, in the processing of applications, 
selecting of suitable candidates and making 
recommendations as may be decided upon by 
them. Such recommendations will be invariably 
accepted unless in cases where it becomes 
apparent that doing so would cause injustice 
to others or if a recommendation so made is 
contrary to national interest or public 
policy."188
In so far as it affects unscheduled agricultural land this 
procedure is only a partial solution because it applies only 
to the applications for vacant or undeveloped land. It does 
not apply to the exercise of consent by the President under 
section 13. If a district council is dissatisfied with the 
decision of the Commissioner of Lands an appeal must be made 
to the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources within thirty
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days from the date the decision of the Commissioner of Lands 
189becomes known. The decision of the Minister is final.
The decision to decentralise land administration may be 
defended on the basis that it speeds up the process of 
allocation, thus easing the pressure on the Commissioner of 
Lands whose function is to oversee that public policy 
considerations and the national interest are not 
jeopardised. The question remains, however, as to whether 
land administration must continue to be fragmented.
Moreover, while district councils have been given the 
opportunity to participate in the process of land 
allocation, it is curious that their responsibilities must 
end there. It is submitted that councils, who enjoy the 
advantages of closer proximity to farmers, should be 
involved in the process of enforcing development covenants, 
a task which has proved difficult for the Lands Department.
The fear of corruption is not the only result of the
concept of land without value. The abolition of
compensation for undeveloped land and the sale of
undeveloped land has "caused the release of vacant land for
development to be drastically retarded primarily because
there is no incentive for private landowners to subdivide or 
190sevice land". Where the land has no improvements,
government can use its power and compulsorily acquire the 
same. But where a person has a large piece of land on which 
there is, for instance, a house occupying a tiny proportion 
of the farm, government has to find the funds to compensate 
the owner and such funds are not readily available. As it 
has already been pointed out in connection with the Lands 
Acquisition Act, such cases have posed a problem to the
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government because it has no power under the Lands
Acquisition Act to compel the owner to subdivide and
surrender the undeveloped portion of the farm.
The introduction of differential rentals, or its 
increase suggested by Bruce and Dorner, would make the 
continued possession of undeveloped land burdensome as such 
land would not contribute in any way towards the payment of 
rent. Landholders might, therefore, find it preferable to 
subdivide and thus remain with a portion which they have the
ability to exploit profitably. The most serious problem wth
the idea of differential rentals is the mechanics of 
implementation. The determination of what rent to charge 
for a given piece of land would depend on so many variables 
- location in relation to infrastructure and the cost of 
such infrastructure? soil fertility; climatic factors? types 
of crops which may be grown - in fact, the whole modicum of 
land potential. To complicate the whole position, all the 
above factors tend to change over time and, therefore, 
periodical reviews would be necessary so that the rent 
reflected the real value of the land at any given time. 
Nonetheless, it would appear to be the preferable course 
because it would have the following effects: (1) it would 
minimise the demand for serviced land and consequently 
reduce the volume of work in the Lands Department? (2) it 
would raise revenue which government should invest in 
improving the infrastructure in less developed areas; (3) it 
would encourage those who have more land than they have the 
capacity to develop to surrender the undeveloped portions to 
the government? and finally (5) it would encourage land 
development in that landholders would be forced to produce
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more, if only, to enable them to pay the rent.
(b) Restriction on the Number of Agricultural Holdings 
The policy of empowering government to restrict the 
size of agricultural land was announced, for the first time, 
by the President in his address to the UNIP National Council 
in 1970. In coming to a decision of how much land should be 
permitted to an individual several factors would be taken 
into account namely, the type of activity intended for the 
land? the fertility of the land? the irrigation potential of
the land? and whether or not the prospective lessee is an
. . . . 191individual, a company or a co-operative society. In
pursuance of this policy section 17(1) states:
"The Minister may, by regulations prescribe 
the maximum area of agricultural land (whether 
or not it has unexhausted improvements) which 
may be held by any person at any one time for 
any specified purpose? and different maxima 
may be so prescribed for different areas, 
districts or provinces.”
This provision is meant to prevent land accumulation,
thereby enable others to have access to land. During the
17th National Council meeting held in December 1982, the
Council resolved that in order to create an egalitarian
society under the philosophy of humanism, "no one private
individual or private organisation shall own more than one
farm, and that appropriate steps be taken to establish the
size of the farm a private individual and private
192organisation would be allowed to develop".
The Commissioner of Lands has requested the Director of
Agriculture to initiate steps to implement the National
193Council resolution, but owing to the difficulty of the
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task no such regulations have been made. Nevertheless, in
the Reserves and Trust Land it has been decided to restrict
alienation to no more than two hundred and fifty hectares 
194per person.
(c) Development Covenants
In order to secure the development of agricultural land
the Minister has made regulations which prescribe the
covenants and conditions of statutory leases of agricultural 
195land. These covenants have largely been moulded on the
basis of the Agricultural Lands Act. Under the covenants
the lessee must confine the use of agricultural land to
agriculture only. He must maintain all improvements and
develop the land 11 in accordance with the principles of good 
196husbandry”. The lessee is enjoined not to allow the land
to remain idle for a period of more than three years except 
with the previous written consent of the lessor. As under 
the Agricultural Lands Act, the statutory lessee must reside 
personally on the land except where the lessee is a body 
corporate in which case it must ensure the residence of a 
manager to take charge of farming operations. Such a 
manager must be approved by the President, as the lessor. 
There is also a covenant prohibiting abandonment. But 
unlike the Agricultural Lands Act, the regulations do not 
provide for minimum development requirements.
While the covenants may be seen as adequate, the 
problem is really one of enforcement. The Lands Department 
is the sole body responsible for the enforcement of the 
covenants. The department is also responsible to ensure
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that land falling under the Agricultural Lands Act is 
developed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. It 
has already been pointed out that farm inspections have not 
been regular due to transport problems. This problem has 
affected both scheduled and unscheduled land. The 
Agricultural Lands Board observed, on one occasion, that 
many unscheduled farms were not being utilised and that the 
Lands Department was failing to enforce development 
covenants attached to statutory leases. The problem is the 
means with which to enforce these covenants. One may also 
add that the request of the Agricultural Lands Board that 
unscheduled land be brought under it, while such action may 
help ensure that land is only alienated to genuinely 
qualified farmers, will not necessarily lead to compliance 
with development covenants, because the same problem of the 
mechanics of enforcement will remain.
(d) Extension of Control Under the Land (Conversion of
Titles) (Amendment No. 2) Act, 1985197
The Working Party submitted its Report in 1981. The
Report not only suggested amendments to the Land (Conversion
of Titles) Act, but also drafts of the amendments that would
require legislative action. Two amendments have been made
so far. The first amendment related to the payment of fees
198by applicants for consent. The amendment Act which is
presently to be considered was the second. None of these 
amendments, however, bear any relevance to the 
recommendations of the Working Party, which are not, to all 
intents and purposes, so radical or far-fetched, as to
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change the governments policy on land matters.
The second amendment deals with a matter which was not 
even one of the issues to be considered by the Working 
Party. It deals with control of alienation of land to 
non-Zambians. It may be recalled that one of the complaints 
of the Agricultural Land Board was that there was no policy 
or directive from the Minister concerning alienation of land 
to non-nationals. The amendment makes some attempt towards 
settling the problem.
Section 2 of the Act provides that no land in Zambia
"shall as from the 1st of April 1985 be granted, alienated,
transferred or leased to a non-Zambian". The proviso saves
the interests or rights acquired by non-Zambians prior to
the said date. Then there follows a number of exemptions
from the above prohibition. The first exemption applies to
a person "approved as an investor in accordance with the
199Industrial Development Act or any other law relating to 
the promotion of investment in Zambia".200 Under this 
exception, therefore, one must be an investor under the 
Industrial Development Act. The purpose of the Act is to 
provide for the licensing and control of manufacturing 
enterprises? to provide incentives for investment? to 
regulate the making of contracts relating to the transfer of 
foreign technology and expertise to enterprises operating in 
Zambia, and to provide for matters connected with or 
incidental to the foregoing. The expression "investor" does 
not appear anywhere in the Act nor does it explain how one 
can come to be regarded as one. The Act gives the 
impression that the investor is the manufacturer because it 
deals at length with manufacturing licences and technology
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transfer contracts. It is just what the title suggests - 
industrial development, but in a narrow sense which excludes 
the agricultural industry. The central role of agriculture 
in the whole gamut of industrial development in Zambia does 
not feature in the Act. There is therefore a need for 
clarification of the expression "investor" so that the Act 
does not thwart the efforts of genuine farmers who are not 
Zambians.
The second exemption relates to non-profit making, 
charitable, religious, educational or philanthropic 
organisations or institutions which are registered and are 
approved by the Minister under section 13A. The third 
exemption relates to where the interest or right arises out 
of a lease, sublease or underlease for a period not 
exceeding five years or a tenancy agreement. In other 
words, the President may alienate land to a non-Zambian 
and/or consent to a transfer of land to a non-Zambian so 
long as the transfer or the interest in the land is a lease 
for a term of, at the most, five years. It is generally the 
case, however, that the kind of investment which would be 
beneficial requires a lot more time to mature. In a way, 
therefore, the five years limit must be seen as a 
disincentive to investors, particularly those who may wish 
to make long term investments or grow crops that require a 
minimum of two years to mature. Some assurance of automatic 
renewal of the leases would have helped allay the fears of 
non-Zambians. The fourth exemption relates to an interest 
which is inherited or transferred under a right of 
survivorship or other operation of law. In any other case, 
the Presidents consent must be secured. Since a gift does
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not transfer land by operation of law, it requires consent.
The severe restriction on the Presidents power to 
alienate land or consent to dispositions to non-Zambians 
under this amendment may have far-reaching consequences on 
the development of agricultural land. For many Zambians the 
raising of funds for agricultural development on a 
commercial scale is rather difficult. Even their reasons 
for acquiring a farm are, often, inconsistent with 
agricultural development. They may buy a farm to use "as a 
week-end pleasure resort or a place to retire to" rather 
than for serious agriculture.201
The full impact of the amendment will depend on who 
qualifies as an investor under the Act. The criticism which 
has been levelled against the Act should not be taken to 
mean that agricultural development must, for ever, depend on 
foreign nationals. However, non-Zambians will still be 
required to grow crops which are not, at present, being 
grown by Zambians. It is probable that the President's 
consent will not be unreasonably withheld, particularly, 
where the non-Zambian is bringing money into the country, to 
grow a crop not widely grown such as cotton, sunflower, 
Virginia flue-cured tobacco, etc. This is all the more 
important because the Act applies to all land - scheduled 
and unscheduled.
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E. CONCLUSIONS
Until 1975, land reform in Zambia was piece-meal, 
reflecting a tendency to respond to a given problem or 
difficulty rather than a comprehensive review of the 
existing legal framework. The Land Commission Report of 
1967 proved irrelevant because the Commission did not 
respond, adequately, to the policy of the Party in power.
The first measure introduced by the government was the Lands 
Acquisition Act meant to enable government to take over all 
undeveloped or unutilised land in the hands of, principally, 
absentee owners. The problems involved in the 
implementation of the Act hava rendered its importance as a 
tool for land development insignificant. The Land 
(Conversion of Titles) Act, 1975 introduced, for the first 
time, wholesale control of all agricultural land, indeed of 
all land. Prior to this Act, a small proportion of 
land-scheduled land, continued to be subject to the control 
of the Agricultural Lands Board. The Agricultural Lands 
Act, however, is deficient in some respects. It must also 
be brought into conformity with the provisions of the Land 
(Conversion of Titles) Act.
The fact that the application of the Land (Conversion 
of Titles) Act also extends to scheduled agricultural land 
means that the owner of a scheduled farm is required to make 
two applications for consent - one under each Act. This is 
not only cumbersome for the applicant but it is also 
time-consuming. One way of avoiding this is to place all 
agricultural land in State Land under one body. Already, 
there are too many bodies on which the development of land 
depends, and the recent decentralisation in the allocation
233
of land has added to the number of land administrators.
In terms of land control, there are some similarities 
in the provisions in the Agricultural Lands Act and the 
covenants in the schedule to the Land (Conversion of Titles) 
Regulations binding statutory lessees. There should, 
therefore, be no problem to the creation of a uniform system 
of land control and land administration. There is however, 
the practical difficulty of enforcing the covenants under 
the Regulations, and the development requirements under the 
Agricultural Lands Act. The ideal solution would appear to 
be to strengthen the staffing position at provincial level, 
and create district offices where land officers can be 
placed. If the government is intent on creating a role for 
local authorities in the administration of agricultural 
land, as it has demonstrated by giving them power to 
allocate land, then it should also extend to them the duty 
to monitor the use being made of agricultural land within 
their districts. Unless there is some improvement in the 
method of monitoring farms, knowledge of the state of their 
development will continue to be haphazard and the law will 
be ineffective in promoting agricultural development.
The new amendment to the Land (Conversion of Titles)
Act has caused a definite degree of apprehension. It is in 
the manner of exercise of the limited powers of the 
President that the public will be interested. A strict 
denial of land to non-Zambians, except in the form of leases 
for a term of five years, at a time when the Zambian farmer 
is handicapped by both lack of experience as well as the 
shortage of capital, may in the long run destroy the 
existing agricultural base.
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CHAPTER THREE
LAND LAW AND THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESERVES
AND TRUST LAND
A. INTRODUCTION
1. General
The origin of the Reserves and Trust Land has been
described in Chapter One. Between them (but excluding
Protected Forest Areas and Forest Reserves), they occupy
nearly, seventy-one per cent of the total surface area of
the country1, and support almost sixty per cent of the
population. The fact that the majority of the people derive
their livelihood from land in the Reserves and Trust Land
makes these areas the crucial target for any broad-based
development policy. The primary goal must not only be to
enable the rural population to be self-sufficient in food
production, but also to enhance its full participation in
the cash economy. This will not only provide a better
standard of living for the rural poor, but will also attract
the urban unemployed, whose manpower is required to provide
2
a further boost to the rural economy. That the government 
is aware of the need to encourage agriculture at grass-roots 
level is evident from the President's policy statement of 
1968. Addressing the UNIP National Council at Mulungushi, 
he said:
"I have stated over and over again that the 
basis of our rural development must start at 
village level with the, approximately, 450,000 
small family farms in existence."3
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While accepting the indispensability to the country of the
commercial farmers, the President decided, nevertheless,
that the emphasis must "rest with those thousands of farm
units which we must help to emerge from a strict subsistence
level into a living relationship with the rest of our cash 
4
economy".
As land is one of the primary factors of production in 
any national economy "the whole land tenure system must be 
geared to provide those securities needed to encourage
investments to improve the land required by a modern
5 . .agriculture". The President warned, however, that a rigid
system of private ownership must be avoided. The President,
therefore, had in mind the evolution of a land tenure
system, short of a freehold system, but conducive to the use
of land for the mobilisation of development capital. In his
address to the UNIP National Council in 1970, he explained
the danger in private ownership of land as the possibility
that those who are in an advantageous position, financially,
may accumulate too much land.6 But land accumulation may
not only result from private ownership. It may also result
from the "rights of usage over vast acres of land by
7individuals under customary law". Nothing, however, has 
been done to evolve a land tenure system that will encourage 
investment and prevent land accumulation in the Reserves and 
Trust Land. As pointed out in Chapter Two, the land tenure 
reforms of 1975 have little practical relevance in the 
Reserves and Trust Land, consequently, the only tenure 
systems existing in these two categories of land which may 
be seen to provide security are leases and occupancy
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licences respectively. The said leases and occupancy 
licences are granted under the archaic Reserves and Trust 
Land Orders prescribing the exceptional circumstances in 
which non-Africans could enjoy rights in the Reserves or 
Trust Land.
By far the majority of people in the Reserves and Trust
g
Land hold land under customary law, hence, for purposes of 
brevity, these two categories of land are, hereafter, 
referred to as "customary land". This chapter which opens 
with a brief discussion of conceptual problems, concentrates 
on the nature of customary land rights in Zambia. These 
rights are evaluated in the context of the many features 
which have been said to retard agricultural development. 
Attention is also focussed on non-customary tenure which is 
increasingly becoming popular with emergent farmers.
2. The Problem of the Concept of Ownership
The problem of the application of property concepts
developed under one system to another system of a different
political and cultural background has taxed many students of
African customary land tenure. Bohannan expresses this
point succinctly when he observes:
"It is probable that no single topic 
concerning Africa has produced so large a poor 
literature. We are still abysmally ignorant 
of African land practices. That ignorance 
derives less from want of 'facts' than that we 
do not know what to do with 'facts' or how to 
interpret them. The reason for this state of 
affairs is close at hand: there exists no good 
analysis of the concepts habitually used in 
land tenure studies, and certainly no detailed
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critique of their applicability to 
cross-cultural study."g
The most difficult concept to apply has been "ownership".
The confusion10 which has arisen stems from the difficulty
of defining it or indeed any other word. It has been
pointed out that three approaches can be recognised in
defining a given word: one approach is to regard the act of
giving the meaning or defining a word as equivalent to
naming, substituting or denoting a thing for which it stands
- the "substitutional" or "notional" approach? the second
approach is the "essentialist" approach, by which every
class or group of things is ascribed an essential or
fundamental nature which is common to every member of its
class and the process of defining consists in isolating and
identifying this common nature or intrinsic property? and
the third method is by supplying the accompanying
elucidation of the manner in which a word is to function in
all the diverse contexts in which it may be used, the
"contextual" approach.11
Each of these methods of defining a term has its own
weaknesses. The "notional" approach assumes that every
legal system, irrespective of its stage of development, has
a notion of ownership, but it does not, in itself, indicate
the contrast in the import of the word when used in a
different cultural setting. Among the leading supporters of
the notional approach would appear to be Bentsi-Enchill. He
explains that variations in land tenure systems are
12variations on a common theme. He further argues, "Tenure 
systems represent relations of men in society with respect 
to that essential and often scarce commodity, land.
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Accordingly, although actual patterns differ from system to
system, there are certain uniformities of type in the
relations involved which make it possible to apply a common
13system of analysis to the different systems". These
arguments were made in an era in which similarities were
emphasised to facilitate attempts to introduce European
forms of tenure through adjudication and registration of
title. Even prominent jurists such as Ollennu and Coker
attempted to establish parallels between African lineage
landholding systems and the English concept of co-ownership,
joint tenancy and tenancy in common.
Much confusion, however, has arisen from the adoption
of the "essentialist" approach. In the early colonial era
administrators and scholars tried to fit the facts of
African land relations into the English concepts of property 
14law. The idea of ownership was an important tool m  the
colonial process. Upon establishing a protectorate, it was
the Crown*s intention to partition land between the settlers
and the indigenous community. The essentialist approach
demonstrated that African forms of land tenure lacked some
ingredients of a fee simple and this being the case African
land rights were in the nature of an usufruct only, lasting
only so long as the land was being used. The conclusions
that emerged from this assumption were that, first,
ownership, if it existed, lay elsewhere than in the tillers
of the soil; and, second, that whatever land was not
cultivated was vacant. It followed, therefore, that, as
under English property theory, vacant or waste land was held
15by the Crown, the Crown could freely alienate it.
Two grounds were offered to explain that customary land
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rights could not amount to ownership. One was that land was
regarded as a deity and therefore could not be owned. The
other, that since customary land law did not recognise the
sale of land, the holder could not be said to own what he
could not sell.16 Both of these reasons have been proved to
be inadequate to justify the denial of the existence of
17ownership under customary law. Neither does the sacred
character of a thing prevent it from being capable of
ownership. In any case, a distinction should be drawn
between absolute ownership or radical title, and the
ordinary ownership of land equivalent to a fee simple
absolute in possession. Any reference by a community to
ownership of land by God, "must necessarily be interpreted
as a statement on the question of radical title and not
18ordinary human ownership”. That there is no ownership 
because there is no sale of land is misleading because the 
absence of land sales may mean only that land has not 
acquired any economic value.
The essentialist approach has, by and large, proved 
unpopular because "it assumes that there is something wrong 
with a foreign legal institution which does not conform to 
English legal principle? it also assumes that a term such as 
'ownership* has a god-given meaning, a 'true' or 'real' 
meaning? and finally it assumes that a thing called 
'ownership' exists and can be discovered in a country's
19laws, just as one might discover diamonds m  a river-bed".
It appears settled, therefore, that ownership, as a legal 
concept varies from one system to another and cannot be 
denied any legal system "by virtue alone that this system
20differs from more refined and established legal systems".
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Obi puts this point clearly when he says:
"The truth is that every legal system allows 
to individuals and groups certain rights and 
interests in and over various forms of 
property. The quantum of these rights and 
interests varies with the nature of the 
subject ... Where the maximum bundle of rights 
and interests allowed by the law is in the 
hands of the same individual or body that 
person or body is said to own the subject 
matter in question."21
In this chapter, the approach adopted is a combination of
the notional and contextual approaches. On the basis of the
notional approach, it is taken for granted that there is
"ownership" of land in traditional African land law, and the
word "ownership" is used to mean the maximum rights a person
or a body has over the land he or it holds subject only to
limitations by laws made by the community or State. The
contextual approach will be used for the purpose of
22describing the nature of ownership under customary law.
B. CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
1. The Nature of Customary Land Rights
Having defined ownership as the greatest interest 
permissible in a given legal system, the next step must be 
to identify the person or body in whom this interest is 
vested. Such an inquiry is not necessarily different from 
that advocated by some scholars who say that it is more
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useful to approach the analysis of customary rights in terms
of "who can do what", instead of "who owns land" or "where
23is ownership located", after all, ownership also confers
the right of control over one's land. The more useful
approach, therefore, is to look at the information that a
stranger seeking permission to settle in a given community
would need. Such information can be elicited by questions
such as "from whom do I get land?", "on what terms?" or
24"what can I do or not do with it?" . In other words the 
questions relate to who owns what interest in what land.
Here there is controversy among various scholars on the 
subject. Some tend to emphasise the ruler or the chief as 
the owner of land, others will point at the whole community, 
whether as a tribe or lineage group, and yet others will 
maintain that the individual occupier or the family as a 
corporate unit is the owner.
(a) Community versus Individual Landholding
Commenting on the Ngoni of Zambia, Gouldsbury and
Sheane have written:
"In theory the whole of the land belongs to 
the Paramount Chief, presumably by right of 
conquest. This ownership is not absolute and, 
in fact, it is safer to assert that the chief 
formerly held the land as it were in communal 
trust for the people ... He could induct his 
sons as landlords over large provinces which 
they administered and from which they 
collected their customary dues."2g
This is echoed by Elias:
"The chief is everywhere regarded as the 
symbol of the residuary, reversionary and 
ultimate ownership of all land held by a 
territorial community. He holds on behalf of 
the whole community in the capacity of 
caretaker or trustee only
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Among those who emphasise the community interest is
Yudelman, who states that land is held by the community as a
collective unit, although eligible members have a vested
right to use particular portions of the area and these
individual rights to arable land are protected so long as
the cultivator occupies the land or is presumed to have an
27interest in a particular holding.
In sprite of the conceptual problems raised by statements
to the effect that land is owned by the whole community some
scholars still continue making such propositions. Modern
works are replete with statements such as "land tenure in
sub-Saharan Africa can be characterised as a communal tenure
28of public ownership and private use rights of land" ; and
"communal ownership of land by the tribe, the clan or the
village, still very widespread in tropical Africa was fairly
well suited to traditional cultivation in a situation of
29abundance of land" , or that "In East African customary law
... the systems of land tenure fall broadly into two main
categories ... First communal or tribal tenure in which
ownership is vested in the ruler as owner or trustee for the 
30community." In a more recent study of the Kunda of the 
Eastern Province of Zambia, Ngandwe says that by tradition, 
the entire tribal land belongs to the tribal community as a 
whole:
"In principle the Chief allocates the land, 
but in practice, people settle themselves 
wherever land is available often without prior 
consultation with the Chief ... The Chief is 
the recognised custodian of tribal land, but 
he does not own the land."31
The proposition that African systems of landholding 
amount to communal tenure, is misleading as it implies that
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"every tribesman has an equal right in every piece of the 
32tribe's land". The fact is that interests in land are
communally based only in the sense that before one can have
access to customary land, he must first secure the
acceptance of the community of which he wishes to become a
part. This community may be said to "own" land in the same
way that nations may be said to "own" the lands or States in
which they live. This explanation has a lot to commend it
in that as Bentsi-Enchill argues, expressions such as
"England", "Scotland", "Finland" etc. are no more than
indications that the lands are "owned" by the English, the
33Scots and the Finns. Likewise, in Africa, such
expressions as Matabeleland, Mashonaland, and Barotseland,
carry the same import, that the land belongs to the
Matabele, Mashona and the Barotse, respectively. Members of
these communities do not have equal rights to every part of
the community's land, except in some cattle-owning
communities such as the Tonga, Lozi and Mambwe, and only for
purposes of grazing. Among these communities, all
uncultivated land and garden land during the inter-crop
period is available for use by any member of the community
for the grazing of cattle. There are no definite pastures
associated with one village rather than with another, as a
34result herds of cattle from various villages intermix.
After harvest, cattle may be released into open fields to 
feed on the maize stalk. An individual may not restrict the 
use of his field to his own stock, as the rest of the 
members of the village are entitled to graze their stock in 
his field. Inspite of this old customary rule fencing, to 
keep cattle off, has not been seriously challenged. In the
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absence of such or other measure, any injury caused to
livestock on account of any act of the owner of the field,
for instance, digging a well in which a cow falls, is 
35actionable.
While there is no special area "reserved” as grazing
land, a situation may arise in which some specific areas are
used for grazing at different times of the year. If a
person makes a field within the grazing area, he suffers no
penalty except that he will have no redress in the event of
damage to his crops by livestock. In the case of Matimba v. 
3 6Kulumbwa, the assessors were in agreement in declaring
that where a person establishes a field in an area which has
been used for grazing, it is up to the individual to take
precautions to ensure that his crop is not destroyed by 
37livestock. There are two problems related to exercise of
rights in grazing land which appear to be unresolved. One
is that while members of the community may graze their
cattle in one another's fields after harvest period, there
seems to be no protection for those who may not have
completely finished harvesting. As the determining factor
appears to be the expiry of the time for harvesting, there
have been occasions when people have suffered damage on
account of the fact that others have released their cattle
on to their fields before they have gathered and stored
their produce. In the case of Mbewe v. Njakilwa and 
38Another , the plaintiff sued the defendant owners of cattle 
which had consumed his maize crop on his farm. The 
defendants did not deny the damage but argued that as they 
were entitled to graze their cattle in the defendant's field 
after the harvest period and the defendant had failed to
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complete the harvest in time or fence the field to keep away 
the cattle, the damage must be attributed to the defendant's 
negligence. The Magistrate dismissed the plaintiff's claim 
holding that as the plaintiff was aware of such custom as 
being in existence in the area, it was his duty to prevent 
damage being done to his property by cattle. This appears 
to be a rather odd decision which has no parallel with the 
customs of other cattle-owning communities. Among the 
Tonga, for instance, it is generally accepted that before 
cattle can be permitted to graze in another's maize field, 
the owners of the field must have completed harvesting. Any 
person who suffers loss on account of cattle being released 
too early is entitled to compensation. The important point 
to be made at this stage, however, is that it is only in 
respect of grazing or undeveloped land that communal rights 
may be said to exist.
By contrast other scholars do not see customary
landholding as communal. Gluckman observed that the
customary system of landholding consisted of a descending
39hierarchy of estates from the King to the occupier. He 
explained that among the Lozi, the King granted, what he 
termed, "estates of holding" in arable land to homestead 
groups represented by their headman. These headmen are 
referred to as "primary holders" of the "primary estate 
holding". The headman, in turn, distributed land to his 
dependants, whom Gluckman termed "secondary holders", 
holding "secondary estates" from primary holders, and they, 
in turn, gave estates to tertiary holders etc. Later, 
Gluckman replaced the expression "estate of holding" with 
"estate of administration". The term administration was
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used to cover the power of allocation of land, the power of
control and regulation of its use, and the defence of land
against trespassers.40
Had Gluckman confined his observations to the Lozi, he
might have spared himself the plethora of criticism against
his theory of a hierarchy of estates of administration. But
he went on to say that such a hierarchy was to be found
among the Bemba, who had a developed political organisation,
and the Tonga who did not have a political organisation but
lived under village headmen, and concluded:
"Thus I would say that my framework of a 
hierarchy of estates of holding is likely to 
cover most systems of African land tenure. It 
will be least clear and of least importance in 
systems of shifting cultivation while land is 
plentiful. Its importance will grow as land 
becomes shorter or where in special 
circumstances cultivation becomes fixed. In 
hierarchically organixed tribes like the 
Bemba, the gradation of estates will be woven 
into the social organization; in more 
undifferentiated organizations such as the 
Tonga, the gradation will not carry with it 
other social obligations."41
This doctrine of a hierarchy of estates was adopted by
Watson, who, describing Mambwe landholding said that the
Chief was the source of all Mambwe land rights. The Chief
granted "estates of holding" to lesser chiefs, who, in turn,
granted estates to village headmen within their
chieftaincies, and the headmen allocated holdings to the
members of their villages. In return each holder of an
estate admitted the political authority of the superior from
whom he derived his estate. Thus the series of estates of
holding, he concluded, reflected the distribution of
. . . . . . . 42political authority within the tribal community.
The existence of a hierarchy of estates as a general
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phenomenon has been refuted by White, who carried out
research into customary landholding throughout the country
with the exception of the Western Province, then called
Barotseland. Commenting on Tonga customary land tenure,
White says:
"Here we have no hierarchy of estates: The 
Tonga had no traditional authorities to 
allocate land in any case, and the Tonga 
headman of a village does not allocate land to 
his villages, and his only participation in 
the acquisition of land is to provide 
information as to whether or not existing 
rights are already enjoyed by an individual in
a piece of land which another wishes to
acquire."43
White maintains that the above situation was not restricted
to the Tonga in respect of whom it might be accounted for on
the basis that they lacked any unifying political structure.
Even in communities with a central political authority such
as the Ngoni, Bemba and Lungu, the position is the same as
that which exists among the Tonga, the main difference being
that in acephalous tribes, there is no conception of a
tribal area occupying a territory, a conception which is
present in a chiefly society. In his view, it is clear,
therefore, that "although there may be a hierarchical
political structure in such tribal areas, there is no
corresponding hierarchy of estates in the form of descending
44allocations of land". Emphasising the absence of any land 
allocating authorities, White argued that, although it was 
frequently stated that a chief allocated land to a village, 
what really happened was that when the villagers wished to 
establish their village on another site, they informed the 
chief, who, as political head, had to know who was within 
the jurisdiction. In order to prove the existence of a
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hierarchy of estates, it was necessary, first, to show in a
land tenure system, a defined land authority who assigned
specific estates to estate holders below him, who, in turn,
assigned land to subordinate estate holders; second, it was
necessary to show the process working in reverse, with
45reversion of rights taking place. He asserted: "In none
of the areas studied during my surveys have I found this
picture present. I do not consider that villages have a
specific defined area of land available to them, forming the
village estate".46
As far as Tonga landholding is concerned, White*s
observations are supported by Colson. Expounding the role
of the village among the Tonga, Colson says that a man has a
right to clear any unoccupied land, and that this system of
landholding limits the position of the headman, since he has
47no right over land as a symbol of village unity. No
authority within the community has the right to allocate 
48land. It is only in a very limited sense that a headman
can be said to have power to allocate land, and this is
where individual rights to land have been abandoned on
account of the village having moved to a new site so that it
is no longer possible for the villagers to return to
cultivate their fields. Unless they dispose of their fields
before they leave, the headman may give the land to someone
who comes to beg for it irrespective of whether the person
49in need is or is not resident in his own village. Further 
evidence regarding the absence of land allocation lies in 
the mode of acquiring interests in customary land. This is 
dealt with more fully below, suffice it here to point out 
that rights in land are acquired by the actual clearing of
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land for cultivation or signifying such intention by
. . 50marking.
The second aspect which must be proved to support the
thesis of a hierarchy of estates is the incidence of
. . 51reversion. The case of Mwnnda v. Gwaba on Tonga
customary law is noteworthy for the contradictory evidence
adduced regarding reversion. In this case the plaintiff was
claiming, inter alia, an injunction restraining the
defendant, a headman, from continuing ploughing his land.
In his defence, the headman argued that since the plaintiff
had left the village of his own accord, the land
automatically reverted to him and he was, therefore,
entitled to allocate it to others or possess it himself.
The court, finding abandonment not proved, granted the
injunction sought, but on the fundamental issue of the
reversionary interest, which the court did not address
itself, the defendant's version was supported by one of the
assessors called by the court. He said:
"When a man moves from a village, the land he 
was ploughing or the land he was given to 
settle, that land remains the property of the 
headman. It is the headman who is going to be 
approached to allocate land."52
In contrast to the above testimony was the opinion of Chief
Ufwenukwa who, although not called as a witness by the court
but by the defendant, was treated as a person who had
special knowledge of the relevant customary law. The Chief
gave his opinion that "when a headman allocates land it is
53not his land as such to give ..." . Of the two
propositions of law it is suggested that Chief Ufwenukwa's 
version is to be preferred because the opinion of the 
assessor apparently makes no distinction between the
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headman's control over land and the question of its 
54ownership. If the statement that the land remains the 
property of the headman means what it says, there is no 
doubt that it is not an accurate proposition of Tonga 
customary land tenure. Abandoned land, or land on which no 
individual rights have been established is part of the 
common pool of land awaiting exploitation by any who may 
wish to cultivate it, and does not fall into the village 
headman's or chief's estate. The ways by which one becomes 
a landholder under customary law seem to dispel the theory 
of a hierarchy of estates whereby traditional authorities 
are said to allocate land to individuals.
(b) Acquisition of Land
The ways by which one acquires land can be divided, 
broadly, into original acquisition and derivative 
acquisition. Original acquisition occurs when an individual 
takes up either, undeveloped or virgin land, or, unoccupied 
and abandoned land. The important feature pertaining to 
this mode of acquisition is that there is no reference to 
any traditional authority, except where there is doubt as to 
whether the land is actually abandoned. Derivative 
acquisition covers instances where land is transferred inter 
vivos or is inherited. These two modes of acquisition are 
common throughout the country, although the importance of 
one over the other differs from place to place depending on 
availability of land.
(i) Acquisition by Occupation
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In some areas, it is still possible to find virgin land
and all that is required to establish rights in such land is
to clear the land in preparation for cultivation. Because
of the labour involved, and the time it takes, it is
sufficient if a person declares his intention to occupy a
given area by marking the extent of land he wishes to clear
so as to warn others off the area. This is common among all
communities irrespective of whether they do or do not
55practice shifting cultivation. Referring to the Ngoni,
Gouldsbury and Sheane have written: "by cutting down a few
boughs, or by various other signs each cultivator could
bespeak a plot or unallotted land for himself" and,
thereafter, by "cultivating it he acquired the right to till
it, which was respected only so long as he continued to work
it".56 This statement, however, involves the authors in a
contradiction as it implies that one can establish rights in
land by occupation of unallotted land. Acquisition by
occupation and acquisition by allocation (or allotment) are
mutually exclusive. If it was the custom that individuals
acquired rights in land by allottnfcni, there would be no
recognition of any rights to land of those who have merely
cleared and occupied land - they would, in fact, be
squatters. Consequently, it is submitted, they must have
used the expression "unallotted land" to mean unoccupied
land. Among the Bemba who practice the chitemene system of
cultivation, early in the dry season, the area to be cleared
is marked out by the individual by pollarding or marking the
trees along the circumference of the area where cutting is 
57intended. Acquisition by occupation also applies among 
communities in the Luapula Province. Ian Cunnison explains
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that a man is free to cultivate wherever it suits him so
long as he does not interfere with other peoples' rights
already established or cultivate on the land on to which
58another may be likely to extend his field.
Acquisition by occupation, however, applies only to
those who are members of a village community. Whoever is
not a member of such community is not entitled to acquire
land in such a manner without first seeking permission from
the headman to settle in the village. In an appeal case
from Chavuma Local Court to the Magistrates Court at
Zambezi, the court was called upon to resolve the issue of
residence where a club house was to be built in a headman's
area without his prior permission. The magistrate's ruling
was that such permission was necessary for a non-resident
although such a grant of permission in no way implied that
the headman owned the land. After due consultation with the
59assessor the magistrate is reported to have said:
"... Any new person wishing to build would 
properly ask the headman where he can do so 
... Now I am satisfied that in this case the 
plaintiff/respondent is the headman of his 
village and that the place where the clubhouse 
was to be built is under his jurisdiction 
according to the custom, he being the headman.
I do not though concede that the land 
concerned is the plaintiff's/respondent's own 
land whereby he has sovereign rights over it
ii
• • •
Having come to a finding that permission was neither sought 
nor secured, the magistrate proceeded to expound the 
headman's right to grant or withhold permission in the 
words:
"I therefore consider that the 
plaintiff/respondent being a headman should 
first be requested if the clubhouse concerned 
can be built. I am quite satisfied on the 
evidence I have heard and with the evidence 
recorded by the lower court that such
265
permission was not asked. I consider he 
rightly refuses now if he should so wish and 
that if those concerned in putting up of the 
building are not satisfied with his refusal 
they should appeal to the chief for his ruling
II
• • •
The above exposition of the law is not only true of the 
Luvale, whose customary law was under consideration in the 
particular case but also equally true of the Tonga and Ngoni 
insofar as the headman*s power to grant or withhold land to 
non-residents is concerned.
The requirement that strangers must seek the permission 
of the headman who will, thereafter, inform the chief as to 
his presence was not onerous in the early days because 
permission was not usually withheld. Undoubtedly, many 
things had to be considered and, in particular, the 
character of the stranger and the reasons for leaving his 
village, but, unless obviously undesirable, the chief was 
not likely to refuse him permission to settle because he 
would add to the numerical strength of the tribe.60 With 
the present shortage of land in some areas, particularly in 
the Southern Province inhabited by the Tonga, it is not 
practical to admit many strangers and, in any event, 
acquisition by occupation is becoming rare. Scarcity of 
land has led some chiefs to abuse their authority. They 
have permitted the settlement of strangers on land with 
respect to which there are rights subsisting, in return for 
personal favours.61
(ii) Transfer of Land by Way of Gift
Customary land rights are essentially individual. Once 
a person has established his rights by occupation he is free
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to transfer his rights to any member of the community 
without reference to any traditional authority. Individual 
land rights are, therefore, free from adverse claims by 
chiefs or headmen. Even Gluckman who proposed the theory of 
a hierarchy of estates conceded that the rights of the
individual were absolute, and whenever the Lozi Paramount
62Chief wanted land he had to "beg" it from the owner. Two
issues that impinge on the title of the transferee are
whether first, there is no restriction on the categories of
people to whom land may be transferred, and secondly,
whether the agreement of members of the family is a
condition precedent to any such transfer. Coissoro has said
of the Tonga, that gifts can be made freely, and such gifts
are not restricted to those who are relations of the 
63grantor. Even strangers may be recipients of land so long
as they have secured permission to settle in the area. It
is the practice, however, to inform the headman and
relatives of such a transfer so that they may bear testimony
64to the transfer.
Among the Luvale of North-Western Province, there is a 
high incidence of transfers among relatives.65 This might 
be seen as the result of their lineage system of landholding 
but such an explanation is not conclusive because similar 
patterns are discernible among both the Tonga and the Ngoni. 
The preponderance of transfers among relations might, 
therefore, be accounted for by reason of the composition of 
villages, rather than the system of landholding. Among the 
Ngoni, gifts of land are frequent but are not confined to 
relatives.66 But according to Priestley and Greening, an 
individual Ngoni can only transfer land after securing the
267
67consent of his patrilineally related senior kinsmen. The
implication being that land is not individually held but
rather corporately held by the family group. This statement
is, however, refuted by White who says:
"My data do not support any such strongly 
developed association of a group of 
patrilineally related persons with the land 
rights possessed by them.”68
It seems that owing to the "omnidirectional” kinship
structure of contemporary Ngoni and their freedom of
residence, it is unlikely that an individual has to secure
the permission of his patrilineal kinsmen to dispose of his 
69land. These relatives may not live in the same village,
as in the former times, and the agnatic structure of family
organisation and residence has broken down. There is no
doubt, therefore, that the individual Ngoni landholder
"enjoys full rights of ownership, including the right of
disposal, over his land and the land received as gift enters
7 0immediately into the ownership of the recipient ... ”. The 
only consideration in cases of grants of land, if it can be 
so called, is the strengthening of social ties, for, the 
grantor is under no legal obligation to give, and the 
recipient under no legal obligation to accept the land.
(iii) Sale of Land
The question of whether or not there is sale of land 
under the various customary laws in Zambia or indeed other 
parts of Africa has led to a great deal of unnecessary 
controversy. On the one hand, there are those who argue 
either that sales of land do take place and are customarily 
sanctioned, or that although they do not take place, this is
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not because customary law forbids land sales, but that in a
situation of abundance of land, there would be no reason for
anyone to pay for land. On the other hand, there are those
who argue, that land sales are contrary to customary law and
in the instances where land has been transferred for value,
the price paid has been in respect of improvements on the
land and not the land itself.
By far the majority opinion seems to be that customary
law in Zambia does not permit the sale of land. Mvunga says
that there has been no satisfactory analysis of what sale of
land means under customary law. Denying the existence of
sales of land he argues:
"In all the areas toured under this 
investigation it is insisted and there is 
thorough unanimity in this, that land cannot 
be and is not sold. What is sold, however, 
are improvements on land such as permanent 
fixtures, i.e. buildings; not the land but the 
thing itself (the house), to be reimbursed for 
expenses incurred and labour employed. It is 
adamantly denied that the bricks, the roof 
material, the window frames and cement bought 
can by any stretch of imagination be regarded 
as part of the land."71
This view is also supported by many previous writers.
Barnes says of the Ngoni that rights in land cannot be sold,
but only given away, and that no presents are given to the
. . . 72grantor by the recipient of a garden or garden site. This
was corroborated by Priestley and Greening who in their
survey noted "Land itself has no monetary value and cannot
be bought, rented or sold nor may gifts take the place of a
monetary transaction. Land or rights to land can only be 
73given away."
In an effort to dispel the purported existence of land 
sales among the Tonga, Conroy explained that the idea of
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land purchase may have cropped up on account of the practice
in early days when the movement of large communities was
accompanied by the payment by such communities of a nominal
tribute associated with the grant of land to such 
74communities. This, he says, has given rise to a fiction
of land purchase and yet elsewhere, people have given gifts
to be received into the community or to establish peaceful
relations between the new community and the old. Summing up
his research findings he said:
"The idea of land purchase as we understand it 
is entirely foreign to Tonga thought and 
custom. All chiefs and councillors are 
emphatic that land sales do not occur and 
would not be tolerated. They all gave the 
same reply, that if such a case came to their 
notice they would fine the seller and order 
the return of the purchase money but, they 
say, no case has ever come before their 
courts. This was unwittingly confirmed by an 
Euro-African farmer in the Reserve who 
complained, somewhat bitterly, that he had 
been trying to purchase land from the Tonga 
for many years but that no one would sell."75
Since the early sixties, however, there has been a
growing feeling that the assertion that land cannot be sold,
but improvements can, is a mere disguise of the cash
transactions that are taking place. William concedes that
in South and Central Africa the sale of land has not
developed to the extent that it has in many parts of East
and West Africa, but, nevertheless, makes the observation
that there is a tendency towards cash transactions in 
7 6land. He explains that in the maize-growing parts of the 
Southern and Central Provinces cash transactions in land 
have emerged in the form of payments for improvements, a 
development said to have commenced among the Tonga. Where 
the plough is used, land must be stumped at much greater
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cost in wages for labour than in the case of normal hoe
cultivation. Land cleared in this way, it is said, acquires
a special value, assessed in money terms, which is
independent of the scarcity or abundance of land in general.
Payments are, therefore, being demanded for improvements,
and not only among the Tonga, among whom there is scarcity
of land, but also among the Soli and Sala who have just
joined the cash economy who are not yet short of land.
While the sale of improvements is not the sale of land in
the normal sense, "yet for all practical purposes these
transactions are sales of land, though in theory differences
77m  productive capacity do not affect the price". The
value of cattle manure is concealed in inflated values of
houses and other fixtures.
In the same way, White also perceived the selling of
improvements as the genesis of land sales, because the
transactions involve the transfer of land rights and value
is paid for improvements, which, being in the nature of
78fixtures, cannot be removed. White cites one case to 
illustrate his point. In the case cited, the relatives of a 
deceased farmer who lived in a different area declined to 
take over the land because none of them wished to leave 
where they were living. Logically, as none of the deceased 
relatives were prepared to take it up, it could be said to 
have been abandoned, and therefore, available for anybody 
who wished to take it. Another local resident showed 
interest in the land, but since improvements had been made 
to the land, the relatives demanded payment for the same.
As the demand turned out to be a test case, it was referred 
to the Native Authority, which held that the relatives of
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the deceased were entitled to receive value for the
improvements. White also found a broader extent of land
sales among the Luvale where, in thickly populated areas,
high prices were being fetched for land. He concludes:
"In societies where land rights are, in any 
case, transferable without reference to a land 
authority, provided residential requirements 
have been complied with, I do not believe that 
the change from transfer by gift to transfer 
for a consideration is such a revolutionary 
step as is sometimes supposed ... In the days 
of a cash economy, especially where land 
acquires a commercial value, it should seem 
perfectly natural that it should be 
transferred for a cash consideration since a 
new scale of economic values has been 
introduced."7g
The propositions by William and White that the sale of
improvements is a mere disguise for the sale of land, and
further, in the case of White, that since improvements
amount to fixtures which pass with land, transfers of such
improvements amount to land sales should be perceived as
misleading. Viewed from the English conception of land,
everything attached to land with a view to its improvement
is part of the land, but it is not clear that there is a
corresponding principle under customary law. As Mvunga
points out, it is a widely accepted principle in African
land tenure that while the ownership of a tree may vest in
one person, the land on which the tree stands may be in 
8 0another. In his discussion of the issue, the thrust of 
his argument is that under customary land tenure, 
improvements are regarded as separate from the land on which 
they are and hence the transfer of rights in these 
improvements do not involve the sale of land. Even in cases 
where the subject of contention is a building, as in the 
case cited, the court will treat the transaction more as a
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contract to sell the buildings than to sell the land.
Mvunga's conclusion is this:
"Thus in respect of bare land, it can be 
stated with confidence that sales have not 
been recognised under customary law as an 
accepted method of transferring land rights.
Economic pressures due to scarcity of land 
will no doubt be forthcoming, but as of now 
the impact of such pressures has not resulted 
in recognition of bare land as being a 
saleable commodity.
My own investigation among the Tonga showed the same
general picture that the Tonga are averse to any implication
that land can be the subject of sale. The answer, even from
local court justices, that "land cannot be sold" is almost
dogmatic. Accompanying this denial is the usual
qualification that improvements or developments on the land 
82can be sold.
In °f the assertion that land cannot be sold,
among the Luvale, an instance has been recorded where a
court recognised a transfer of land in exchange for goods.
83In the case of Ndonji v. Makiki, cited by Mvunga , the 
plaintiff, a deceased's young brother, sued the defendant 
for consideration still owing in respect of the transfer of 
a cassava garden by the late brother to the defendant. The 
parties had agreed that the transfer of the garden would be 
in consideration for a bull, two blankets and a piece of 
cloth. The defendant defaulted after the transfer of the 
cassava garden. Upholding the plaintiff's claim, the local 
court ordered the defendant to pay a sum of money in lieu of 
the items of exchange for the garden. Although this is, in 
fact, nothing more than a sale of land for a consideration 
in kind, this case is denied recognition as being decisive 
on the point, for the reason, it is said, that it is at
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variance with customary law.84 This brings us back to the 
issue of land sales about which it is submitted that there 
is no conclusive proof that customary law forbids sales of 
land.
(iv) Acquisition by Marriage
Land can be acquired as an incident of marriage. In 
Zambia there are three such systems, virilocal, uxorilocal 
and bilateral. In a virilocal marriage, the wife moves to 
the village of the husband, whereas in an uxorilocal 
marriage, the husband moves to the wife*s village where he 
may reside for some years and thereafter, return to his 
father's village. In a bilateral marriage the couple may 
live wherever they prefer. These systems of marriage have a 
bearing on the nature and extent of land rights enjoyed by 
wives (in a virilocal marriage) and husbands (in an 
uxorilocal marriage) or either of them (in a bilateral 
situation). The most notable communities where virilocal 
marriages are practised are the Tonga, the Ngoni, the Mambwe 
and the Luvale, while uxorilocal marriages are popular among 
the Bemba, the Lunda and some communities in the Central 
Province such as the Lala, Lamba, etc. The Lozi are unique 
in that they practise both uxorilocal and virilocal types of 
marriage, and are thus bilateral.
1) Virilocal Marriage and Landholding
Often a woman in this type of marriage will be 
cultivating the same field as her husband, who may have 
acquired the land in preparation for marriage or on 
marriage. In either event the field belongs to the husband
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85and the wife has a mere right of cultivation. The husband
who is duty bound to find a field for his wife or wives in a
polygamous marriage, retains the right to determine how the
land should be used, and he can alter the boundaries as he 
8 6desires. At any time he could deprive her of a portion of
87the land and give it to another wife or to his children.
The woman's rights to such land is, therefore, precarious.
As Colson puts it:
"On divorce or widowhood, a woman lost her 
right to use such land although she could 
remove the crop which she had tended. Women, 
therefore, felt little security of tenure in 
land allocated to them by their husbands."g8
This appears to be in contrast to Conroy's observation that
a woman retains rights to land after the death of her 
89husband, but he admits that the position of wives residing
90with their husbands is more complicated. She, however,
has certain claims to the produce from the land. On divorce
the wife is entitled to half share of the produce unless she
is responsible for the failure of the marriage, and where
the produce is sold, half the sum realised, and this share
91becomes her absolute property. Scudder says of the Tonga
"In case of divorce, the land returns to the husband, though
the wife retains rights over all crops which she is
cultivating in the garden at the time of her divorce, or
92which have been stored in her granary". There is a great
deal of uncertainty regarding some of these rules due to
local variations and the practical problem of
differentiating customary law from popular practice in the
93absence of court decisions on the point.
The general position described above seems to be common 
also among the Ngoni. The wife has a general interest in
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the land belonging to the husband and on his death, she may
be permitted to remain in the deceased's village
irrespective of whether there are any children of the 
94family. The Mambwe appear to have gone a little further
in that even on desertion, the wife loses the rights to use
95her husband's gardens. Desertion was deemed to have taken
place under the system of labour migration if the man failed
to return after an absence of three to five years and did
9 6not communicate with his wife or her relations.
It is not in all cases, however, that a wife, in a
virilocal marriage, acquires land through the efforts of the
husband. She may, like any man, acquire it on her own
initiative, independently of the husband. In such
circumstances, she has exclusive rights to such land and
these rights are retained by her even after divorce or the
97death of the husband.
2) Uxorilocal Marriage and Landholding
Among the uxorilocal communities are the Bemba, Lunda
and the Lamba. In these communities, on marriage, the man
joins his wife's village. In fact his obligations to the
wife's matrikin commence long before the marriage takes
place. Once the marriage negotiations are successful, the
man will spend some days labouring in the gardens of his
in-laws. Even after marriage has been solemnised, he will
for some time depend on his in-laws for the provision of
98food until some cleared patch of land is given to him.
The man's residence in his wife's village may continue for
so long as the marriage continues, but, after a few years,
99he is at liberty to take his wife to his own village.
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Land which is obtained by way of gift from the relations of 
the wife always remains the property of the wife and the 
husband's interest is only in the produce. If divorce 
occurs the husband is only entitled to his share of the 
produce, and on his death his successors have no claim to 
the land.100 Thus a husband in an uxorilocal marriage 
suffers similar disabilities to a wife in a virilocal 
marriage.
In the Lozi community, which is bilateral, the rights
of the spouse who is living away from his or her village are
similar to the general effect of uxorilocal and virilocal
marriage. Where the wife lives in the husband's village,
the rights in land are vested in her husband, but she has
equal rights in the crops produced from his piece of land.
On divorce or the death of the husband, she is entitled to
half the produce, and if she dies, her heir can claim her
share against her husband's relatives. By contrast where
the husband lives in his wife's village on account of
marriage, he has no rights in the crops for "neither the
102land nor the labour" is his.
(v) Acquisition by Inheritance
The rules of inheritance provide further evidence for 
the proposition that rights in land are vested in individual 
occupiers rather than in the community at large. Rules of 
inheritance are relevant for the reason that they may cause 
the parcellation of land which may, in turn, hamper 
agricultural development.
Customary law of inheritance is either matrilineal or 
patrilineal. Matrilineal inheritance is the system whereby
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property rights are derived through the female line.
Consequently a man's children have no right to his estate,
but his mother, brothers, sisters, maternal uncles,
matrilineal nephews and matrilineal nieces. Under the
patrilineal system rights to property are traced through the
male line with children taking priority over the man's
parents, his brothers and sisters. Under both systems there
appears to be no provision for the widow.
Among the matrilineal people in North-Western Province
- the Luvale, Luchazi, Chokwe, Lunda and Ndembu, the
103principal heir is the nephew of the deceased. The nephew
succeeds to all the property. Where there are several
nephews the matrilineal family of the deceased select the
particular nephew to inherit. Children and the deceased's
widow have no right to the estate or part thereof, although
they may get some of the property at the discretion of the
heir. In the absence of a nephew, a niece is chosen and in
the absence of a niece, it will be one of the sisters or
brothers. One aspect of importance is the discretion of the
maternal relatives to choose the particular heir within the
permitted category of relationships to the deceased. The
Tonga appear to allow the utmost discretion to the maternal
relatives referred to as basimukowa to elect the heir.
Under Tonga custom, there is no automatic inheritance by any
probable heir. The basic criteria are: i) nephews and
brothers are preferred over any other relative of the
deceased, ii) males are preferred over females, iii) a woman
of exceptionally good character may be chosen where there
104are no available male candidates. Failing nephews and
brothers, grandchildren may inherit, and it is only in the
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105absence of grandchildren that sons may inherit. In
contrast, the Chewa of the Eastern Province have more
definite rules. The order of inheritance is uncles,
brothers, nephews, the sons and the father.106
The majority of patrilineal peoples are to be found
mainly in the Northern and Eastern Province. In the
Northern Province are the Mambwe, Namwanga and Lungu
peoples, and in the Eastern Province, the Ngoni. Three
months after the death of the deceased, the heir referred to
among the Northern Province patrilineal peoples as impyani
is selected by the patrilineal relatives of the deceased.
The heir may be a son or a brother of the deceased. The
Ngoni rules of inheritance are as follows: i) where all the
sons of the deceased are of the same mother the estate goes
to the eldest son? ii) where the deceased is survived by
sons born of different wives the eldest son of the senior
wife inherits? iii) failing the sons, it will be the eldest
daughter, failing daughters, brothers and failing brothers,
the eldest sister. If the deceased had no children and
neither brothers nor sisters the father inherits and in his
107absence, the mother. The heir inherits the estate of the
deceased as his individual property to deal with as he 
108prefers, although he assumes the obligations of the 
deceased in relation to the dependants of the deceased and 
all those to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis.
The Lozi in the Western Province provide a variation of 
the patrilineal system. The principal heir, called shwana 
is chosen by the deceased's relatives a year after the death 
of the deceased. The heir is chosen from among the 
deceased's children - males taking preference over females.
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In the absence of children the estate devolves on the 
deceased's parents. Brothers and sisters of the deceased 
can only inherit if the deceased had neither children nor 
parents surviving him. Like the widow, members of the 
extended family have no interest in the estate.
In its Report on the Law of Succession, the Law 
Development Commission pointed out that the above rules of 
inheritance worked well in typical traditional societies but 
in urban areas the clash of traditions arising from 
intermarriages, and the gradual decline of the extended 
family system made observance of these rules difficult. 
Consequently, the Law Development Commission argued, it was 
necessary to introduce reforms to the law of succession 
which would have the effect of making the children and the 
widows the beneficiaries of the deceased's estate. These 
proposals were made notwithstanding the expression of 
satisfaction with customary law by the majority of people in
rural areas. The Law Development Commission's proposals are
. . . 109deficient in many respects and run counter to customary
law, for instance the idea that mothers should be trustees
of their infant children. The Commission's proposals do not
relate to inheritance. Even if the government was to effect
the reforms called for, customary law will continue to apply
in relation to land. The important point to be made is that
in both matrilineal and patrilineal systems, land is
inherited by a sole heir, be he a nephew or a son.
Consequently rules of inheritance are not responsible for
parcellation. Parcellation is the result usually of
transfers inter vivos by a father to his children as they
come of age, or marry.
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(c) Current Trends in Customary Land Rights
The above discussion has shown that generally customary
land rights are vested in individuals rather than
communities. It may well be that this is, in fact, a change
from communal rights to individual rights. An examination
of existing literature on the customary law of various
ethnic communities shows that earlier scholars tended to
stress the power or authority of the chief who was said to
be responsible for allocation of land. This may have been
encouraged by chiefs who claimed to have proprietory
interests in the land which they could transfer to minerals
prospectors.110 Modern works tend to emphasise the
111individual aspect of customary land rights and explain 
the role of the chief as administrative rather than 
proprietory.
The continuity of rights in land depends on land use. 
Much of Zambia has poor leached sand veld and lateritic
112soils and the pattern of rainfall is rather unreliable.
This has resulted in the development of various systems of 
land use dominated by shifting cultivation. The length of 
the period a parcel of land is used is dependent on 
ecological factors. In much of the Central Province small 
patches are cultivated for two to three years and then left 
to regenerate. Among the Mambwe, who practise "advanced 
chitemene" land may be used for about eight years, while on 
certain parts of the Luapula valley, in the Luapula 
Province, the stronger soils permit cassava fields to be 
cultivated for three to four years with intervals of
281
fallowing. Where shifting cultivation is very pronounced, 
the rights in land are more of an ephemeral nature as they 
are transferred from one piece to another over a 
comparatively short time. Consequently, no one claims any 
rights in fallow land.
In most communities, however, there is a growing 
tendency towards permanent holding of land. Thus a man may 
leave his land fallow for two to three years without any one 
disputing his claim to its use. Even in his absence, so 
long as his next of kin show interest in it, there will be 
no interference. The rights of an individual over cleared 
land are so inviolable that "land would have to be
exceedingly short before a Bemba would risk a quarrel on
113 . . .this account ...". Similarly, among the Tonga, rights m
114fallow land are respected. Conroy, however, brings out
the question as to the length during which such rights may 
continue to be recognised. He states that there were some 
disagreements among Tonga traditional authorities regarding 
the length to which rights in fallow land may continue to be 
respected. Some chiefs maintained that however long the 
land was resting, no one could deprive the owner of the land 
until his death even though the land had degenerated into 
bush. Others argued that rights in resting land lapsed 
after five years at the most. My own investigation revealed 
that as a general rule, rights in fallow land continue 
during the life of the owner and can be inherited upon his 
death. To the question whether rights in fallow land 
continued after the land was overgrown and reverted into 
bush, a panel of local court officials in Choma district was 
in agreement in asserting that the village headman could
282
permit its use by somebody without land but only with the
115permission of the owners. It is clear from this
qualification that, to all intents and purposes, the
individual's rights continue unless there is evidence to
show abandonment. The version of the opposing chiefs, that
rights lapse after a period of five years is an effort to
adapt customary law to take into account growing population
pressure on the land.
On the 13th of October 1980, the President appointed a
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the shortage of land in
the Southern Province and the methods which may be used to
facilitate expeditious acquisition of unutilised or
underutilised land and make such recommendations as the
Commission felt appropriate.11,6 The Commission's findings
regarding Tonga customary land tenure support the view
which confines the authority of the chief or headman to the
117regulatory role without any powers of granting land. The
regulatory power pertains to the granting or withholding of
permission for strangers to settle in the area and ensuring
that grazing land is used exclusively for grazing. The
Commission, however, points out that even these regulatory
functions are diminishing in importance on account of the
pressure on available arable and grazing land. The
Commission discovered "instances where through the chief's
acquiescence or his lack of power to enforce, people are
encroaching onto grazing areas, converting these areas for
residential and crop cultivation purposes", and concluded
that traditional authority over land use was being whittled 
118away. The pressure for change was also evidenced by
submissions to the Commission that the Tonga concept of
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Katongo, by which villagers, through their headman,
Sikatongo, would claim to be entitled to land surrounding an
old village site, was outdated and impracticable in modern 
119Zambia. The future trend would appear, among the Tonga,
to be further diminution in the regulatory role of
traditional authorities and a limitation on the length of
the period during which rights in fallow land and claims to
old village sites may develop.
The question whether or not customary law, under the
influence of the cash economy has sanctioned land sales is a
difficult one. There is no doubt that the introduction of a
cash economy has had some effect on customary land 
120practice. Improvements to the land, if not the land
itself, have acquired a cash value, and there is no doubt
that sales of improvements on land do take place. Inspite
of this development, however, it is persistently said that
land cannot be sold under customary law. Hence Colson's
remark that there is, among the Tonga, some ambivalence
towards land sales - on the one hand they insist that land
cannot be sold while on the other, they admit that sales do 
121take place. The difficulty in determining whether or not
sales of land do take place arises, it is submitted, from 
the hypothetical nature of the question. From the 
literature which has a bearing on this question, it is 
apparent that in none of the cases cited to prove that a 
sale took place was virgin land the subject matter. All the 
cases cited in the matter of land sales by either White or 
Mvunga involved land which could, by village standards, be 
deemed to be developed. These cases are, therefore, 
inconclusive if they are meant to show either that sales of
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land take place or that they do not. The argument that only 
improvements on land, and not the land itself are sold is 
equally suspect. It has been stated that land rights are 
established, originally by occupation which involves 
clearing. Clearing the land in preparation for planting 
adds value to the land and such value is equivalent to the 
cost of labour. But the point is that virgin land is not 
the subject of any individual rights which can be 
transferred to another by way of sale. Thus, when the 
question is posed whether or not undeveloped land can be 
sold the answer must be an unequivocal 'no1 for the simple 
reason that no individual owns it, and a person cannot sell 
what he does not own. The failure to realise this factor 
has rendered much of the discussion sterile and academic.
It is possible that in the situation of scarcity of land 
people will inflate the value of improvements on the land, 
when, in fact, what they want to sell is the land itself.
It may be the case that improvements are being used as a 
disguise. It is, however, still the case that there is no 
recorded sale of undeveloped land. For the future it is 
unlikely that land sales will be encouraged because of the 
general prohibition under the Land (Conversion of Titles) 
Act, the implementation of which has so far been confined to 
State Land.
2. Customary Land Tehure and its Effect on Agriculture
As a relevant factor in the development of agriculture,
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customary land tenure has been criticised not only by 
scholars, but also by local administrators and international 
aid agencies. It is important to look at the major 
criticisms and examine whether they are borne out by 
customary law in Zambia. The absence of confidence in 
customary land tenure as a tool for agricultural 
modernisation has been caused by (a) the nature of customary 
law in general, (b) the alleged absence of security of 
tenure, (c) alleged restrictions on alienation of land, (d) 
parcellation and (e) absence of control.
(a) The Nature of Customary Law
122Customary law remains largely unwritten. In the
early sixties some attempts were made in East and Central
Africa to compile customary laws into "Restatements" as
123guides to administrators. These efforts met with
difficulty owing to variations among tribal communities in 
the same country, and were later abandoned. No 
"restatement" of customary law in Zambia was undertaken. 
These attempts, however, did not provide an exhaustive list 
of rules of thumb, but broad generalisations which 
emphasised uniformity rather than local variations. Arising 
from the fact that customary law is unwritten is its 
uncertainty. It is not contended that written law is 
invariably certain, as the often conflicting interpretations 
of legislative provisions by courts negates absolute 
certainty in any case. But what is important is the fact 
that in the case of legislation the existence of the rules 
is not in question, and the task is one of determining the
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scope within which they are to operate. The difficulty with
customary law is that the very existence of a given
proposition of law needs proof. For this purpose rules have
124been enacted for the ascertainment of customary law.
Modern literature on customary law is replete with
instances where the application of a particular rule of
custom is, by no means, clear. The extent of rights in
resting land (discussed above) provide one such instance.
Another subject of uncertainty relates to rights in grazing
125land. In Matimba v. Kulumbwa one assessor said:
"There is no such place like a grazing area.
There may be a place where the land is fertile 
and people may put fields on that land but 
there should be the herdsmen making sure that 
the cattle do not destroy the crops."126
To the question as to whose responsibility it would be to
ensure that crops are not damaged by cattle where an
individual opens a field in an area where cattle have been
grazing for a number of years, the assessor's reply was,
"the one who puts a field in a grazing area has to fence the
field". In this apparent contradiction is evident the fact
that there is uncertainty regarding, not only priority
regarding land use, but also the rights of individuals who
cultivate "grazing" land.
Uncertainty also surrounds the rights of women in
virilocal marriages. Mvunga reveals that there was
considerable objection by female members of the panel he
interviewed, to the proposition that even if the wife
cleared the land by herself, if the husband took part in the
127location of the site, the field belonged to him. Female
members wished to treat the land as self-acquired property 
to which they had exclusive rights. Although the
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proposition may be seen as no more than "a gesture of male 
128chauvinism", the existence of controversy is indicative 
of uncertainty. Similarly, in my investigation, it was 
clear that, although the rules are supposed to be obvious to 
those governed by them there was disagreement among members 
of the panel, particularly between local court justices and 
the headman. The headman contended that the rights of a 
spouse who had moved to the village of the partner were at 
risk on the dissolution of the marriage. The Presiding 
Justice contended, however, that if that spouse had expended 
efforts in cultivating the land, the spouse could not be 
deprived of the land notwithstanding the dissolution of the 
marriage. It was, nonetheless, clear that the doubts in the 
minds of some members of the panel had not been dispelled 
and that they preferred not to pursue the argument on 
account of the relatively exalted position occupied by the 
Presiding Justice in the legal system.
Another problem with the nature of customary law has
been the alleged inability of customary law to adapt to
changing circumstances. In particular, some of the tenets
enshrined in custom are not in keeping with present economic
and demographic realities. One of these doctrines is that
membership of a given community confers upon the person a
right to have access to some portion of tribal land.
Gluckman has written: "By virtue of membership in the nation
or tribe every citizen is entitled to claim some land,
whether it be from the King, or from such political unit as
129exists in the absence of chiefly authority". This
doctrine has its own advantages, the most notable being that 
its application has led to the absence, so far, of a
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130landless class, but it is unrealistic in a situation of
scarcity of land.
In addition, this doctrine has led to the perception of
land as a free commodity, which, in turn, has the effect,
. . 131allegedly, of discouraging greater productivity. As the
argument goes, the African views land as a fundamental
factor in guaranteeing the African*s hereditary right to
exist in his preferred milieu, and such a relation to the
land involves very little pressure for increased
agricultural production and financial return through greater
132inputs of labour. Land is seen as a means of providing
security at a basic subsistence level rather than as a
source of marketable surplus. In order to encourage surplus
production, it is argued, the traditional concepts have to
be changed and emphasis laid "on the most productive use of
land rather than on a pattern of use geared to provide
133security at a low level of production".
The conclusion that the absence of a "cost factor" 
discourages increased productivity requires further 
examination. It is based on the assumption that whoever 
incurs some expense in acquiring land will use it to recover 
his expenses. The experience with State Land in Zambia has, 
however, shown that notwithstanding the expenditure incurred 
in acquiring farms, some of the farms remain undeveloped and 
underutilised. There is also the danger that if funds are 
dissipated in acquiring land, there will be little left to 
invest in its development. In any event, the cost factor 
would not ensure the continued exploitation of the land once 
the cost had been recovered. Moreover, peasant farmers have 
continued to make a substantial contribution to marketed
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produce, notwithstanding the fact that they have not had to
134purchase their maize fields. Finally, the assumption
that customary law cannot adapt to changing economic and 
social conditions is debatable. . Current trends in 
customary land tenure indicate a movement towards the 
restriction of the powers of traditional authorities and 
rights in fallow land. The real issue is whether the pace 
at which customary law is adapting to the changing economic 
and social conditions is adequate bearing in mind the crying 
need for increased agricultural production. Where it is 
required that immediate reform is necessary to facilitate 
development, legislation may be passed to bring about any 
radical change in landholding. But the use of legislation 
to bring about change is not only a response to the 
deficiencies of customary law. The history of the 
development of the common law has shown the degree to which 
legislation has been used to break out of the strictures of 
judge-made law, and evolve new rights and institutions to 
achieve the desired goal.
(b) Absence of Security of Tenure
Uncertainty about the nature of customary land rights
may cause the landholder to feel insecure. Another cause is
what is loosely referred to as "communal" land tenure.
Where land rights are communally based, an individual member
of the community may be discouraged from spending money on
its development because he is uncertain whether he will be
allowed to enjoy the land to the exclusion of other members
135of the community. Commenting on the customary land
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tenure in mid-west Nigeria, Runowicz stated that rights in
land, after the harvest, were less stable as the land
13 6returned to bush "in trust of the community". The
problem here appears to be the fact that customary land
rights continue to be enjoyed only so long as the land is
being used and lapse when the landholder ceases to use it.
Runowicz found that in such a system, landholders were
reluctant to use fertilizer and that farmers tried to avoid
the loss of their land by establishing bogus plantations of
rubber trees to give the impression that the land was still
137being cultivated.
Commenting on the effect of communal ownership on
agriculture, a report of the United Nations' Food and
Agricultural Organization stated:
"This sort of communal ownership, with
individual possession limited to one crop
rotation (and return of the plots to the
common fund upon expiry of this period), has
the fundamental disadvantage of not
encouraging land improvements. As such
improvement is often very expensive, the
peasants will undertake it only if they have a
guarantee that they will benefit personally
from it. This implies the extension of their
usufruct well beyond a few years.'' Q
1
The same arguments have been used against corporate tenures
whereby a family or lineage group holds rights in land as
one corporate unit, even though individual members of the
family or lineage group use separate plots for 
139cultivation.
The argument that customary land tenure inhibits 
agricultural development because it is communal is no longer 
tenable. Customary interests in land were for a 
considerably long time believed to be communal but more 
recent appraisal has emphasised the individual nature of
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these rights. As far as Zambia is concerned the theory of
communal ownership has not enjoyed any substantial support.
Only on grazing land or unoccupied land can the members of
the community have equal rights.
There are, however, two communities which have been
associated with corporate landholding, namely the Luvale and
the Lungu. In these ethnic communities land is said to
belong to local matrilineages which constitute villages and
resting land is identified with the village as its property,
. . 140but not the individual. But the essence of security of
tenure is the assurance that the landholder will not be
deprived of his land so long as it is being cultivated, or
if not, it is resting. One may, therefore, agree with
Benneh that since an:
"individual's right to cultivate an area which 
he has claimed for himself is never taken away 
from him under the corporate tenure system, 
farmers have the necessary incentive to invest 
in their acquired tracts of land"141.
It is only in cases where periodical redistribution of land
is practised that the cultivator may be discouraged from
142planting permanent crops , but in none of the Zambian
communities is this the case. The recognition of rights to
fallow land disproves the existence of periodical
redistribution of land. Denying the absence of security of
tenure among the Kunda in Chief Jumbe's area in the Eastern
Province, Ngandwe states that although individual rights
under customary land tenure are subject to limitations such
as that land cannot be sold, there is sufficient security of
143tenure to encourage investment. He reveals that all the
twelve "emergent" farmers he interviewed stated that their 
investment in land were limited only by their "humble
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resources and definitely not by want of security of 
144tenure". *
The proposition that there is security of tenure under
customary law is, however, subject to two qualifications
namely the rights of spouses in virilocal and uxorilocal
marriages, as the case may be, and the rights of "strangers"
to the community. It has been shown above that the rights
of spouses under the two systems of marriage are recognised
only during the existence of the marriage. Due to the high
incidence of divorce in some communities, there is no
security of tenure as regards the immigrant spouse, and
consequently, little incentive to grow anything other than
annual crops or take measures to conserve soil fertility,
let alone plant fruit trees. As Mitchell observed among the
Yao of Malawi, the men have no interest in long range
145agricultural plans in the village of their wives. He
went on to explain:
"If he invests capital, it is in moveable 
goods; if he builds a substantial house, it is 
in his matrilineage village. It is 
significant that when I gave some men avocado 
pear seedlings and told them that they took 
seven years to bear, not one planted the 
seedlings in the villages at which he was 
married. All planted them at their 
matrilineage villages."146
147The normal trend which is becoming increasingly popular, 
is for a husband to serve a few years usually between two to 
three years and then return to his village where his rights 
are more secure, but those of his wife are, correspondingly, 
less secure. Unlike a husband, however, the wife cannot 
insist that the family moves to her village where her rights 
are, comparatively, secure.
Naturally, the impact on agricultural development of
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the fact that women have little incentive to invest in land 
must be seen in the totality of their economic standing in 
the traditional sector. There is no denying the fact that 
they have the right to hold private property and some have 
substantial private wealth for instance, in terms of 
livestock, but since they have little security in the 
villages of their husbands, their livestock, invariably, 
remains in their own villages where they have little 
opportunity to see that it is being properly looked after. 
But for the majority of women, the husband is still the 
breadwinner, so much so that they have little resources to 
spare which they can invest in land even given security of 
tenure. Nevertheless, as the opportunities for women to 
earn independent income increases both in urban areas and in 
villages (through the sale of agricultural produce), and the 
access to credit from banks improve, it will be necessary to 
confer security of tenure on wives in virilocal marriages. 
The incentive arising from their feeling secure will enable 
them to invest in long term projects in the villages of 
their husbands, where they can have personal control and 
develop managerial ability to get into commercial 
agriculture.
The other qualification to the theory that customary 
land tenure does confer security of tenure relates to the 
land rights of 'strangers' to the community. Earlier on, it 
was stated that entitlement to community land was dependent 
on the individual being a member of the community, and that 
a stranger should approach the headman of a village or 
chief, as ^ the case may be, to be admitted as a member of the 
village or the tribal community. Upon the chief or village
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headman accepting the stranger, the latter acquires the same 
rights as other members to land in the tribal area. In 
theory, the stranger enjoys the same degree of security as 
other members that the relevant customary law offers. In 
times of abundance of land, and, so long as the numbers of 
such strangers are few, these strangers are openly welcomed, 
and there is no conflict with the local population. In the 
event of land shortage, however, the immigration of a large 
number of strangers may create anxiety in the local 
population which may lead to the erosion of the security 
enjoyed by strangers. Such settlements of strangers were 
established during the period of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland due to the absence of restrictions on movement 
among the Federal States. The majority of these people who 
came mainly from S. Rhodesia, settled in Lusaka rural, but 
there were also large settlements in Kabwe rural, in the 
Central Province. A 1969 census revealed that there were in 
excess of 8000 settlers in Lusaka rural and more than 7,300, 
in Kabwe.148
Research undertaken by Mutsau shows that all these
strangers sought and secured permission to settle in the
areas in the normal manner. But as their number increased,
they began to maintain their cultural identity, a
development which gave the impression of aloofness to the
local Lenje population. In the course of 1963 the
relationship between the settlers and the local population
became so strained that suggestions were made to the chief
149that they should be expelled. Central government
intervention, however, has helped difuse the tension, but 
the lesson to be learnt is that security of tenure is also
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dependent on acceptance by the local community. Mutsau 
reports that on account of insecurity, there was a desire 
among the younger settlers to leave the area and seek 
employment in the urban areas or to leave the country 
altogether.150
It may well be argued that the absence of foreign 
settlers need not hinder agricultural development as there 
is a comparatively larger indigenous rural population in the 
country, but the worrisome fact remains that the experience 
of settlers in Kabwe rural is not unique. The same 
experience has been suffered by Zambians who are "strangers" 
in the sense that they belong to other ethnic groups. Local 
languages have developed derogatory expressions such as 
mushamashi, in Lenje, and munyukunyuku, in Lozi to refer to 
strangers generally. The colonial government did little in 
its land policy to erase the perception of land as being 
held by the tribe when under the policy of native reserves 
it alienated reserves to natives "as tribes or portions of 
tribes". It created the impression that a reserve belonged, 
exclusively, to the tribe to which it had been granted, and 
to no other tribe or member of another tribe. The result 
has been the restriction of free settlement on other land, 
of those who, although they have the capital and managerial 
ability to cultivate a large farm, are unable to do so owing 
to scarcity of land in their communities. In terms of 
affording security to the stranger, government legislation 
may not immediately change the attitude of the local 
population, but it may give legal remedies and establish a 
code of conduct by which the interests of both the local 
population and the strangers are regulated.
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(c) Absence of Title Deeds, Restriction on Dealings and
Capital Formation
The Land Commission of 1982 reported that many
witnesses expressed deep regret about the lack of title
deeds in the Reserves and Trust Land areas which, in their
view, prevented them from using land as security for loans
151from financial institutions. The absence of title deeds
is not the only factor. It is also alleged that
restrictions imposed by customary land tenure on dealings,
particularly, prohibition against the sale of undeveloped
land, inhibits the use of customary land as security.
Further, these two factors by preventing the free transfer
of land inhibit the creation of a market for land which
would ensure that land with agricultural potential is more
productively used.
If land is to be used more in line with its potential,
argues Yudelman, it must be seen merely as one of the
factors of production and a basis established for
distinguishing the economic value of different pieces of 
152land. Land has, therefore, to be negotiable with its
price regulated by ordinary market forces of supply and
demand so as to place a value on land according to its
potential. In the circumstances, an efficient market for
land would bring about a circular action: "better land would
be higher priced because it would produce more, but because
it was high priced, there would be pressure to use it to
yield higher returns, and so better land would have to be
153put to more productive use than poorer land". This chain
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of reaction would, he says, have the effect of shifting
emphasis from subsistence production to specialisation of
production and, ultimately, commercialisation of
agriculture. It is also argued that the absence of
marketability of land prevents "progressive" farmers from
consolidating fragmented parcels or acquiring larger
holdings, while "innovative outsiders who might come in and
154make land more productive than locals are also blocked".
These arguments are of doubtful validity, however.
Freedom of transfer of land and the high cost of the land
that such freedom might entail did not prevent speculation
on State Land. It is conceivable, nonetheless, that the
non-marketability of land has prevented easy access to land
by other ethnic communities.
The second part of the argument is that "owing to the
customary rule that land cannot be sold ... it plays no role 
. . . 155in capital mobilisation". Mortgages of State Land are
common but their operation is restricted to the unexhausted 
improvements. Mortgages of undeveloped land, therefore,
cannot be made. This factor is very important in 
considering the importance of land as security for loans in 
the Reserves and Trust Land. Since unimproved land cannot 
be mortgaged, it is the value of the improvements that will 
determine how much can be loaned. In many rural areas, the 
value of improvements is so low that it is doubtful that 
much can be loaned on their security. There is also the 
question of the demand for rural land. Whether or not a 
financial institution which has lent money on the security 
of land will recover the full amount when it realises its 
security depends on the demand for that particular land.
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Where there is land shortage such as in the Southern and 
Eastern Provinces disposing of land by way of sale is bound 
to be easier than where land is plentiful. There is no 
question, however, that a number of farmers, particularly, 
the emergent farmers, who have made valuable improvements on 
their land would benefit from mortgages of customary land. 
There is also an increasing number of urban workers who, on 
retirement, wish to settle on customary land.
In terms of customary land tenure in Zambia the above 
discussion has shown that apart from the Ngoni with regard 
to whom land sales together with improvements do not take 
place, elsewhere, such sales are recognised. Theoretically, 
therefore, a mortgage of customary land is possible.
Whether or not banks can be persuaded to accept customary
land as security and the desirability of permitting
. . . 157villagers to use land m  this way is discussed elsewhere ;
it is, however, pertinent to point out at this stage that
the requirement of residence may pose a problem. Rights in
customary land are acquired by residence in a particular
community and even when customary law permits the sale of
improvements on land, the transferee, if he is not a
resident must, prior to acquisition, secure permission to
settle in a given area from the chief or headman, as the
case may be. The requirement that "strangers" must first
secure the permission of the traditional authority, if they
wish to acquire an interest in land, and since a mortgage is
a transfer of such an interest in land, means that financial
institutions would have to secure permission from
traditional authorities if they wish to lend on the security
of land within the chief's area. Moreover, in the event of
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the villager failing to repay the loan, the requirement of 
permission would seriously restrict the number of possible 
purchasers to whom the bank could dispose of the land and 
realise its security.
(d) Parcellation and Fragmentation
A further criticism of customary land holding is that
159it leads to the parcellation of land. The two causes of
parcellation in customary landholding are, allegedly the
right of every member to a share of tribal land, and the
customary rules of inheritance. In his evaluation of
customary land tenure in the context of agricultural
development, Podedworny made the following remark:
"One of the basic principles of the 
traditional system of land tenure is the right 
of every member of a given community to the 
land irrespective of how long one remained 
away from his permanent - that is - tribal 
place of living. This constitutes one more 
source of conflicts and a factor leading to an 
ever greater fragmentation of holdings."160
Although Podedworny uses the expression "fragmentation" what
he actually means is parcellation, at least, in the context
of the definition adopted. There is no doubt that every
traditional ruler feels compelled to find some land for
every one of his subjects. In the face of land shortage,
however, this entails a limitation to the period during
which one may enjoy rights in resting land. Rules of
inheritance may contribute to the parcellation of farm land
if they entail the division of the deceased's land into
several small portions to several heirs. The danger of
parcellation is that it may result in the resulting pieces
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of land being too small to sustain a family even with the 
use of expensive implements. At present, there appears to 
be little evidence of the effect of parcellation. In the 
whole of the Southern Province, where, owing to scarcity of 
land, the effects of parcellation would be more pronounced, 
no such complaint was ever made to the 1982 Land Commission.
What has been perceived as common throughout the 
country is what may be termed as fragmentation, the 
ownership of several scattered portions of farm land as 
opposed to a consolidated unit. The problem with 
fragmentation is that the farmer's time is divided between 
travelling from his village to these scattered portions and 
cultivation. Goddard takes a much broader perspective when 
he states:
"If the farm is scattered in a number of 
separate fields, a large percentage of the 
total working hours may be wasted in 
travelling between the compound and the 
various fields. Excessively small fields may 
be neglected. Land improvement and 
conservation measures may be hampered because 
of the need for co-operation amongst 
neighbours, while small fields may prevent the 
introduction of machinery to increase 
efficiency."161
It is practically difficult to assess the actual time spent
on travelling to distant fields due to variations in terms
of numbers of fields, distance between villages and farms
and individual ability. In an attempt to apportion the
working hours of women in a Bemba village in the Northern
Province, Stromgaard found that "no less than 16 per cent
... was spent walking to and from the fields in the forest
162because of their distance from the village". This
observation has a wider application because, while the area 
immediately surrounding a village site is the first to be
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used for cultivation, when the same shows signs of 
exhaustion, there is no immediate shifting of the village 
site to another area. Villagers begin to search for arable 
land and then establish fields further and further away from 
the village.
While fragmentation has its adverse effects, it also 
has its advantages. There are usually cogent reasons why a 
farmer prefers to have several scattered holdings differing 
in size. Land of different soil types is required to suit 
the cultivation of different crops. It might be more 
advantageous for a farmer to grow vegetables and legumes 
where the soil and water content is adequate, such as along 
the river banks, than grow the same in a cassava field as 
cassava being a root crop can be grown even where the water 
content of the soil is low. Equally important is the degree 
of attention required to produce particular types of crops - 
vegetables require greater attention, so they are placed 
closer to the village or in the backyard of the house, 
whereas cassava and maize can, depending on suitability of 
land, be produced further away from the village. The 
decision, therefore, to have separate holdings are based 
more on economic grounds than necessarily land shortage.
In many Zambian communities, it is not surprising to
find villagers cultivating different fields simultaneously.
Barnes identified three types of gardens cultivated by the
Ngoni. These would be a main garden varying in size from
about one to three acres, old village site gardens, and
163moist gardens made near streams. The main gardens are
those made by bush clearing and are chosen having regard to 
the type and quantity of the natural vegetation. The more
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thick the vegetation, the more fertile the land is said to 
be. Main gardens are used for growing staple crops such as 
maize. Old village gardens are established on the site of 
former huts and byres in order to take advantage of ashes 
and cattle manure which restore fertility to the soil. In 
old village gardens, tobacco is sometimes grown, but they 
may also be used in the same way as main gardens. On moist 
gardens near streams vegetables are usually grown. They are 
also used to grow maize during the hot season when the main
fields are short of moisture.
164 165Richards and Stromgaard have shown that the Bemba
have a wide range of gardens used sometimes simultaneously,
and sometimes at different times of the year. The biggest
of these gardens will be the main ash garden on which maize
and millet (the staple crops) are grown. There are also a
variety of small ash gardens on which two or more such crops
are grown and there seems to be extreme specialisation of
gardens in terms of what crops are grown. Even a burnt out
trunk of a tree, and a mound in an existing garden may be
used for growing different crops. No less than thirteen
varieties of gardens have been identified by Stromgaard.
Among the various Luapula peoples, too, a similar situation
166of multiplicity of gardens has been said to exist. In
these communities cassava which is the main staple crop is 
grown in the valley where it requires little attention and 
can withstand occassional droughts. It has also got the 
advantage that being a root crop, it requires no special 
storage facilities as it can be left in the ground until 
needed. In addition to the main garden most families also 
have gardens of maize or sweet potatoes in the fertile soils
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at the edge of the swamp, and around the villages and old
village sites vegetable gardens are cultivated early and
167tobacco in the middle of the rain season. Fragmentation
is common in many areas in Zambia, but the reason for its 
existence is not necessarily that customary land tenure is 
defective, but the numerous ecological factors determining 
the appropriate land use suitable for a given piece of land.
In as far as fragmentation is caused by ecological 
factors rather than land tenure, there would appear to be 
little point in seeking to make changes in customary 
landholding as it has no bearing on the problem in the 
majority of cases, and any attempt to introduce 
consolidation is bound to be unsuccessful.
(e) Absence of Control
It is the nature of traditional land tenure systems in 
Zambia that there appears to be no control over land use and 
land holding. Neither the scholars who have maintained that 
chiefs and headmen are land allocating authorities nor those 
who say they are land controlling authorities have gone 
further to indicate the nature of the control exercised.
The impression remains as regards the former that once land 
has been allocated, the functions of the chief or headman 
have been fulfilled. Thereafter, the chief or headman is 
powerless to interfere in the farmer's use of the land. As 
for the latter, the "interests of control" do not seem to go 
beyond the exercise of powers of accepting and rejecting 
"strangers", the settlement of domestic and inter-village 
disputes and the organisation of hunting and fishing trips.
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There is some element of control regarding the setting of
fire to bushes surrounding villages and the burning of the
remains of gardens after harvest (in systems of ash
fertilization), but these controls are solely to prevent
accidental damage to granaries or maize heaps still in the
gardens. The importance of land control goes beyond the
preservation of soil fertility. Land control can be used to
promote efficiency in land use and also prevent land
accumulation (as has been attempted on State Land) .
The government does recognise the importance of control
and not only of agricultural land in State Land but also
customary land in the Reserves and Trust Land for, "to
continue with a situation in which there is no control or
system of exploiting natural resources in the country, is
planting time bombs, the explosion of which will have dire
168consequences ..." . In his address to the UNIP National
Council in 1970, the President said:
"The danger, therefore, does not lie only with 
land which is freehold, which has been a bone 
of contention in recent years. It also lies 
in the rights of usage over vast acres of land 
by individuals under customary law."169
Absence of control has not only manifested itself in
the manner of land acquisition, but also in the fact that
customary land rights may continue irrespective of whether
or not the land is being used. There is general agreement
that once ownership has been established by occupation or
purchase, no one, including the traditional authorities, can
deprive the landholder of his land. Many scholars take the
position that the inviolability of customary land rights
only lasts so long as the individual continues to actually
cultivate the land, but does not extend beyond the period
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when the land is no longer in use. There is ample evidence 
to suggest that rights in fallow land are, increasingly, 
coming under pressure, particularly, in areas of land 
shortage. In sjpiie of this pressure, the position remains 
that powerful clans and lineages still "hoard" land which is 
not being used for cultivation. This was brougt to light by 
the 1982 Commission of Inquiry. In Gwembe District, the 
Commission was informed that in Chief Munyumbwe's area,
there were "some minority but powerful clans" that held onto
. . 170unutilised land. It was also revealed to the Commission
that undeveloped tracts of land, whose previous owners had 
either left the area or died, could not be occupied by those 
in need of land. There was some pressure on the Commission 
to recommend that aspects of customary land tenure which 
recognise title to land which is not being used should be 
abolished.171
While the above situation cannot be said to be common 
throughout the country, it does serve to highlight the 
possible dangers which may arise from the absence of control 
of customary land. But the Commission made no proposals 
regarding steps that could be taken to prevent land 
accumulation and promote the efficient use of customary 
land.
Absence of control has been deprecated in respect of 
both arable land, and grazing land. The discussion of 
grazing rights has shown that these rights are exercisable 
by any member of the community, and are, therefore,
"communal" in that sense. Although there might be some 
areas where it is usual to take cattle for grazing, there 
is, in fact no fixed area known as grazing land. Any
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unoccupied land is grazing land. As grazing rights are 
common to all, there is no incentive on any member of the 
community to take measures to ensure that there is no 
destruction of such land. The conservation of these areas 
and the improvement of their pasture requires periodical 
investment of capital and labour while damage may be done by 
over-grazing. Traditional authorities have shown little 
initiative in mobilising the resources of their communities 
to prevent over-grazing. Suggestions to apportion grazing 
land among members of communities which use such land were 
made to the Commission by some witnesses, and two chiefs in
Choma district are said to have supported the move towards
172 . . . ."individualisation". Individualisation of grazing land
cannot, however, take place without a comprehensive scheme
for the grant of registered title. While compulsory
registration of title appears to be popular among
progressive farmers, it is deeply resisted by the ordinary
173peasant farmer.
While the absence of control may be deprecated, it must
be borne in mind that excessive control has the effect of
threatening the security of the landholder. The wider the
scope of control, the greater the feeling of insecurity.
Insecurity will have the undesirable effect of reducing the
incentive of thie farmer. In addition it is extremely
difficult to control land use in a country with such a wide
variation in population density and agricultural potential.
One has merely to point at the present difficulties relating
to the control of agricultural State Land whose total area
is relatively small by comparison to the Reserves and Trust 
174Land. Historically, attempts to control land use in the
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Reserves and Trust Land date back to 1906. In that year the
British South Africa Company attempted to curb the chitemene
system of cultivation to preserve forests. The people who
were affected by this order, the Bemba and the Mambwe found
it difficult to grow their staple crop, millet, and there
175were outbreaks of famine. Hence, although the move was
rightly aimed at initiating village regrouping as well as
soil conservation, the response to the scheme was massive 
176resistance. The attempts made by the colonial government
to promote commercial production by methods not destrutive
to the soil through Peasant Farming Schemes and Improved
177Farmer Schemes also met with little success.
If control is to be imposed, it will have to be done
selectively so that maximum benefits are reaped in those
areas where conditions necessitate the measure. On this
basis it will have to begin where there is land shortage,
both in terms of arable as well as grazing land. In other
areas some general rules preventing the deforestation of
wasteland could be introduced and firmly enforced through
district authorities and traditional authorities. The
178Natural Resources Act permits the Natural Resources Board
179to make orders relating to destocking, but this provision 
has not been used.
It is important at this stage to examine the findings 
and recommendations of the Land Commission which relate to 
control. On livestock, the Commission found that cattle 
population in the Southern Province had substantially 
increased between 1975 and 1980 owing, in part, to general 
reluctance on the part of owners to sell cattle which, to 
them, represented a form of wealth. This increase in
308
numbers resulted in the over-grazing of large areas. Apart 
from calling upon the government to enforce section 26(1)(2) 
of the Natural Resources Act, the Commission made four other 
recommendations, all of which were accepted by the 
government:180
"(i) [not relevant]
(ii) ... an introduction of a levy on a 
number of cattle in excess of the 
carrying capacity of each given area 
should be considered as a possible 
measure of livestock control ...;
(iii) A system of paddocking in the communal 
grazing (lands) should be encouraged as 
soon as possible on a self-help basis in 
order to improve the management of 
grazing pastures;
(iv) The agencies involved in the promotion 
of livestock industry in the rural areas 
of the Province should increase their 
efforts in teaching the peasants of the 
need to keep manageable herds which can 
adequately be supported by the available 
grazing land in the area and that these 
efforts should be extended to production 
units of the various educational 
institutions in the Province;
(v) [Not relevant]
(vi) The Southern Province Co-operative and 
Marketing Union responsible for 
marketing scheduled crops should examine 
the possibility of undertaking the 
marketing of livestock as well, possibly 
to the Cold Storage Board of Zambia".lgl
On the whole, these recommendations would appear to be 
sound, except that the application of the suggested levy and 
the encouragement of paddocking on a "self-help" basis are 
points which are bound to raise a great deal of 
misunderstanding, both between the government and the 
cattle-owners and among the cattle-owners themselves. As 
the suggestion goes, the levy is supposed to be imposed if 
the farmer introduces an additional beast to graze in a 
given area. In practical terms villages do not have any 
given "village lands" which correspond to villages. At
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present cattle can roam freely over wide areas or villages 
and this freedom is important because the availability of 
vegetation changes in accordance with seasons and the lands 
in question. It is, therefore, very doubtful whether such a 
decision would not cause more acrimony than is justified. 
Another point is that the country's beef industry has never 
been adequate and present government policy is towards 
increasing the national herd. Any action, therefore, which 
may be seen as penalising those who are cattle-owners by 
requiring them to pay a levy for every animal in excess of 
the permitted number will be counter-productive. Moreover, 
the Commission suggested the levy to serve as a penalty, 
rather than a means of raising funds which can be invested 
in those areas to increase the carrying capacity. This 
appears to be the case in that the Commission fails to 
mention the fund into which the levy should go. If the 
money is treated as part of the general government revenue, 
it might never benefit the people who contribute to it. In 
consequence the areas from which the funds will come will be 
deprived of investment capital. A better approach would 
appear to be the creation of a special fund in which these 
levies should go and the use of such a fund to improve the 
carrying capacity of the land.
The second recommendation which requires closer 
attention is that communal grazing land should be paddocked 
on a self-help basis. The difficulty lies in that, 
theoretically, there is nothing known as grazing land, as 
all unoccupied land can be used for grazing. To encourage 
individuals to, as it were, carve out for themselves 
individual pieces of land for their livestock, is to
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introduce a scramble for unoccupied land, which is bound to 
cause unnecessary friction among peasant farmers. The 
economically strong might fence off disproportionate sizes 
of land for their private use while the others will be 
forced to share the remainder. No steps to "individualise" 
grazing land or unoccupied land should be made on a 
self-help basis. Any paddocking must be a part of an 
overall scheme of land apportionment in areas of land 
shortage.
The Commission also addressed itself to the problem of 
soil conservation. It noted the existence of soil erosion 
in some areas of the Southern Province and admitted that 
erosion could have been checked by enforcing the provisions 
of the Natural Resources Act. It made five recommendations:
"(i) Conservation Committees provided for
under the Natural Resources Act should 
be re-activated?
(ii) A campaign to inform the people ... of 
the dangers of soil erosion should 
immediately be mounted;
(iii) People should be made responsible for 
the cost of constructing soil erosion 
control works?
(iv) Soil conservation fund be set up and the 
Southern Province Co-operative and 
Marketing Union be made responsible for 
the collection of funds from farmers in 
the Reserves and Trust Land areas.^g2
The fifth recommendation relates to soil erosion on State
Land. In the White Paper, the government accepted all the
recommendations but pointed out that the charging of a fee
for the control of soil erosion would require legal backing.
What is not clear is what should happen if a farmer fails to
pay the fee. This question might be settled under the
legislation which will have to be made to enable the
government recoup the cost of conservation works.
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C. NON-CUSTOMARY INTERESTS IN THE RESERVES AND TRUST LAND
1. The Problem of Converting Customary Land into State Land 
The Orders-in-Council regarding the Reserves and Trust 
Land provide an opportunity for those dissatisfied with 
customary land tenure to obtain grants of leases in the 
Reserves and occupancy licences in Trust Land. Upon 
securing the lease or occupancy licence, the landholder 
ceases to be governed by customary tenure as his rights and 
obligations are set out in the relevant Orders-in-Council.
As shown in Chapter One, the rationale of the policies of 
Reserves and Trust Land was to separate land for the use of 
the indigenous people from that which would be alienated to 
European settlers. With the coming of independence, it had 
become clear that these divisions were no longer justified. 
Yet it is impossible under the Orders-in-Council to turn 
customary land into State Land because of the provisions in 
the Orders which were meant to ensure that there would be no 
diminution in total size of customary land. These 
provisions all relate to changes in the boundaries of either 
the Reserves or the Trust Land, and since the wording is 
different, they are separately quoted as follows:
Article 6(3) of the Zambia (State Lands and Reserves) 
Order states:
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"The President may make such adjustments of 
the boundaries of any Reserve that may appear 
to be necessary or desirable, provided always 
that in case of any such adjustment, the area 
of no Reserve shall be materially affected or 
diminished thereby and on such approval being 
given the land excepted from a Reserve shall 
be deemed to be no longer subject to the 
provisions of this Order with regard to 
Reserves and the land assigned to a Reserve 
shall be deemed to be subject to the said 
provisions." (Emphasis added.)
Section 3(3) of the Zambia (Trust Land) Order states:
"The President may make such adjustments of 
the boundaries of any area of Trust Land as 
may appear to him to be necessary or 
desirable, provided that in the case of any 
such adjustment the area of Trust Land 
concerned shall not be materially affected or 
diminished thereby, and provided further that 
the land excepted from the area concerned 
shall thereupon cease to be Trust Land and 
shall become State Land and the land assigned 
to such area in exchange therefor shall become 
Trust Land." [Emphasis added.]
On the basis of these provisions, when the Ministry of
Rural Development requested to have more State Land carved
183out of rural land, the Commissioner of Lands replied that 
this could not be done.184 The first task is to determine 
whether the difference in wording reflects any differences 
in policy. It would appear that while the provisions have 
been differently worded, the import is the same. The import 
seems to be that boundaries of the Reserves or Trust Land, 
and also, by implication, State Land may be adjusted, but in 
so doing, any reduction in the area of each category of land 
must be compensated for by a corresponding reduction in the 
area of the category of land which would, otherwise, benefit 
from the adjustment. Regrettably this is not very clear 
from the State Land and Reserves Order. A more clear 
expression of policy is contained in the Trust Land Order. 
Boundary adjustments should leave the Reserves or Trust Land
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correspondingly similar in size to what they were before 
adjustment.
The second problem is whether these provisions,
relating, as they do, to boundary adjustments go far enough
to prevent the creation of a piece of State Land within a
Reserve or Trust Land. It may be assumed that "adjustments
of boundaries" does not mean the creation of new boundaries
which may result from the creation of State Land inside a
Reserve or Trust Land. It is submitted, however, that the
intention of the colonial government must have been to
prevent the diminution in the size of tribal land,
irrespective of how this might be brought about. This
interpretation appears to be justified because in the
circumstances in which the President is empowered to grant
non-customary interests in the Reserves and Trust Land such
interests are of very limited duration and the piece of land
to which such interests relate does not cease to form part
of the Reserve or Trust Land.
One possibility would appear to be that the President
can use his powers to acquire land for public purposes and
then turn it over to the Ministry of Rural Development.
This possibility was dismissed by the Commissioner of Lands
in response to the request by the Ministry. He argued that
"the creation of State Land from Reserves and Trust Land for
the purposes of turning such land into farms would not
amount to setting aside Reserves and Trust Land for 'public
185purposes' as defined in Appendix 4 ..." . Under the State
Lands and Reserves Order, the President may set aside land
in any Reserve for public purposes and any such land so set
186aside ceases to be Reserve Land and becomes State Land.
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Under the Trust Land Order, the President is empowered to
187acquire Trust Land for public purposes and any land so
188acquired ceases to be Trust Land and becomes State Land.
The definition of "public purposes" in both the Reserve 
Order and the Trust Land Order is the same and includes, 
inter alia;
"for exclusive Government use, for the use of 
the native inhabitants of Zambia, or for 
general public use".^gg
This definition appears to be wide enough to justify the
setting aside of land in both Reserves and Trust Land for
purposes of re-settlement as well as alienation to private
individuals for purposes of farming. This interpretation,
however, runs counter to the purpose for which Reserves and
Trust Land were established - to provide adequate land for
the indigenous population. Repeated exercise of the power
to set aside land for public purposes will have the effect
of diminishing the size of the Reserves and Trust Land.
Moreover, the limitation of the use to "native inhabitants"
is contrary to the current policy of racial integration. It
is, therefore, necessary to review the whole question of
land categorisation in terms of its relevance to existing
circumstances.
2. Provisions Regarding the Grant of Non-Customary 
Interests in the Reserves and Trust Land 
In both the Reserves and Trust Land, the President is 
empowered to make grants to any person, except that a grant
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to a non-native may be made only in three cases: (i) where 
the land has been set aside for public purposes, (ii) by 
special permission given under regulations issued by the 
President, and (iii) by a grant under Article 6A. Under 
Article 6A the President is empowered to grant leases to 
non-natives or a rural council, provided that the term does 
not exceed:
Mi) 99 years in the case of land set aside 
for public purposes;
ii) 33 years in the case of a grant to a 
missionary society or charitable 
organisation; and
iii) 5 years in any other case."
Before making a grant under Article 6A(i) above, the
President must consult the rural council within whose area
190the land is situated. Under Article 7, the President
191made regulations referred to as Reserves Regulations
which prescribe the rights and obligations of the lessee.
These regulations relate only to grants to non-natives.
Other regulations made under Article 7, the Reserve Grants 
192Regulations permit the President to make a grant to any
African who would be recommended for the purpose in
accordance with the provisions of a law enacted by the
193Parliament of Zambia. A grant made to an African under
the Reserve Grants Regulations was to confer a fee simple
estate in the land to the grantee which estate would have
been reduced to a lease for a term of one hundred years
under the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act.
Under the Trust Land Order, the President may "when it
appears to him to be in the general interests of the
194community as a whole*
"a) make grants or dispositions of Trust Land 
to individual natives or rural councils 
in accordance with the provisions of any
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regulations made under section 10 of this 
Order ?
b) grant rights of occupancy of Trust Land 
to natives or non-natives and demand a 
rental for the use of any land so 
granted ?
c) grant a right of occupancy in any Trust 
Land in exchange for any interest in 
State Land."
The right of occupancy may be granted for any term but not
exceeding ninety-nine years and subject to the terms of any
contract which may be made between the President and the 
195occupier. The President is, however, precluded from
making grants of rights of occupancy to a non-native under
terms which free him from paying rent or preclude the
196President from revising the rent. The power of the
President to make grants of Trust Land has been delegated to
the Commissioner of Lands, subject to the directions of the
197Minister responsible for land matters. As in the case of
the Reserves, a Trust Land grant made to an African vested
198in the African an estate in fee simple, which, by reason
of the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act has been converted to
a lease for a term of a hundred years.
The above summary is the framework within which 
statutory grants are to be made in the Reserves and Trust
Land. In practice, however, there is no strict compliance
with the law. In the case of an individual African a grant 
can be made in either Reserves or Trust Land limited only in 
duration by the rule that no interest can now be conveyed 
exceeding a hundred years. Hence, to an African landholder 
of a statutory grant, no difference exists whether the grant 
is in the Reserves or Trust Land. Since independence, 
leases have been granted in Reserves and rights of occupancy 
in Trust Land to Zambians and non-Zambians, alike, for a
317
term of ninety-nine years. To Zambians, the grants have
been made in respect of commercial, agricultural and
residential purposes. The rationale in making these grants
is to encourage development by enabling Zambians to obtain
loans on the security of a lease. In the case of
non-Zambians grants have been made in both the Reserves and
Trust Land to enable them to carry on business enterprises
199which Zambians are at present unable to engage in. The
government has, however, insisted upon a condition in
respect of grants to non-Zambians that Zambians participate
in the enterprise as members of the board of directors.200
There is, however, one important restriction on the
grant of ninety-nine year leases, and this is the
requirement of survey diagrams. Section 12(1) of the Lands
201and Deeds Registry Act states that "every document 
relating to land presented for registration shall describe 
the land by reference to:
a) a diagram, as defined by the Land Survey 
Act which has been approved by the 
Surveyor-General, the year and number of 
which is quoted in such document? or
b) where the Surveyor-General is satisfied 
that an actual survey or the approval of 
a diagram is, for the time being 
impracticable, a sufficiently detailed 
plan which has been approved by the 
Surveyor-General subject to such 
conditions, if any, which the 
Surveyor-General may think fit to impose?
and such diagram or plan shall be annexed to such document"
But under section 12(3):
"Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 
1, any lease or agreement for a lease of land 
creating a term not exceeding fourteen years, 
or any assignment or sublease of the whole of 
the land thereby demised or let, may, in lieu 
of a diagram or plan mentioned in subsection 
1, have annexed thereto a sketch plan approved 
by the Surveyor-General showing with 
reasonable accuracy the position of the
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boundaries of such land."
In the absence of a certified diagram, the President may 
only grant an interest for the duration of fourteen years, 
pending the preparation of the survey diagrams. Where the 
grant is of a lease or occupancy licence for a term of 
fourteen years, only a "sketch plan" is required. What is 
required on the "sketch plan" is a description of the 
property and its location in relation to the surrounding 
physical features.
3. Procedure for the Acquisition of a Grant
The manner in which an individual may obtain a grant in
the Reserves and Trust Land is of utmost importance to
individuals who are dissatisfied with customary land tenure.
At the same time, it is important to carry out a thorough
investigation of the title to, and the extent of the land in
question in addition to any interests other people may have
in the land. The absence of a machinery for proper
verification of boundaries and subsisting interests may
encourage people to obtain title to large tracts of land on
which some villagers may in fact be situated. It is for
this reason that the Reserve Order requires the President to
consult the rural council within whose area the land is 
203 . .situated. Similarly, under the Trust Land Order the
President, before making the grant, must have regard to the
customary laws existing in the district and consult the
204rural council in whose area the land is situated. The
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expressions "rural council" and "local authority" have been
widely interpreted to include traditional authorities such 
205as chiefs. An official government circular issued in May
1985 makes the position clear by stating: "Local authority,
in the Orders, has been administratively understood to mean
206the Chief and the District Council". Thus, while the law
does not go so far as to provide for the participation of
traditional authorities, administrative practice has
remedied this omission.
The procedure for acquisition has not always been
consistent. Prior to 1985, the practice adopted was to
require any applicant for land to obtain the consent of the
chief, the rural district council and the District
Secretary. Consent was evidenced by means of endorsements
of the above authorities on the sketch plan depicting the
207piece of land being applied for. One of the defects with
this procedure was that none of the officials was compelled
to carry out a physical inspection or to verify the nature
and extent of the land in question. The other defect was
that it was easy for individuals to obtain endorsements by
council officials who were not, however, authorised to do
so. Where this was done, the fact would not be obvious to
the Commissioner of Lands.
The new procedure contained in the Land Circular No 1,
of 1985 is a great improvement over the previous procedure.
It spells out the rules governing grants in both the
Reserves and Trust Land as the following:
i) In order to ensure that a local authority
has been consulted, the Commissioner of 
Lands will insist that each 
recommendation is accompanied by:
(a) Written consent of the chief under 
his hand?
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(b) extracts of the minutes of the 
committee of the council responsible 
for land matters embodying the 
relevant resolution and showing who 
attended, duly authenticated by the 
chairman of the council and the 
District Executive Secretary?
(c) extracts of the minutes of the full 
council with the relevant resolution 
and showing who attended, duly 
authenticated by the chairman of the 
council and the District Executive 
Secretary?
(d) four copies of the approved lay out 
plan showing the site applied for, 
duly endorsed and stamped by the 
chief, chairman of the council and 
the District Executive Secretary.
ii) The preparation of the lay out plan 
showing the area applied for should be 
done by persons possessed with the 
cartographic know-how.20Q
iii) It has been decided, for the time being, 
not to allocate more than two hundred and 
fifty hectares of land for farming 
purposes in the Reserves and Trust Land 
areas. The District Councils are, 
therefore, advised not to recommend 
alienation of land on title in such areas 
in excess of two hundred and fifty 
hectares as such recommendations would 
not be considered.
iv) In each case recommended to the 
Commissioner of Lands, the recommending 
authority shall certify that it has 
physically inspected the land applied for 
and confirm that settlements and other 
persons' interests and rights are not 
affected by the approval of the 
application.
This procedure is an improvement over the former in its
insistence on authenticated extracts of minutes of rural
councils and on physical inspection. The obligation on the
President to consult, which does not ordinarily carry with
it the necessity to obtain the consent of the local
authority, has been extended to securing consent. No grant
has ever been made by the President where consent has been 
2 09withheld. Another important reform has been the
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restriction in terms of size to two hundred and fifty 
hectares. The new procedures, however, raise fresh 
problems, namely the delay which must be expected from 
complying with the process, and the problem of dealing with 
interests already existing in the land, which is the subject 
of the grant. Delay will not only result from the need to 
obtain the extracts of minutes of the rural councils but 
also from the need to inspect the land. The Land Commission 
of 1982 recommended that the final decision as to whether or 
not a grant should be made should lie with district councils
who should also be required to keep a register of all such
210 . . . 211 grants. The government rejected this recommendation.
One possible reason for the rejection is that it would
result in the loss of control by the central government over
grants of land in the Reserves and Trust Land. But the
Commission's recommendation that the initial consent should
be given by the chief only after consultation with the
village headman or headmen, as the case may be, was 
212accepted. It is an improvement over the present practice
which enables the chief, on his own, to give consent without 
the necessity for him to liaise with any other traditional 
authority.
The other problem is how to treat existing interests. 
The regulations governing the grant of leases and occupancy 
licences are silent on this, and even the model lease in 
respect of labour depot sites in the Reserves makes no 
mention of this issue. The assumption could have been that 
the land which would be the subject of the grant would be 
unoccupied. But even in the case of unoccupied land, it is 
practically impossible to find any piece of land,
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particularly, to the extent of two hundred and fifty
hectares that will not have a community interest such as a
right of way to another village, the river, or grazing land
etc. The present Reserves lease (which is similar to the
right of occupancy), provides under clause 2(12), that the
lessee covenants with the President:
"Not to disturb or remove any person, village 
or plantation existing on the said Reserve 
Land at the date of these presents without the 
consent, in writing, of the President."
With regard to the right of way, the proviso to clause 4(4)
states that:
"The existing roads and thoroughfares, 
including footpaths, over the said Reserve 
land shall remain free and uninterrupted 
unless the same shall be closed or altered by 
the President or other competent authority."
The Deputy Commissioner of Lands is aware of the
problem of existing interests for he admits that the manner
in which villagers are scattered is such that it is
difficult, in practice, to find a piece of land of a
213reasonable size, which is completely unoccupied. The
solution proposed under clause 2(12), of recognising the 
interest of those already in occupation of the land and 
protecting such interests until such time as the President 
gives consent to their removal is a very unsatisfactory one. 
Existing interests are an encumbrance on the title of the 
lessee or licensee, making it difficult for him to use the 
land as security for a loan. It cannot be assumed that the 
President will find it politically safe to consent to have 
villagers moved from one place to another, and thus, it can 
be deduced that consent will not, invariably, be granted.
In the circumstances, the solution would appear to be that
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first, wherever possible, only unoccupied land should be 
considered for a grant? second, where there are a few 
scattered homesteads, a grant should not be made until an 
inquiry has been held as to the existing rights and the 
facilities for re-settlement. Provision must also be made 
for the proposed grantee (applicant) to pay compensation 
which the displaced persons, the traditional authorities and 
the council officials consider to be adequate. Even this 
suggestion is fraught with the danger that some villagers 
will still be unfairly treated, nevertheless it permits the 
bringing of certain areas under commercial cultivation which 
may be held up because two or three people have broken away 
from the village and settled elsewhere on their own. For 
the future, it is important to campaign for village 
re-grouping which will lead to the release of vast areas for 
more intensive agricultural use. The difficulty with 
village re-grouping is that it runs counter to the mode of 
production, shifting cultivation. The success of 
re-grouping depends on the extent to which government can 
educate the masses on more permanent systems of cultivation 
which involves greater use of inputs such as fertilizer.
Moreover, clause 2(12) is bound to provoke friction 
between villagers who are already in occupation of land, the 
subject of the grant. Villagers are likely to continue to 
use land in the same way, extending it as they think 
manageable. They are hardly likely to be persuaded that 
they now must be confined to the existing farms on account 
of the fact that someone has been granted the land 
immediately adjoining.
As to the protection of easements such as rights over
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roads, thoroughfares and footpaths, it is important that the 
access of villagers to water, grazing land and other 
villages should be preserved. Some caution must, however, 
be exercised as this protection will make it impossible for 
the lessee or licensee to fence off animals which may damage 
his crops. Where such damage is likely, it should be made 
easy to secure from the President his consent to have the 
farm enclosed. It is also important not to take a literal 
interpretation of "footpath" as some paths may only lead to 
a dead end. Footpaths must be seen in relation to the 
frequency of their use and their importance to the 
villagers.
4. Rights and Obligations of Lessees and Licensees
The rights and obligations of lessees in the Reserves 
are the same as those of licensees in the Trust Land. These 
are contained in the Reserve Grant Regulations and the Trust 
Land Grant Regulations and incorporated in the lease and 
occupancy licence, as the case may be. Any reference in the 
following discussion to leases will apply mutatis mutandis 
to occupancy licences. The lease has terms similar to the 
statutory lease of State Land and scheduled agricultural 
land, although some provisions are peculiar to it.
So long as the lessee pays the rent and complies with 
all the covenants and conditions in the lease, he will 
"peaceably hold and enjoy" the land without any interruption 
by the President or any person lawfully claiming under him.
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This security of tenure is, however, subject to various 
provisos of which the important are numbers 6, 7 and 8.
Under 6, the President reserves the right at any time to 
acquire a strip of land of a uniform width not exceeding 
sixty metres for the purpose of constructing roads or 
railways without compensating the lessee except in respect 
of damage to unexhausted improvements existing on the land. 
The amount of compensation is to be fixed by government 
valuers, but in the event of a dispute as to such amount, 
the lessee may refer the matter to arbitration. One of the 
principles that emerges from this proviso is that 
undeveloped land will not be compensated for. This is no 
longer surprising considering the fact that the principle of 
"land without value” has been the main thrust of the land 
tenure reforms introduced in 1975. But the other principle 
which has not been in keeping with the modern trend is that 
of arbitration. It should be recalled that disputes as to 
the amount of compensation arising under the Lands 
Acquisition Act, 1970, must, ultimately be referred to the 
National Assembly, and not an arbitrator. Due to delay and 
the complexity of National Assembly proceedings, arbitration 
appears to be a better alternative. The loss of the land 
which has been excised is not the subject of compensation, 
and there is no provision by which the lessee can be offered 
an alternative strip of land to take the place of that which 
has been taken away.
Under proviso number 7, the President has the right to 
resume possession of the land for public purposes as defined 
in the Lands Acquisition Act, 1970, and in addition to those 
purposes, the establishment of a town is specifically
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included. The Lands Acquisition Act does not, however, 
define "public purposes" at all and the reference to this 
expression in the proviso must have been by error. It is 
not difficult to envisage how this error arose. The 
expression was contained in the Public Lands Acquisition 
Ordinance which the Lands Acquisition Act repealed. When 
the law was revised following the repeal of the Ordinance, 
the Act was substituted without recognising other 
inconsistencies. It may be inferred, however, that the 
intention was to empower the President to acquire land in 
the Reserves under the provisions of the Lands Acquisition 
Act.
Finally, proviso 8 empowers the President to re-enter 
whenever the rent remains unpaid for twenty-eight days, or 
the lessee fails to comply with any of the covenants and 
conditions in the lease. In addition to his right of 
re-entry, the President retains the right to take any action 
in respect of breaches of the covenants. But subject to the 
above provisos, the lessee's position is no less secure than 
that of the statutory lessee under the Land (Conversion of 
Titles) Act, 1975. He has the right to clear the land to 
such an extent as may be necessary for farming and building 
operations and to use the trees and timber for the 
maintenance of buildings and other domestic uses, although 
he may not sell or remove them without the written consent 
of the President.
The lessee is under various disabilities, however. A 
grant of land in Reserves does not enable any dealing in the 
land comprised in the grant without prior consent of the 
President:214
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"a) whereby any interest in such land or part 
thereof is granted to any person who is 
not an African? or
b) within five years of the commencement of 
the grant."
Further, where land in the Reserves has been granted to an
African, it cannot be subdivided without the prior consent
of the President, and save as may be provided by a law
enacted by the Parliament, such land cannot be disposed of 
215by will. Any document or agreement purporting to enable
the African lessee to deal with the land contrary to
216regulation 4 is to that extent void. These restrictions
were intended to prevent Africans from unadvisedly disposing 
of their land which is the major source of their livelihood. 
They were also intended to protect the African from 
ambitious entrepreneurs who may wish to accumulate land by 
inducing peasants to sell out for money. The provisions do 
not, however, go far enough in that they permit such land to 
be transferred, after five years, to any other African 
without the consent of the President. This defect has, 
nonetheless, been remedied by a covenant in the lease which 
states:
"Except with the prior written consent of the 
President not to assign sublet mortgage charge 
or in any manner whatsoever encumber or part 
with possession of the said land or any part 
thereof or interest therein or concerning the 
same or attempt so to assign sublet mortgage 
charge encumber or part with possession of the 
said Reserve Land."217
The wording of the covenant is similar to the provisions
relating to restraint on subdivision and alienation of land
in both the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act and the
Agricultural Lands Act.
The remainder of the covenants in the lease, apart from
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those relating to the payment of rent and rates, are meant
to serve, basically, two important purposes, that is, to
promote agricultural development, and to conserve soil
fertility. The lessee must reside, personally on the land,
but, unlike the lessee of a scheduled farm, he may engage a
218competent manager, in his absence, to run the farm. As 
pointed out in Chapter Two, this option is necessary, as the 
manager may be more qualified and experienced than the
lessee himself. The lessee also covenants not to abandon
219 . .the land , or permit it to remain "idle" for a period of
more than three years except with the prior written consent
220of the President. Similar provisions are also binding on
the lessee of agricultural land on State Land.
Further, the lessee must take proper care to maintain
221all the improvements on it. Within a period of
twenty-four months from the date of the certificate of 
title, the lessee must erect on the land "good and 
substantial buildings" to the approval and satisfaction of
the President, to a value which is determined at the time of
222 . . the grant. This is the minimum development clause, but
in contrast to those that bind lessees of State Land, this
clause permits the fixing of a minimum value of the
improvements, and the period is shorter than the three years
223permitted for statutory lessees on State Land. In
addition, the lessee must, within the said twenty-four
224months "cultivate a reasonable size of arable land".
There is no similar covenant or provision binding statutory
lessees but lessees of scheduled farms must comply with any
order of the Agricultural Lands Board fixing the proportion
225of the land which must be cultivated annually. The
329
question that arises is which, of the two methods of
compelling cultivation, is preferable. The fixing of
portions is hardly commendable as the nature of the land
itself might make it difficult for the farmer to comply
within the period permitted. Thus lessees of land with poor
terrain or dambos may be unfairly treated if they have to
cultivate, within the prescribed period, the same extent as
the others. It is preferable that a lessee be permitted to
cultivate whatever proportion that the President may
determine as reasonable within the time available, taking
into account the particular circumstances of the land.
In terms of conservation the lessee must "comply with
226the practice and accepted methods of good husbandry" and
"not keep more stock than the reasonable carrying capacity
227of the said Reserve Land". There are similar provisions
binding statutory lessees and lessees of scheduled land. In
order to enable the State to ensure that the covenants and
conditions are being complied with, the President is
empowered to enter upon the Reserve Land, at any reasonable
time during the day, in order to examine the state of
cultivation, condition and repair, and for the purpose of
228inspection and survey "in the public interest". There
are, therefore, some similarities and some contrasts between 
the rights and obligations of lessees of Reserve Land and 
those of lessees of agricultural State Land.
5. Evaluation of the system of grants in the Reserves and
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Trust Land
The demand by some farmers for greater security of
title than that offered by customary land tenure calls for
an evaluation of the system of grants in the Reserves and
Trust Land in terms of its suitability to cater for those
who are dissatisfied with customary land tenure. The issue
is whether the system based, as it is, on individual
initiative is better than a systematic adjudication of the
rights of all members of a community in a district or
region. There are various advantages in relying on
individual initiative both from the government's point of
view and also from that of the community. As far as the
government is concerned, there is little manpower required.
The personnel that process the papers, chiefs, councils and
the officials of the Lands Department are already part of
the establishment performing other duties, and no extra
officers have had to be engaged to handle, exclusively,
applications for grants in the Reserves and Trust Land. The
government does not have to use its surveyors to prepare
survey diagrams or sketch plans for each and every
applicant. The government thereby makes a saving in terms
of manpower as the Survey Department is severely handicapped
229by a shortage of manpower. Consequently, the government
also saves in terms of cost which might, otherwise, have 
been incurred in paying additional surveyors and for their 
equipment. The government incurs little cost under the 
prsent system, as even the inspection of the land, which is 
the subject of the application, is carried out by the rural 
council in whose area the land is situated.
Moreover, reliance on individual initiative is likely
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to raise less controversy than systematic adjudication on a
grand scale. The demand for the modification of customary
tenure is more evident among those who are less
traditionally-inclined, the so-called "progressive" farmers,
than among the ordinary peasants. In such circumstances, a
piece-meal approach at the instance of interested
individuals would appear to be preferable as it does not
compel the others to follow suit. Individual initiative can
also be defended on the basis of the differences in the
systems of land use. Among Zambian ethnic communities,
there are different systems of cultivation, ranging from
shifting cultivation to permanent cultivation, the latter
being more prevalent in areas of land shortage. A wholesale
system of adjudication and registration would be more
appropriate for farmers who have advanced to a more
permanent system of cultivation than for the others. If
those who practice shifting cultivation are unduly
restrained on account of registration of title without the
government taking measures to improve the soil, starvation
might result. It is the recognition of this problem that
under the system introduced by the colonial government in
1962 under the Native Reserves and Native Trust Land
(Adjudication and Titles) Ordinance, adjudication and
registration could only be carried out at the instance of
rural councils and traditional authorities. When the
ordinance was re-enacted in 1966 only one area had been
declared an adjudication area. When this Act was repealed 
230in 1975 only the Orders-in-Council governing the Reserves 
and Trust Land provided an alternative to customary land 
tenure.
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There are some problems connected with this individual
approach to registration, however. Land in the Reserves and
Trust Land is in an unsurveyed state, and it is therefore up
to the individual, by himself, to pay the private surveyors.
While it is possible for entrepreneurs in urban areas who
want land in the Reserves and Trust Land to raise the survey
fees, villagers may not be able to afford them. It is
perhaps for this reason, among others, that few, if any,
villagers have taken advantage of the system. The procedure
for securing a grant is also fraught with difficulties. The
procedure involves the applicant in costly travels to
traditional authorities, the rural council and the
Department of Lands. Expenses which could have been avoided
under a system whereby the State carries out the
preparations for the grant including the surveys. Moreover,
"the obtaining of consent from the chief and the rural
council can be ... discouraging for Zambians and
non-Zambians alike when a land developer has no ethnic ties
231with the area m  question". The consent of traditional
authorities is easier to secure where one is known as a 
"local" rather than a "stranger".
But the worst disadvantage of the individual approach 
is that it is unplanned. In the absence of planning the 
lands held on leases and on occupancy licences are scattered 
throughout the country, thus making it difficult for 
government, through the Commissioner of Lands, to ensure 
that lessees and licensees comply with the terms and 
conditions attaching to their leases and licences. In view 
of the difficulties the government has faced in monitoring 
the development of State Land, it is difficult to conceive
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how it can do the same to the Reserves and Trust Land. A 
planned approach whereby unoccupied land is first identified 
and then divided into blocks of farms for alienation to 
interested farmers would make it easier for land officers to 
check the condition of the farms. Alternatively, an 
adjudication of an area followed by grants to individual 
peasants would still make it easier for the government, with 
the help of rural councils, to keep under review the state 
of the land.
Finally, individual initiative does not take into 
account the future requirements of the growing population in 
the Reserves and Trust Land. Under the present procedure no 
application for a grant in the Reserves or Trust Land will 
be considered if the land in question is in excess of two 
hundred and fifty hectares. This limitation is not an 
adequate safeguard as a number of economically powerful 
persons may acquire so much amongst themselves leaving 
nothing for posterity. It was one of the declared 
intentions of the colonial government in creating the 
Reserves and Trust Land that adequate land be set aside for 
the indigenous Africans, but the system of grants in these 
areas, in its present form, will eventually so reduce the 
size of the land under customary tenure as to force more and 
more villagers to the urban areas in search of work, rather 
than encourage the urban unemployed to return to the 
villages.
In the light of these advantages and disadvantages, and 
taking into account the variations in patterns of 
agricultural production, population density and ecological 
factors both approaches could be employed depending on the
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circumstances pertaining to a given district or rural area. 
Grants at the instance of individual applicants may continue 
to be made in areas with a small population density, where 
commonly, shifting cultivation is in practice. The power to 
enforce covenants would have to be shared with rural 
councils which have an advantage over the Lands Department 
by virtue of their relative proximity to the farmers.
Where, due to scarcity of land, people cultivate land on a 
permanent basis, a comprehensive system of adjudication and 
registration of title is advisable to give greater security 
of tenure to the landholders. At present the country has no 
legal machinery by which such a system could be implemented. 
It may be that the move to introduce adjudication and 
registration of title may face a great deal of opposition, 
particularly from those who believe that it may diminish the 
traditional authorities' powers of control. To forestall 
such opposition, the decision as to whether or not the 
system of registration of title should be introduced and at 
what stage should be left to the communities themselves, 
acting through their traditional leaders and rural district 
councils.
The rights and obligations of lessees and licensees in 
the Reserves and Trust Land share some features with those 
binding statutory lessees and lessees of scheduled farms on 
State Land. Although not altogether satisfactory, they are 
more suited to emergent farmers with a reasonable income 
than peasant farmers. The requirement, for instance, that 
the lessee should construct buildings of a substantial value 
within a year of occupation definitely rules out compliance 
by the majority of peasants in the villages. This req
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uirement limits the extent to which villagers are likely to 
apply for grants in the Reserves and Trust Land.
D. CONCLUSIONS
It is the declared government policy that rural 
development must be based on the subsistence farmers who 
live in rural areas. Government policy does not, however, 
go further to show how this might be achieved except to 
point at the need to impose land control in the Reserves and 
Trust Land. The Natural Resources Act provides a framework 
for the use of State power to conserve natural resources but 
the Act has not been enforced. In any case existing 
legislation does not empower the State to control the manner 
by which the individual customary landholder uses the land. 
Such control exists over State Land, but there is no 
comparative system of control over land held under customary 
land tenure. As long as government continues to be 
undecided as to what direction land policy in the Reserves 
and Trust Land should take, the dual system of land tenure 
will continue.
In the meantime there are growing demands on the part 
of emergent, or semi-commercial farmers to have certificates 
of title to land, while large areas are becoming 
over-grazed. Although such demands are not widespread there 
is a need to provide a proper legal framework within which
336
those who are dissatisfied with customary land tenure and 
believe that a documentary title may enable them to use 
their land as security for loans can acquire such titles.
The alternative system of landholding in the Reserves 
and Trust Land, namely leases and occupancy licences, is 
based on archaic Orders-in-Council which are at odds with 
existing circumstances. The system, based as it is on 
individual initiative, must be reviewed in the context of 
its relevance to all categories of farmers, the need for 
planned development, and the protection of the interests of 
subsistence farmers in the rural areas.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT FOR DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The problems of the farmer do not only relate to 
security of tenure. The farmer must raise the capital that 
he requires to develop the farm. The issue of agricultural 
credit would not arise if all farmers had adequate funds to 
meet their investment requirements, but, in the majority of 
cases, this is not so. Farmers of all types, both 
commercial and small scale, do rely, to a greater or lesser 
extent, on some form of credit from various sources - 
commercial banks, co-operatives, credit or thrift societies 
and government specialised credit institutions. The issue, 
which has assumed great importance, not only in Zambia but 
also in other developing countries, is how to ensure that 
all types of farmers gain access to agricultural credit. In 
Zambia's State Land, credit is linked with access to land 
because, as shown in Chapter Two, the most crucial 
considerations governing the grant of consent to an 
assignment of agricultural land is whether or not the 
proposed assignee has the capital, at the time of the 
application for consent, to develop the farm.
In this connection, promissory letters from financial 
institutions proving that funds will be made available to 
the proposed assignee have played an important part in the 
determination of whether consent will be given or withheld. 
The importance of agricultural credit to smallscale
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farmers and subsistence farmers on customary land in Zambia 
has never been underestimated. The grant of leases and 
occupancy licences in the Reserves and Trust Land is meant 
to facilitate the use of land by rural farmers as security 
for loans from financial institutions. The demand for 
registered titles to land under customary land tenure, 
mentioned in Chapter Three, is further testimony to the 
consciousness of farmers of the relative advantage, in terms 
of access to credit, that statutory lessees on State Land 
enjoy over customary landholders in the Reserve and Trust 
Land.
The conviction on the part of government that peasant 
farmers are disadvantaged with respect to credit explains 
the importance that government has placed on its own 
sponsored institutional credit. From the time of 
independence, government has used various forms of 
arrangements to enable rural farmers to have access to some 
form of credit or other. Its first task after independence 
was to introduce amendments to the Land and Agricultural 
Bank Act1 to enable the Bank to lend on the basis of forms 
of security that rural farmers could provide. The 
government then embarked on promoting the establishment of 
co-operatives and credit societies to mobilise rural savings 
and encourage financial institutions to lend to 
co-operatives on the basis of the mutual assurances of the 
members. From 1969, the idea of a credit institution owned 
by the State which could lend to small farmers, in 
particular, took shape in the form of the Credit 
Organisation of Zambia, and since then the country has, in 
the main been dependent on institutionalised agricultural
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credit. In of what may be seen as a massive injection
of loan funds into the rural sector, the performance of 
specialised credit institutions in the country, 
particularly, the defunct C.O.Z. has been so disappointing 
as to force the government to re-evaluate the role of credit 
in agricultural development in general and the 
commercialisation of peasant agriculture, in particular.
The result of this re-appraisal of the role of credit 
has been a more strict assessment of credit worthiness 
which, in turn, has improved the performance of the existing 
government credit institutions - the Agricultural Finance 
Company and the Zambia Agricultural Development Bank. The 
price, however, has been a shift in emphasis from the 
totally subsistence farmers to the small scale and 
commercial farmers. Zambia's experience with agricultural 
credit brings out one of the most serious problems facing 
governments of developing countries - the conflict between 
two important ideals. One of these ideals is to use credit 
to increase the output of the poorest farmers so that they 
contribute to the economic growth of the country. The other 
ideal is that in a country where there is competition for 
scarce resources by various sectors of the economy, credit 
should be given only to those with regard to whom there is 
little risk of default. While the government's goal is to 
develop agriculture, financial prudence dictates, however, 
the utmost circumspection in the use of credit. At the 
centre of this conflict in aims is the role of credit in the 
developmental process, particularly, where the government 
has limited resources.
This chapter begins with theories regarding the role of
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credit, traces the historical development of Zambiafs credit 
policy (including the emergence of co-operative credit and 
thrift societies), the role of the commercial banking sector 
and concentrates on structures and performance of the 
government credit institutions.
1. The Role of Agricultural Credit
A subsistence economy, that is, one in which each
family consumes most of what it produces perpetuates its own
poverty because poverty itself inhibits the acquisition of
capital (goods) without which output cannot be raised. Two
reasons have been suggested for this outcome:
"On the one hand, to accumulate capital goods, 
men must set aside much of their time and 
effort for this purpose; but when people are 
very poor most of their effort has to be 
devoted to producing for consumption. In 
other words, acute poverty gravely retricts 
the ability and willingness of a subsistence 
community to save. On the other hand, 
communal poverty also weakens the incentive to 
accumulate capital goods or to adopt better 
methods of production. Once a family can 
produce sufficient of a particular type of 
crop or other output to meet its own needs, 
there is little incentive to strive to 
introduce more efficient methods of 
cultivation, husbandry or production, so long 
as other families in the community are too 
poor to barter for or buy any surplus product.
A subsistence economy is, therefore, in a 
vicious circle; poverty keeps the community 
poor." 2
The first reason in the above quotation would seem to imply 
that in order to increase the output in the subsistence 
economy funds must be provided by way of credit to enable 
farmers to purchase agricultural implements and so on. The
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second implies that there must be an assured market for 
whatever surplus is produced in order to give farmers the 
incentive to produce more. The conclusion is, therefore, 
that in order to break the vicious circle caused by poverty, 
credit and markets must be made available.
There is general consensus that credit may play a
significant, if not a decisive role in the productive
capacity of peasant economies. There is, however, some
controversy as to how much emphasis should be placed on
agricultural credit as a stimulus to increased production.
On the one hand, there are those who argue that credit, in
the form of working capital, must receive first priority.
On the other hand, others argue that credit per se is not
desirable in the early stages of agricultural development.
The quotation from Furness (above) would seem to support the
former contention which has enjoyed widespread support.
This support has come not only from economists in the
developing countries themselves but also those in aid-donor
countries as well. Among the earlier proponents of this
view are the economists, Lewis who, in 1955 wrote "Farmers
3need much more capital than they can afford to save" , and 
Leibenstein who said in 1957: "If capital, labor, 
entrepreneurial ability per head, technical knowledge, and 
the credit facilities available increase, the income per 
head will rise". This adherence to what Von Pischke has 
termed "the small farmer credit need creed" is still 
discernible in more recent studies.
To take two further examples: Makings, whose emphasis 
was on developing countries in Africa, has explained the 
need as follows:
355
"During the first stages of advancement it is 
difficult for an African farmer to save enough 
to provide adequate working capital out of his 
small surpluses. Capital formation can 
scarcely begin until he can increase his 
output whereas any sustained increase in 
output must call for working capital."6
And even more recently Uma Lele of the World Bank wrote (in
an unofficial capacity):
"Modernizing agriculture requires large 
infusions of credit to finance use of 
purchased inputs such as fertilizer, improved 
seeds, insecticides, additional labour, etc.
..• Because savings in traditional agriculture 
tend to be relatively small at initial stages 
of development, increased demand for working 
and fixed capital must largely come from 
increased supply of credit."
He added:
"Small farmers have meagre internal resources 
and, therefore, are most in need of production 
credit."Q
The popular arguments, cited above, have come under
increasing criticism. These criticisms have become more
pronounced following the disappointingly poor performance of
credit so far given to subsistence farmers in developing
countries. Howse has suggested that the provision of
agricultural credit to people with low income and poor
9educational background is "not generally warranted". He
disagrees with the argument that peasant farmers must have
access to credit before they increase their productivity and
thus their income. He asserts:
"In my view credit is a privilege - not every 
one*s right - and that privilege must be 
earned. The greatest need today is for a 
system that teaches peasant farmers how to 
develop by using the resources they already 
have and that gives them confidence in their 
own ability to affect their status in 
society."1Q
Howse attacks the basic assumption that the subsistence
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community has no money. In reality, he says, there is
money, and peasants can and must be taught to save some of
their income to meet anticipated future expenditure. If
people do not save money, he argues, the answer is not to
give them credit as is often done by governments, but "to
wean them off credit as soon as possible - if one is forced
to give credit at all".11 The solution to shortage of money
for agricultural development is to encourage saving, for
instance by creating savings clubs. From the pool of the
clubs, members can benefit enormously because of the
12additional buying power that it brings.
In his criticism of "the small farmer credit need 
creed", Miller states that the argument, although logical, 
makes the following assumptions which, frequently, are not 
justified:
1. That agricultural research has developed improved
technology which is clearly superior to 
traditional methods.
2. That farmers have seen practical demonstrations of
the new technology, understand it, and are anxious 
to use it.
3. That farmers have confidence that the fertilizer,
seeds, pesticides, and equipment needed to adopt 
the new practice will be available in the villages 
at the proper time and in the amounts required.
4. That the necessary credit to purchase these inputs
will be made available at the required time, and
5. That farmers have been assured there will be a
market for the extra production at prices which 
will make the financial rewards of adopting the
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improved technology well worth the weather,
13biological and market risks involved.
Unless, he says, these preconditions are met, extending
credit to small farmers may do more harm than good by
putting them in debt. In the light of the foregoing
preconditions the role of credit is perceived not as the
initiator of agricultural development, but as an
"accelerator" of development. As Miller puts the argument,
"On the other hand, where the proper conditions already
exist or can be created, well-managed production credit can
give agricultural development a strong boost by accelerating
the rate of adoption of improved technology by farmers who
14would otherwise be prevented from using it."
There seems to be general agreement, therefore, that 
agricultural credit is important to agricultural 
development. The controversy relates to the stage at which 
credit must be introduced. There is little doubt that 
institutional credit has been and is being provided on the 
assumption that the subsistence farmer has insufficient 
resources to purchase inputs, and therefore, to start him 
off, credit must be extended to him. If this assumption is 
true, then there would appear to be little alternative for 
any government which is committed to improving the lot of 
its people, for, although agriculture is for the peasants a 
way of life, it is also a business, and as such cannot be
carried on, much less expanded, unless capital is made
15available. Yet it may be argued, as does Penny, that in 
fact, peasants do have some savings, albeit meagre, and what 
is required is to mobilise these rural savings through 
savings clubs which can lend its members the money they
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need. The role of such savings clubs, commonly known in 
Zambia as thrift societies is discussed elsewhere, but it 
may be pointed out here that they have never had adequate 
funds to fulfil their obligations to their members and they, 
too, have had to rely more on external credit, that is 
credit from large co-operatives and from the government 
lending institutions. In order to assess the possible 
extent of rural savings, a survey carried out by the Rural 
Development Studies Bureau of the University of Zambia on 
rural incomes must be examined.
The survey covered all the provinces (except the 
North-Western Province) and took a sample of 683 
households.16 On the basis of their annual incomes, the 
households were classified into four groups. Group one, 
which consisted of forty-one percent of the households, was 
the most deprived, with average earnings from crop 
production of only six kwacha per annum. This group also 
suffered from periodic shortages of food. Group two, 
regarded as typical of the subsistence household and 
constituted thirty-six percent of the number of households 
interviewed, had an average household income of forty 
kwacha. The third group, which constituted fifteen percent, 
had an average income of K155. However, some of this income 
was derived from other sources, such as part-time wage 
employment. The only category which can be said to be 
better-off is group four, but it only constituted nine 
percent and the average earning was still less than a 
thousand kwacha per household per annum. The general 
picture that emerges is that more than three-quarters of the 
rural households have less than fifty-kwacha per annum.
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Although the survey was conducted roughly ten years ago, 
owing to the worsening of the economic situation in the 
country, the position of the rural household could not have 
improved. Consequently the conclusion must be that as far 
as Zambia is concerned, the vast majority of rural peasants 
do not have any worthwhile savings.
The next consideration, however, is whether or not, in
view of proven rural poverty, agricultural credit is the
answer. In the past, particularly during the
pre-independence era, when, as a matter of general policy,
17credit to subsistence farmers was non-existent, some 
subsistence farmers were able to increase their production 
and even be regarded as a threat to the commercial sector, 
without having to rely on credit from any source. This 
factor has led to the conclusion that production becomes one 
of the criteria to be considered before the dispensation of 
loan funds. In fact, the argument that credit is merely an 
accelerator follows from the premise that credit is not 
useful and must not be given to those who do not already 
show initial productivity. Production as a criterion has a 
lot to commend it since it shows a positive response to 
existing opportunities. However, it is also the case, at 
least in Zambia, that the subsistence farmers who increased 
output were to be found in areas which were comparatively 
better served with marketing infrastructure, for instance 
the old line of rail and the main road networks to the 
Eastern and Northern Provinces. Moreover, even where the 
infrastructure exists, differences in circumstances such as 
the presence of the tse tse, pests and soil fertility may 
account for low productivity whether of livestock or crops.
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As a general rule, therefore, the "productivity-first"
criterion is unsuitable since it will merely re-enforce
existing inequalities caused by locational and ecological
differences. Nevertheless, all things being equal, the
"productivity-first" criterion does serve to eliminate the
least deserving farmers from receiving credit. This is all
the more important in Zambia because, as the survey
indicated, the households in group one (with the least
income per capita) were more handicapped by shortage of
labour resources arising from migration to urban areas, than
any other cause. Credit to this category would constitute
an unnecessary burden until such time as the households in
it have adequate manpower to make optimum use of loan funds.
In view of the foregoing, it is difficult to dispute De
Wilde's observation that a proper assessment of the role of
credit is difficult because experience has shown that while
excessive credit acts as a disincentive with the farmer
working less and saving less, there are cases, however,
where efforts of farmers have been frustrated because,
although they are doing their best, they have had no access 
18to credit. Noting that Africans have been able to save to
purchase what they want, De Wilde prescribes that a good
system of agricultural credit must seek to encourage and
supplement production efforts and savings, but he adds:
"This does not mean that farmers can or should 
invariably be expected to produce some savings 
as a condition for receiving credit.
Savings, as a requirement, cannot be applied to all farmers
because there are some farmers whose production is very
marginal on account of factors such as inadequacy of land,
20infertility of the soil etc. Due to what may be termed
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locational and ecological contrasts, De Wilde divides
21subsistence farmers into two categories:
1) Those who have started developing their 
farms without credit but no longer find 
their savings adequate to defray rising 
development costs; and
2) Those who have had little chance to 
acquire for themselves the resources 
required to escape from the bind of 
subsistence farming but have the 
opportunities and will do so provided 
credit is made available.
The first, he says, are likely to make the most productive
use of credit as long as their incentive to save is not
impaired. The second can be helped only at considerable
risk because the potential for higher output is likely to be
less certain and capacity for repayment correspondingly
less. He urges credit to this category to be made available
in order that the fruits of development be widely shared,
but the credit given must be more cautious to avoid serious
losses.
De Wilde offers an admirable synthesis between those 
who would extend credit to all and sundry and those who 
regard credit as a privilege deserved only by those who can 
show that they have already produced surpluses from the 
sales of which they have been able to save. In the Zambian 
context and on the basis of the survey of rural incomes 
groups one and two would come within De Wilde's group one, 
while group three of the survey would fall under De Wilde's 
group two. The survey's group four would not qualify under 
De Wilde's credit worthiness policy because it would not 
have the opportunity to develop in Sjp&e of credit due to 
manpower constraints.
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2. The Case for Specialised Credit Institutions
Specialised credit institutions have become a feature
of agricultural development planning in many Third World
countries. These institutions have been preferred to others
or to supplement others such as informal markets or
co-operative credit societies. Where there are surplus
funds in the hands of people who do not have an immediate
use for it, such funds might be lent to those in need of
investment capital, thus developing an informal credit
market. The development of an informal credit system,
however, takes time, particularly in an economy where the
majority are subsistence farmers and even the use of money
as a medium of exchange is relatively recent. Moreover,
Third World governments are reluctant to encourage any
development which may result in the heavy indebtedness of
small scale farmers to individual money lenders who may 
22exploit them. It is suggested that once this danger is
recognised, it should be possible to control the development
of local markets for funds in such a way as to avoid the
23exploitation of smallholders. Co-operative credit, where 
the co-operative is also involved in marketing, is an 
improvement over individual money lending provided it 
charges realistic interest rates.
The advantages of using locally based institutions such 
as individual traders and co-operative societies are said to 
be the easy access to local views on the personality of the 
applicants, and the potential profits from investments, both
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of which factors lead to the efficient selection of 
borrowers. Other advantages are that they have easy access 
to information regarding the use to which money is being 
put, the performance of the enterprise, and the case for 
leniency in the event of repayment difficulties. In the 
case of co-operatives, they have the added advantage of 
being able to apply sanctions. A loan from a co-operative 
society to any of its members creates a joint responsibility 
on the members of the co-operative to exert pressure to 
recover it, as it is in the interests of the members that 
the co-operative continues to be economically viable.
In an appraisal of locally based institutions such as
0 A.
co-operatives in Kenya, Heyer notes the above advantages 
but goes on to point out some disadvantages which should 
also be considered. One of the dangers she sees in the use 
of local institutions is that they are open to local 
political influence, and hence, may find it difficult to 
refuse loans to influential members of the community or to 
insist on repayment from influential borrowers when 
repayment falls due. In sjpitfi. of these dangers Heyer argues 
that there are ways of avoiding such problems, for instance 
by regulating the size of individual loans to avoid a major 
proportion of the funds being used for one or two 
influential people. Her conclusion on the point is that in 
view of the advantages that local institutions enjoy over
more bureaucratic institutions, they should be encouraged to
. . 25develop, albeit, under supervision and safeguards.
While co-operative credit and individual lenders should 
be encouraged as suggested by Heyer, the view that there is 
a need for a specialised credit institution enjoys
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widespread support. Indeed for countries in East, Central
and Southern Africa where "well-articulated village money
markets" are not as common as in most parts of West Africa,
2 6there seems to be little else that a government can do.
Hence the observation by the Rural Economic Development
Working Party in 1960:
"The development of the rural agricultural and
minor industries will require a large
injection of capital. The African producer 
cannot provide it. There must, therefore, be 
credit institutions to provide both long-term 
finance and seasonal credit."27
This argument not only highlights the role of agricultural
credit, but also the view that a specialised lending
institution serving a given group of farmers is the panacea
for rural poverty. The appeal of a government credit system
to both farmers and government officials is not difficult to
see. The fragmented capital market which existed at the
time of independence did not supply the amount of credit
needed or on the terms which would permit farmers to
modernise their farming methods. Furthermore, in the past,
existing formal credit institutions such as commercial banks
have shown little interest in serving agriculture,
28especially the small farmers. Where they have extended 
credit, it has been to commercial farmers who are able to 
provide collateral security. For instance, the 
establishment of the Land and Agricultural Bank with the 
purpose of lending on the security of land served mainly the 
commercial farmers who had registered title to land while 
the subsistence farmers who did not, were excluded. This 
concentration on the category of farmers who are actually 
better-off leaves the emergent and subsistence farmers
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without assistance.
The most important reason for the indifference on the
part of commercial banks is that lending to rural
subsistence farmers is a very risky undertaking. The
absence of advanced techniques in the production process
means that productivity depends not only on the efforts of
the individual farmer, but also other factors such as
favourable weather conditions. There is no assurance that
the inputs that are used will necessarily increase output,
as drought, which has of late been persistent in Africa, may
put paid to the farmer's expectations. Equally important is
the level of education which has an effect on the ability of
the farmer to apply the inputs efficiently. Other
discouraging factors are the price risks and the high costs
of making and collecting small loans to numerous subsistence
farmers scattered in various parts of the country. The
risks attending the provision of credit to subsistence
farmers has resulted in commercial banks shunning this
category of farmers. This fact is evident from the paucity
of rural branches of commercial banks, whose attention is
focussed on more predictable business enterprises. Since
the commercial banks will not be drawn into lending to
individual rural farmers, it is argued that it is the
responsibility of government to invest in rural development,
29the major part of which is agricultural development.
Other arguments in favour of the government taking a 
leading role in the provision of agricultural credit are 
that a government lending institution could be used to test 
new credit arrangements on a trial basis, leading to the 
adoption of those that prove successful and the
366
30discontinuance of those that are not, and the importance
of informed assessments of credit need and the general
necessity for advice, direction and supervision in credit 
31use. Extrapolating on the last point Makings says:
•'Governments have the administrative network 
covering the geographic field over which 
credit must be spread, enabling facilities and 
services to be provided at less cost than 
could be approached by a non-government 
organization. It is part of the functions of 
governments to raise funds for development 
purposes not sufficiently attractive for 
private enterprie, or not commercially viable 
in the early stages. And, more particularly, 
the agricultural extension services with which 
successful credit provision must be closely 
linked at this level, are government 
services.m32
The characteristic features of specialised agricultural
lenders differ substantially from non-specialised financial
institutions. Bourne and Graham describe some of these as
being a large degree of supervisory and technical
involvement in the production activities of their borrowers,
a project approval approach to granting loans, different
performance criteria than commercial banks, and different
33skill requirements for their staff. Other features are 
that these institutions rely on loans and grants from the 
government and avoid providing deposit facilities to the 
public. They are, therefore, unable to mobilize rural 
savings to increase their financial resources. The absence 
of deposit facilities means these institutions do not 
realise the potential multiplier effects that arise when 
borrowers deposit loan proceeds with the lending 
institution, thus increasing its supply of loanable funds. 
The lack of deposit facilities is not because they are too 
costly, but that "deposit costs require more realistic loan
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pricing and more careful lending policies". It is much
easier for managers of specialised agricultural credit
institutions to obtain government funds cheaply and thus
avoid competition with commercial banks for local funds.
This type of arrangement, argue Bourne and Graham, reduces
the responsibility of financial managers, whereas resource
mobilization from many depositors introduces considerable
35pressure for accountability to the investors.
A more controversial feature of specialised credit
institutions is the comparatively low interest rates. Low
interest rates stem from that theory of the role of credit
which emphasises supply-leading credit as opposed to
demand-leading credit. This theory, expressed by Von
Pischke as the "credit need creed" has been discussed above,
its basic theme being that the availability of credit, even
in advance of demand for it, will encourage farmers to adopt
new and advanced farming techniques. Other reasons for
cheap credit are equitable in character. Farmers need to be
compensated for their losses from government price ceilings
on food products (which largely helps consumers in urban 
3 6areas). The problem of what interest rates should be
charged is still a subject of debate for the reason that
37interest rates play a number of different roles. One 
approach that does not involve crippling the operations of 
credit institutions would appear to be to subsidise 
agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and other chemicals 
required by farmers. This would be easy where the marketing 
bodies also provide the inputs and are government-sponsored.
Low interest rates have attracted considerable 
criticism. It is said that low interest rates encourage the
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use of loans by farmers for non-productive purposes because
they do not have to put into the farm a great deal of effort
. 38and investment to make the farm pay for its improvement.
Another criticism is that low interest rates increase the
demand for credit, and if, as is usually the case, demand
exceeds supply, some kind of rationing will be necessary.
In any system of credit rationing, the allocation of credit
will be more concentrated on those farmers who are
relatively well advanced so as to avoid unnecessary risk.
Such an approach will not only leave out the majority of
subsistence farmers for whom credit from specialised
institutions is crucial, but also have the effect of
reinforcing the existing inequality in economic standing
39among farmers of different categories. Adams has observed
that according to recent studies the lower the real rate of
interest the more heavily concentrated will be the loans in
40the hands of relatively few people. On the difficulty of
detecting this trend, Adam says:
HThis fact may be masked by formal lenders who 
make a number of small loans to the poor and 
multiple large loans to wealthy borrowers.
The modest average size of loans and the large 
number of loans made hide the fact that 
relatively few people receive most of the 
benefits from cheap credit. This is not due 
to a conspiracy. The self-interest of each 
lender combines with the excess demand that 
exists for negatively priced loans to force 
lenders to ration funds to their most 
profitable and powerful customers.
Credit rationing itself causes major difficulties. It
places an extra burden on the administrative staff of credit
institutions and due to pressure from prospective borrowers,
a situation develops where the chances of corruption
increase and staff morale recedes. There is also the danger
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that a credit institution lending money at a very low
interest rate is at the mercy of government and may find
itself insufficiently compensated. In the circumstances it
may be forced to decapitalise, in addition to concentrating
on large loans to established farmers.
In its report submitted in 1960 to the Northern
Rhodesia government, the Rural Economic Development Working
Party came up with some illuminating observations. While
conceding the need for a specialised credit institution it
recommended that credit be provided on commercial terms.
Subsidies, the Working Party said, could be necessary to
help the agricultural industry onto its feet, and such
subsidy could take the form of freeing the producer from
payment of interest on his borrowed capital, but such
subsidy ought to be paid by the government to the credit 
42institution. The government was urged not to confuse the
separate issues of credit and subsidy by setting up credit
schemes to grant interest-free loans to producers. There
were two reasons for this:
"Firstly any measure of interference with 
normal economic forces should be separately 
planned and applied, and then only as and when 
it is required. Such interference has the 
characteristics of a narcotic. Properly 
applied ... it can produce valuable results. 
Indiscriminately applied it can be harmful and 
habit-forming. It misleads the Government and 
the producer and gives them a false sense of 
economic success.". ~43
The second reason was that the combination of credit and 
subsidy would leave the government perpetually as sole 
provider of credit since commercial banks could not enter a 
field where sub-economic rates applied. The government 
would not be able to provide enough capital from its own
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resources, and even if it could do so, it would be tying up
its own money unnecessarily at the expense of projects which
could only be financed by itself. From this arose the
conclusion that:
M... While the Government must at present 
provide credit facilities for rural economic 
development and most if not all of the 
capital, it must do so in a way that will 
encourage private capital participation, not 
forgetting the individually small but 
cumulatively large savings of the rural
Africans themselves."..44
From the above arguments, the Working Party had in mind the
establishment by the government of a credit institution
whose sole business would be to lend money to the
agricultural sector, but run purely on commercial lines and
not as part of normal government business.
Makings sees the role of the State in the provision of
credit as one of the most important questions which has
faced emergent African countries. The question is whether
the State should take over the responsibility for supplying
credit and, if so, the extent of its commitment. A State
might aim to provide the whole of the direct credit needs of
the agricultural industry as far as it was practicable,
or it might aim at providing supplementary credit at the
level at which commercial bank credit is not available. In
his view "it is in the national interest for a government to
make credit available to the industry to an extent
sufficient to offset any marked disability the industry may
have in obtaining commercial credit, but if government
credit is provided on a scale or at a level which competes
with commercial credit there may be some waste in resource
45use through faulty direction". Makings would, therefore,
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conceive the role of government as a residual provider of 
credit to specialised institutions which would charge 
interest rates which compete with those of commercial banks. 
In this way the commercial farmers would have a choice 
between government credit or commercial credit. At the same 
time, it is hoped, commercial banks would be afforded a fair 
share of the credit market in the agricultural industry.
On balance, it would appear that despite the problems 
which have been encountered by specialised credit 
institutions, there is still a need for them, if only to 
serve that sector of the agricultural industry which does 
not have easy access to commercial credit. The difficulty 
would appear to be the low interest rates. The argument 
that the effect of low interest rates is to reduce the 
participation in the credit market of the commercial banks 
does not necessarily stand up to scrutiny. History has 
shown that even before the establishment of specialised 
credit institutions, commercial banks took little notice of 
agricultural growth among emergent farmers. This is evident 
from the paucity of rural branches. It is not only the 
interest rate which motivates the commercial banks, it is 
also the nature of security. However high the interest 
rates charged, where there is no security for the loan 
commercial banks will be loath to invest in the enterprise. 
Even where security is good, it may still be necessary to 
create an institution to serve agriculture, a factor that 
explains the emergence of land banks in colonial Central and 
East Africa. These land banks were established because 
commercial banks did not lay as much emphasis on the 
agricultural sector as they did on other sectors.
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3. The Historical Development of Zambia's Credit Policy
The historical development of Zambia's credit policy is 
of vital importance for three reasons. The first of these 
is that it shows the aspects of lending policy introduced by 
the colonial government which have continued to enjoy 
support in the post-independence era, for instance the need 
for a specialised credit institution which must serve 
agriculture and related industry. The idea of specialised 
credit institutions is a legacy of colonial agricultural 
credit policy whose brain-child, the Land and Agricultural 
Bank, continued to operate for a period of three years after 
independence. The second reason is that a historical 
perspective will reveal the evolution of the idea of local 
participation in the process of loan grants. The expression 
"local participation" is used to mean the role played by the 
ruling Party's functionaries at village and district level 
in recommending to government credit institutions those 
applicants who are credit worthy, thereby, influencing the 
decisions of the lenders. Since these functionaries are the 
elected representatives of the villagers or constituents, 
their role is seen as actual participation by local people 
in the determination of loan eligibility. The third reason 
and perhaps the most important is that the history of 
agricultural credit in Zambia, perhaps more than in any 
other country, explains, to a large extent, the gradual 
tightening of lending policy which is taking place.
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(a) Summary of Credit Infrastructure at Independence
At independence agricultural credit was available from 
five co-operative credit associations (covering the 
Copperbelt, Southern, Central, Eastern, Western and 
North-Western Provinces), the Land and Agricultural Bank, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, and the commercial banks.46 
The Ministry of Agriculture and the commercial banks were 
largely responsible for loans to expatriate farmers. The 
multiplicity of government financed credit sources not only 
constituted a burden on the officials who administered 
credit, but also led to overlapping. Some farmers were, 
consequently, without assistance. Following the 
recommendations of the United Nations Survey Mission 
(UN/ECA/FAO) in 1964 a committee was appointed to study the 
simplification of the system. In 1965 the committee 
recommended that the Land and Agricultural Bank be 
responsible for all credit but that operations be channelled 
through the outlets of all the established agencies. At the 
same time, the Credit Organisation of Zambia was set up to 
provide credit mainly for the emergent and subsistence 
farmers in provinces off the line of rail. The continuing 
confusion over credit sources and administration led to a 
decision to scrap the provincial credit institutions. As a 
further boost to administrative efficiency, the posts of 
manager of the Land and Agricultural Bank and the Credit 
Organisation of Zambia were held by a single man. The First 
National Development Plan provided for increased government 
credit for agriculture and also emphasised the importance of
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enforcing credit-repayment. It also called for increased 
involvement of commercial banks in agricultural credit. The 
simplification of the administrative system proceeded until 
by 1968, the Credit Organisation of Zambia was the sole 
source of government credit for farmers.
(b) Adaptation of the Land and Agricultural Bank
The structure of the Land and Agricultural Bank, 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Land Bank"), has been 
covered in Chapter One. What falls to be discussed here are 
the measures carried out after independence to adapt the 
bank's lending policy to the changed emphasis from reliance 
on commercial farmers to the encouragement of emergent 
farmers. By simply making changes to the operation of the 
Land Bank, it may be assumed that the government accepted 
the idea of a specialised credit institution, and all that 
was required was to adapt it so as to serve a much broader 
section of the farming community. These changes took the 
form of broadening the range of farmers to be served by 
amending the definition of "farmer" under the Land and 
Agricutural Bank Act, introducing a completely novel idea of 
decentralisation of operations of the Bank by establishing 
District Advisory Committees, and thirdly, introducing a new 
provision regarding the grant of unsecured loans. It is 
also important to comment on the provision regarding 
interest rates as these provisions, which remained intact 
long after independence until the Bank was dissolved in 
1967, clearly show the role that specialised credit 
institutions were meant to play.
375
So far as agricultural development was concerned, it 
was the business of the Land Bank to lend money to farmers, 
co-operative agricultural societies, farmers* associations 
or unions, agricultural show societies or other agricultural 
bodies **for any purpose which is, in the opinion of the
Bank, likely to further the interests of the farming
47 . . .industry". But the statutory definition of "farmer"
clearly excluded subsistence farmers and, therefore, the
majority of African farmers. Under section 2 a farmer was
defined as:
"... a person who devotes his attention to 
farming in the territory either exclusively or 
together with some profession, business or 
other occupation for his own profit."
The expression "for his own profit" would seem to exclude
subsistence farmers. Because of this limitation few African
farmers could qualify and the only way the Land Bank could
assist in promoting peasant farmers was by lending to rural
credit societies, themselves defined as "a society formed by
a group of small peasant farmers in order to provide
short-term or seasonal credit where such credit could not
normally be obtained".48 African farmers who were not
members of rural credit societies could not benefit and
since there were not that many African rural credit
societies at that time, African farmers were not adequately
served by the Land Bank. By an amendment to the Act made in
1964, the range of farmers to be served by the Land Bank was
broadened to include subsistence farmers, so that the
definition of farmer read:
"... a person who devotes his attention to 
farming in Zambia, either exclusively or 
together with some profession, business or 
other occupation and includes a person who 
normally produces crops in quantities
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sufficient only for the subsistence level use 
of himself and his family or, from time to 
time, produces a surplus of such crops in 
quantities sufficient to enable him to sell 
such surplus for his own profit." (emphasis 
added).
The underlined words were added to the definition to achieve
the desired effect.
The mere inclusion of subsistence farmers in the
category of farmers eligible for loans by way of amendment
would not have been sufficient. The Land Bank granted loans
on the basis of security that had to be made available by
the borrower. Among the kinds of security that were
permitted were a mortgage of land within Zambia, an informal
charge evidenced by a memorandum which should be registered
in the Lands and Deeds Registry, stop orders on crops or
other produce, bills of sale, and any other security
50approved by the Board. It might be thought that stop 
orders as security could have been afforded by African 
farmers? however, only those farmers who were not 
subsistence farmers would have been able to make use of stop 
orders. The reason is that although a stop order affects 
future produce, the Land Bank would only accept such a stop 
order where there was evidence that in the past years the 
farmer had been in the habit of selling, at least part of 
his produce to a marketing body. In this way the Land Bank 
would be able to decide whether the farmer was in a position 
to produce sufficient to repay the loan. If the farmer only 
produces enough for himself and his family, the value of a 
stop order is doubtful, for, there is no evidence that the 
farmer is capable of producing a surplus. In practice, the 
stop order system supports the production-first and
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credit-later theory. In order to permit the widest possible 
range of farmers who could borrow from the Land Bank, the 
government inserted section 33A which permitted the Bank 
"subject to such general and specific directions as may be 
made by the Minister [to] make loans without security to 
such farmers or classes or groups or types of farmers as may 
be specified by the Minister." The most serious flaw in 
this provision was that it left the initiative of not 
insisting on security to the Board of the Land Bank itself. 
The Minister could not, as part of government policy, direct 
the Land Bank to drop the requirement of security. A Land 
Bank which had been in operation for twelve years, 
transacting business on the basis of mainly fixed assets and 
land as security could not be expected to take the risk of 
lending on no security at all. It is, therefore, hardly 
surprising that the Bank never availed itself of this 
provision.
In addition to broadening the range of eligible farmers 
and permitting the grant of unsecured loans, the government 
also introduced District Advisory Committees as part of the 
organisational structure of the Land Bank. The 
establishment of the District Advisory Committees might be 
interpreted or understood as an attempt to enable the 
participation of the local communities which are to be 
served, in the loan dispensation process. It might, 
however, be an attempt to decentralise the decision making 
process in so far as, in some instances, the District 
Advisory Committee could approve loan applications. There 
is some advantage to be gained in a policy that not only 
results in decentralisation, but also in local
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participation. Decentralisation of the operation of
specialised credit institutions enables decisions on
applications to be communicated easily and loan funds
released with minimum delay, factors which are crucial for
farmers who need the money on time to buy inputs for
immediate application. Local participation ensures that
those who grant the loans are very familiar with the
circumstances of each individual applicant, and also that
the people who are being served regard the Bank as
accessible and helpful rather than a complicated and
bureaucratic institution.
The Minister was empowered to establish by order in the
Gazette such number of District Advisory Committees as he
51deemed necessary. The order would specify the area within 
which the committee was authorised to exercise its 
functions. District Advisory Committees consisted of a 
chairman and such other members as the Minister deemed 
expedient. Board members of the Land Bank could be
52appointed as members of the District Advisory Committees.
The Minister specified the period for which a member of the
committee could serve but any member was free to resign
after due notice, in writing, to the Minister. The Minister
was also empowered to remove a member from office if such
member was unfit to discharge his functions, or was
adjudicated bankrupt or had made a composition with his
creditors. He also had discretionary power to remove any
53member from office for any reason he deemed sufficient.
The function of the District Advisory Committee was to 
consider applications submitted by farmers who were 
themselves compelled to submit their applications to the
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committee, where one existed, instead of sending\Snesi\ directly
54to the Board of the Land Bank. District Advisory
Committees were not, however, competent to consider
55applications submitted by co-operative societies. After
considering the applications submitted to it by farmers, the
committees had to forward the same to the Board together
with recommendations as to which applications should be 
56approved. The Bank, however, had a discretion either to
grant or refuse any application notwithstanding the
57recommendations of the committee. This procedure helped 
to check any local biases as all records pertaining to the 
deliberations of the District Advisory Committees were 
available to the Board for scrutiny.
The functions of the committees did not stop at the 
advisory stage, however. There was provision for the Board 
to extend the powers and duties of the committees. The 
Board of the Land Bank could authorise the committees to 
grant loans without reference to it, but such authorisation 
was not to extend to the grant of loans to agricultural 
co-operative societies which included rural credit
CO
societies. In the event that a particular committee was 
authorised by the Board to make loan grants, it was up to 
the committee to grant the same without referring the 
application to the Board. But, still, records of such loan 
grants were to be made available to the Board for 
inspection. It is doubtful, however, that the Board would 
have authorised large sums to be loaned without its 
approval. It is more than probable that where the Board 
authorised the exercise of this power by any committee, it 
would restrict the quantum of loan funds, and also the
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period for which the loans would be made. Seasonal loans
are more fitting for committees at district level to deal
with than, say, medium term or long term loans.
One other measure introduced by the new government
related to interest rates. Under the original provisions of
the Land and Agricultural Bank Act, the interest to be
charged was: not to "be less than [was] sufficient to cover
the average rate payable by the Bank on the funds mentioned
in sections nineteen and twenty" of the ordinance and the
59costs of administration including provision for losses.
Sections 19 and 20 related to the sources of funds for the
Bank. The major source of the Bank's funds was the
government which through the Legislative Council vote
dispensed loans to the Bank at an interest that was
determined by the Financial Secretary (who after
independence became the Minister of Finance). The Bank was,
however, authorised to raise funds by discounting with other
banks bills of exchange of co-operative agricultural
societies; overdrafts from other banks; acceptance of monies
on deposit; and any other method which would meet with the
approval of the Minister. The amendment of 1964 stated:
"The Bank may, with the approval of the 
Minister, charge a rate of interest lower than 
that specified in subsection (1) of this 
section. In such case the amount by which 
interest at the rate charged falls short of 
the provisions of subsection (1) of this 
section shall be paid to the Bank from moneys 
appropriated by Parliament for the purpose."6Q
This provision thus permitted the subsidisation of interest
rates at the request of the Land Bank and with the agreement
of the Minister. It would have had the same effect as the
charging of a rate lower than the commercial rate, which in
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turn is said to discourage lending by commercial banks.
(c) The Credit Organisation of Zambia
The Credit Organisation of Zambia which in 1967
replaced the Land and Agricultural Bank, had begun its
operations in 1965, in spits of the fact that it did not
exist in statutory form. It had a very short and disastrous
life, beiru) wound up in 1970, with an accumulated loss
of twenty million kwacha.61 An examination of the structure
and operation of the Credit Organisation of Zambia, best
known as the COZ, is relevant to the determination whether
any lessons have been learnt from its brief existence. The
COZ assumed statutory form on the 11th of August, 1967 when
62the Credit Organisation of Zambia Act was passed. In 
terms of structure, the COZ was very similar to the Land 
Bank, but it had certain other features which were different 
from the Land Bank.
(i) Organisational Structure
The Organisation had a similar structure to the Land
Bank except in terms of numbers. It was headed by a Board
consisting of not less than nine or more than twelve members
63appointed by the Minister, by Gazette notice. Members of
the Board were to serve for a term not exceeding two 
64years. Among the members of the Board, the Minister 
appointed the chairman. He also appointed a General Manager 
who was also a member of the Board. A retiring member was, 
however, eligible for re-appointment. A member ceased to be 
a member of the Board if he died, resigned, was adjudicated
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bankrupt or of unsound mind, became convicted of an offence
and sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine,
or absented himself from three consecutive meetings of the
65Board without its leave. Unlike members of the Land Bank
Board, members of the COZ Board did not cease to be members
on becoming members of the National Assembly.66
As with the Land Bank, the Minister could appoint such
a number of District Advisory Committees for the COZ as he
67"deemed necessary or expedient". Such an appointment was
made by order published in the Gazette. District Advisory
Committees consisted of a chairman and such other members as
the Minister deemed necessary. All the members were
appointed by the Minister. In fact the usual number of
members appointed was five, including the chairman. The
format of the order in the Gazette did not, however,
disclose the status of those appointed or the positions they
68held within their community. This can partly be 
attributed to the fact that the Credit Organisation of 
Zambia Act did not prescribe what qualifications appointees 
to the District Advisory Committee should have. The 
consequences of this omission is commented upon below, in 
connection with the performance of the COZ. The other 
provisions relating to the District Advisory Committees were 
a replica of the provisions regarding the same in the Land 
and Agricultural Bank Act, and, therefore, need not be 
repeated.
(ii) The Objectives of the COZ
The objectives of the COZ were different, to a certain 
degree, from those of the Land Bank. In common with the
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Land Bank, the COZ's business was to lend money to farmers 
and co-operative societies for various purposes. Both the 
Land Bank and the COZ could also lend money to farmers1 
associations or unions, agricultural show societies and 
other bodies for purposes which, in the opinion of the COZ 
or the Land Bank, would further the interests of the farming 
industry. In contrast to the Land Bank, however, the COZ 
had an additional object:
"to lend money to establish, purchase or
improve commercial and other business projects
approved by the Organisation.
The contrast, therefore, lies in the fact that whereas the 
Land Bank had been established purely for agricultural 
purposes, the COZ had a dual role of serving both the 
agricultural sector and the commercial sector. Much of the 
appraisal of the COZ which has taken place since its 
dissolution seems to have focussed on the performance in 
relation to agriculture but not commercial business 
enterprises unrelated to agriculture, perhaps because the 
emphasis of the COZ appeared to have been on the farmers 
rather than businessmen.
Having thus altered the objects of the COZ, the 
provision regarding the purposes for which a loan could be 
made had to be correspondingly extended. Generally, a loan 
could be made by the COZ (and before it the Land Bank) to a 
farmer or any other person, "for the purchase, development 
and improvement of land, [and] the commencement or carrying 
on of farming operations generally". Under the Credit 
Organisation of Zambia Act, however, the provision was 
extended to include "the purchase, establishment and 
improvement of any business or commercial enterprise
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70approved by the Organisation". To define further the 
nature of loans to commercial business, subsection 3 of 
section 29 stated:
"(3) A loan may be made by the Organisation 
for -
a) the promotion, purchase or improvement 
of any business such as that of 
merchant, trader, dealer, storekeeper 
or agent for the sale of or for 
dealing in natural or manufactured 
goods, materials, provisions and 
produce;
b) the development, establishment and 
carrying on of any enterprise, such as 
that of builder, contractor, cabinet 
maker, fishery pit sawyer, transport 
contractor, upholsterer, shoe 
repairer, and generally to do all such 
things as are incidental and conducive 
thereto."
The motive behind the extra responsibility given to the COZ
was to equip it with the necessary power to cope with the
economic reforms which were announced by the President a
year after the Credit Organisation of Zambia Act was passed.
In 1968, the President introduced his first economic
reforms, the extent of which was to restrict the running of
business by foreigners, particularly in the rural areas.
Even in urban areas, however, the grant of retail licences
was to be restricted to nationals, and those foreigners
already in the retail business were encouraged to sell their
71concerns to Zambians. This could not work if Zambians 
could not find the resources with which to acquire the 
retail businesses. For this reason, the COZ's objects had 
been extended to lending for purposes of commercial 
enterprise. The effect of extending the objects was to 
increase the responsibility of the COZ in relation to its 
resources at a time when rural development, which had,
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hitherto, been largely neglected, should have had priority.
The COZ could grant loans on the same kinds of security
as the Land Bank - mortgages, charges, bills of sale, and
any other security that could be approved by the Board,
except that whereas under the Land and Agricultural Bank Act
stop orders could only be made on crops and other produce,
under the Credit Organisation of Zambia Act, stop orders
72could be made on bank accounts. Apart from these changes 
the Credit Organisation of Zambia Act was a replica of the 
Land and Agricultural Bank Act, save for minor alterations 
necessary such as currency, numbers of Board members and the 
layout of sections.
(iii) Performance of the COZ
The COZ was established to fill a gap which had not
been covered by the Land Bank because of its insistence on
tangible security such as land, or by the commercial banks,
whose lending to the agricultural sector had been minimal.
It was not a clearly thought-out model to achieve its
objectives, the fact that it had begun operation two years
prior to its being formally established by Act of Parliament
being an indication of the haste with which it was founded.
In its early years, care was not taken to consider the
important aspect of credit-worthiness - the application form
for a loan went little beyond enquiring the type of crop and
the acreage to be planted. No arrangements had been made,
at least before the COZ assumed statutory form, with
marketing agencies for the repayment of money owed to the
73COZ from the farmers1 sales to them. In some cases, no 
attempt was made to keep a record of borrowers* names and
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addresses - a fact which is borne out by the fact that the
COZ was unable to produce such a basic statistic as the
74 . 75actual number of borrowers, let alone audited accounts.
This omission was itself a result of poor accounting
7 6procedures and a chronic shortage of trained staff. By 
the end of 1967 the total amount lent to the COZ had reached
77 7ft
K18.8m, and by 1968 this figure had risen to K19.7 m.
In 1969 the COZ was transferred from the control of the 
Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Finance, which 
led to a noticeable hardening of lending practices, but with 
the repayment levels of thirty percent, the greater 
proportion of which could be accounted for by commercial
farmers, these changes were too late to save the
79 . . . .Organisation. Introducing the Credit Organisation of
Zambia (Dissolution) Bill of 1970, the Minister of Rural
Development told the House:
"Regrettably as hon. Members will be aware, 
the volume of outstanding debts not repaid by 
farmers has reached alarming proportions, now 
of the order of eight million kwacha, and it 
is now necessary for Government to bring the 
whole problem of agricultural credit on a 
firmer and more rational basis."8Q
Considering the repayment rate, the eight million kwacha
figure must have been an underestimate, but according to the
Minister the COZ had served its purpose. He went on:
"I am being frank with the House when I say 
that I do not regard the Credit Organisation 
of Zambia as having been a failure; it has 
performed far too valuable a function in 
difficult conditions to be placed in that 
category. But what we now need is a new 
appraisal, a new approach, and new attitudes 
from the farming community, and it is intended 
that this winding up process will mark a new 
phase along these lines and we will have what 
is in effect, a new era in the availability of 
agricultural credit in this country, based on 
realistic considerations.** ,
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According to the Minister, therefore, what was needed was a 
re-shaping of lending policy. This did not, however, 
prevent attacks on the government by members of the 
opposition who argued that the COZ’s failure had been caused 
by government using it to gain political support. There 
might have appeared to be some justification for this as 
government did little to recover loans from defaulting 
farmers. This policy in turn, tended to penalise those who 
had dutifully repaid their loans.
Much has been said regarding the effect that the 
operation of the COZ may have had on the attitude of peasant 
farmers towards credit. The appointment of members of the 
ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
to the District Advisory Committees, although meant to 
enable local participation, in fact had the effect of 
introducing political bias in the dispensation of loans.
Many borrowers regarded their loans as grants for their 
loyalty to the ruling party, hence their perception that 
they were not contractually bound to repay. Apart from the 
obvious harm to peasant attitudes towards credit, the 
failure of the COZ has resulted in the present institutions 
adopting more strict requirements regarding credit 
worthiness. Before we discuss the operations of the two 
institutions responsible for granting loans today, namely 
the Agricultural Finance Company and the Zambia Agricultural 
Development Bank, attention must be focussed on the 
increasingly important role being played by the commercial 
or private banks.
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B. THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS
The arguments in favour of special agricultural credit
banks and the operation in Zambia of two such institutions
have not meant that private banks have no role. It is true
that prior to 1966 one feature of commercial bank lending
was the low level of credit extended to agriculture. The
little that was extended to agriculture was given to
established expatriate farmers. As a consequence the
proportion of total bank credit declined up to the lowest
point of 1.8% in 1967 during which year non-agricultural
82lending increased to 77% over the previous year. From
1970 the proportion of bank lending began to improve,
but the increase was rather slow, forcing the government
during the Second National Development Plan period to call
83upon the banks to increase their lending to farmers. The 
up-turn in 1970 appeared to indicate a growing awareness by 
commercial banks that they had a role to play in 
agricultural finance.
Since 1970, but particularly in the 1980s there has 
been a general increase in lending to the agricultural 
sector by all commercial banks. There are six commercial 
banks doing business in Zambia - the Citibank (Zambia) Ltd; 
the Bank of Credit and Commerce (Zambia) Ltd; Grindlays 
International (Zambia) Ltd; the Standard Chartered Bank 
(Zambia) Ltd; Barclays Bank (Zambia) Ltd, and the Zambia 
National Commercial Bank Ltd. Of these only the Zambia
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National Commercial Bank is wholly owned by the government. 
The rest are privately-owned as earlier attempts on the part 
of the government to buy shares were not successful. The 
Citibank is very small and is the latest to appear on the 
Zambian commercial banking business. Its share of 
agricultural lending only amounts to nineteen percent of its 
total lending figure which by December 1984 amounted to 
slightly above thirty-two million kwacha.84 Its major 
emphasis appears to be mining which during the same year 
received fifty-eight percent, with agriculture taking second 
place and manufacturing and commerce sharing twelve 
percent.85
The Bank of Credit and Commerce is also a comparatively 
small bank, of recent origin. As on 31st of December 1982 
the proportion of lending to the agricultural sector was 
nearly seventeen percent of its total amount lent. Its 
priority was on manufacturing and mining and quarrying. 
Building and construction also received a higher proportion 
than agriculture. In 1983, however, the proportionate share 
of agriculture almost doubled, rising to thirty-one percent. 
But manufacturing industry took first priority, accounting 
for thirty-eight percent of the total loan funds, with 
mining, building and construction, and distribution and 
services sharing the major proportion of the remainder. In 
1984 there was a further increase in the share of loan funds 
to agriculture. Its share rose to thirty-six percent. The 
priorities remained the same. Agriculture came second to 
manufacturing, but building and construction lost place to 
distribution and services (including trade). The position 
was similar to that of Grindlays Bank. In 1982 its total
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expenditure on agriculture only amounted to approximately 
thirteen percent of total lending. Its major proportion 
going to the mining and other parastatal manufacturing 
companies, in fact almost half. It also seems to have lent 
a sizeable proportion to multi-national companies, with the 
rest being spent on retail businesses. In 1984, however, 
there was a dramatic shift in emphasis. Manufacturing took 
first priority, accounting for just over thirty-two percent 
of total lending, but agriculture rose to second place with 
nearly twenty-three percent, while mining took third place. 
As for the Zambia National Commercial Bank the figures for 
1984, indicate, yet again, that the agricultural sector 
occupied a third place. Manufacturing had first priority 
while retail trade took second, leaving agriculture with 
only fourteen percent of total lending. Some caution must 
be exercised, however, as loans to financial institutions 
amounted to forty million kwacha. It is not clear which 
financial institutions these are, but it is possible that 
the two specialised credit institutions could have borrowed 
from the National Commercial Bank, as they have been in the 
habit of doing. If this is the case, the share of 
agriculture in comparison to the rest would rise to more 
than fifty percent. These figures are based on returns by 
each bank submitted to the Bank of Zambia.
The four commercial banks mentioned above have had a 
short history and their individual financial outlays are 
much less than the two main commercial banks, the Standard 
Bank and the Barclays Bank. With regard to the Standard 
Bank the records, submitted quarterly, to the Bank of Zambia 
indicate that agriculture has consistently enjoyed first
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priority, at least since 1979, the period during which the 
government drive for increased agricultural production 
gained momentum. Not only has agriculture featured better 
than mining and manufacturing but between 1980 and 1983, 
there has been an increase of over seven percent over and 
above the 1979 figures. According to the percentages 
provided by the Standard Bank itself, agricultural credit, 
although amounting to only twenty-eight percent in 1980, was 
the highest proportion given to any industry. Manufacturing 
received an average of eleven percent, while mining was just 
above ten percent, thus totalling twenty-one percent, still 
less than the credit advanced to agriculture. This 
situation remained unchanged both in 1981 and in 1982, 
although by 1982, manufacturing industry had far outstripped 
mining. In 1983, however, agricultural credit shot up to 
thirty-five percent by December, and as on the 31st of 
December 1984, agriculture accounted for thirty-eight
Q g
percent of total credit given. While agriculture enjoyed 
an unassailable pride of place, however, the second place 
alternated between mining and manufacturing throughout all 
the quarters.
The same trend is discernible from the 1983 and the 
1984 figures available for Barclays Bank. In 1983 the Bank 
spent almost thirty-five percent of its loanable funds on 
agriculture, and in 1984, this figure had risen to 
forty-five percent. Agriculture in recent years, has 
occupied a central place, followed by mining and quarrying, 
and thirdly manufacturing. Not only is the proportion of 
credit for agriculture much higher in the two major banks - 
the Standard Bank and Barclays Bank, but also the actual
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amounts given as loans are far in excess of loans provided
by the rest of the banks, taken individually. It is also
important to bear in mind, that the total figure given to
agriculture and agro-industries by all the commercial banks
is in excess of all the loanable funds of both the two
credit institutions created by government - the Agricultural
Finance Company and the Zambia Agricultural Development 
87Bank. This is not to imply, however, that specialised
credit institutions are, therefore, irrelevant, because the
identity of the recipients of commercial credit, differs
substantially from that served by the specialised credit
institutions. To take the example of Barclays Bank into
whose role Wilson has done comprehensive research, Barclays
has been able to increase its lending to small and medium
scale "emergent farmers" although it has minimised credit to
individual or independent farmers (as opposed to those who
88are part of a settlement scheme) on customary land.
According to Wilson's report, about ten percent of the 
small and medium term loans went to farmers on customary 
land and another ten percent to those farmers with small 
holdings near urban areas, and the remaining eighty percent
was spent on farmers participating in government schemes and
89 . .projects on State Land. Apart from assisting m  financing
trainees in agricultural training schools, the Bank has been
assisting three other schemes, the most important of which
is the scheme operated by the Tobacco Board of Zambia. In
this scheme, the Tobacco Board of Zambia (TBZ) having
acquired land from the government grants short-term leases
to individual tenants who cultivate tobacco under the
supervision of the TBZ. A machinery pool (for hire) of
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tractors and machinery is provided by the TBZ for new 
tenants who, in later seasons obtain medium term loans from 
the Board for the purchase of implements. As the 
performance of the tenants improve^, the most successful 
tenants move off the scheme into other farms owned by the 
TBZ on more independent basis. Barclays Bank assists the 
successful tenants, and in their early days, their loans are 
guaranteed by the government. These government guarantees 
are not provided for subsequent years, so that much of what 
is lent by the Bank is inadequately secured.
Specialised credit institutions such as the 
Agricultural Finance Company have also assisted such schemes 
in addition to subsistence farmers. The amount of money 
lent by such institutions may be small in proportion to the 
number of subsistence farmers, but their effort has provided 
an opportunity where none existed before. Rather than take 
the risk of lending to individual subsistence farmers, 
commercial banks provide loans to specialised credit 
institutions such as the Agricultural Finance Company who 
later disburse the same to individual farmers. By lending 
to these institutions under a government guarantee, 
commercial banks undertake no risks at all. Nevertheless, 
the efforts of commercial banks are highly appreciated 
because specialised credit institutions do not have adequate 
funds to meet the demand for credit.
In the limited circumstances in which commercial banks 
lend directly to farmers, the nature of the security that 
they require is of utmost importance. Commercial banks use 
two types of security - the mortgage of land and the 
agricultural charge. The importance of these two types of
394
security depends on the resources of the farmer. Commercial 
farmers may choose either to obtain a mortgage or to create 
an agricultural charge or both. For the majority of 
farmers, however, neither of these two types of security is 
available. These two types of security are separately 
discussed below in terms of their relevance to the various 
categories of farmers - commercial, emergent and 
subsistence.
1. Mortgages of Land
This type of security is one of the most popular among
commercial farmers, most of whom are farming on State Land.
Its importance has, however, been adversely affected by the
land reforms of 1975. Section 10(1) of the Land (Conversion
of Titles) Act states:
"Any mortgage, charge, or trust subsisting 
over land immediately before the commencement 
of this Act shall, on such commencement 
operate only on and against the unexhausted 
improvements on the land and, so far as 
regards land apart from the unexhausted 
improvements, shall be deemed to be 
extinguished."
This provision means that no mortgage can be created out of
undeveloped land because it cannot be sold for value.
Nevertheless the broad definition of unexhausted
improvements as "anything resulting from the expenditure of
capital or labour ... or the making of any material change
90in the use of any building or land" should enable a farmer 
who has merely cleared his farm to execute a mortgage based
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on the cost of the labour. The important thing to remember, 
however, is that whereas before the land reforms a farmer 
could raise a mortgage without any prior investment in the 
development of the land, after the reforms, the initial step 
is to raise capital, develop the farm and only then would 
the farmer be in a position to mortgage the farm. How the 
initial capital is raised is a matter for the individual 
farmer himself as he cannot expect any assistance from the 
banks since undeveloped land is no security at all.
Mortgages of customary land have never taken place.
Two issues are relevant to the mortgaging of land in the 
Reserves and Trust Land. One is whether it is possible to 
create a mortgage of land falling under customary law, and 
the second is whether registration of title whereupon the 
land would then be governed by statutory tenure would 
attract commercial banks to the land in the Reserves and 
Trust Land. It has been shown in Chapter Three that, while 
there is a controversy as to whether or not customary law 
permits the sale of land, there is no doubt that the sale of 
improvements on it, together with the land is permitted. 
Since the customary land holder can sell land together with 
the improvements on it, he can legally create a mortgage in 
favour of a financial institution, which, in the event of 
default would have the right to dispose of the land.
Legally, therefore, there would appear to be no barrier on a 
farmer mortgaging his customary land. There is, however, 
one customary rule which would appear to make mortgages of 
customary land impracticable. Under customary land tenure 
applicable to all ethnic communities, for a person to 
acquire rights in land such person must be either a member
396
of such community, or have the permission of the traditional
authorities to settle on the land of that community.
Similarly, any transfer of land is permissible only in so
far as the transferee is resident in the area of such a
community, otherwise, as a "stranger" he would have to
secure the permission of the traditional authorities
referred to. In order to lend on the security of customary
land, the bank, being a "stranger", would have to secure the
permission of traditional authorities to acquire the land by
way of a mortgage. In the event of default and the bank
wishing to realise its security, the requirement of
residence would seriously limit the range of people to whom
the land could be disposed of by the bank. Consequently,
due to depressed demand, the value of the security would be
so compromised as not to be worth the risk.
The use of land in Reserves and Trust Land as security
would only be practicable after land tenure reforms by which
rights similar to those enjoyed in State Land would be
introduced and a system of documentary title introduced.
The question still remains, however, whether such reforms
would necessarily attract financial institutions. The
assumption by those demanding registered title to land in
the Reserves and Trust Land is that this would be the case.
91This assumption is, nevertheless, not justified. The
Kenyan experience disproves this assumption for the
"original hope that the commercial banks would become an
even larger source of credit for African farmers has not, by
and large, been realised ... the possibility of getting a
mortgage has not ... significantly enhanced the security of 
92a loan". It is not often realised that it is more
397
convenient, administratively, for the commercial banks to 
lend to the few commercial farmers than to the thousands of 
smallscale farmers.
Moreover, the increase in dealings in customary land 
may have dangerous consequences. A UNFAO report of 1966 
warned:
"Above all, total freedom to transfer and 
dispose of land as a chattel, which is the 
logical result of the widespread establishment 
of individual ownership, might lead to 
property being grabbed by the moneyed class,
i.e. the tribal chiefs, leading rural 
citizens, and the urban rich ..."g3
The Report also points out that funds used for purchasing
land would no longer be available for productive investment.
The East African Royal Commission, while advocating the
"individualisation" of tenure, appreciated the danger of
rural indebtedness. The Commission noted that in many
countries with similar conditions as East Africa, peasant
land ownership had resulted in a heavy burden of what it
termed as unproductive debt. The Commission observed:
"When land has become a negotiable security 
which can be used for raising loans, there are 
always those who, in times of prosperity , 
wish to borrow and those who are prepared to 
lend money on a scale out of all relation to 
the value which the land offered as security 
will assume in times of depression. The 
result is the creation of unsupportable 
burdens of indebtedness in which debt charges 
swallow up the income earned from the land and 
so eventually destroy incentive to further 
effort on the part of the cultivator."g4
The Commission could well have added that the chronic
indebtedness of peasants would result in their being
dispossessed of their land by financial institutions which
would sell the improvements together with the land to the
highest bidder, leaving the peasants landless. It is not
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enough to state as does Paul Brietzke that for the present 
"the fear that a landless class will appear (in Malawi)
95seems to be groundless as rural land values are so low".
The value of improvements on the land will increase with
increased demand and this is likely to take place earlier in
areas of land shortage than in others, but precautions
cannot be postponed until the situation becomes critical.
The Commission itself suggested safeguards calculated to
prevent peasants from abusing their freedom to mortgage land
and some restrictions on the exercise of the power of sale
9 6by lending institutions. As with all controls however, 
the problem is one of the capacity of the State to carry out 
such control effectively, and as demonstrated in Chapter Two 
regarding agricultural State Land, control is a very 
difficult task.
2. Agricultural Charges
Agricultural charges are created under the Agricultural
Charges Act which was passed by the colonial government in
97 981961 and revised in 1963. The general purpose of the
Act is to facilitate the borrowing of money by farmers on
the security of charges created on farming stock and other
agricultural assets. A farmer may execute, in favour of any
person, a charge on all or any of the farming stock or other
99agricultural assets as security for a loan. The Act 
provides for two types of charges, a floating charge and a 
fixed charge. A floating charge can be created only in
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favour of a bank defined as "any commercial bank ... and the 
Government",100 otherwise it is null and void 
notwithstanding that it has been registered.101 A floating 
charge may be effected on farming stock and other 
agricultural assets from time to time belonging to the 
farmer, but should not include tobacco, maize, potatoes, 
milk or vegetables or else it will be void as regards any of 
these goods.102
A fixed charge may be created from farming stock and 
other agricultural assets including:
a) in the case of livestock, any progeny 
thereof which may be born after the date 
of the charge; and
b) in the case of agricultural plant, any 
plant which may, whilst the charge is in 
force, be substituted for the plant 
specified in the charge.
While the parties to a fixed agricultural charge are free to
agree on any terms the Act has granted certain rights and
imposed certain obligations. A fixed charge confers on the
104holder three types of rights. One of the rights entitles
the holder, on the happening of any event specified in the 
charge as being an event authorising the seizure of property 
subject to the charge to take possession of the property so 
subject. Another right conferred on the holder by the Act 
is the right to sell the property which he has taken 
possession of, after an interval of five clear days or such 
less time as may have been agreed by the parties. Where the 
charge so provides, the sale may be by private treaty, but 
in the absence of any such provision, the sale has to be by 
public auction. Finally, the holder of the charge is 
entitled, in the event of his power of sale being exercised, 
to apply the proceeds of sale towards the discharge of the
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moneys and liabilities secured by the charge, and costs
incurred by him in taking possession of the assets and the
sale, but he has to pay any surplus to the farmer.
The Act also imposes on the farmer several obligations
concerning the security. Unless the parties have agreed to
the contrary, whenever the farmer sells any property which
is the subject of the charge, he must pay to the holder the
amount of the proceeds of the sale or the money received on
account of the sale, and subject to the agreement between
the parties, the sum so paid, is to be applied by the holder
105to discharge the loan outstanding. Although the farmer 
is under no obligation to insure his property, where the 
property is insured any monies received under the policy of
insurance must be paid over to the holder of the charge so
• 106 that it can be applied to the discharge of the loan.
This obligation on the farmer is, however, subject to the
agreement of the parties. Alternatively, where money is due
to a farmer under an insurance policy regarding property
which is subject to the charge, the insurer may pay to the
holder of the charge directly and any such payment is a
valid discharge of the insurer to the farmer to the extent
of the amount so paid. As in the previous case, the holder
must use the money from the farmer’s insurer to discharge
107the farmer's debt. In so far as other creditors of the
farmer are concerned, the holder of a fixed agricultural 
charge has priority. But this priority is limited to the 
circumstances where the other creditor has actual knowledge 
that the money was paid to him in breach of the provision 
which requires the proceeds of sale to be paid to the 
holder. As this aspect is crucial to the nature of the
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security conferred by an agricultural charge, this provision
is quoted in full. Section 4(5) states:
"Where any proceeds of sale which, in 
pursuance of the obligations imposed by 
subsection (2), ought to be paid to the holder 
are paid to some other person, nothing in this 
Act shall confer on the holder a right to 
recover such proceeds from that other person 
unless the holder proves that such other 
person knew that such proceeds were paid to 
him in breach of such obligation, but such 
other person shall not be deemed to have such 
knowledge by reason only that he has notice of 
the charge."
Further, it is expressly provided that so long as the 
proceeds of sale are to be paid to the holder, the farmer is 
at liberty to sell any of the property subject to the charge 
and neither the purchaser nor the auctioneer, as the case 
may be, should be concerned that the proceeds are paid to 
the holder even if he is aware of the existence of the 
charge.108
It is clear from section 4 that the farmer is entitled
to sell property which is the subject of a fixed charge.
The next question is whether, in view of this, the holder is
adequately protected from the loss of the property which
constitutes his security. On this issue the holder is
protected in so far as accountability of the farmer to the
holder is concerned. It is a criminal offence punishable by
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years, for the
farmer fraudulently to fail to pay the holder the proceeds
from the sale of property which is the subject of the 
109charge. Likewise, if the farmer fraudulently removes or
suffers to be removed from his land any property subject to 
the charge, he is guilty of an offence and liable to the 
same period of imprisonment. Where, however, third parties
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are involved the protection of the holder appears to be
negligible. The question of how to strike a balance between
the interests of third parties against the holder of an
agricultural charge has been a difficult one. Most
consumers, for instance, buy produce from farmers, and other
farmers buy minor agricultural assets on a very informal
day-to-day basis. It would be too much to ask such
purchasers to search the Registry to discover whether the
farmer's assets are subject to agricultural charges. At the
same time the requirement of registration would serve little
purpose if not to ensure that those with notice must account
to the holder the sum offered for the assets. But the Act
goes further to say that notice of the existence of a charge
is not sufficient unless the purchaser knows that the farmer
is accepting the money in breach of the charge. In fact the
onus of proof is on the holder to show that the third party
knew that the money paid to him was paid in breach of the
farmer's obligation.110 This is a very difficult onus to
becauSB
discharge particularly the knowledge on the part of the
third party that the farmer has an agricultural charge is
not sufficient. Apparently the holder must prove, in
addition, that the third party knew that the property sold 
to him is the property which is the subject of the charge.
A better compromise at least from the holder's point of view 
should have been that where the third party had notice of
the existence of the charge, the onus would be on him to
prove that the goods he purchased were not the subject of 
the charge. Notice should act as a forewarning so that 
those who deal with farmers should search the registry in 
respectof the property which has been charged. In the
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absence of this provision, the holder is left with a mere 
action against the farmer for breach of contract, in 
addition to recourse to the criminal justice which does not 
necessarily act as a recompense to the holder's loss of the 
security. Some solace could have been granted to the holder 
by a provision which would require the farmer to use the 
proceeds received from a third party to acquire other assets 
which would form part of the property charged so as to 
restore the holder to the position he was in before the 
sale. As it is, the Act puts the holder in a precarious 
position when faced with a fraudulent farmer.
In the case of floating charges, the security is
similar to a company debenture.111 The proviso, however,
lists the circumstances in which the floating charge becomes
a fixed charge. These circumstances include a receiving
order in bankruptcy being made against the farmer, the death
of the farmer, the dissolution of partnership in the case
where the property charged is partnership property, and
where in cases where the parties agreed that the happening
of a certain event the holder may serve written notice, the
112actual service of such notice. The farmer who has
granted a floating charge is under the same obligations as
the one who has executed a fixed charge and has to pay over
the holder in respect of any proceeds received from the sale
of agricultural assets, or compensation under a policy of
insurance. In the case of a floating charge, however, the
farmer need not comply with this obligation if the amount
received is used to purchase farming stock which become
113subject to the charge.
Section 6 compels a farmer to give a written notice to
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a purchaser of certain types of fanning stock. The notice 
should state the names and addresses of all persons holding 
agricultural charges over the farming stock' and the priority 
of such agricultural charges. The farming stockonthe sale 
of which notice is required are cattle, tobacco, milk, 
maize, agricultural vehicles, machinery or other plant. On 
receipt of the notice, the purchaser or person effecting the 
sale on behalf of the farmer as the case may be must pay the 
proceeds of sale to the holders of the agricultural charges 
in accordance with the notice and with due regard to the 
priority and amounts stated in the notice. Compliance with 
this provision by the purchaser operates as a discharge of 
such purchaser from any claim, but any purchaser who 
contravenes this provision is guilty of an offence and
114liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment or both. 
Similarly, a farmer who fails to comply with the requirement 
that he must furnish a written notice to a purchaser is
guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine
115 . .or imprisonment or both. The rest of the provisions of
the Agricultural Credits Act relate to the mechanics of
registration of charges, but again the question arises as to
whether section 6 regarding notice confers any security on
the holder of an agricultural charge. In the absence of
notice from the farmer, the holder is not protected against
third parties, as they are not required to pay the proceeds
to him. Further, even where notice has been given by the
farmer to the purchaser, if the purchaser does not account
to the holder, a criminal proceeding against the purchaser
is the only remedy. The purchase money is recoverable from
a third party only in cases where such third party received
405
money from the purchaser with knowledge that the property
sold was subject to the charge. The circumstances in which
third parties (who may be the farmer's other creditors) may
have notice are very limited because there is no provision
in the Act requiring the farmer to publish notices of
charges. In fact it is unlawful to print for publication or
publish any list of agricultural charges or names of farmers
who have created agricultural charges.116 Apart from the
question of notice, "an agricultural charge shall be no
protection in respectof property included in the charge,
which, but for the charge, would have been liable to
117distress for rent or rates". The protection offered to
the holder under the Agricultural Credits Act is, therefore,
very limited. The agricultural charge is not, in the strict
sense, real security, but access to the means by which the
118creditor may recoup his money.
The importance of agricultural charges as security
depends on the value of the farmer's agricultural assets
and/or farming stock. Farming stock is defined, fairly
broadly, to include crops, including horB cultural produce
119and livestock, which includes poultry. Agricultural 
assets in the form of implements such as tractors etc. are 
not available to subsistence farmers, hence their inability 
to produce more. But smallscale farmers (those who sell at 
least half of their produce) in areas where agriculture has 
progressed to a more commercial stage such as Southern 
Province, own implements such as ploughs, in addition to 
valuable farming stock in the form of cattle. These farmers 
are, therefore, able to raise the security required for an 
agricultural charge. Commercial banks have, nevertheless,
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restricted lending on the security of agricultural charges 
to commercial farmers, mediumscale farmers, and in respect 
of smallscale farmers, only those operating within 
supervised schemes. The ordinary subsistence farmer in the 
villages can only look to the government credit institutions 
for assistance. An agricultural charge cannot assist the 
subsistence farmer because he does not have adequate farming 
stock. In terms of which of the two forms of security, that 
is the mortgage and the agricultural charge, is more 
commonly used, the figures published by the Lands Department 
are not conclusive. For instance, in 1970, the Lands 
Department reported that 737 mortgages had been registered 
as compared to 500 agricultural charges, but the figure 
representing the number of mortgages registered did not draw
a distinction between mortgages of urban properties and
120those of agricultural land. Tentatively, one may
conclude that as urban properties are more numerous than
■fetal of
agricultural properties, theA737 registered mortgages has a 
higher proportion of urban properties than agricultural and 
that agricultural charges are more common than mortgages.
C. CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT
Co-operatives have a long history in Zambia. One form 
of these co-operatives is the credit union, commonly 
referred to as the thrift society. There is a general
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consensus that credit unions can play an important part in
the mobilisation of the savings of the members and the use
of such savings to meet the short-term and seasonal cash
121requirements of some of their members. Immediately after
independence, Zambia experienced a rapid increase in
co-operatives although there was greater emphasis on
122producer and marketing co-operatives. A full discussion
of the post-independence development of co-operative
marketing unions is contained in Chapter Five. At this
stage specific attention will be paid to credit unions. In
terms of financial assistance to credit unions, the
government plays no role although it administers the
Co-operative Credit Scheme (through the Department of
Co-operatives), began in 1975. The funds for this scheme
were donated by the Swedish International Development
Agency, (SIDA), to the government to be used for the
provision of seasonal credit to rural agricultural
123co-operative societies. It is not clear how much of the
resources of the scheme has been given to credit unions as
opposed to marketing and producer societies. For instance,
the Eastern Province report discloses that in the 1981/82
season twenty-six societies participated in the Co-operative
Credit Scheme, but it does not say whether any of these were 
124credit unions. Before we discuss the role of credit
unions and their significance, the legal framework within 
which these societies operate need to be briefly reviewed.
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1. The Co-operative Societies Act, No. 63 of 1970
Although this Act applies to all types of co-operative
societies, it has some provisions which are applicable to
credit unions only. Among the provisions which apply to all
societies are those regarding the minimum number of
membership and the powers and functions of the Registrar of
Co-operative Societies. A credit union or any form of
co-operative society can be formed by at least ten persons.
Such persons must show that they intend to form such a
society in accordance with the statutorily defined
125co-operative principles. The application to the
Registrar must be in prescribed form and accompanied by
126copies of the society's by-laws. Prior to approving 
registration, the Registrar may require such additional 
information about the proposed society as he deems necessary 
including:-
"a) the economic or other need for the
organisation of the society;
b) the educational and advisory work
respecting co-operative principles and 
the organisation and operation already 
being carried on among the applicants for 
registration and other persons expected 
to become members;
c) the number of persons expected to become 
members upon the commencement of • 
operations;
d) whether the capital to be furnished
initially by the applicants for 
registration and other persons expected 
to become members is sufficient for the 
commencement of operations;
e) the availability of officers capable of 
directing and managing the affairs of the 
society, and of keeping such records and 
books of account for the society as the 
Registrar may require."
Where on account of the information provided to him 
under subsection (1) of section 11, the Registrar is of the 
opinion that the applicants for registration and other
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persons expected to become members require more educational
and advisory work regarding co-operative principles and the
organisation and operation of a society, he may delay his
approval of registration in order to prescribe more
educational and advisory work, or allow discussion of the
objects of the society with more persons who could be
128expected to benefit from membership. Similarly, if the
Registrar is of the opinion that the membership is too small
for the satisfactory commencement of operations, or more
time is necessary to raise the capital initially required,
or that more training is needed for persons expected to
become officers, approval for registration may be delayed.
If as a result of the information required, and
notwithstanding any action taken under subsection (2), the
Registrar forms the view that registration is not
"economically advisable" or he is otherwise unwilling to
129approve registration, he may decline to approve. In any
such case, however, he must give specific reasons for 
declining to register the society not only to the Minister, 
but also to the applicants themselves. The members of the 
proposed society have a right to appeal to the Minister 
against the decision of the Registrar but the appeal must be 
lodged within ninety days of the refusal by the 
Registrar.130
Where, however, the Registrar entertains no doubts 
concerning the feasibility of the society, he may register 
it, by issuing a certificate of registration. Registration 
of a society makes the society a body corporate by the name 
under which it is registered. The registration entitles the 
society to hold property, enter into contracts, institute
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and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do any
of the things that it has the power to do under the
. . 131provisions of the Act.
Part VIII of the Act contains special provisions
regarding credit unions. The objects of a credit union are
stated as "the promotion of th*r!£t among its members and the
creation of a source of credit for its members at controlled
rates of interest exclusively for provident or productive 
132purposes". Membership of a credit union must be drawn
from groups of persons having a common bond of occupation or
association or from groups living within a well-defined
neighbourhood or community, or within a rural or urban 
133district. This provision does not, however, prevent the
credit union, with the approval of the Registrar, from
admitting as members persons from prescribed organisations.
These organisations are a public body performing a function
of government or providing a public service? a religious
organisation; a labour, agricultural, or benevolent
organisation? and an organisation operated exclusively for
charitable, educational or community welfare purposes,
without any part of its income being available for the
134personal benefit of the members or share holders. Any 
organisation which becomes a member of the credit union has 
a right to vote through a duly appointed delegate at the 
meetings of the credit union.
A credit union or society has various powers relating 
to the raising of funds. A credit union is empowered to 
receive the savings of its members as payment for shares.
It may also receive deposits from other societies. It may 
make loans to its members for provident or productive
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purposes. It may deposit money with commercial banks, the
Post Office, building societies and other companies
authorised to receive money on deposit. It may also invest
in stock bonds or securities of the government, provided
that the total amount of investments made by a credit union
135do not exceed half of its capital. The Act also confers
on credit unions wide borrowing powers. Subject to the
approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, a
credit union may borrow upon a vote of at least
three-fourths of the members of the Board of Directors:
11 (i) moneys not exceeding in the aggregate 
one-quarter of its combined capital, 
surplus and deposits? or 
(ii) moneys not exceeding in the aggregate an 
amount equal to the total of the market 
value of stocks, bonds and securities of 
the Government of Zambia held by the 
credit union 136
Where members of the Board of Directors wish the credit 
union to borrow additional moneys, at least three-quarters 
of them must so recommend. Thereupon the matter is brought
before the members of the credit union who must pass a
137special resolution to implement the recommendation of the 
directors. Even where a special resolution has been 
secured, however, the balance owing by the credit union in 
respect of all the funds borrowed should not, at any time, 
exceed half of its combined capital, surplus and deposits. 
Another way of raising funds arises from the power conferred 
on the credit union, with the approval of the Registrar to
"charge, hypothecate, mortgage or pledge its immovable or
138movable property".
With respect to loans section 64(1) provides that all 
loans by a credit union must be made for a provident or
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productive purpose. The regulations made under the Act
139prescribe the maximum amounts that may be lent and except
for loans of small amounts the credit union must insist on
security being provided. An assignment of shares, deposits
or negotiable instrument endorsed by a guarantee may be
140accepted by the credit union as security. Where a
mortgage of land is offered as security, the Registrar's
141approval must be secured before the money is lent. Where
the loan does not exceed twenty kwacha and the repayment
must be made within one month no security is required except
a promisory note to repay it.
Certain provisions have been included to prevent some
members of the union receiving a disproportionate share of
loan funds. Under section 65(1) no loan may be made by the
credit union if the result is to cause the borrower to
become indebted to the credit union for an amount which
totalled with other loans to the borrower exceed eight
percent of its paid-up capital surplus and deposits, or in
excess of such lesser percentage as may be provided in the
by-laws. Where more loan applications are pending than can
be granted by the credit union from the funds available,
preference must be given by the credit committee to the
applicants for smaller loans in the order in which the
applications were received, if the need for the loan and the
security offered compare favourably with the need and the
142security offered by applicants for larger loans.
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2. The Development of Credit Unions
The wide supervisory powers of the Registrar and the
detailed rules by which credit unions are to operate under
Co-operative Societies Act, 1970 are a response to the
failure of government policy on co-operatives immediately
after independence. From 1968 the government strove to
encourage the formation of co-operatives generally, and more
specifically, producer co-operatives. This the government
did, in part, through making credit more easily accessible
to co-operatives than private individuals. Consequently
there was a sudden increase in the number of co-operatives
but the quality of these co-operatives left much to be
desired. They were, basically, family co-operatives
consisting of the leader of the household and the members of
his family, the main intention being to obtain loans easily.
The number of co-operatives increased to such an extent that
143the Department of Co-operatives failed to cope. Based on
his experience on the National Co-operative Development
Committee of the then Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development, Lungu has stated:
"The response exceeded all expectations, as 
hundreds of groups of people were clamouring 
for registration. The increase in the number 
of co-operative societies placed a severe 
strain on the staff of the Department of 
Co-operative Societies, which, at the end of 
1965, totalled only 132".144
The table he provides shows that by 1970 the number of
cooperative societies had more than doubled. This increase
in co-operative societies did not, however, include credit
unions which lost their appeal because, due to relaxation in
lending policy by the COZ people did not see much need to
145pool their savings. As the number of co-operatives
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surpassed the managerial capacity of the Department of 
Marketing and Co-operatives, many of the co-operatives 
collapsed and in 1970 it was decided to develop more 
self-reliant and economically viable societies. More 
careful examination was to be made before registration, and 
more training was to be given to members and holders of 
office before and after registration. It is in the light of 
the initial problems and consequent failure of co-operative 
policy that the Co-operative Societies Act, 1970 was passed. 
This explains the extent to which the Act and the rules have 
gone to define the pre-requisites for the registration of 
societies and the wide powers of the Registrar and the 
regulation of day-to-day business of the societies. By so 
doing, however, the Act has become very complex and 
necessitated, even further, the need for the comprehensive 
education of members of societies and office holders. It is 
doubtful, however, whether the Department of Co-operatives 
is able to extend its services to rural areas, other than 
provincial capitals.
Generally, however, the number of credit unions has 
shown a slow, albeit, steady increase and the Credit Unions 
and Savings Association of Zambia has contributed to the 
survival of some of them. The Association has been carrying 
out the re-organisation of some credit unions and the
146preparation of development programmes for credit unions.
Government has attributed the slow development of credit
unions to a deliberate policy of "controlled expansion", so
as to avoid the rush which results in the formation of
147unviable societies. In 1979, there were 91 credit unions
with a total membership of 21,194 and the total savings and
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share capital amounted to K2,863,857. In 1980, the number
increased to 105, membership increased to 21,969, the share
capital to K3,695,198 with a total turnover of K259,331.
In 1981, the number of registered credit unions increased to
114 while the total membership jumped to 26,416, but while
the share capital and savings increased to K5,669,714, the
actual turn over decreased to a pre-1980 level of 
149K182,707.
At the provincial level, the trend in the development
of credit unions follows the trend in agricultural output.
The more productive the province, the greater the resources
150with which to form credit unions. Lusaka Province tops
the list with 19 credit unions, although two of them are no 
longer in business. Lusaka also has the largest membership, 
10,394 and the largest turn over, K119,545 per annum. The 
Southern Province has 21 registered societies, three of 
which are dormant, but the membership is very low, 3,436 and 
the turn over is only K10,225. The Copperbelt has 14 of 
which only 8 are active and Western Province has nine 
societies. The rest of the provinces have very small 
numbers, among some of which are dormant.
In sfnte. of the amount of effort that has been put into 
encouraging credit unions since the colonial era, the result 
must be disappointing. This is not, however, surprising 
taking into account the limited resources available to 
farmers in rural areas. The survey into the possible extent 
of rural savings conducted by the Rural Development Studies 
Bureau of the University of Zambia shows that three-quarters 
of the rural population in Zambia have less than K50 per 
household per annum. Such humble resources leave little
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margin for savings. Consequently, the role of credit unions 
in the development of agriculture in the rural sector must 
be seen as marginal.
D. THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCE COMPANY
151Following the dissolution of the COZ in 1970, its
work was taken over by the Rural Development Corporation, a
government-owned company. The Rural Development Corporation
(RDC), came into existence as the Agricultural Development
of Zambia Company Ltd and was incorporated under the 
152Companies Act on the 1st of April 1968. By special
resolution, it became the Rural Development Corporation on
153the 10th of September, 1969. The RDC created a
subsidiary, the Agricultural Finance Company, which was 
incorporated under the Companies Act on the 12th of January,
1970. With regard to personnel, the RDC had retained all
the staff of the COZ when it took over, and these workers 
were subsequently transferred to the Agricultural Finance 
Company (hereinafter referred to as the AFC), a factor which 
drew a great deal of criticism from members of the 
Opposition in the National Assembly. It was widely felt 
that those who had failed to make the COZ successful should 
not be involved in the administration of the new body, but
the government was not persuaded and most of the staff who
had served the COZ were absorbed by the AFC.
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In the Second National Development Plan, it was
disclosed that the establishment of the AFC in the place of
the defunct COZ showed the determination of the government
to operate "a business-like credit system providing for the
154financial needs of the farming community". Under the
Plan, it was envisaged that the AFC services would be
expanded to cover an increasing number of credit-worthy
producers, that it would have sufficient funds to meet all
reasonable requirements including long term loans, and that
155efficiency will progressively improve.
Unlike the COZ, the AFC is not a statutory body, having
been incorporated under the Companies Act. It has often
been assumed that this would minimise government
interference, so as to permit the officers of the company a
156free hand in the running of the company. In fact, this
is not the case. Several factors contribute to government 
exercising a great deal of influence in the operation of the 
company. First, the initial funds are provided by 
government. Second, all the members of the board of 
directors are political appointees and, as such, are bound 
to promote political ends in the dispensation of loans, and 
third, the government, through the Commissioner of Lands, 
has control over land, which constitutes the security of the 
AFC. The government is, therefore, in a position to block 
efforts by the AFC to repossess farms belonging to people 
who occupy influential positions.
418
1. Organisational Structure
The AFC is headed by a Board of Directors, the number
of whom is determined, from time to time, by the company in
a General Meeting, but the number of members of the Board
157should not be less than two nor more than ten. The Board
of Directors has been vested with a general power of
management of the company including the power to do all
things necessary to carry into effect all the objects,
purposes and discretions provided in the Memorandum of
Association. The limitations being the provisions of the
Companies Act and the resolutions of the company in a
158General Meeting. The Board is specifically empowered to
borrow on behalf of the company, and for this purpose use
the company's assets to create a mortgage or charge. It may
also issue debentures, debenture stock and other securities
to procure funds for the general business of the company.
Of the five directors, three were appointed in their
own right while the other two were members ex officio.
These were the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, and
the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and
159Water Development. The Board of Directors appoints the
General Manager and the Provincial Managers. Each Province 
has a Provincial Manager, accordingly there are nine 
Provincial Offices of the AFC. The Provincial Manager is 
assisted by the Provincial Management Committee comprising 
seven members including the Provincial Manager who acts as 
the Chairman. The other members are two loans officers, the 
accountant or his assistant, the Credit Controller or his 
assistant, one technical officer (livestock) and one 
technical officer (estates). Below the provincial level are
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District Officers, headed by the District Manager. Up to 
1985, there were forty-two district offices, with the 
Southern, Western and Eastern Provinces, having six each, 
the North-Western and Luapula Provinces having five each, 
Lusaka three, Copperbelt, one, but the province with the 
largest number is Northern Province, with seven district 
offices. At each level the AFC office has power within a 
monetary ceiling to approve loans. At district level the 
maximum is K10,000 irrespective of whether the loan is 
seasonal, medium or long term. But loans for the purchase 
of farms, however small the amount applied for, must be 
approved by the Head Office in Lusaka. Provincial offices 
may approve loans between K10,001 and K40,000. The Head 
Office headed by the General Manager may approve loans of 
between K40,001 and K100,000, except for medium term loans 
whose ceiling is only K50,000. For medium term loans in 
excess of K50,000 and any other loan in excess of K100,000, 
only the Board of Directors is competent to approve.
Two other bodies are also involved in the consideration 
of loan applications - the District Development Committee 
and the Ward Development Committee. The former attends to 
applications from commercial farmers and emergent farmers, 
while the latter is concerned with subsistence farmers. One
may assume that the sums considered by the District 
Development Committees are larger than those considered by 
the Ward Development Committees, because subsistence farmers 
only receive seasonal loans on account of their inability to 
furnish adequate security.
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2. Objects and Powers
The objects and powers of the company are contained in 
clause 3 of the Memorandum of Association. Clause 3 
consists of twenty provisions broadly framed to enable the 
company not only to lend money for farming and the 
development of agro-industries, but also to invest its 
profits in all kinds of business. With regard to 
agriculture, the company's business is to lend money and 
provide "any kind of credit facilities to any person, 
company, statutory corporation, Government, Municipal or 
body politic, association or co-operative society" for a 
wide variety of purposes. These purposes include the 
purchase, development and improvement of land and the 
commencement or carrying on of farming operations generally; 
the purchase of stock and agricultural implements; the 
construction of irrigation works and work forming part of an 
irrigation scheme? and for the furtherance and promotion of 
any other developments, projects, industries etc which may 
be conducive to the material benefit of farmers or the 
farming industry. It is also the object of the company to 
lend money to any co-operative society, farming association, 
and other associations and unions for any purpose which is 
conducive for the furtherance of the interest of the farming 
and other rural industries.
To carry out the above objects the company is empowered 
inter alia, to borrow and secure the payment of money in 
such manner and on such terms as the directors may deem 
expedient and to mortgage or charge the undertaking or any
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part of the property; enter into any arrangements with the 
government or other authorities that may seem conducive to 
the company's objects and to obtain from such government or 
authority any rights, privileges and concessions which the 
company may think desirable; and do all such other things as 
are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the 
company's objects.
The above objects and powers of the AFC reflect the 
high expectations with which the company was launched. As 
shown below, the demand on the company's resources has so 
increased, particularly on the part of farmers, that in the 
end the company has concentrated on financing individual 
farmers and co-operatives, while little has gone into the 
development of rural agro-industries. The company has, 
however, made full use of its borrowing powers, as it has 
been the recipient of loans from the commercial banking 
sector which charges a high rate of interest, which the 
company subsequently passes on to its borrowers.
The company makes three kinds of loans - seasonal,
medium term and long term loans. Seasonal loans are granted
mainly for the purchase of inputs needed to grow crops. The
loan and the interest on it is due at the end of the harvest
season.160 The medium term loan is not fixed but is usually
between two and five years, and may be used to purchase
agricultural implements. The long term loans, usually
referred to as real estate, are for periods extending from
five years to any period the company may determine. It is
usually used to enable a farmer to purchase land, together
with improvements thereon, but it may also be used to make
161long term investments such as irrigation works. The
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loan, irrespective of type, must be used for agricultural 
162purposes. The specific purposes are incorporated in the
loan agreement. This requirement, that the money lent must
be used for productive purposes connected with agriculture
is common to many lending institutions in Central and East 
163Africa. The rationale is not difficult to find - it is
simply that the ability of the borrower to repay the loan is
best enhanced if the farmer uses it to produce a surplus,
the sale of which will raise the funds from which the loan
and the interest can be repaid. While decrying the tying of
loans to the purchase of particular inputs or the production
of specific crops, Dodge warns that "it is important that
adequate provision be made for guaranteeing that loan funds
be used to purchase agricultural requisites rather than
164consumption items”.
There is, however, a contrary view which also requires
attention. While it is accepted that not all the financial
needs of the farmer can be classified as suitable for
agricultural credit, in assessing the credit demand of the
farmer, reasonable provision must be made for the living
expenses of the farmer. Farmers are under various economic
and social pressures to spend money on such items as
education, health and customary obligations. As Binns has
observed ”it may be true that the way to deal with the
problem of disproportionate expenditure on customary
observances is by education, but education is slow, and, in
the meantime, the demand is compelling, so compelling,
indeed, that many farmers will fulfill their obligations to
their religion and their societies before those to their 
165farms". The difficulties involved in an attempt to
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provide "reasonable" living expenses are that such expenses
have no relation to the capacity of the farm to produce
more, so that the farmer will have to rely on non-farm
income to meet the obligation and non-farm income is not
half as reliable as farming, unless the farmer takes up wage
because of
employment. In fact it is/the fear that the farmer will, in 
economic terms, misuse the money that package loans have 
been used. In such packages the farmer has, prescribed for 
him, the quantity of inputs that should be used for a given 
farm size. Payment is then made by local purchase order to 
the companies that have provided the farmer with the 
necessary inputs or implements as the case may be, so that 
the farmer does not handle any cash.166 The only instance 
where cash is paid to the farmer is in respect of farm 
labour.
While the above method of dispensing credit helps to
minimise the misuse of loan funds, it is, by no means
totally effective, as there is the possibility that the
farmer will sell the inputs to others in exchange for cash.
Instances have been reported where fertilizer obtained
through loans has been sold for cash. Those who still
favour the idea of paying companies directly for inputs
provided to the farmer, instead of giving cash to the
farmer, claim that such instances are few and far between,
particularly in small village communities where local
167affairs are common knowledge. In such circumstances, the 
farmer is aware of the risk of the transaction becoming 
known to the local Ward Development Committee who will bar 
him from any future loans. Another problem arising from 
this method of granting loans is the advantage taken by
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companies selling agricultural inputs and implements, of the 
institution providing credit. The company may overcharge 
the goods on the invoice the farmer takes to the AFC, 
knowing that the goods will be readily paid for. There is 
little evidence of this occurring in Zambia up to the 
present, perhaps on account of the fact that the companies 
who sell these goods are all parastatal bodies, such as the 
Agricultural Farm Equipment (AFE) for farm implements and 
Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ) for fertilizer, and the 
Zambia National Milling Company (MNC) for chicken and stock 
feed.
3. Security for Loans
The AFC relies on various forms of security for loans. 
These include agricultural charges under the Agricultural 
Credits Act, mortgages, bills of sale and stop orders. The 
majority of borrowers of the AFC, however, can only use stop 
orders because they are settled on or farming customary 
land. While some have agricultural implements which can be 
charged, many do not have such assets, and the only hope for 
repaying the loan is through future sales of farm produce. 
The most common form of security, therefore, is the stop 
order. A stop order is addressed to the purchaser of the 
farmer*s produce, the most important of whom are National 
Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) and the provincial 
co-operative marketing unions. The actual wording of the 
stop order is extremely important in determining its legal
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significance. The stop order purports to assign the money
due to the farmer from the marketing board and marketing
co-operatives to the Agricultural Finance Company to cover
the loan advanced to the farmer and the interest thereon.
Before one can assess the legal significance of the stop
order, some brief appraisal of the law relating to the
assignment of choses in action such as debts is called for.
Pollock and Maitland trace the development of
assignment of choses in action only in so far as the
proposed assignee acts as an agent of the creditor. They
state: MIn the case, however, of the mere debt there is
nothing that can be pictured as a transfer of a thing; there
can be no seisin or change of seisin. In course of time a
way of escape was found in the appointment of an
attorney." At common law, it is an established principle
that an assignment of a debt cannot entitle the assignee to
170sue for it in his own name. Prior to 1873 the only
method of assigning a contractual right such as that arising
from a contract of sale was by novation which required the
171consent of the debtor. In equity, however, the notion
that a contractual right could not be assigned was
repudiated and the court of chancery enforced the
assignments of choses in action generally. An equitable
assignment cannot, of course, transfer the right to sue
under common law, but it confers upon the assignee the right
to invoke the aid of equity:
"Equity considers that as done which ought to 
be done, and, since the parties have agreed 
that the common law right under the contract 
is the property of the assignee, the assignor 
must allow an action at law to be brought in 
his own name so as to make the transaction 
effectual."172
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No particular form is required to constitute a valid
equitable assignment. The transaction upon which the
assignee relies need not be specifically referred to as an
assignment. The determining factor is the intention of the
assignor. If the intention of the assignor is that his
contractual right should become the property of the
assignee, then equity will compel the assignor to do all
that is necessary to implement his intention. The only
difficulty is to ascertain this intention. In Brandtfs Sons
173and Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co., Lord McNaghten speaking of
an equitable assignment said:
"It may be addressed to the debtor. It may be 
couched in the language of command. It may be 
a courteous request. It may assume the form 
of mere permission. The language is 
immaterial if the meaning is plain.M174
The next inquiry relates to the effect of an equitable
assignment as regards the assignee's right of action against
the debtor. Whether or not an equitable assignee can sue
the debtor in his own name depends, first, upon the nature
of the right assigned, that is, whether it is a legal or an
equitable chose in action; second, the nature of the
assignment, that is, whether it is absolute or non-absolute.
A legal chose in action is a right that can be enforced by
an action at law, for example, a debt due under a contract
of sale, with which we are concerned. An equitable chose in
action is a right that was enforceable before the Supreme
175Court of Judicature Act, 1873 only by a suit m  equity.
It is a right connected with some form of property such as 
trust property over which the court of chancery had 
exclusive jurisdiction.
An absolute assignment is one by which the entire
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interest of the assignor in the chose in action is, for the
time being, being transferred unconditionally to the
assignee and placed completely under his control. In order
to qualify as absolute, however, it is not necessary that
the assignment "should take the form of an out and out
transfer which deprives the assignor forever of all further
176interest in the subject matter". It is now a settled
principle that a mortgage, in the ordinary form, that is, an
assignment of a chose in action as security for a loan, with
a proviso for redemption and reassignment upon repayment of
177the loan, is an absolute assignment. In such cases the
whole right of the mortgagor in the subject matter passes, 
for the time being, to the mortgagee, and the fact that 
there is an express or implied right to re-assignment upon 
redemption does not destroy the absolute character of the 
transfer.
Where the assignment is not absolute, it may take one 
of three forms. It may be a conditional assignment, an 
assignment by way of charge, or an assignment of part only 
of a debt. A conditional assignment is one which is to 
become operative or cease to be operative on the happening 
of an uncertain event. In order to show the contrast 
between an absolute and a conditional transfer two cases are 
cited, both of which have some resemblance with the stop 
order issued by the Agricultural Finance Company in terms of 
the wording of the agreement.
178In Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co., a 
building contractor executed a written 
instrument by which in consideration of his 
bankers allowing him an overdraft, and by way 
of security to them for all money due or 
falling due in the future under his account, 
he assigned to them all moneys due or to 
become due to him under his building
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contracts. He also empowered the bankers to 
settle all accounts in connection with the 
buildings and to give receipts for money paid 
for work done by him.
It was held that the written instrument, since it
unconditionally assigned, for the time being, all moneys due
or to become due under the building contracts, constituted
an absolute assignment.
179In Durham Brothers v. Robertson, a firm of 
builders executed the following document in 
favour of the plaintiffs: "Re Building 
Contract, South Lambeth Road. In 
consideration of money advanced from time to 
time we hereby charge the sum of #1,080, which 
will become due to us from John Robertson on 
the completion of the above buildings, as 
security for the advances, and we hereby 
assign our interest in the above-mentioned sum 
until the money with added interest be repaid 
to you."
It was held that this was merely a conditional assignment.
The contrast in the two cases has been said to lie in
180the position of the debtors. In Durham Brothers v.
Robertson, the whole sum due from Robertson, it is argued,
was not assigned to the plaintiff, but only so much of it as
181would suffice to repay the loan together with interest.
The document's effect was that when that amount was paid,
itself an uncertain event, the interest of the assignee
should automatically cease: "Thus the debtor, Robertson,
became directly concerned with the state of accounts between
the assignor and assignee, for he would not be justified
under the document in making a payment to the latter after
182the money actually lent with interest had been repaid."
In Hughes v. Pump Hotel on the other hand, the debt was 
under the terms transferred completely to the assignee.
There was no limitation of the amount for which the 
assignment should be effective, there was to be no automatic
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reverter to the assignor upon repayment of the loan, and
hence the debtors until they received notice of redemption
and actual re-assignment, would be entitled to make payments
to the assignee without reference to the state of accounts
between him and the assignor.
An assignment by way of charge is one which entitles
the assignee to payment out of a particular fund, but does
not transfer the fund to him. In the case of Jones v.
183Humphreys, a school master assigned to a money-lender so 
much of his salary as should be necesary to repay a sum of 
£22 10s which he had already borrowed and any further sums 
which he might borrow. It was held that this was not an 
absolute assignment of the salary, but a mere security which 
entitled the money-lender to have recourse to the salary 
according to the state of the school master's indebtedness.
After some initial fluctuation of judicial opinion it 
is now settled that the assignment of a definite part of a 
debt is not an absolute assignment. To be absolute the 
assignment must transfer the whole debt in its entirety.
The rationale for this principle is to avoid increasing the 
burden on the debtor which would result if the creditor was
permitted to spli£ up the debt into separate causes of
184 . . .action. It, however, necessitated the institution of a
suit in chancery as a preliminary to the common law suit.
The Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 which amalgamated
the superior courts of law and equity into the Supreme
Court of Judicature permits a suitor to obtain by one
proceeding in one court the same result which prior to the
18 5Act would have necessitated two proceedings. Under
section 25(6) the assignee of a legal chose in action may
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sue in his own name if the assignment satisfies three
conditions. It must be written; it must be absolute; and a
written noViCe of its existence must be given to the debtor.
If the assignment does not fulfill these conditions the
assignee must rely upon the rules governing equitable
assignments and must join the assignor either as a
18 6co-plaintiff or a co-defendant. Attention must now be 
focussed on the stop order of the AFC, the legal effect of 
which must be examined in the context of the principles 
discussed above.
The stop order may be addressed to any purchaser of the 
produce of the farmer but usually stop orders are addressed 
to important marketing bodies such as the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board and marketing unions. The loan 
will ordinarily have been given before the marketing body 
becomes indebted to the farmer because the farmer needs the 
loan before he can produce and sell. Consequently, at the 
time the farmer executes the stop order, the actual amount 
of the debt is unknown to all parties - the farmer, the 
assignee, and the debtor. It is only after harvest and the 
marketing boards or unions have actually got hold of the 
produce will the amount they owe the farmer, in terms of the 
number of bags and the current prices, become apparent. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the amount of the debt due is not 
ascertainable at the time of signing the stop order does not 
necessarily prevent the assignment from being absolute 
because the first paragraph of the stop order reads that the 
farmer "hereby assign unto The Agricultural Finance Company 
Limited ALL monies now in your hands or owing by you to me 
or hereafter coming into your hands or becoming due and
431
owing by you to me in respect of the surrender to you or the
sale to you In other words, by the stop order, the
farmer purports to assign all the present and future money
of the farmer to the AFC. But then the document continues
to say that the marketing board or union should:
"Hold the same unto the said company and its 
assigns by way of security for the payment of 
such sum or sums of money and the interest 
thereon as may from time to time be owing by 
me to the said company in respect of any loan 
or loan account granted or extended by the 
said company in consideration or partly in 
consideration of this stop order but not 
exceeding the total amount (in words) ... ."
In addition the farmer declares that "this stop order is
irrevocable and that it shall not affect or be affected in
any way by other security which the said Company may hold in
respect of the said sum or sums".
There is no doubt that the document exists in written
is
form and being addressed to the debtor, thatAthe marketing 
boards and unions is adequate notice of whatever it is 
supposed to effect. The question is whether it amounts to 
an absolute assignment. The document puts the assignor and 
assignee in a similar position as the parties in Hughes v. 
Pump House Hotel Company to the extent that from the first 
paragraph, all the money due now and in future is assigned 
for present and future debts, but by the second paragraph of 
the stop order the farmer would appear to have introduced a 
limitation as to the actual amount for which the assignment 
should be effective. The debtor to the farmer should not 
hold unto the Company, that is the AFC, an amount exceeding 
the sum stipulated in the stop order. In other words, the 
excess must be paid by the debtor to the assignor. 
Consequently this arrangement has more in common with Durham
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Brothers v . Robertson which was held to be a conditional
assignment. In addition, there is the principle that the
assignment of a definite part of the debt and not the entire
187debt is not an absolute assignment. Further, the second
paragraph (quoted) might convey the impression that the 
assignment was only intended to be by way of charge and not 
as an absolute assignment. There are grounds, therefore, to 
conclude that under the stop order as presently framed, the 
farmer uses the debt more as security rather than an out and 
out transfer. The undertaking that the stop order is 
irrevocable in no way alters the legal effect of the 
document.
The stop order, therefore, does not create an absolute 
assignment and consequently is void as a statutory 
assignment. But equity will treat as done that which should 
have been done, and, therefore, the transaction is good as 
an equitable assignment of a legal chose in action. In such 
circumstances the assignee, that is, in our present case, 
the Agricultural Finance Company cannot sue solely in their 
own name but must join the farmer (assignor) either as 
plaintiff or as defendant together with the recalcitrant 
debtor. A serious problem that may arise in this kind of 
procedure is that where the assignor is made a party to the 
proceedings as the first plaintiff, the farmer may not 
co-operate and in such an event the accounts between the 
farmer and the debtor, that is, the marketing board or union 
will be difficult to verify. Equally, where the farmer is 
made a co-defendant to the suit, he may collude with the 
board or union to have the debt paid to him contrary to the 
provisions of the assignment. The basic problem is that the
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law does not enable the assignee to ascertain the accounts
regarding the transactions between the fanner and the
debtor. As the marketing board and unions have to handle
thousands of such stop orders in any given year and at
different times of the year, their task is a difficult one.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in some cases stop
orders have been ignored by marketing bodies in their haste
to pay farmers whose usual complaint is that they are not 
188paid on time. Another problem related to the 
effectiveness of stop orders is how to prevent private sales 
by farmers. Stop orders are lodged with the important 
marketing bodies, but this does not constitute notice to 
private traders who may purchase the produce of the farmer. 
The AFC could, undoubtedly, sue the farmer, but it has no 
access to the security. The conclusion is inescapable that 
the stop order is not an effective form of security to the 
AFC. The only consolation is that a farmer who has ignored 
the procedure should not expect to receive another loan, 
and, therefore, genuine farmers are unlikely to sell their 
produce privately.
4. Procedure for Loans
If the AFC is to serve subsistence and small scale 
farmers the procedure for securing loans must be simple and 
intelligible to the clientele. Unfortunately, this is not 
as easy as it may seem because of the need to get as much 
information about the applicant, his land and his
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performance and future plans as possible. In a largely 
illiterate society such as Zambia's extra help is required 
to enable the farmer to complete the application form. As 
there are various kinds of loans - real estate or farm 
purchase loans, medium term loans, and seasonal loans, the 
details in the application forms and their complexity 
differ. The forms, however, make no clear-cut difference 
between medium term loans and seasonal loans. They are both 
referred to as "operating loan" applications but one is 
distinguished as a large-scale operating and/or farm 
development loan and the other form is simpler and is 
distinguished by the maximum amount of loan for which it can 
be used. As the real estate loan and the large scale loan 
can only be used by commercial farmers, no real problems 
arise, as these have access to expertise in terms of 
understanding the contents of the application forms.
The real estate loan application requires an individual
applicant to provide personal information including
citizenship, residence, details of work permit and other
businesses in which the applicant is involved and his
capacity in such businesses. It would appear from the
nature of the details required that non-nationals are
eligible to get a loan to purchase a farm, but since the
Land (Conversion of Titles) (Amendment) Act of 1985, this
aspect must be seen in the context of the severe
restrictions imposed on the President's power to alienate
189land to non-Zambians. A company is required to give
details regarding particulars of its registration, 
directors, percentage of shares which are owned by Zambians, 
and enclose balance sheets, and memorandum and articles of
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association. In both cases, that is whether it is the 
company or an individual, there must be details of the 
proposed farm programme for the following five years. The 
rest involves information regarding the applicant's farming 
experience - farm size, cropping performance and the 
machinery used. Particular stress has also been placed on 
crop marketing arrangements and the purposes for which the 
loans are required. The application form for large scale 
loans are in many respects similar to the above, except that 
for applications for large-scale loans the previous 
performance of the farmer must be shown including the names 
of organisations in whose favour stop orders may have been 
registered. Despite the exhaustive detail required in both 
application forms, the AFC runs little risk as adequate 
security will, normally, have been provided. The major 
problem lies with subsistence farmers who are unable to 
provide adequate security and in respect of whom, therefore, 
the viability of the project is the crucial element that 
should ensure that the farmer will have sufficient resources 
to repay the loan.
The application form most relevant for subsistence
190farmers is the one for an operating loan of up to K5,000.
It is divided into four parts - two of which must be 
completed by the applicant and the other two by an 
agricultural officer. Part I concerns general personal 
information, but also requests details of where the 
applicant intends to sell his produce, the location of his 
farm, size of cleared land, and the crops currently being 
grown. Part II requires the applicant to give details of 
the purpose of the loan, and the farmer's own financial
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contribution. Part III requires the agricultural officer to 
confirm the exact area of cleared land available to the 
farmer, the implements the farmer uses and an inventory of 
those he owns. Other details concern the farmer's 
performance in two previous seasons, planting dates, mode of 
weed control, and the number of livestock owned by the 
farmer.
Whereas Part III is purely a factual report, Part IV
involves a high degree of evaluation on the part of the
agricultural officer. The agricultural officer is required
to comment on the amount of the seasonal loan that the
farmer has applied for, any other items apart from seed,
fertilizer and pesticides, which the farmer may require, and
finally any other information the agricultural officer may
have regarding the application. Every application must, in
the first instance, be submitted either to the District
Advisory Committee or the Ward Development Committee which
considers the application, unless where the sum applied for
is above its monetary limit in which case it will make its
comments and pass on the application to its superior 
191authority.
The task of the District Development Committee, in the 
case of commercial farmers and Ward Development Committees 
is to consider the application in terms of the economic 
viability of the project. For instance, where the farmer 
wishes to grow rye, instead of maize, the relevant committee 
must determine the marketing prospects of the crop, the 
economic benefit to the farmer, and the national need for 
the crop. The committee has also to evaluate the farmer's 
capacity to run the farm not only in terms of preparedness
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192but also his personality. In order to help the committee
focus attention on the crucial elements on which its
evaluation must be based, a certificate of eligibility or
non-eligibility form which must be completed by the
193committee has been introduced. In this form it is 
expressly provided that to satisfy the eligibility 
requirements the applicant must:-
”a) Be a citizen of Zambia, or a Zambian
resident and must be residing in the Ward 
area.
b) Possess legal capacity to incur the 
obligations of the loan - that is, the 
applicant must be over twenty-one years 
old.
c) Be an individual who has farm background 
and either training or farming experience 
sufficient to assure reasonable prospects 
of success in the proposed farming 
operations. However, an applicant who is 
already in full time employment or 
holding a Government post would not be 
eligible even though he meets other 
requirements as to farm background, 
experience and training.
d) Possess the character, ability and 
industry necessary to carry out the 
proposed farming operations and honestly 
endeavour to carry out the undertakings 
and obligations required of him in 
connection with the loan.M
Where the committee does not approve the application it must
give reasons for its disapproval. Presumably this is to
enable the provincial office to review the application in
the event of an appeal against the decision of the
committee.
5. Performance - Problems and Achievements
The overall performance of the Agricultural Finance
438
Company is examined in two major respects - capital and its 
sources, and loan recovery. The former affects the extent 
to which the AFC has been able to fulfill its obligations in 
the light of increasing demand on its financial resources. 
The latter, that is loan recovery, concerns the methods of 
loan recovery and the problems that the AFC has encountered 
over the years. In the light of the above mentioned factors 
an attempt is made to assess the role that agricultural 
credit as provided by the AFC has played in the fostering of 
agricultural development.
(a) Capital and its Sources
The AFC's first source of income was the sum of K23
million that was owed by farmers to the defunct Credit
194Organisation of Zambia. In its first year of operation
it dispensed K8.4 million and the following year the figure
195increased to Kll million. Both these sums were secured
as government loans. The amount of loanable funds increased
to K32 million in 1977, but the following year on account of
government withdrawal of its K5.5 million subsidy only K22
196million was approved for loans. This figure was
subsequently reduced to K15 million for the 1978/79 
197season. By this time it was becoming increasingly clear
that the funds at the disposal of the AFC could never meet
the demand for credit. In 1978 K84 million worth of
applications for agricultural loans were received, and since
only K22 million could be given, there was, already, a
198shortfall of K62 million. The position had not improved
much by 1982 as out of a demand of K74.6 million only K31
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199million was disbursed. It was accepted during this
period that the inadequate availability of funds "had a
restraining effect on the Company's operations".200 In fact
discussions had begun between the AFC and the Ministry of
Agriculture and Water Development under the sponsorship of
the Director-General of the Zambia Industrial and Mining
Company (ZIMCO) to which the AFC was later to be
transferred, to locate sources of funds for lending in the
201ensuing 1982/83 season. As the financial problem
escalated the AFC made use of its power to raise funds from
non-government sources and secured K35 million at an
interest of 10.5 per cent from the following commercial
202banks in the 1983/84 financial year:
Bank of Credit and Commerce K.10 million
Standard Bank 7 million
Barclays Bank 7 million
Zambia National Commercial Bank 5 million
Grindlays Bank 3 million
CitiBank 3 million
As management had been authorised to raise up to K37 million
another two million was still being awaited. The idea was
to enable the company to increase its loanable funds to K60
million. The following year the lending limit was reduced
from K60 million to K30 million as there were no new loans
secured from commercial banks, and hence, the Board
authorised management to borrow from any financial
203institution to the extent of K43 million.
As the AFC begins to rely more and more on commercial 
banks for its loanable funds the cost of lending to farmers, 
will increase. In 1983/84 when the company had had to
borrow at 10.5 percent interest, it was lending at an
interest of only 12 percent, a mere difference of 1.5
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percent. The 12 percent interest applied irrespective of 
whether the loan was seasonal, medium or long term. 
Considering the fact that the money the AFC had borrowed was 
a seasonal loan, it had to lend the money as a seasonal loan 
with all the risks attaching to recipients of seasonal loans 
- the subsistence farmers. At the rate of interest it 
charged, it is hardly possible the risk was covered, let 
alone the administrative costs. If the AFC is expected to 
run on economic lines, it will have to charge an interest 
which must cover the administrative costs, the risk involved 
in terms of the actual provision for bad debts, as well as a 
certain amount of profit which will not only enable its 
services to increase, but also meet the demand for credit 
which has, by far, outstripped supply. It is possible that 
inspite of increased demand, the number of deserving 
applicants has not increased to the same extent, 
nonetheless, even using the increasingly more strict 
criteria necessitated by shortage of funds, the actual 
amount of loans approved does not always coincide with the 
actual sum of money disbursed. As a result the AFC has been 
indebted to various companies, such as the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board, which provide requisites to 
farmers on the strength of Local Purchase Orders issued by 
the AFC. But it may be argued that shortage of funds could 
have been limited if loan recovery had been exceptionally 
good.
(b) Loan Recovery
Loan recovery is inter-twined with the question of
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security. Overall, the performance has been better than its
predecessor, the COZ, but losses have continued to be
incurred. In 1977, the AFC made a loss of over K5 million
and this increased to over K8 million in 1978 bringing
overall accumulated losses to K15.7 million from the date of
204the company's incorporation. The rate of debt collection
was a disappointing 52% against the loans due for recovery.
In consequence, the Board directed management to put more
emphasis on recovery as the company would have to depend on
recoveries for its loanable funds, and ruled that no fresh
loans should be granted to those who had loans 
205outstanding. The position was no better in 1982 as the
206company made a further loss of K8.7 million, bringing the
accumulated total of outstanding loan recoveries to K90 
207million. In 1983 there was an even worse record. The
208AFC made a loss of K19.636 million. The Chairman of the
corporation emphasised the need for management to "intensify
the recovery efforts and more importantly to make some
changes in the area of credit assessment if the recovery
209problem" is to be settled. It was at this stage that the
Board of Directors considered whether the AFC should
210continue to lend money, mainly to small-scale farmers.
It was resolved that no changes should be made until further
211statistics were provided. In 1984, an all-time record of
K25 million of loss was incurred by the AFC, against a total
212group loss of K31 million. It was against this
background that the holding company, the RDC, was dissolved 
and the AFC became a subsidiary of ZIMCO.
At various stages, different reasons have been given to 
account for the low recovery rate. In 1978, the issue of
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corruption was raised. An officer of the AFC, misused money
received from the company's borrowers who had paid him in
ignorance of the fact that he was not authorised to accept 
213payment. This is, of course, an isolated case, the more
common reasons being that (1) the National Agricultural
Marketing Board has not consistently honoured stop 
214orders. This is, in itself, a reflection of the
looseness of the relationship between the AFC, and the
marketing bodies. Even where an agricultural charge has
been made, where prosecution has taken place, the penalty
215for its breach has been said to be minimal. (2)
216Drought has affected the productivity of the farmers. In
an effort to reduce the impact of drought on its financial
position, the AFC insured the crops of its clients
cultivating fifty hectares or more during the 1981/82 season
by paying K1.2 million to the Zambia State Insurance 
217Corporation. (3) High interest charges by commercial
banks on whom the AFC has increasingly come to depend have
218had an adverse effect on the fortunes of the AFC.
(4) The AFC had extended many seasonal loans "without
adequate tangible security for loans. The security was
mainly based on expected income instead of tangible 
219collateral". But even where security has been given,
non-economic considerations get in the way of realising the
security. The exercise of foreclosure against influential
commercial farmers with political ties is a difficult task.
Nonetheless, in 1983, twelve farms valued at over half a
220million kwacha were re-possessed.
In the circumstances the AFC has responded in a variety 
of ways to reduce its recurrent losses and improve its
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financial image. Its first step has been to concentrate
221loans on those farmers who are already well-established.
Emphasis has been placed on past records - how much the
applicant has, in the previous seasons, sold to marketing
bodies. The effect of this approach, as Harvey has stated,
is to reduce sharply the number of farmers reached by the 
222AFC. Consequently, the AFC no longer sees credit as the
all-important initiator of agricultural development but as 
an accelerator of agricultural production.
E. THE ZAMBIA AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK
The Zambia Agricultural Development Bank (hereinafter
referred to as the ZADB) is the second government-owned
223credit institution. It commenced business in 1983. The
ZADB was estabished by the Zambia Agricultural Development 
224Bank Act, 1979 whose date of commencement was 1st July,
2251981, the delay in the commencement of the bank's
business having been caused by a delay in its
226capitalisation. The establishment of the ZADB raises two
important questions, one relates to the form by which it was 
created and the other to its role in the provision of 
credit. Unlike the AFC, the ZADB is a statutory body. One 
of the reasons suggested for the fact that the AFC is not a 
statutory body was that government interference should be 
minimal. Whether this is the case, in practice, is
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doubtful, but in the discussion that follows it will be
important to bear in mind the relationship between the
government and the ZADB in so far as the same may affect the
operations of the Bank.
The other question raised by the establishment of the
ZADB is its actual role given the fact that so far the AFC
has been and continues to extend credit to both commercial
and small scale farmers. The intention of government might
have been to operate two credit institutions. If that were
the case, however, it would have been proper to delineate
the range of farmers to be served by each institution. It
appears from Parliamentary Debates that the real intention
was to merge the AFC and the Cattle Finance Company to form
the ZADB. Instead of a merger of the two companies,
however, the ZADB assumed a completely independent
existence. A different line of approach has been suggested
by the Bank of Zambia, which has stated:
"As part of the efforts to strengthen 
agriculture, the new Zambia Agricultural 
Development Bank, which became operational in 
1983, will undertake direct lending to 
large-scale farmers. The Bank will also 
engage in technical supervision of these 
farmers and provide extension services."227
If this is the real role of the ZADB the consequences to the
AFC would be disastrous as it would be deprived of its only
profitable source of income. The bias towards large scale
farmers does not appear from the Act establishing the Bank,
however, but from the regulations governing the credit
policy. With the above few comments, attention will now be
focussed on the constitution of the Bank, its objects and
powers and its performance during the first year of its
lending operations.
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1. Organisational Structure
Section 3 of the Zambia Agricultural Development Bank
Act establishes the Bank as a body corporate with perpetual
succession and a common seal capable of suing and being sued
in its own corporate name. At its head is the Board of
Directors "responsible for the policy and the administration
228of the affairs and business of the Bank". The
constitution of the Board is ten - the Chairman
and three other members are appointed by the
Minister of Agriculture and Water Development, the other six
members are appointed by the shareholders. The tenure of
office of the members is three years but they are eligible
for reappointment. The Board may appoint such number of
committees from amongst its members as it may deem
necessary, and it may delegate to such committees any of its
229functions under the Act. In its early stage, the
administrative structure has not developed to any 
appreciable extent. There are no district offices, and, 
therefore, no committees at district level to attend to 
applications.
2. Objects of the Bank
The business of the ZADB is stated to be:
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"a) to provide loans or any other form of
credit facilities to any person, company, 
statutory corporation, local authority, 
association, co-operative society, the 
Government or any other institution 
approved by the Board for any 
agricultural or fishing project? 
b) to do all other matters and things 
incidental to or connected with the 
foregoing.H230
In a broader context the objective of the Bank is said to be
to increase agricultural and fisheries output by improving
productivity, thereby increasing the incomes of the farming
231and fishing communities. This objective is to be 
attained through both financial and technical support to 
farmers and fishermen of all classes. The Bank should 
attach great importance to technical supervision of its 
projects through extension services to facilitate better use 
of inputs.
To enable it to pursue this objective the Bank is
empowered to exploit various sources of funds. In addition
232to its authorised capital of K75 million, the Bank may
have, from time to time, money appropriated to it by
233Parliament, or raise money through loans. With the 
approval of the Minister responsible for finance the Bank 
may raise additional funds by:
a) obtaining overdrafts from other Banks,
b) receiving moneys on deposit, and
c) any other method of which the Minister responsible for
finance may approve.
At the time of commencing its operation, the Bank received 
K1 million from the government as its initial capital. This 
amount proved to be too small, and after a joint concerted 
effort by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development,
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the Ministry of Finance and Cabinet Office, a loan of K10
million was obtained from the Bank of Credit and Commerce
and the Zambia National Commercial Bank, under a government 
235guarantee. The government contribution is to constitute 
part of its alloted share capital of K35.25 million or 
fifty-one percent of the shares. The other shares are 
expected to be taken up by local institutions, to the extent 
of K14.25 million or nineteen percent, and international
institutions to the extent of K22.50 million or thirty
. 236 percent.
3. Loan Eligibility
Article 7 prescribes the range of persons who may apply
for loans from the Bank. In general, any person (or body
corporate) who is a farmer or intends to become a farmer on
a full-time basis may borrow from the ZADB. However, the
Bank will not extend a medium or long term credit unless it
is fully satisfied that the applicant has contributed from
his own funds an amount of up to twenty percent of the total
237resources requested to finance the project. Loans are to
be directed, primarily at farmers and fishermen, and 
co-operative institutions. Nonetheless, private and public 
corporations may borrow from the Bank if they are autonomous 
financial and administrative entities engaged in development 
activities relating to agriculture and fisheries. In 
exceptional circumstances the Bank may consider applications 
for financial assistance from part-time farmers who qualify
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in all other respects and are already in occupation of a 
viable piece of land. In such cases, the Bank has to be 
satisfied that fanning operations will be adequately 
supervised, pending the owner's assumption of full-time 
farming. This concession was intended to benefit owners of 
smallholdings and medium sized farms on the outskirts of 
major towns who are in full-time employment.
4. Security for Loans
Section 19 states that a loan may be granted on any of 
the following types of security:
(a) a mortgage on unexhausted improvements on 
land within Zambia;
(b) stop order on crops or bank accounts;
(c) bills of sale or agricultural charge 
created under the Agricultural Credits 
Act; or
(d) any other security prescribed by the 
Board.
The property offered as security may be owned either by a
prospective borrower or a third party, provided that such
party gives his consent in writing to pledge his property.
For purposes of determining the value of the security
offered by the borrower a number of principles have been
established. These principles are contained in a document
238in which the Bank has spelt out its lending policy.
These principles are that (a) machinery and equipment should 
be valued at cost of manufacturing or purchase, less 
depreciation, or their market value; (b) that negotiable 
assets such as goods in stock, securities and company shares
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should be estimated on the basis of cost or market prices 
whichever is the lesser; (c) land, buildings and other 
construction works should be estimated on the basis of 
either government assessment for tax purposes, or the Bank's 
own direct valuation, and (d) perishable goods, unless 
insured to their full value against appropriate risks, 
should be irrelevant to the borrower's credit worthiness.
5. Performance
At this early stage, it is not possible to assess the
impact of the bank on the credit scene, nevertheless some
general observations may be made. From its document on
lending policy, the bank appears to have been launched with
greater foresight and more precise operating rules than the
AFC, and indeed any previous credit institution. By
December 31st of 1983, the bank had handled no less than 140
loan applications, 51 such applications were rejected, 88
were still under consideration, and a block loan of
Kl,249,057 to the Zambia National Service Co-operatives were 
239approved. The block loan was intended to assist 51 of
the Zambia National Service's Co-operatives to purchase 
inputs for growing 3,500 hectares of maize and 1,220 
hectares of sunflower. This was within a month after the 
bank's commencement of business. It is apparent, however, 
that small scale farmers can be assisted only if they are a 
part of a co-operative society or other agricultural scheme. 
This inference is drawn from the fact that although the ZADB
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provides for the grant of credit on the security of a stop
order, which is the easiest security and, therefore,
available to small scale farmers, the regulations covering
the bank's credit policy make no reference to stop orders
and the whole modicum of operational rules are more relevant
to commercial farming. This is inspite of the bank's
express commitment that the bulk of its clientele will be
small holders. The bank goes on to say:
"In order to adequately support them 
technically and financially, the Bank has 
tailored a lending strategy which will 
facilitate reaching them through 
geographically-designed areas called 
operational zones."24Q
It is not clear what criteria will be used to determine the
selection of these operational zones, but if these zones are
to be selected in the same manner as the Intensive
Development Zones established under the Second National
Development Plan, not only will the number of farmers served
be restricted, but on a country-wide basis, the areas to be
covered will be very few.
F. CONCLUSIONS
While there is general agreement regarding the 
importance of credit to the development of agriculture there 
is no agreement as to the stage at which it should be made 
available. The present practice among financial
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institutions that lend on the security of stop orders is to 
insist on the production of records of previous sales to 
marketing bodies. This means that financial assistance is 
only available where the farmer has already reached the 
stage of producing a surplus. This approach excludes all 
subsistence farmers, strictly so-called. The application of 
more rigorous criteria to assess credit worthiness arises 
from Zambia's poor credit record as exemplified by the 
defunct COZ.
The case for specialised credit institutions in Zambia 
is stronger because of the restricted role of commercial 
banks and credit unions in the dispensation of agricultural 
loans. There is no doubt that the AFC and the ZADB will 
continue to render invaluable service to commercial as well 
as small scale farmers. There are very few districts where 
the AFC, the older of the two, has not established a branch 
or an agency. Four provincial branches have been said to be 
unviable due to the low finance absorption. This calls for 
further improvement in the infrastructure including 
transport and marketing. The problem of what security 
should be required will continue to be a subject of debate. 
After some initial laxity in the assessment of credit 
worthiness, the AFC has become more tight-fisted, 
especially, in the light of financial constraints. There 
are various forms of security, the most reliable being land. 
Its importance has diminished since the Land (Conversion of 
Titles) Act, while customary land has never been used as 
security. The agricultural charge offers little protection 
to the lender and the stop order whose legal significance is 
not clear is no security at all. Nonetheless, in the quest
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for security, sight should not be lost of the fact that the 
greatest security, after all, is the honesty and the 
integrity of the borrower. This is all the more so as even 
where a mortgage has been made, the value of the unexhausted 
improvements against which the mortgage operates may 
depreciate and, where the borrower does not remedy the 
situation, the security may be lost.
On the existence of two credit institutions both 
serving the agricultural sector, it is important for 
government to spell out which category of farmers or loan 
purposes each is to serve. At present both purport to be 
serving all kinds of farmers although the emphasis on the 
ZADB on "projects" and "enterprises" gives the impression 
that it is more concerned with the commercial farmers. 
Nevertheless, it is important for government to delineate 
areas of operation between the two institutions because 
government policy statements gave the impression that the 
ZADB would be an amalgamation of the existing credit 
companies. The fact that such amalgamation has not taken 
place has not, however, dispelled the doubts which hang on 
the future of the AFC as such. Such doubts will create a 
feeling of insecurity on the part of the staff which in turn 
may lead to poor morale and ultimately poor performance. It 
is also obvious that a duplication of energy is bound to 
result from the present situation.
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CHAPTER FIVE
STATE CONTROL OF THE PRODUCTION AND THE MARKETING OF 
AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters examined the law relating to the 
development of agricultural land and the financing of the 
agricultural development of such land. The land reforms 
introduced in 1975 were geared towards extending State 
control to unscheduled land. On Reserves and Trust Land 
some limited control is exercised through State grants of 
leases and licences. State intervention in the provision of 
credit has been intended to control the direction of the 
cash flow in favour of agriculture as opposed to 
manufacturing industry, and within the agricultural sector, 
in favour of the small scale farmer. It is also significant 
that the promotion of cash crops has been achieved by making 
credit available for their production and withholding credit 
in respect of the production of other crops. This chapter 
examines the regulation of the production and marketing of 
agricultural produce. Such control is being exercised 
through statutory boards whose prominent features are the 
extent to which government controls their operations, their 
wide powers, the exclusion of the judiciary in the 
determination of disputes between the farmers or dealers and 
the boards, and the criminal sanctions attached to the 
contravention of the regulations. As State control is being 
exercised through the boards, the rationale for such control
466
is interwoven with that of the existence of the boards 
themselves.
Government control through statutory bodies takes the 
form of the licensing of growers, dealers and graders of 
agricultural produce, the determination of producer prices 
and the marketing of the produce. State control of the 
production and marketing of agricultural commodities such as 
maize, tobacco, cotton and other cash crops has a long 
colonial history. Statutory bodies still remain a feature 
of the marketing of agricultural commodities. Recently, 
however, there has been a gradual shift in emphasis from 
statutory bodies to co-operatives and specialised companies. 
This change has been prompted by the inability of the 
statutory bodies to cope with their wide responsibilities. 
The problems which have faced these statutory bodies, and 
thus the exercise of control by the State arises from the 
relationship between the statutory bodies and the government 
which has robbed the bodies of the incentives to achieve 
operational efficiency.
1. The Role of Government in Marketing
At the root of the issue of marketing in Zambia, as in 
other African countries, has been the role of government in 
the marketing process. From the broad nature of services 
that marketing incorporates, has arisen the need for 
government to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the 
marketing of agricultural products. The services falling
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under marketing have been said to include the establishment
of rural buying centres at which produce can be purchased
from farmers, the transportation of such produce from the
rural centre to the consuming centres in urban areas and
other deficit rural areas, the initial processing, grading
and packing of such produce, the actual pricing and selling
of the produce, and the establishment of storage facilities
particularly where immediate re-sale is not practicable or
where the produce is perishable.1 In order to be able to
provide these services efficiently, the marketing agency
must have access to information, both about the prospects of
future demand and about the internal and external outlets
for commodities, and must be able to generate sales through
. . 2effective techniques, sales and advertising.
In determining what marketing system is suitable for 
the rural areas four options may be considered. These are: 
(a) private enterprise, (b) government direct purchase 
schemes, (c) co-operative societies, and (d) government 
statutory boards. Each of these systems of marketing has 
its advantages and disadvantages. These aspects were 
discussed by the Rural Economic Development Working Party 
set up in 1961 whose terms of reference included marketing.
(a) Private Enterprise
Examining the system of marketing through private 
enterprise, the Working Party noted several advantages. 
Private enterprise would not only provide a more flexible 
mechanism for price adjustments, but would have the added 
advantage of being free from political influence. The
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Working Party noted that "attempts to cushion the producer
from fluctuations in prices, which are invariably made when
the Government becomes involved and political factors can be
brought into play, but which reduce efficiency and weaken
3the national economy in the long run, are avoided."
Further, the Working Party noted, if private enterprise is
encouraged, specialised trading activities may develop to
serve the agricultural industry. Such traders can perform
an important service in taking the risk of price
fluctuations, the development of new markets for the
products, and in the supply of agricultural inputs required
by the farmers.
Against these advantages, however, are disadvantages
which appear to have played a more important part in
determining government policy. Private enterprise cannot,
it is argued, be relied upon to give a fair deal to the
primary producer; and the mere fixing of minimum prices is
not adequate to save farmers from exploitation (in the
4pejorative sense) by traders. Another disadvantage is that 
private traders will not interest themselves in areas where 
production has not reached a figure which would make 
marketing viable. Such areas will be shunned by traders and 
thus further depress the incentive to farmers to increase 
production. Further, the Working Party noted that private 
traders would be more inclined to operate in areas where 
their profits would be highest and where transport and other 
infrastructure have already been developed by government, 
and since remote areas have insufficient infrastructure, 
such areas will not be covered by traders. In spHa of such 
disadvantages, the Working Party felt that private
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enterprise still had a role to play in marketing:
"... Where a crop or product is of a 
specialised nature, such as, for example, 
premium groundnuts or dressed poultry or 
beeswax, private enterprise, which has its own 
ways of seeking out the small and highly 
lucrative markets which exist for such 
products, should be left to arrange the 
marketing, subject to such Government 
supervision as may be desirable in the 
interests of the producers. In such 
circumstances, if private enterprise is able 
to compete adequately with the marketing of 
the product it should be encouraged to do so 
and the whole field should be left to its 
control."5
Even outside this scope, there is still room for private 
enterprise since statutory marketing boards, wherever they 
have been established, handle certain crops only while the 
rest are left to private traders. This is the case in 
Zambia, where statutory marketing boards have been 
established, a number of crops are not handled, notably 
cassava, which is the popular staple crop in three of the 
country's provinces, Northern, Luapula and North-Western 
Provinces.6 In sprite of the shortcomings of private 
enterprise, therefore, the private trader has a role to 
play.
(b) Government Direct Purchase Schemes
The Rural Economic Development Working Party recognised 
the need, in the absence of any other marketing 
organisation, for government to purchase crops whose growth 
it has encouraged and to market them itself. Such a method 
should not generally be adopted as past experience had shown 
that it has led to wastage and inefficiency. In addition, 
other factors rendered this option unpopular. The
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government is bound to be influenced by political
considerations in setting the price, while the organisation
of marketing will be time-consuming to field officers whose
attention should be confined to the encouragement of other
crops. In the circumstances, the Working Party felt that
while special circumstances may warrant the establishment of
government purchase schemes, the operation of these schemes
should be temporary, pending the adoption of other
alternative systems of marketing. These arguments against
government purchase schemes have been borne out by recent
efforts by government to establish a direct purchase scheme
for cassava in the Northern Province, between 1980 and 1981.
The scheme proved a failure "due to some technical problems
7that developed during the process in the rainy season".
(c) Producer/Marketing Co-operatives
It is argued that if producers could organise 
themselves and market their own produce, this would enable 
government assistance or participation in the marketing
Q
operation to be minimised. While the Working Party
welcomed such a development, it recognised that marketing
was a specialised business which producers were not often
qualified to undertake. Besides, it added, African rural
producers were too numerous and too weak in organisation to
undertake the responsibilities involved. Organising these
producers into co-operative societies would help in view of
the arguments in favour of co-operative societies that:
i) their democratic organisation brings a 
sense of participation to the producer 
and minimises the censure which a 
government controlled organisation may
471
expect to encounter in times of falling 
prices;
ii) it provides valuable training in business 
and business organisation;
iii) it retains profits in the interests of 
members and secures for them the best 
possible prices, thus strengthening the 
bargaining position of farmers vis a vis 
commerce generally; and
iv) it can organise guaranteed markets for 
the producers and integrate marketing 
with production more closely.
Despite these advantages on which the Department of
Co-operatives and Marketing laid emphasis, the Working Party
was reluctant to recommend any development of co-operatives
on the grounds that the existing ones in the Eastern
Province were proving too costly. Since independence,
however, efforts have been made and continue to be made to
encourage co-operatives with the emphasis, in the early
stages, on producer co-operatives, and more recently on
marketing co-operatives.
(d) Government Statutory Boards
Statutory marketing boards have become very popular 
with African governments, but their roles have differed from 
one country to another. In some countries, statutory boards 
have used co-operatives and private traders as agents to 
purchase the farmers' produce or distribute farm inputs. In 
others, the boards have acted as residual buyers of specific 
crops at pre-determined prices. The nature of the role 
played by the statutory board and, therefore, the extent to 
which governments control the production and marketing 
processes depends on the reasons or justification for its 
creation. Various reasons have been given to justify
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government intervention generally, and the establishment of 
statutory boards, in particular. The Working Party stressed 
three purposes which a statutory board should serve - the 
stabilisation of prices, the provision of incentives to 
farmers, and the promotion of certain crops as opposed to 
others. Stable prices, it said, are essential to the 
success of a rural development programme and, therefore, 
"There is a need, with a relatively weak and immature 
economy, to cushion producers from undue shocks, whether 
resulting from changes in overseas demand or from such 
internal causes as droughts, floods and diseases."10 
According to the Working Party, such protection could best 
be afforded only within the machinery of a government 
statutory board. In order to encourage production, it 
argued, minimum prices have to be stipulated in advance, and 
such stipulation can only be done where a statutory board is 
in operation, and not where a free market applies. The 
second justification was that a guaranteed market would be 
an incentive to the producer, because he would be assured, 
subject to quality, that the whole of his produce would be 
bought. This particular justification is also noted by 
Stutley of the Ministry of Overseas Development of the 
United Kingdom, although his views do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Ministry itself.11 Further, government 
can, through its pricing policies, encourage the production 
of certain crops as opposed to others. The statutory board 
in such circumstances would act as an instrument of 
government policy, encouraging particular crops while, at 
the same time, discouraging over-production. Other reasons 
cited in support of statutory boards are that the controls
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exercised through them could ensure the supply of food and
the maintenance of national and regional reserves, the
taking of profits which would otherwise go to the private
trader, and the promotion of exports or the achievement of
12added value through processing. According to the Working 
Party, statutory boards enjoyed the advantage of being 
flexible in their operation while their monopoly position 
would keep marketing costs to the minimum. Thus, it
prescribed, "such boards should be as widely based as
. . . . 13possible to minimise operating costs".
Against this plethora of justifications is growing
opposition to statutory boards in the light of their
performance in various Third World countries. It is argued
that as marketing in most developing countries is
characterised by large transport costs, seasonality of
production, access limited to certain times of the year (due
to poor roads), and the small size of individual surpluses,
government institutions have to have storage facilities
14which increases the operating costs. Further, "the
overhead costs of maintaining a permanent marketing or
supply facility at primary level, as opposed to the
establishment of a temporary buying point, tend to encourage
the handling of a multiplicity of crops so as to extend the
season of gainful operation as far as possible" with the
result that one main crop indirectly subsidises the handling
15costs of others with a smaller turnover. What appeared to 
the Working Party as an advantage, namely, the broad base on 
which the statutory board must operate to be effective, is 
seen as a weakness by others. It is also argued that there 
is a tendency to obscure the cost of the service and to
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underestimate the trading skills required.16 Stutley draws
the conclusion that where, for some reason, government
intervention is necessary, government should only undertake
those functions which "private enterprise cannot or will not
undertake at a reasonable cost, giving priority to those
activities which they are in the best position to 
17undertake". In other words, government statutory boards 
should play a residuary role, and preferably of a temporary 
nature, pending the take over of marketing by private 
enterprise.
2. Background to Present Marketing Arrangements
At the time of independence, marketing was being
conducted by co-operative marketing unions while State
control was being exercised through statutory bodies, which
also handled some agricultural produce. With regard to
co-operative marketing unions, two in particular played an
important role. These were the Eastern Province
Co-operative Marketing Union, (an amalgamation of three
small marketing unions established in 1957), now generally
referred to as the Eastern Co-operative Union (ECU), and the
Southern Province Co-operative Marketing Union. The
shareholders of these unions were primary co-operative
unions of producers in the rural areas. Maize, in both the
Eastern and Southern Province, and groundnuts in the Eastern
Province, were and still remain the major commodities
18handled by these co-operatives. While these two
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co-operatives operated in their respective provinces, 
government statutory boards tried to provide marketing 
services to cover the rest of the country. These were the 
Grain Marketing Board and the Agricultural Rural Marketing 
Board.
(a) Grain Marketing Board
The Grain Marketing Board, (hereinafter referred to as 
the GMB), was formed in 1964 as the result of the 
decentralisation of the Federal Grain Marketing Board which 
served both Northern and Southern Rhodesia following the
19dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
The Board consisted of five members appointed by the 
Minister responsible for agriculture. The Minister also 
appointed one of the members as Chairman. In addition to 
these members, the Minister could nominate an official from 
the Ministry of Agriculture to attend board meetings and 
take part in its proceedings as if he were a member.
Members ordinarily held office for two years, although a 
retiring member could be re-appointed.
Among the functions and duties of the GMB were the
20following: to take possession of any "controlled produce" 
vested in it under the provisions of the Act, to buy and 
sell any uncontrolled product offered to it for sale, to 
provide storage and handling facilities for controlled 
products, to import and export controlled products as it 
considered necessary, and to do "all things necessary and 
consistent with the provisions of the Act to ensure the 
orderly marketing of controlled products". A Government
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21Notice of 1964 declared maize, maize meal, shelled and
unshelled groundnuts to be controlled products. The
prescribed areas were the Eastern Province? the districts
Chililabombwe, Kabwe Rural and Urban, Chingola, Choma,
Kalulushi, Kalomo, Kitwe, Livingstone, Luanshya, Lusaka,
Mazabuka, Mufulira, Ndola rural and urban and part of Mumbwa
district. In addition the Board divested itself of flaked
maize and any other product acquired by the government for
22the purpose of scientific research. The 1964 list of
controlled products remained in force until 1966 when a new
23list was issued. This was, however, substantially the
same except that groundnuts ceased to form part of
controlled products, but was replaced by seed cotton. In a
later statutory order, however, shelled and unshelled
groundnuts were declared controlled products in the Eastern
24and North-Western Provinces.
In April, 1967 a longer list of controlled products was 
issued together with their prescribed areas. The products 
included maize, maize meal, shelled and unshelled 
groundnuts, Canadian wonder beans, haricot beans, mixed 
beans, sugar beans, velvet beans, cowpeas, sunhemp, 
sunflower seed, sorghum, soya beans, and seed cotton. The 
prescribed areas were the Western and Central Provinces and 
the Southern Province districts of Livingstone, Kalomo,
Choma, Gwembe, and Mazabuka. At the same time, maize, maize 
meal, shelled and unshelled groundnuts and seed cotton were 
declared the controlled products in the Eastern Province and 
in the North-Western Province, shelled and unshelled grounds 
were declared controlled products. In 1968 the list of 
controlled products and prescribed areas issued in the
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25previous year was repeated in its entirety. The situation
2 6remained the same in 1969 except that the board was then
appointed as the agent of the government in the marketing of
fruit and vegetables.
The policy of having a government statutory body
compete with private marketeers and co-operatives in the
marketing of commodities is said to have evolved for the
27following reasons:
i) to encourage production by offering a 
ready market, thus promoting increased 
agricultural production.
ii) to reduce retail prices by entering the 
retail market, competing with other 
retailers, thereby helping to lower the 
cost of living and,
iii) to control imports, thereby protecting 
producers at home.
The Minister set the prices by statutory order. These
orders stated the prices to be paid to producers, with the
price differing according to whether the product was
tendered at a town or a rural depot. Where the product was
delivered to a rural depot, the prescribed price was to be
reduced by handling and transportation charges in the
schedule. Further deductions were made in the event of the
product being defective in part. The orders also enumerated
the depots where products were to be tendered. Ocran's
research reveals that the Marketing Division of the Ministry
of Rural Development made periodical assessments of the need
for additional buying depots, and once the final decision
was made, the new depots would be included in the next
28statutory order.
In general, Ocran states, the activities of the Board 
until 1967 were centred on the acceptance of certain 
controlled products and residual products, but much of its
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operation concentrated on depots along the (old) line of 
29rail. In 1967 the Board took over 131 depots in the 
Southern, Central and Western Provinces, from the
30Agricultural Rural Marketing Board (discussed below) . The
GMB steadily increased its responsibilities - developing a
cotton ginnery in 1965, and becoming an importer and
distributor of seed, fertilizer, fruits and vegetables in
1969. By August, 1969, however, problems had begun to 
31emerge. In some depots there were no empty bags in which 
to pack maize, no woolpacks and no cotton bell sacks, all of 
which components the board should have provided. Further, 
complaints began to be voiced that the board took too long 
to move the products from the depots to the silos, and in 
some cases, that farmers had not been paid for products 
delivered to the depots.
(b) The Agricultural Rural Marketing Board
The Agricultural Rural Marketing Board was established
with the purpose of taking over the operations of the
Agricultural Rural Marketing Service which had provided
marketing services in areas not covered by the Grain
32Marketing Board. The operation of the ARMB was made 
complex by the fact that they operated on behalf of separate 
African Farming Improvement Funds in the Central and 
Southern Provinces. The complexities in the accounting 
system led the government to establish the Board which would 
have nothing to do with the funds. The Board was 
established in 1964 with the purpose of providing marketing 
services to non-viable areas in liaison with the Department
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of Marketing of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry 
defined a non-viable area as "one which had an agricultural 
potential, but in which the value of surplus agricultural 
produce had not yet reached the level at which it could 
carry its full marketing costs without producer prices being
depressed to a point which provided the farmers with an
. . . . . . 33insufficient incentive to increase production”. Thus,
ideally, the Board's operation was supposed to be temporary,
pending the increase in the production of agricultural
commodities to an extent where they would cover the full
marketing cost.
The ARMB was established under the Agricultural Rural
34Marketing Board Ordinance which came into effect on July
3, 1964. Like the GMB, the ARMB was under the direction of
the Minister of Agriculture in the exercise of its powers
and duties. The membership of the Board consisted of a
chairman and at least three other members. The duties of
the Board were broadly framed as consisting of promoting and
fostering the development of agriculture in each and every 
35 . .area. The Minister was empowered to declare any area an
"Agricultural Marketing Board area” and upon such a
declaration the Board acquired a monopoly over the marketing
of certain products as well as the general responsibility
3 6for the development of marketing in the area. The Board
itself could undertake the marketing of cattle, agricultural
and other produce, and the supply and distribution of
. . 37agricultural requisites. In May 1964, the Board declared
its first set of prescribed or Agricultural Marketing Board 
3 8areas. These included Mazabuka District, the Central, 
Luapula, and North-Western Provinces, and, with the
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exception of Mankoya District, the Western Province. Later
39in the year the Eastern Province was also declared.
During the year the Board marketed maize, groundnuts, 
tobacco, pineapples, sorghum, sunhemp, rupoko, velvet beans, 
sunflower seeds, cowpeas and mixed beans. With regard to 
tobacco, the Board's role was merely that of purchasing the 
crop and transporting it to warehouses near the old line of 
rail where sales were made by auction or private treaty 
under the general supervision of the Tobacco Board of 
Zambia.40
In 1965 the Southern Province districts of Choma,
41Kalomo, and Gwembe were added to the list of Board areas.
It is suggested that this was done because the Southern
Province Co-operative Marketing Union was not interested in
the marketing of cotton, the production of which the
42Ministry was trying to promote. The following year, the 
whole of the Western Province, including the district of
Mankoya (which had previously been excluded) was added to
43 . . .the list of prescribed areas. In 1966, the activities of
the Board were expanded to include the distribution of
seeds, fertilizer and other agricultural requisites, even in
regions where marketing co-operatives were operating
. . 44allegedly because these co-operatives were inefficient.
The added responsibilities of the ARMB, however, proved 
too much for it to handle on account of the lack of finance 
and trained staff. In 1967, therefore, the Minister 
directed that the GMB should take over the functions of the 
ARMB in the Southern, Central and Western Provinces, thus 
leaving the Eastern, Luapula and North-Western Provinces for 
the ARMB. The sombre picture, therefore, is that although
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it was merely a temporary measure, it was not as successful
as was earlier envisaged. As Ocran has, rightly, observed:
"The failings of the ARMB were essentially 
those of an understaffed institution with too 
many jobs. It had a mixture of commercial and 
non-commercial activities (which were never 
conducive to efficiency in the strict sense), 
in a nationwide area covering a good many 
crops."45
The early years of independence, therefore, saw the 
emergence of a special marketing board to serve rural areas. 
Through it a wide range of agricultural crops were 
controlled while others were being promoted. In the course 
of time the responsibilities increased beyond the capacity 
of the board. The solution adopted by the government was to 
replace both the GMB and the ARMB with a new marketing body 
called the National Agricultural Marketing Board.
B. THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARD
The National Agricultural Marketing Board (hereafter
referred to as NAMB), came into existence on the 1st of
September, 1969. Under the previous arrangement resource
allocation had been biased in favour of the GMB. Government
thought that favourable terms of trade had to be shifted
away from the line of rail farmers so that producers, as a
whole, could receive the same favourable treatment wherever
46they happened to be. Ocran aptly summarises the 
historical background to the establishment of the NAMB.
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Apparently, after independence, there was official 
government concern over the effectiveness and the purposes 
of the two marketing boards. A decision was reached in 
favour of a single statutory marketing body to be 
responsible for the marketing of all products. A working 
party was appointed by the Minister of Agriculture to 
consider the matter. The Working Party consisted of 
officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Director of 
Co-operatives and one of his assistants, one representative 
of the Ministry of Finance and one representative of the 
Office of National Development and Planning, and the 
managers of both the GMB and the ARMB.
After receiving evidence from various interested
parties, the Working Party submitted its report on February,
28th 1967. It was the opinion of the Working Party that
"there should not be an all-embracing board, absorbing the
existing Cold Storage Board and the Dairy Produce Board",
but rather an agricultural marketing board that would handle
all cereal and other food crops, including groundnuts,
47cotton and fruit. It excluded eggs, poultry and 
vegetables from the Board's functions and suggested that 
co-operative marketing unions should be encouraged to 
operate alongside the marketing board.
1. Formal Statutory Structure
The formal structure of the Board is an important 
element in the determination of the relationship between the
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Board and the government and, therefore, the decision-making
process. Section 3 established the NAMB as a body corporate
with perpetual succession, capable of suing and being sued.
In the exercise of its powers and functions, however, the
Board is subject to any written direction (both general and
specific) of the Minister who appoints all the members of 
48the Board. The Board consists of nine members of whom at
49least three must be public officers. In all the
deliberations of the Board, however, a nominee of the
Minister from the Ministry may attend and take part in the
proceedings of the Board, but without the right to cast a
vote. The tenure of membership is three years but, at the
expiration thereof, a member is eligible for re-appointment.
A person cannot be appointed as a member of the Board while
he is an undischarged bankrupt or serving a sentence of
imprisonment and one ceases to be a member on death,
bankruptcy, absence from three consecutive meetings of the
Board without its permission, resignation, conviction for an
offence and sentence of imprisonment without the option of a
fine, or if he becomes, in the opinion of the Minister,
mentally or physically incapable of performing his duties as
a member. The discretion vested in the Minister to remove a
member by reason of mental and physical incapacity
underlines the immense powers of the Minister with respect
to the Board. In addition, the Minister is empowered to
terminate the services of any member by giving one month's
notice. Further, the Minister may perform all the functions
of the Board in certain circumstances. Section 7(7) states:
"Whenever, due to vacancies in membership of 
the Board there are less than five members of 
the Board, the Minister may perform all the 
functions of the Board until such time as, by
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appointment, sufficient vacancies have been 
filled to bring the number of members of the 
Board to more than four, and all such 
appointments to the Board necessary to bring 
its total membership to more than four shall, 
in such event, be made by the Minister within 
three months of the date of the vacancy last 
occurring before the Minister exercises his 
powers under this subsection."
These provisions ensure that the government, through the
Minister, keeps a tight control over the Board and its
activities and, consequently erodes any degree of autonomy
that the Board may enjoy.
The Board may appoint from its own members an executive
committee and delegate to such committee any of its powers
it deems fit. With the consent of the Minister, the Board
may appoint other committees to carry out general or
specific functions as the Board may determine and the Board
may, with the approval of the Minister, delegate to such
50committees such of its powers as it may deem fit. While 
the membership of the executive committee is restricted to 
members of the Board, other committees may comprise members 
who are not in the Board. This explains the restriction to
the effect that no person should be appointed to a committee
. . . 51if he would be disqualified from membership of the Board.
2. Functions and Powers
The functions and powers of the Board indicate the 
extent to which the State exercises control over the 
marketing of agricultural commodities. Control is being 
exercised through the grant of monopoly powers of marketing
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of certain agricultural commodities known as controlled
products which are vested in the Board, and the licensing of
middlemen who might wish to deal in those controlled
products. But the Board's powers go beyond the marketing of
controlled products only. Section 11 provides that the
functions of the Board are to take possession of and dispose
of any controlled product vested in it, to buy and dispose
of any controlled product whether vested in it or not, to
buy and dispose of any non-controlled product, to buy, sell
and distribute agricultural requisites, to import or export
any agricultural products and requisites, to provide storage
and handling facilities for any agricultural product or
requisite, and to do all things necessary and consistent
with the provisions of the Act to ensure the orderly
marketing of controlled products and the supply and
distribution of agricultural requisites, within any
prescribed area. A controlled product is statutorily
defined as "any agricultural product, including cattle,
livestock and poultry, or any product derived therefrom,
declared by the Minister in terms of subsection (1) of
52section seventeen to be a controlled product".
Under section 17, the Minister is empowered, by 
statutory order, to declare any agricultural product, a 
controlled product and prescribe the area within which the 
product is a controlled product. The Minister may declare 
different products to be controlled products in different 
areas. Having declared the products which are to be 
controlled products the Minister is obliged to fix, by 
statutory order, the prices payable by the Board for any 
controlled product. The prices of controlled products may
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be varied according to the type of products, differing
qualities of the same product, differing quantities
delivered, the place at which the product is delivered, the
date of delivery and the containers in which the product is 
53delivered. Unless the Board grants written permission, it
is prohibited to remove any controlled product from any
54 . . .prescribed area. Control would be ineffective if people
could transport products from prescribed areas for sale, the
difficulty, however, is the machinery for enforcement of
this provision. Extra manpower is required to check every
form of transportation to ensure that it does not contain a
controlled product. At present the Board does not have the
necessary manpower and while the Act gives senior police
officers wide powers of search and seizure, it is not
practicable for them to search every vehicle. Consequently,
these powers have remained largely unused and there has been
no prosecution for contravening the prohibition. While the
prices of controlled products are fixed by the Minister, the
Board is empowered to fix its own prices in respect of all
55uncontrolled products. It is also required to operate an
equalisation fund for every controlled product, uncontrolled
. . 56product, and each agricultural requisite.
The money which should go into the equalisation fund is
the amount by which the proceeds from the sales of any
product or requisite exceeds the costs incurred by the Board
57in selling the product or requisite. In the event of the 
proceeds of sale being less than the costs of the Board in 
providing the marketing service, the difference must be met 
from the equalisation fund and if the money in the fund is 
not sufficient for this purpose, the government must make up
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the difference. The provision for equalisation funds give 
rise to two comments. The requirement that every product or 
agricultural requisite should have its own equalisation fund 
has never been complied with due to the plurality of 
products and requisites handled by the Board. The auditor's 
reports for the years 1976 to 1980 disclose that the books 
of accounts were not being maintained in accordance with the 
terms of sections 21(1), (2) and (3) (which require the 
maintenance of separate accounts and equalisation funds for 
products) because the Board, with the concurrence of the
auditors, considered it impracticable to maintain such
59 . . .accounts and funds. Second, an equalisation fund is
practicable where the price leaves a margin for profit but
not where as in the case of the NAMB, the government,
through the Minister, decides the purchase price and the
sale price and only reimburses the Board in respect of the
cost incurred in providing the marketing service.
To enable the Board to carry out its functions 
effectively the schedule to the Act confers on the Board 
extensive powers. These powers extend from de-controlling 
any product vested in it to making rules relating to the 
terms and conditions relating to the delivery of products, 
to the borrowing of money, the investing of surplus funds 
and the entering into agreements or contracts with suppliers 
for the better execution of its functions. If at any time 
it appears to the Minister that the Board is in default in 
the performance of any duty or obligation of the Board under 
the Act, he may, by written notice, require the Board to 
make up for its default within a period of time fixed by 
him. For carrying out its functions the Board's source of
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funds are parliament, monies that may accrue to it in 
pursuance of its activities and such other monies and assets 
as may be acquired by the Board in any other way.60
3. Registration of Dealers and Agents
As the Board enjoys monopoly powers regarding the 
marketing of certain agricultural produce and requisites the 
role of other entrepreneurs in respect of controlled 
products is restricted to that of dealers and agents only. 
Any person interested in dealing with any agricultural 
product or requisite, irrespective of whether such a person 
is an agent, producer, dealer, miller, or direct consumer is 
required before acting in any such capacity to register his 
name with the Board and disclose to it information relating 
to the product or requisite and the depot where he intends 
to deliver his products or requisites. The Board, however, 
has wide powers to reject any such application for 
registration, one of the grounds for such rejection being 
that the Board thinks that such registration will not be 
conducive to the orderly and efficient marketing of 
agricultural products. An exception to the requirement of 
registration is in respect of consumers of controlled 
products where such products are acquired solely for the 
consumption by the producer or members of his family.
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4. Vesting and Surrender of Controlled Products
Section 29(1) of the Act vests three classes of 
controlled products in the Board. These are (a) any 
controlled product grown in a prescribed area by a producer 
as soon as it is harvested; (b) any controlled product which 
is acquired by an agent, miller or dealer? and (c) any 
controlled product imported into any prescribed area by any 
person as soon as it has been so imported. Any vested 
product becomes the property of the Board and must be 
surrendered to the Board in accordance with any directions 
which the Board may give as to time, place and the 
quantities. It is the duty of any one in possession of any 
controlled product to inform the Board as soon as the 
product is available for surrender. The Board is empowered 
to establish receiving depots at which controlled products 
may be surrendered and rural depots where persons who are 
not producers or agents can surrender their produce.
Persons in possession of a controlled product must do so at 
the nearest depot, but where this is not possible he should 
notify the Board of the fact and, thereafter, comply with 
any directions the Board may give relating to the surrender 
of the controlled product.
Moreover, while the producer or dealer is under an 
obligation to surrender his produce to the Board, the Board 
has no obligation to accept the produce. The Board's 
acceptance depends on the produce complying with standards 
of quality, classification, grading and packaging stipulated 
in the Local Sales Rules61 made by the Minister. If the 
Board accepts the produce, it must issue a receipt thereof
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but, until it does so, it is under no obligation or
62liability in respect of the product. If the Board does 
not accept the produce, it may reject it whereupon it ceases 
to vest in the Board and may be sold by the producer or 
dealer.
What emerges from these provisions is that producers 
are in a precarious position. As soon as the producer has 
harvested his crop, he cannot sell it to any body other than 
the NAMB, but the risk of its destruction remains with him 
until he gets his receipt. In the past the NAMB has not 
collected farmers' produce on time and farmers have suffered 
loss on this account. It appears to be unfair that the 
Board should have produce vested in it without carrying the 
risk of loss in the event of its destruction. The 
provisions relating to delivery and those relating to the 
passing of risk are consistent with a statutory body which 
occupies a residual position instead of a monopoly position. 
As a residual buyer the Board could impose its own terms of 
where it will collect the produce, at what price and the 
standard, in terms of quality, it will accept, because the 
farmer is free to dispose of his produce and only in the 
event of failure to sell may he be forced to comply with the 
Board's requirements. At present the Board is in a monopoly 
position, thus forcing farmers to deliver their produce to 
its depots only but running no risk of loss occurring 
between the harvest and the acceptance of the depots.
Section 29 which defines controlled products is so wide 
in scope that, by itself, it would force subsistence farmers 
to surrender their produce to the Board. Section 30 
qualifies the scope of controlled products by providing
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several exceptions. First, any controlled product sold for 
seed by the producer does not vest in the Board. Second, 
any controlled product may be retained by the producer if he 
requires it for consumption by himself, members of his 
family, his servants or his livestock. Third, a person may 
import any controlled product for his own consumption or 
that of his family so long as he does not sell the product 
or otherwise dispose of it to any person other than the 
Board. Further, the Board may, at any time, by statutory 
order, divest itself of any controlled product, or declare 
that any controlled product described in the order be sold 
by its producer to a direct consumer in the area where it is 
produced. Offences under the Act are punishable by a fine, 
a period of imprisonment or both.
Certain preliminary observations on these provisions 
can be made. It is clear that the NAMB plays a dual role.
It has a monopoly over the marketing of controlled products 
and, at the same time, it has a residuary role over 
non-controlled products because they are not vested in it. 
With regard to controlled products, therefore, there is no 
competition with any other body or person in the prescribed 
areas. Consequently, private traders or entrepreneurs have 
no role in those areas, other than as agents of the Board.
In terms of its financial resources, it depends on the 
producer price and the sale price, both of which are 
controlled by the State. In this type of relationship with 
the State it is not clear what goals the Board should pursue 
when the power of decision-making in such important areas as 
pricing and the determination of which produce should be 
controlled products lies elsewhere. Consequently, it is not
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surprising that the Board has faced numerous problems in its 
operations.
5. Performance
The first board members comprised six non-government 
officials: Messrs J.E.M. Landless (Chairman), J.M. Banda, 
R.S. Banda, R. Chongo, G.C. Lialabi, and B.J. Tambuzi, and 
three government officials who were Permanent Secretaries of 
the Ministries of Rural Development, Trade and Industry, and 
Finance. The preponderance of non-official membership is 
obvious, but the degree to which the various categories of 
farmers was represented is not. Commercial farmers were 
represented in the person of Mr Landless, a commercial 
farmer himself.
On its establishment, the NAMB became responsible for 
virtually all farming requirements in both State Land and 
the Reserves and Trust Land. It monopolised the purchase, 
sale, importation, exportation and the storage of maize on a 
country-wide scale. It operated two cotton ginneries, one 
established by the GMB and based in Lusaka, and the other in 
Chipata (in the Eastern Province). It also monopolised the 
purchase of cotton as a continuation of the role of the GMB, 
except in the Eastern Province where the Eastern Province 
Co-operative Marketing Union marketed the crop. With regard 
to agricultural requisites, the NAMB became the monopoly 
distributor of fertilizer, thus replacing the private 
commercial entrepreneurs who had sold fertilizer in the
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urban areas and the ARMB which had sold it in the rural 
areas.
In 1970, the Minister made his first statutory order
under the National Agricultural Marketing Board Act in which
he declared the controlled products. These products were
maize, maize meal, shelled and unshelled groundnuts,
Canadian wonder beans, haricot beans, mixed beans, sugar
beans, velvet beans, cowpeas, sunhemp, sunflower seed,
63sorghum, soya beans and seed cotton. The areas in which 
these products were controlled were the Copperbelt Province, 
the Central Province, and the districts of Kalomo, Choma, 
Gwembe and Mazabuka in the Southern Province. In the 
Eastern Province, only maize, maize meal, shelled and 
unshelled groundnuts and seed cotton were declared 
controlled products, while in the North-Western Province, 
the controlled products only consisted of shelled and
64unshelled groundnuts. In a subsequent statutory order,
however, the NAMB divested itself of two types of products -
maize in the manufactured form, commonly known as flaked
maize used for the manufacture of beer, and any controlled
product acquired by the government for the purpose of
scientific research.
In the same year the Board attempted to broaden its
horizon by undertaking the marketing of fruit and
vegetables. Since these were not controlled products, it
could only do so as a residual buyer and importer.65 The
avowed justification for taking on fruit and vegetables was
that this would provide an improved market for Zambian
fog
produce while, at the same time, mee^ short-falls in imports 
from abroad.66 As an importer of perishable products such
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as vegetables, the Board was seriously handicapped by
inadequate refrigeration facilities. This was particularly
evident in 1970 when, due to the heavy rains, many farmers
were forced out of production which, in turn, led to
shortages. By the end of 1970, nearly a thousand tons each
of onions and potatoes had to be destroyed due to the
absence of specialised storage facilities, equipment and
68knowledge of the techniques required.
The 1970 Producer Prices Order named a hundred depots
located throughout the country, although fifty of them,
situated in rural areas operated only seasonally. The
depots established in Lusaka and Ndola were for perishable
goods - fruit and vegetables. The Board's practice at the
two depots was to receive the produce during the early hours
of the morning so that the produce would still be fresh by
the time it reached the retailers whose hours of business
commenced at eight o'clock in the morning. Consequently,
the period for receiving the produce at the depots was
between 6-8 a.m., a factor which led to complaints by some
farmers that only the big farmer with his own transport
69could deliver his produce on time. The question of how 
many depots should be established is of great importance in 
two respects. In the first place the continued operation of 
a marketing body, as indeed any other business, depends on 
its financial viability. In the second place, if marketing 
services are to act as an incentive to rural farmers, access 
to these services, in the form of depots, must be made 
available as close to their villages as possible. There is, 
therefore, a conflict between the idea that every depot be 
economically viable and the idea that depots should be
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established as close to the fanners as possible. The 
establishment of temporary sheds which are operational only 
during harvest and thus do not require permanent full-time 
staff is an attempt at a compromise. The Board's procedure 
in establishing depots was to submit its plans to the 
Ministry of Rural Development which would then determine the 
feasibility of the depot. The Board's initiative could, 
therefore, be threatened by the Ministry which had to 
provide the funds as was the case in 1970 when the Board's
plans to establish four depots were turned down by the
. . 70Ministry.
From a meagre hundred depots in 1971, the NAMB had
increased the number of depots by 1981 to one thousand. Out
of these, however, only the initial one hundred could be
said to have been viable? hence it is appropriate to
describe the NAMB as providing a service rather than as
71operating a strictly business concern. Despite this
increase in the number of points at which produce could be
collected, however, the actual proportion of produce handled
by the NAMB did not change significantly. In fact with
effect from 1978 onwards, the total share of maize handled
by co-operative marketing unions was approximately
72fifty-four percent. Of these unions, the Southern
Province Co-operative Marketing Union (SPCMU) was the
largest single purchaser, but this situation has been
explained by the fact that SPCMU took over rural marketing
functions in most parts of the Southern Province except
73Gwembe District, in 1977. Since 1978, however, the 
contribution of co-operative unions towards handling 
remained steady at more than half, but with the restricted
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role that the NAMB has had to play since 1980, the whole
marketing process at rural and district level will rest with
the unions, so that one can expect a gradual increase in the
proportion of produce handled by co-operatives.
The contribution that the NAMB has made to the
marketing of agricultural produce can best be appreciated
when one examines the operational problems it has faced
since it began its work in 1969. The NAMB's problems appear
to have commenced at the very beginning. The problem of
storage has already been mentioned. This problem has
plagued the NAMB in each successive year. Plans have been
made, however, to improve the position by establishing
sixty-four all-weather steel storage sheds for maize and
fertilizer. Twenty-five of these sheds are to be situated
in the Southern Province, while the rest are to be
74distributed throughout all other provinces. Of the
twenty-five sheds meant for the Southern Province thirteen,
maize and fertilizer sheds constructed with the help of the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) were
75officially handed over to the NAMB in May, 1983.
A problem which might take time before a lasting
solution can be found is that of transportation. The
problem of transportation affects not only the movement of
crops from rural depots to district depots where they can be
stored, but also the distribution of inputs, particularly
fertilizer. From the time of its creation, the NAMB has
persistently been accused of failing to, or delaying the
7 6collection of produce from farmers. On its part, the NAMB 
has attributed its transportation difficulties to poor 
feeder roads which they claim become impassable in the event
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77of heavy rains. In some cases those products, which
cannot be collected, go bad and have to be destroyed -
except for maize which may be processed as stock feed. In
October 1985, the Minister for Agriculture and Water
Development is reported by the official government newspaper
of having declared 6,867 bags of maize, which had been lying
exposed to the rains for three years in the remote Luapula
78Province town of Isoka, unfit for human consumption. In 
this particular instance, which in Zambia is by no means 
isolated, there appears to have been a critical shortage of 
vehicles. It has often been claimed that agricultural 
requisites such as fertilizer have not been delivered to the 
depots in some rural areas, or have been delivered too late. 
The problem of delivering fertilizer, as indeed other inputs 
which have to be imported, is compounded by shortage of 
finance and delays caused by congestion at ports utilised by 
the country for importation of goods, notably Dar-es-Salaam 
in neighbouring Tanzania.
Another problem has been the provision of grain bags 
which farmers are to use. On occasions, empty grain bags 
have either been in short supply or have arrived late. In
1976 the NAMB made a ruling that new bags must be paid for
79 . . . .in cash. In this way the Board would be in a position to
import them from abroad.
Finally, the Board has always operated on a deficit
which brings into question the pricing policy government has
forced it to pursue. The 1976 Annual Report discloses that
in all the depots there was an acute shortage of handling
equipment as well as containers and other packaging
materials due to lack of funds, and non-availability of some
498
of the equipment and raw materials. The same complaint of
insufficiency of working capital was raised in 1977, when
the cause of the problem was attributed to stockholding and
80"unrealistic budget allocations" from the government. In
addition, the Board was owed money by certain unnamed
parastatal bodies against whom it could not take steps to
recover for fear of the repercussions that might befall 
81them. The deficits between financial returns and the
operating costs and depreciation have risen from K62,105,000
in 1977 to K109,633,000 in 1980. Since then, however, the
government has reduced its subsidies on fertilizer and to
some extent on maize, consequently the Board has had to
increase prices in order to cover its costs and reduce
reliance on government subsidy. The operating deficit for
1981 (which had to be met by government subsidy) was down to
K68,072,000. Government has not been very keen in meeting
these subsidies promptly, thus causing the Board to
experience liquidity problems and, in most such cases, it is
the farmer who is paid late for his produce. Although the
Board has stated that farmers are paid within four to five
weeks, this has not always been the case and there have been
occasions when farmers have been told to wait 
82indefinitely, although the earlier practice of paying 
rural villagers by cheques has been discontinued.
The NAMB's problems were becoming apparent to the 
government and those it purported to serve shortly after it 
came into operation. In September 1971 the government 
commissioned the Ford Foundation to study the operations of 
the Board and make recommendations with respect to its 
financial, managerial practices, and organisational
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83arrangements. The report submitted by Williams and 
Wardale began by considering the arguments in favour of a 
statutory board as opposed to a wholly government-owned and 
operated institution, or private enterprise. The report 
noted that the choice of statutory marketing boards was made 
on the basis of the following considerations:
a) Public ownership facilitates the 
achievement of the non-market welfare 
objectives of the government?
b) Unlike a government department, with its 
inflexibility and slow decision-making 
processes, a statutory board, enjoying a 
high degree of autonomy would be able to 
employ incentives and techniques similar 
to those which promote efficiency in the 
private sector.
Williams and Wardale suggested two ways by which a statutory 
board could achieve the efficiency of the private sector. 
First, something akin to a profit motive could be introduced 
by establishing specific goals and measures of performance. 
Second, there must be sufficient managerial freedom or 
autonomy of management to develop the initiative and 
entrepreneural skills needed to achieve the goals proposed. 
According to the two researchers, in the absence of the two 
features, it is unlikely that a statutory board would be 
successful.84
Williams and Wardale then proceeded to show how these 
features had not been provided in the policy of the Zambian 
government towards the NAMB. They felt that until the role 
of the Board vis a vis government was changed, the Board 
could not be expected to improve its performance. They 
pointed out that there was a lack of a clear formulation by 
the government of the NAMB's objectives as neither the 
Ministry of Agriculture nor the Board was quite sure what
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the Board was supposed to be achieving. According to their 
report there was too much control by government over the 
Board: it was notified by ministerial directive which crops 
it was to handle and the areas in which it was to perform 
its marketing functions, as well as what the purchase and 
sale prices would be for each crop and agricultural input.
As all its operations could be traced to direct ministerial 
instruction, the Board had a readily available scapegoat for 
its inefficiency and little incentive to try and emulate the 
private sector.
In addition, the report pointed out, because the prices 
set by the government had not been sufficient to cover its 
operational costs, the Board had become increasingly 
dependent on government subsidies. The Ministry of 
Agriculture granted these subsidies with growing reluctance, 
but took no steps to discover whether the subsidies were 
solely a result of government's uneconomic prices or could 
be the result of inefficiency. Williams and Wardale 
asserted that government had failed to provide an 
institutional framework within which the NAMB could 
function:
"A well-defined set of goals, a matching set 
of operational criteria and a sufficient 
degree of managerial freedom are the three key 
factors with which the government must concern 
itself if any parastatal is to be successful.
It is precisely the failure of the Government 
to deal adequately with these three matters in 
the past which has contributed significantly 
to the present unsatisfactory nature of 
NAMBOARD's operations. To regard the mere 
formation of a parastatal as itself some sort 
of panacea for the solution of a complicated 
social or economic problem is, unfortunately, 
demonstrable nonsense - the experience of 
NAMBOARD being itself a prime example of
this."85
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These criticisms are as valid now as they were in 1971.
At a workshop on "Parastatals and Economic Development” held
in Lusaka in May 1986, at which the NAMB was used as a case
study, it was said that the Board had been adversely
affected by lack of incentives for improved performance as
well as lack of management autonomy and hence
8 6accountability. In a paper presented by Promil Paul, a 
consultant for a leading firm of accountants and auditors, 
it was disclosed that the NAMB's poor performance could be 
attributed to government pricing of key products, which had 
the effect of preventing the Board from developing an 
economic pricing policy. The pricing system also had the 
effect of discouraging the private sector from participating 
in trading in the controlled products because of inadequate 
margin to cover the high transport and handling costs to 
remote areas. Further, Promil Paul stated, the NAMB's dual 
objective to meet the non-commercial provision of services 
to farmers and still maintain commercial or economic 
viability put a great strain on the Board's scarce 
resources. In his view, for the NAMB to perform effectively 
it must be restructured organisationally, financially and 
administratively with five objectives: i) to expand the role 
of markets, ii) to expose the Board to the stimulus of 
competition, iii) to clarify objectives and relations 
between the government and the Board, iv) to optimise 
managerial autonomy at all levels of the firm, and v) to 
improve the overall efficiency of the NAMB as an entity. 
Moreover, Dodge pointed out in 1977 that the NAMB's 
"inefficiency is due, in part, to the increasingly large 
number of functions it has been called upon to perform
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without a comparable increase in skilled staff”, and that
government response has been the imposition of additional
controls which have only served to cripple initiative on the
88part of the Board.
The foregoing observations and suggestions for reform, 
if implemented, would have the effect of reducing the role 
of the NAMB from its monopoly position to that of residuary 
buyer. In the process of reducing its burdens, even the 
number of crops which it may market would be curtailed. All 
this would result in the State losing control over the 
marketing of agricultural produce, although through the 
pricing mechanism it would still be possible to encourage 
the production of certain crops as opposed to others. It 
is, nevertheless, important that the Board's functions 
should be reconsidered as mere re-organisation, while it may 
bring about efficiency, will not necessarily solve the 
problems resulting from the sheer enormity and complexity of 
the task that the Board is to perform. It is an 
over-simplification to attribute the NAMB's problems solely 
to inefficiency. The problems of the Board regarding the 
distribution of agricultural requisites have little to do 
with inefficiency. It is the Board's policy that all 
imports and local purchases of agricultural requisites must 
be ordered a year in advance. Before the Board determines 
how much, for instance, fertilizer is required, 
consultations are carried out by the National Fertilizer 
Committee which is composed of representatives of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development, the 
Commercial Farmers Bureau, the Bank of Zambia, Nitrogen 
Chemicals of Zambia, the Tobacco Board of Zambia, and the
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NAMB's bankers. This committee considers the proposals put 
forward by the Board and the final figures are agreed upon. 
This process is supposed to take place in the month of April 
of each year, and the tendering and receiving of quotations
is finalised in July. Suppliers are notified during the
month of August after the Central Supply and Tender Board 
has made the award. In the absence of foreign exchange and 
transportation problems, the first consignment is expected 
to be at the ports by January the following year in 
readiness for the coming season which commences in March. 
However,
"Due to problems of the non-availability of
foreign exchange at the right time,
transportation difficulties when fertilizer 
arrives at ports, and congestions, this 
programme has never been fulfilled."gg
Both fertilizer imports and consumption have been
increasing at a steady rate since 1970. Fertilizer
purchases have risen from 11,925 metric tons in 1972 to
90186,000 metric tons in 1981 and out of this, less than 
one-sixth is produced locally by Nitrogen Chemicals of 
Zambia. Being a land-locked country, Zambia has had to 
depend on the port facilities of its neighbouring countries 
for the importation of goods. Four ports have been most 
popular for fertilizer imports - Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, 
Beira and Nacala in Mozambique and East London in South 
Africa. When fertilizer arrives at ports, a distribution 
schedule is monitored to the NAMB's agent at any given port 
stating the depot/station, description and quantity to be 
dispatched directly.
The railways, both Zambia Railways and Tanzania-Zambia 
Railways (Tazara), have contributed to delays. Station to
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station wagons expected to arrive within four days sometimes
take much longer. Under these circumstances the NAMB has no
option but to deploy road transport although this mode of
transport is nearly five times more expensive than the 
91railways. On the same point, the then financial
controller of the NAMB, G.O. Ezeokafor explained in 1978:
"Internal transport has also presented its own 
problem. The budget is normally based on the 
rates charged by the Zambia Railways but in 
actual practice road transport is largely used 
owing to non-availability of enough rail 
wagons to transport maize, fertilizer, 
implements etc. Road Transport is more than
three times as expensive as the railway." _y 2
Distribution to rural provinces is done exclusively by 
road and at times by boats such as in the Western Province 
from Mongu to Kalabo. Due to poor infrastructure, Western, 
North-Western, Luapula, Northern and Eastern Provinces are 
usually served first from the previous year's carry over. 
However, the remaining provinces along the old line of rail 
have commercial farmers who usually plan and purchase stocks 
far ahead of the rainy season. In the event of delays in 
the arrival of new fertilizer, the limited stocks end up by 
being shared more or less equally by all provinces. There 
are cases where, even when fertilizer arrives at district 
centres, transport to take it to rural or sub-depots 
constitute a big bottle-neck. This is because most of the 
feeder roads are not properly maintained, and transporters 
are just too reluctant to risk their depleted fleets of 
vehicles for which spares are not easily available. Where 
fertilizer arrives late or coincides with the rainy season, 
the bad feeder roads become impassable, thus literally 
cutting off the rural and sub-depots from the main district
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and provincial centres. Before we examine the steps 
government has taken in response to the various criticisms 
made against its handling of the Board, attention must be 
focussed on the pricing policy for controlled goods, a 
policy which has shared the blame for the poor performance 
of the Board.
6. Government Pricing Policy
(a) Early Government Pricing Policy
The pricing policy for agricultural produce has a great
influence on the overall performance of the agricultural
sector. Farmers, like other investors, always strive for
reasonable returns on their investments. Consequently, they
respond to changes in the prices of commodities in such a
manner that the changes produce results most favourable to
them. Through government manipulation of prices of various
commodities it is possible to encourage increased production
of the desired commodities. It is urged, however, that
price determination must take into account the
organisational and technical support that goes with 
93agriculture. In a paper prepared for the National 
Commission for Development Planning, Katilungu and Zeko have 
stated:
"Any price policy aimed at developing 
agriculture, should take into account and, if 
necessary, influence, the following factors: 
the ratio of the general level of agricultural 
product prices to the level of agricultural 
input prices; and the ratio of the general
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level of non-agricultural input prices to the 
general level of non-agricultural prices."94
They state that while these price relationships are in
theory distinct, any set of measures for price regulation
will simultaneously affect all of them. If, for instance,
the government succeeds in establishing price floors for two
or three major crops, downward price fluctuation will be
restricted and relative prices, the output-input price
ratio, and the terms of trade of agriculture will all be
altered to some extent. Price policies, therefore, must be
based on a consideration of their effects on all the key
price relationships. A stable price is one that ensures, or
would ensure, that the producer receives a reasonable return
on his investment. Such a stable price is of great
importance in agriculture where resources cannot be shifted
quickly and employed in different but more profitable areas.
As there is usually a long period between investment and the
actual realisation of the output, sudden price changes
unfavourable to producers would have the effect of putting
some of them out of production for a long time.
Further, they contend that changes in the relative
prices of different agricultural commodities results in
shifts in the allocation of inputs among the commodities
involved. As "farmers respond to changes in prices by
re-directing their efforts in accordance with profitability"
the overall output of a given agricultural product "can be
increased by transferring inputs from other competing
95 . . .  . . .crops". This objective can be attained by manipulating
prices of different commodities. They also place emphasis
on the importance, in terms of achieving overall increase in
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the production of a given product, of the price-ratio of 
outputs to inputs. In their view, price ratios more 
favourable to farmers can be brought about by lowering the 
prices of inputs to the farmer and by raising the prices of 
outputs.
On a broader plane, the price-ratio between the
agricultural and non-agricultural commodities, they argue,
determines the rural-urban income distribution. The general
trend in an economy where a large segment of population is
found in rural areas is that, literally, all the income is
derived from the sale of agricultural produce. Higher
prices paid for agricultural produce would, therefore, act
as an incentive to farmers in rural areas to increase
production while at the same time raising their incomes.
Regrettably, non-agricultural products have always commanded
higher prices in relation to prices of agricultural
products, thus creating unfavourable terms of trade for
rural farmers.
Writing in 1977, Dodge asserted that the framework of
Zambia's crop pricing policy had changed little since the
9 6colonial period. Nonetheless, it may be stated with ample
justification that at present the principles regarding the
determination of prices for commodities have remarkably
changed. In her brief summary of the institutional set-up
for price determination she explained that following
independence the Agricultural Marketing Committee (AMC) was
97established in 1964 for the following functions:
i) To advise on methods of price 
determination for agricultural 
commodities, what prices should be 
charged and what changes, if any, were 
advisable;
ii) To advise on the co-ordination of
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producer prices of agricultural 
commodities;
iii) To advise on the extent and nature of 
price and marketing controls and the 
manner of their operation;
iv) To examine and report on the operation of
the statutory marketing boards; and
v) To prepare an annual report and review of
matters falling within the purview of the 
committee.
In its first report of 1965, the AMC presented a report on 
maize in which it advised that the country's objective must 
be national self-sufficiency in maize since imports were 
undesirable and exports could not be economically sound for 
geographical reasons. It established the target for maize 
production as annual consumption plus three to four months' 
consumption requirements as an insurance against a 
succeeding bad crop.
In formulating its principles for price determination, 
the AMC considered various options among them the cost-plus 
system whereby the price is related to the cost of 
production plus a profit margin, and the dual-price system 
by which price differentials are introduced depending on 
whether the product is to be sold locally or externally.
The AMC rejected both. The former on the grounds of the 
difficulty of estimating the costs of production as well as 
the inability of the system to take into account the demand 
for the product. The latter, on the ground that it ignored 
the interests of the consumer and the effect of the pricing 
policy on the national economy, as the gap between the 
selling price to the local consumer and the average return 
to the producer might lead to black marketeering.
The AMC recommended a pricing policy "that would 
maintain a reasonable equilibrium between domestic demand
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98and supply by a process of limited price adjustments".
Such adjustments were not to exceed twenty-five ngwee for 
each successive year. Whether the price should rise or fall 
would depend on the extent to which deliveries to the 
statutory board exceeded or fell short of internal sales by 
the board. The following recommendations of the AMC were 
made to, and accepted by, the government:
i) That the Minister of Agriculture should 
announce each year, by the month of 
September, a pre-planting price for maize 
to be delivered to the statutory board in 
the twelve months from the following 1st 
May?
ii) The pre-planting price should, before the 
1st of May each year, be subject to 
confirmation as a fixed price by the 
Minister of Agriculture, and if not so 
confirmed should be varied by the 
Minister but by no more than twenty-five 
ngwee;
iii) The pre-planting price announced in each 
year should not vary from one year to the 
next by more than twenty-five ngwee per 
standard bag;
iv) That all prices for maize should be per 
200 lb and should exclude the cost of the 
bag.
Inspite of government acceptance of these principles 
they seem to have been more honoured in their breach than in 
their observance. Dodge provides numerous instances of 
this. In the 1964-65 crop year, deliveries to the Grain 
Marketing Board's depots exceeded internal sales by more 
than ten percent and the AMC recommended that the 1965/66 
pre-planting price should be reduced by twenty-five ngwee. 
Government, however, while approving the need for reduction, 
reduced only by half of the recommended figure.
In 1967 the AMC observed that in the 1965/66 crop year, 
maize deliveries exceeded local sales by twenty-eight 
percent, a further reduction of twenty-five ngwee was
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imminent. The AMC, supporting the decrease in the price, 
argued that commercial farmers had increased their maize 
acreage and the milling industry, which was subject to price 
control in maize meal, was burdened by increasing production 
costs. The reduced profitability might discourage further 
investment in the milling industry. Instead of passing on 
the cost of increased milling cost either to the consumer, 
in the form of prices for mealie meal, or the government in 
the form of subsidy, the producer price, which so far had 
had a detrimental effect on the production of other crops 
such as tobacco, cotton, and groundnuts, should be reduced 
by thirteen ngwee per bag. The AMC disapproved the 
reduction by a full twenty-five ngwee on account of the 
effect it might have on the emergent farmer. It observed 
that there was a conflict between economic and developmental 
objectives. Maize could be produced more efficiently by 
commercial farmers, thus, from an economic viewpoint, there 
was no place for the medium and small scale producer. But 
from the point of view of economic development in general, 
it was essential that farmers, medium and small scale, be 
encouraged to produce for sale. The AMC also recommended 
subsidies to assist African farmers to become more 
efficient. The government, however, reduced the price by 
twenty-two ngwee, at the same time reducing the selling 
price of the statutory board by thirty ngwee, a subsidy 
which benefitted the milling companies and the urban 
consumers. In the following year the producer price of 
maize was further reduced by twenty ngwee, inspite of a 
profitable export market.
In his analysis of producer price policy in the AMC's
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annual report of 1968, the Director of the Department of
Economics and Marketing in the Ministry of Agriculture,
stated that there was some inconsistency in the producer
prices for maize in the non-controlled areas. Little
attention was paid to whether an area was in a surplus or
deficit supply position. He suggested that the government's
maize price policy should provide a basis for regional price
determination. The use of the national criteria at the
local level - a producer price which would guarantee
self-sufficiency in production, allow for the replacement of
reserve stocks, and take advantage of export markets for
maize - would assure the determination of appropriate price
levels throughout the different local areas of the country.
Thus when considering regional pre-planting prices such
factors as the size and location of the relevant local
markets, amount of local production, landed cost of imports,
local milling and marketing margins, costs of exporting the
crop, and trends in local production should be taken into 
99account.
These recommendations were the precursor of producer 
price differentials in various areas. In 1968/69 the price 
of maize in outlying provinces with a deficit in maize 
production was considerably higher than the price in surplus 
areas. For example, in the 1968/69 crop year the price for 
maize delivered to the line of rail depots was K3.20 per 
bag, it wasonly K2.40 in the surplus area of Chipata in the 
Eastern Province. Similarly, in the deficit areas such as 
Kasama, in the Northern Province, Mansa in the Luapula 
Province, Kabompo in the North-Western Province and Mongu, 
in the Western Province the prices were above K3.70 per bag,
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the differences in the prices even among deficit areas being
a reflection of transport costs.
In the 1970/71 crop y e a r , for the first time,
government introduced a guaranteed floor price of K3.20 per
bag of maize at all depots throughout the country. The
floor price is said to have been introduced to ensure a fair
compensation to all farmers, including those in remote
areas.100 According to Dodge, the effect of the floor price
was to encourage maize production primarily in the Eastern
Province (a surplus area) because the floor price was fifty
ngwee above the previous year's price in most other areas.
Price differentials were maintained depending on the depot
to which the products were delivered but in 1975 all
differentials totally ceased.101 In a vivid assessment of
the country-wide effect of the introduction of a uniform
pricing policy, Dodge says:
"The farmers who have gained from the uniform 
pricing policy - i.e. those who have received 
higher prices for maize relative to the line 
of rail main depot price in recent years than 
they received in 1969/70 - are the farmers in 
the line of rail provinces, the Eastern 
Province and - in 1973-76 only - the Samfya 
and Kawambwa districts of the Luapula Province 
and the Solwezi district of the North-western 
Province. The farmers who have been the 
losers under uniform pricing - i.e. those who 
have received lower prices relative to the 
line of rail main depot price than they 
received in 1969/70 - are the farmers in the 
Mansa district of the Luapula Province, the 
Kabompo and Zambezi districts of the 
North-Western Province. It would be very 
difficult (if not impossible) to find a 
justification on grounds of "equity" for this 
division between farmers who have gained and 
those who have lost."1Q2
Thus, continues Dodge, uniform pricing has the effect of
raising the incomes of rural farmers unevenly, the size of
benefits it provides varying in direct relationship to the
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remoteness of a farmer growing the product and the amount of
the product he grows. More recently, Katilungu and Zeko
have reported the preference of some traders for price
differentiation, giving higher prices to specific regions in
the country for those crops which are easier to produce.
The argument is that concentration of production in such
areas would help reduce marketing costs, in the end making
it cheaper for consumers to buy the produce. But Katilungu
and Zeko support uniform pricing on the ground that
difficulties may arise in determining the basis of such a
price policy, and that pursuing a differential pricing
policy could lead to the creation of deficits in some areas
as produce would tend to move to areas with high prices.
They conclude, the "present situation of uniform prices has
103so far proved quite workable".
(a) Current Pricing Policy
At present prices are determined on a cost-plus basis 
which is the total cost of production for the crop per unit 
plus some percentage of profit margin. Consequently, the 
cost of inputs are set by the government. To enable a 
farmer to obtain a fair price there have been subsidies to 
producers for inputs, to marketing agencies for handling 
transport and storage costs and to consumers in the price 
paid for the final produce. In the case of maize for 
instance, the price paid to the producer is higher than that 
at which the maize is sold to the milling companies. The 
difference in price is met through subsidies by the 
government.
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In terms of the process by which the actual cost of 
production is assessed, the planning unit of the department 
is responsible for collecting data. The data is collected 
from two sources - one is from farms owned by parastatal 
organisations. Crop husbandry on such farms complies with 
standard practices recommended by research stations. The 
second source of data lies with farmers assisted by the 
Commercial Farmer's Bureau who report on anticipated costs 
of production for commercial farmers. The planning unit 
assesses all the data and thus arrives at the average cost 
of each category of farmers. This data is then presented at 
a meeting attended by the Permanent Secretary in the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development and by 
representatives from various farming and marketing 
organisations, at which a profit margin expressed as a 
percentage of the average cost of production is decided.
The price is then recommended to the Cabinet on whose 
approval it is gazetted as the official price. In so far as 
the cost of production is taken into account, this 
represents a remarkable change in pricing policy from that 
which was applicable during the period that Dodge covers.
There is, admittedly, some difficulty in applying the 
cost-plus method of pricing. The cost of production must 
necessarily be different from place to place since the 
question of how much fertilizer, for instance, is required 
to produce a given yield depends on soil and climate which 
are, themselves, variables. Consequently, the data that 
relate to the cost of production must be considered to 
relate to average conditions and practices for different 
management levels. Thus, given fixed and variable costs,
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profits would only accrue to the extent above which these
costs can be covered through sales of farm output. As
Katilungu and Zeko explain:
"Every farmer's average cost of production 
differs with the number of bags he produces.
Given fixed costs between two farmers, one who 
produces more would cover the costs quicker.
It follows, therefore, that any given price 
for the crop will only enable some farmers to 
cover their costs and yet others to even make 
a profit. An increase in the price of the 
crop does not automatically result in all 
farmers making a profit. Notwithstanding 
these factors, pricing is still an important 
tool for increasing production of crops."104
They also point out that omitted under the present mode of
calculating the cost of production for the emergent farmer
is the cost of transportation. As marketing agencies'
transport charges for collection of produce from depots
amount to fifty ngwee per bag, this constitutes a cost on
the farmer's part which reduces his profit margin. They
recommend, so far as maize pricing is concerned, that any
price policy should take into account not only the interest
of commercial farmers as is the case at present, but also of
emergent farmers. They added that such prices should
reflect not only the cost of production but also the general
trend in prices of both other agricultural products as well
as non-agricultural goods. In their conclusion, they warn
against continually increasing prices of agricultural crops
in proportion to increases in cost, as this may adversely
affect consumers. Rather, they urge, government should
recognise the importance of non-price mechanisms for
increasing food production such as better extension services
to improve the management skills of farmers, and the
105improvement of marketing facilities.
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The argument that consumers may suffer if the 
government increases the price to correspond with any 
increase in the cost of inputs has been at the centre of 
government policy since independence. There is no doubt 
that there have been some significant increases in the price 
of agricultural commodities because during the period 1971 
to 1980 the cost of a bag of maize rose by more than 
fifty-eight percent, while groundnuts went up by a hundred 
and eighty percent. It is nevertheless the case that prices 
of consumer items such as detergents, bread, blankets went 
up by even a wider margin than the price of maize (which is 
more widely grown than sunflower). Washing powder went up 
by ninety-four percent, bread by one hundred and five 
percent as did blankets. These disparities in price 
increases creates an unfavourable balance of trade for the 
rural farmers who depend on maize, and also makes the urban 
income more appealing than the rural. More important, 
however, from the point of view of marketing bodies such as 
the NAMB, the difference between the amount it pays the 
farmers and its selling price is not adequate to cover its 
cost for carrying on the service. Consequently, it has to 
rely on government subsidy to keep it afloat.
7. Summary and Prospects
The picture that emerges is that after independence, 
the State evolved an ambitious programme through the 
statutory marketing body, the NAMB, to control the
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production and the marketing of agricultural commodities.
The means by which the State sought to exercise this 
control, however, clipped the wings of the statutory board, 
thus, in part, ensuring its failure. The various criticisms 
which have been levelled at the government, have not gone 
unheeded. The government's excessive control, by requiring 
that a broad range of agricultural commodities be handled 
only by the NAMB, led to inefficiency and gross waste. 
Attempts at de-control have been two-pronged. One method 
has been to reduce the number of controlled products thereby 
reducing the NAMB's burden and affording some degree of 
participation by private enterprise in the marketing of 
agricultural produce. The other method has been to 
encourage the development of marketing co-operatives at 
provincial level so that these co-operatives can provide the 
primary service at local level. These efforts have been 
supplemented by, in the case of cotton, the establishment of 
a specialised limited company, the Lint Company of Zambia 
(or LINTCO) to promote, process, and market lint cotton.
The first method, that is, reduction in the number of 
controlled products, began in 1973 when the Minister ordered 
that "excepting maize, cotton and groundnuts in the Eastern 
Province and maize and cotton in other parts of Zambia, no 
controlled product shall vest in or become the property" of 
the NAMB in terms of section 29 of the Act.106 This order 
became effective from the 5th of March 1973. The order did 
not prohibit the Board from handling crops which were no 
longer controlled, but the Board was no longer compelled to 
market the de-controlled commodities. It afforded the 
opportunity to the Board to concentrate on the few crops
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that remained controlled. The Board's other functions, such 
as the importation and distribution of farm inputs, however, 
remained its sole responsibility. The establishment of 
LINTCO and the Horticultural Products of Zambia (ZAMHORT) to 
handle fruit and vegetables, both government-controlled 
companies, mean that the NAMB may neither market cotton nor 
fruit and vegetables, although cotton still appears on the 
list of controlled products. The extent to which efforts to 
de-control have benefitted the Board is impossible to tell, 
but the Board's financial outlook appears to be still 
unfavourable, because, it is submitted, as long as the State 
controls the prices of controlled products and other 
agricultural products, there is little room for the Board to 
make a reasonable profit since, as the Board argues, the 
basis on which prices are determined by government are 
erroneous. The establishment of provincial marketing 
co-operatives and their performance is discussed below, but 
attention needs also to be focussed on a different method of 
State control (illustrated by statutory board for tobacco), 
the Tobacco Board of Zambia.
C. THE TOBACCO BOARD OF ZAMBIA
The Tobacco Board of Zambia, (hereinafter referred to 
as the TBZ), offers an example of the use of a statutory 
board, not as a monopoly marketing body, like the NAMB, but
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as a body responsible for the promotion of the production
and marketing of a given agricultural product, in this
107instance, tobacco. The Tobacco Board of Zambia was
108established in 1967 under the Tobacco Act and became
operational on the 1st of April, 1968.
1. Constitution and Functions of the TBZ
The TBZ is a body corporate consisting of the chairman, 
one member representing the growers of Virginia flue-cured 
tobacco, one member representing growers of burley tobacco
and not more than three members representing buyers of
109 . . .tobacco. All the members are appointed by the Minister
who is empowered to appoint such additional members as he
feels necessary. The tenure of office of members is two
years but they are eligible for re-appointment for
subsequent terms. Whenever representation on the Board of
any two or more of the categories of membership (the two
types of growers and the buyers) becomes vacant, the
Minister may perform all of the functions and duties of the
Board until such time as, by appointment, such categories
are duly represented. The Minister, must, however, make the
necessary appointments within three months of the date of
the vacancy last occurring. But for this limitation, the
Minister would perform the functions of the Board
indefinitely. Nevertheless, the Minister's power to
terminate the services of the members by a month's notice
ensures that he remains in control of the Board.
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The functions of the Board are wide-ranging and involve 
the promotion, protection, and the maintenance of the 
production, sale, preparation for subsequent use and the 
export of tobacco. The Board has, in addition, a specific 
duty "to control and regulate the production, marketing and 
export of tobacco".110 It is through the control and 
regulatory power of the Board that the State has sought to 
control the production and the marketing of tobacco.
Through the presentation before the National Assembly of the 
Board's annual reports by the Minister parliament is 
afforded the opportunity to scrutinise the activities of the 
Board.
2. Control and Regulatory Power of the Board
The Board controls the tobacco industry in two ways - 
the registration of tobacco growers, and the licensing of 
dealers in tobacco, in particular, graders, buyers and 
auctioneers.
(a) Registration of Growers
The secretary to the Board is the Registrar under the 
Act. Any grower or person who bona fide intends to grow 
tobacco must be registered as a grower of the particular 
class or classes of tobacco which he intends to grow.
Growers who are being assisted by government or a government 
agency (the Board, the Bank of Zambia, or any statutory body
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whose objects include the giving of financial aid by way of 
grant or loan to fanners) may be represented by a nominee of 
the Permanent Secretary and such a person is deemed to be 
the grower of all the tobacco produced by all the assisted 
farmers. One circumstance in which the grower need not 
register is where he is a tenant producer of tobacco grown 
on a licensed buyer's land under the terms of the contract 
whereby the producer agrees to plant tobacco on no more than 
ten acres of the land and also agrees either to share the 
crop with the licensed buyer or pay him a stated share of 
the proceeds in consideration for his use of the land. In 
this case, the licensed buyer is deemed to be the grower and 
it is he who is required to register. The other is where 
tobacco is grown by a farmer who is a member of a 
co-operative society whose objects include the marketing of 
tobacco grown by its members and the farmer is required, 
under the contract with the society, that his tobacco should 
be marketed exclusively by the society. In this case the 
society is deemed to be the producer and must register.111 
On completion of registration, for each successive season, 
the Registrar will allot one registration number to each 
registered grower for each class of tobacco to be grown by 
the farmer in that season.
The application for registration contains a clause 
which becomes effective on registration which empowers the 
Board, as agent of the registered grower, to dispose of or 
destroy or cause the same to be destroyed or disposed of, 
any surplus or unsold tobacco belonging to the registered 
grower and remaining in his possession or under his control 
at the end of any selling season. The Board may, however,
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by written permission, allow the registered grower to retain 
surplus tobacco which has not been sold at the end of the 
selling season until the next selling season.
The registration of a grower may be cancelled if a 
grower is convicted of an offence under the Act or has given 
the Board false information or fails to comply with any 
condition or duty imposed by the Act. The grower may appeal
to the Minister but "no appeal shall lie to any court from
. . . . 112 the decision of the Minister".
(b) Licensing of Graders
It is an offence to carry on the business of grading
tobacco without a licence from the Board. So an application
for a grader's licence must be submitted, but the Board has
a discretion to refuse any such application. It may refuse
"if in its opinion" the applicant is not a "proper" person
to hold such a licence, or the applicant is unable or
unwilling to comply with any regulations as regards premises
to be used for grading or any other relevant regulations
113under the Act or any other written law. An aggrieved 
applicant has a right of appeal to the Minister. The Board 
may cancel or suspend any grader's licence issued under the 
Act if the grader has been convicted of an offence or the 
Board is satisfied that the grader has given false 
information to the Board or registered grower, or failed to 
comply with any condition or to perform any duty imposed on 
him by the Act. A grader who continues to carry on business 
after his licence has been cancelled or suspended is guilty 
of an offence. But he may appeal against the cancellation
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or suspension of his licence to the Minister, whose decision 
on the matter cannot be appealed against.
(c) Licensing of Buyers
Section 41 makes it an offence for any person, other
than the Board or an agent to buy tobacco, unless he is
licensed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. An
application for a buyer's licence must be submitted to the
Board by the person who intends to be a tobacco buyer. In
such an application the intending buyer may nominate an
employee or an agent who, on his being licensed, is entitled
to buy tobacco for, and on behalf of the licensed buyer
under his licence. The Board is empowered, with the
approval of the Minister, by rule, to prescribe grounds upon
which it may refuse to issue a buyer's licence, and attach
to any such licence any conditions which it deems reasonable
in the circumstances. Notwithstanding the grounds for
refusal which the Board may prescribe, it must refuse to
issue a licence if it is not satisfied with the financial
114standing of the applicant. In addition to the general
buyer's licence, the Board may issue an "exclusive" licence, 
that is, one which gives the buyer the right to buy a
particular class of tobacco to the exclusion of all other
buyers. Any such exclusive licence may be confined by its 
terms to a specific area specified in the licence. The 
buyer's licence must contain particulars relating to the 
class or classes of tobacco which the buyer is licensed to 
buy, the area or areas (defined by the Permanent Secretary) 
in which the buyer is licensed to make his purchases, any
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condition attaching to the said licence, and any other 
particulars which may be prescribed.
An applicant whose application for a buyer's licence 
has been refused or is dissatisfied with the condition or 
conditions attached to his licence may appeal to the 
Minister whose decision on the matter is not subject to 
judicial review.
The Board may cancel or suspend the operation of the 
licence for the same reasons as those applying to a grader's 
licence. The buyer has the same right of appeal in such 
circumstances as those relating to the grader.
(d) Licensing of Auction Floors
A person who intends to use any premises as an auction 
floor for the sale of tobacco must make an application in 
the prescribed form to the Board for a licence to convert 
the premises into a licensed auction floor. An owner or
occupier of any premises for the sale of auctionable
115 . . . .tobacco without a valid licence is guilty of an offence.
The Board's own premises when used as an auction floor is
exempt from the requirement of an auction floor licence.
Again, as with previous applications, the Board has a
discretion in approving or refusing the application for the
same reasons as for refusing the 'traders' and buyers'
licences. Similarly, an appeal may lie to the Minister
against the decision of the Board but no further.
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3. Sale of Tobacco
The Act provides for two methods by which tobacco may 
be sold - by auction or by private treaty. For this reason, 
tobacco is divided into two categories - auctionable and 
non-auctionable tobacco. It is an offence for any person to 
sell auctionable tobacco otherwise than by auction. This 
prohibition does not, however, apply to the re-purchase or 
re-sale of auctionable tobacco which has already been 
purchased or sold on the auction floor, the sale of 
auctionable tobacco by the Board, purchase or sale of a 
trade sample or for use in research, or the sale or purchase 
of auctionable tobacco at primary or rural level to a 
licensed buyer authorised to do so. With regard to 
non-auctionable tobacco, the position is the reverse. It is 
an offence to sell non-auctionable tobacco by auction, 
unless it is part of a consignment for export.
State control extends also to the importation and 
exportation of auctionable tobacco. The Minister is 
empowered to grant import and export permits to licensed 
auctioneers to import tobacco and registered growers to 
export the same. The licensed auctioneer who has secured a 
permit to import tobacco is required to sell it in lots 
separate and apart from the locally produced tobacco, and 
disclose the name of the country from which the tobacco was 
imported. With respect to locally produced tobacco, 
whenever the Minister is of the opinion that the quantity of 
a particular class or grade which is being produced for sale 
will exceed the requirements of both the internal and 
external markets, he may, after consulting the Board,
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prescribe the amount that will be sold within the country or 
exported, or prescribe the manner in which the Board should 
determine how much of the tobacco should be exported. The 
Board may, with the approval of the Minister, establish 
centres where surplus tobacco may be sent by growers and the 
Board may determine the manner by which tobacco in such 
pools will be disposed of.
4. Pricing of Tobacco
The Act empowers the Minister, after consultation with 
the Board, by Gazette notice, to set the minimum prices at 
which auctionable tobacco may be sold for internal and 
external markets.116 This aspect distinguishes the TBZ from 
the NAMB because in the case of the NAMB, the products it 
handles have fixed prices from which it cannot depart.
Where minimum prices are fixed, the Board is at liberty to 
receive a better price on the auction floor. Such minimum 
prices vary in respect of different markets and different 
classes and grades. The price fixed by the Minister is 
valid for one season only and during that season the 
Minister cannot vary it. If the Minister fails to fix a 
minimum price, the minimum price during that season is fixed 
at one ngwee per pound weight. Licensed buyers are duty 
bound to purchase auctionable tobacco only at or above the 
appropriate minimum price already fixed.
In order to protect the interests of the local growers, 
if any person buys auctionable tobacco for the purposes of
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any external market at a price less than the internal market 
minimum price fixed for such tobacco, he is precluded from 
re-selling the tobacco within the country. But in certain 
circumstances, the Minister may on the recommendation of the 
Board, and under such conditions as he may think fit, issue 
a permit authorising the re-sale of the tobacco within the 
country at less than the appropriate internal market minimum 
price. The circumstances are where the Minister is 
satisfied that auctionable tobacco will be manufactured 
within the country and exported for sale outside the 
country.
Although the TBZ, unlike the NAMB, is not and was never
intended to be a monopoly purchaser of the crop, it is,
nevertheless, affected by the price of the product for which
it is a marketing agency. The resources available to it
might decrease due to a decrease in the production of
tobacco and thus the levy it receives from growers. The
117Tobacco Levy Act which came into operation on the 26th of
118April 1968, empowers the Minister to prescribe the class
or grade of tobacco which should be subject to the levy.
Accordingly, the Tobacco Levy Regulations made by the
Minister in 1968, prescribed the classes of tobacco that are
subject to the levy and these classes are the same as those
which have been prescribed as auctionable under the Tobacco
Act. The monies obtained from the levy of various classes
of tobacco is used for the purposes of assisting the Board
in the discharge of its functions, and in the promotion of
119the tobacco industry generally.
The price policy for tobacco was, originally, 
influenced by its leading role as the main foreign exchange
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earning crop, average consumption amounting only to thirty
percent of total production. The rest of the crop had to be
sold to international buyers but the number of such buyers
who could be attracted to the Lusaka auction floors depended
on, not only the quality, but also the quantity of the
tobacco which was available for sale. Consequently, the
price policy aimed at raising the prices of those grades
which were in high demand on the world market, thereby
encouraging increased production of such grades. From 1966
to the 1969/70 season, the producer price for tobacco was
the auction price set at the auction floor in Lusaka, less
charges for transportation, handling, commissions and the
tobacco levy due to TBZ. In the 1969/70 season, the average
120auction price was 62.61 ngwee per kilogram. In an
attempt to reverse the downward trend, the government
introduced a floor price of 80.2 ngwee per kilogram -
providing a subsidy amounting to 17.6 ngwee per kilogram.
For 1972/73, 1973/4 and 1974/5 seasons the floor price
remained 90.4 ngwee, but in the 1974/75 season, no subsidy
was required because the floor price was below the auction
121price of 94.45 ngwee per kilogram. Generally the price
which was paid for tobacco on the local market was higher 
than the world market price but due to the high local cost 
of production, these prices had to be maintained to keep 
farmers in production. Payment of high local prices in a 
situation of low world market prices meant that the crop had 
to be exported at a loss and solely for purposes of earning 
some foreign exchange. The subsidy was more crucial to 
assisted tenant farmers who had to cover all the costs of 
numerous supporting services concerning credit, input supply
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and extension, besides their actual production in the field. 
In the long run, however, the rate of increase in the price 
has not been matched by the rate of increase in cost and 
this has led to farmers shifting away from tobacco 
production to maize production. Thus production today only 
serves the local market, with nothing left for export.
Further, while growers of auctionable tobacco (Virginia 
tobacco) have had a guaranteed price, growers of 
non-auctionable tobacco (such as barley and Turkish tobacco) 
by far the majority of whom are small scale farmers, have 
not enjoyed any guaranteed price and this has done little to 
encourage small scale farmers who are already confused by 
the numerous grades of tobacco on which the price 
depends.122
5. Performance of the TBZ
The Tobacco Act came into force on the 1st of April 
1231968. In the same year the Minister made rules relating
124to marketing and licensing and regulations covering
prescribed classes which denoted which classes should be
auctionable and which should not. The schedule to the
125Tobacco (Prescribed Classes) Regulations indicated that 
Virginia flue-cured tobacco was the only class which was and 
remains auctionable. Burley tobacco, fire-cured tobacco, 
air-cured tobacco, and sun- and air-cured tobacco, are not 
auctionable and are, therefore, sold by private treaty.
At the same time, under the Tobacco (Prescribed
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126Varieties) Regulations, the Minister prescribed what
varieties of the prescribed classes were permitted to be
grown in the country.
The prospects of the TBZ have largely depended on the
place of tobacco in the agricultural sector. At the time of
independence tobacco competed with maize as Zambia's major
127agricultural commodity. Virginia flue-cured tobacco has 
been the most lucrative and commercially produced kind of 
tobacco, while barley and Turkish were and still are largely 
produced by small scale farmers. Since independence, 
however, production of all types of tobacco has gradually 
declined.
From the date of independence up to the end of 1969 the
government had spent five million kwacha creating a
marketing infrastructure to encourage tobacco production.
This infrastructure included an auction floor in Lusaka with
a capacity to handle eighty million pounds of tobacco per
annum, a warehouse, and storage facilities. This
expenditure did not, however, result in the expected
increase in production as the year's crop dropped to eleven
128million pounds. The decline was attributed, largely, to
129the departure of expatriate commercial farmers. The
downward trend continued in the following year as production
130dropped again to ten and a half million pounds. The drop
in production affected both Virginia tobacco and Turkish 
tobacco. There was, however, a slight increase in barley 
tobacco and it was hoped that the tenant farming schemes 
introduced by the government would lead to an increase in 
the production of both Virginia and barley tobacco.
Since 1971, however, the production of Virginia tobacco
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has steadily increased except during some odd seasons such
as the 1980/81 and the 1981/82 when there were decreases in
production. In these seasons the cause for the fall in
production was officially said to have been "unsatisfactory
131weather conditions". Otherwise an increase m  production
was recorded in 1983 to the extent of 22.5% over the
previous year, although it was still the case that total
production was still below that achieved in the 1980/81 
132season. In the following year there was a 12% increase
in production over the previous year, but again it was still
less than the peak production of 1980/81. Consequently, it
is now openly admitted that the importance of tobacco as a
133foreign exchange earner has dwindled. Tobacco is no
longer exported but consumed locally and the revamping of
the tobacco industry, says the National Commission for
Development Planning, will require a considerable injection
134m  terms of credit and extension services.
The decrease in the volume of production of both
Virginia and barley tobacco has had an adverse effect on the
financial position of the Tobacco Board of Zambia. As Dodge
has explained:
"Both the auction floor and packing plant have 
a break-even point of 12,700 metric tons per 
annum. In 1973, total production was roughly 
6,700 tons, of which 471 tons was burley.
Since burley tobacco is not auctioned, the 
auction floor was operating at less than 
one-half the break-even level in 1973, while 
the packing plant was operating at only 
slightly above 50 percent of the break-even 
level. Thus large government subsidies have 
been required to cover the costs of operation.
In 1975 and 1976 TBZ requested K1 million for 
this purpose."135
Even though there has been an increase in the production of
tobacco reaching its peak in 1980/81, the present production
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is still less than what is required for the Tobacco Board of
Zambia to make a significant profit.
It is not only the decrease in production of tobacco
which has caused problems for the Tobacco Board of Zambia,
the extent of its activities has also contributed to its
financial problems. Prior to 1982 the TBZ carried out and
supported farmers through various schemes, in which
135extension was an important component. These schemes were 
namely - Tenant Farming Schemes, Assisted Tenant Schemes, 
and Family Farming Schemes.
(a) Tenant Farming Schemes: The TBZ used to let farms of
proven tobacco value with a minimum of five hundred acres of 
arable land to tenants with an option to renew their 
tenancies. Tenants were required to use not less than forty 
and not more than eighty acres for tobacco. The Board 
provided tenants with capital for farm improvement and 
guarantees for loans, in addition to its administrative and 
supervisory duties.
(b) Assisted Tenant Schemes: The TBZ operated these
schemes for people who had proved successful in its training 
centres where, for a period of three years, they were 
trained in the production of tobacco. These farmers were 
allocated farms, thirty to forty acres of which were to be 
used for tobacco, while sixty to eighty acres were to be 
used for maize. Assisted Tenant Farming Schemes were under 
the direct management of the Board and the costs of all the
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supporting services, known as scheme costs, had to be 
recovered from tobacco sales. The TBZ provided various 
services including capital for improvement, loan guarantees, 
and managerial assistance which included extension advice, 
accounting services, and machinery maintenance services.
(c) Family Farming Schemes: Unlike Assisted Tenant Farming
Schemes, these farms were smaller - one acre for tobacco and 
two acres for maize. The TBZ provided managerial 
assistance.
The participants in these schemes were subsidised by
government, although the degree of subsidisation varied
greatly from one scheme to another. Dodge found that the
schemes suffered from low yields and that owing to a lack of
expertise and inadequate scheme management, participants put
137little acreage into tobacco. Reluctance to grow tobacco
seems also to have resulted from low economic returns by
comparison to maize. In 1982, the TBZ began the process of
re-organisation. The effect of this re-organisation is that
its functions have, in practice, been reduced to those of a
marketing agency in the strict sense. It has been shorn of
its extension and managerial services which have been
transferred to the Department of Agriculture in the Ministry
of Agriculture and Water Development which has absorbed all
the extension officers of the TBZ. Consequently, it is in
the process of selling its farms which it had let to farmers
138under the various schemes, to the farmers themselves.
This is yet again an indication of the limited scope within 
which State control is exercisable by government through
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statutory boards.
D. MARKETING CO-OPERATIVES
1. Legislative Provisions
The Co-operative Societies Act contains provisions 
which apply specifically to marketing co-operatives. Under 
section 25 a society may be registered primarily to 
undertake and carry out any kind of business connected with 
the "marketing, collecting, receiving, taking delivery of, 
buying, handling ... of any agricultural product produced or 
delivered to it by its members or non-member patrons ...". 
Section 26 also permits the registration of a society whose 
business is the purchasing and distribution of agricultural 
requisites and household necessities for sale at retail to 
its members or non-member patrons. There is also a proviso, 
however, permitting co-operative unions and federations to 
sell such agricultural requisites, consumer goods and 
household necessities at wholesale prices to their member 
societies. Presumably a co-operative union may not sell 
wholesale to non-members even if they are patrons. A 
society marketing agricultural products, handling 
agricultural requisites or providing farming services to its 
members may be appointed as an agent of any statutory 
marketing board or other authority established by statute
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for the purpose of marketing agricultural products or
139distributing agricultural requisites.
A society formed for the purpose of marketing
agricultural products may, with the approval of the
Registrar, execute marketing contracts with its members,
requiring them to sell their produce or part thereof, for a
given period of time exclusively to the society or its 
140agents. Such a contract may provide that the society may
resell the products delivered to it with or without the
necessity of title to such products being vested in the 
141society. After re-sale the society must pay to the
producers the price after deducting the commission due to 
it. The contract may also specify the sums which must be 
paid as liquidated damages for failure to deliver or the
T A O
withholding of the required amount of produce. In terms
of procedure, except where general approval has been given
by the Registrar in respect of a particular form of
contract, every society which wishes to enter into any
marketing contract, must, before execution of such contract
forward two copies of the same to the Registrar who should
143indicate his approval or otherwise as the case may be. A
marketing contract entered into between the society and its
members cannot be contested in court on the ground that it
144constitutes a contract in restraint of trade. Section 32
was apparently intended to enable the society to rely, at 
least, on the produce of its members to conduct its 
marketing business. It may appear inconceivable that 
members of a marketing society should choose to sell their 
produce elsewhere, instead of backing their own society, but 
this possibility has always existed. Roberts and Elliott
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have recorded an instance in 1968 when fanners in the
Eastern Province refused to sell their maize to the Eastern
Province Co-operative Marketing Association because the
charges it made left the farmers with too small a profit 
145margin. In the event of competition between or among
marketing agencies, farmers might find it beneficial to take 
their produce to the most efficient body. The detrimental 
consequence of this practice is that it will undermine the 
business of their society, leading to fewer options to 
farmers. In order to strike a fair balance between the 
interests of the society and those of its members, the 
circumstances relating to each marketing society intent on 
executing marketing contracts must be examined by the 
Registrar before he gives his approval to such contracts.
The capacity of the society to handle the whole of the 
produce of its members effectively must be a very important 
consideration.
2. Trends in Favour of Co-operative Marketing Policy
Co-operatives have enjoyed government support since
independence, but government efforts prior to 1980 were
concentrated on producer co-operatives rather than marketing
co-operatives. In 1980, government embarked on the
establishment of marketing co-operatives in all provinces.
The NAMB's operations in the rural areas were to be
gradually curtailed and co-operative marketing unions
146encouraged to take over from the Board. The Board's
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operations are to be confined to the provincial capitals.
While co-operative marketing unions provide primary
marketing, the Board will provide secondary marketing
facilities - storage, importation and exportation and the
distribution of agricultural requisites to co-operative
147marketing unions. In addition to the four unions in
operation before 1980, namely, the Southern Province
Co-operative Marketing Union (SPCMU), the Eastern
Co-operative Union (ECU), the Northern Co-operative Union
(NCU), and the Luapula Co-operative Union (LCU), in the
order of their importance, five other co-operative unions
were organised to operate on provincial basis. Those
registered in 1980 were the Copperbelt Co-operative union,
the Central Province Co-operative Union, the Western
Province Co-operative Union, the Lusaka Province
Co-operative Union, and the North-Western Co-operative 
148Union. Although the new unions were expected to be
fully operational by 1982, at the end of 1981 only the
Copperbelt Co-operative Union did any business. Through the
Kaoma East Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society, as agent, the
co-operative purchased maize, sunflower seed, groundnuts and
149paddy rice on a small scale.
One of the basic problems the government has faced is
the nature of the relationship between the co-operatives and
the NAMB. The guidelines issued by the Ministry of
Co-operatives on the 7th of March 1985 regarding the nature
of this relationship and the roles of both the co-operatives
and the NAMB are as follows:
i) All existing co-operatives are to continue 
in operation; ii) the NAMB will continue to 
operate only in those areas where 
co-operatives have not yet assumed full
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responsibility; iii) provincial co-operative 
unions will have to raise their own overdrafts 
for crop purchasing; iv) provincial 
co-operative unions will be responsible for 
the purchasing of maize directly from the 
farmers; v) on delivery by the co-operative 
unions to district depots, all maize delivered 
will become the property of the NAMB; vi) the 
NAMB will pay the co-operative unions for 
maize delivered to its district depots on the 
basis of the total of the current producer 
prices and commission for handling and 
transport costs; vii) in deficit provinces, it 
will be the responsibility of the NAMB to move 
maize to those areas; viii) the NAMB will 
charge the co-operative unions the producer 
price for maize delivered to the district 
depots; ix) the NAMB will charge the 
government the transport and handling costs 
when maize is moved to deficit districts; x) 
all restitutions will be separately claimed 
from the government by the co-operatives and 
the NAMB; xi) the NAMB will have the 
responsibility of distributing fertilizer to 
co-operative unions; xii) the provincial 
co-operative unions will sell the fertilizer 
on behalf of the NAMB as agents only, but will 
be permitted to charge the Board the 
appropriate commission; and xiii) the NAMB 
will have no claim against the Agricultural 
Finance Company for fertilizer sold on local 
purchase orders (LPOs) to farmers by the 
co-operative unions.
These guidelines which have been the subject of
discussion between the Director of Co-operatives in the
Department of Co-operatives and the representatives of the
co-operative unions do not appear to be exhaustive. It is
not clear, for instance, whether the long-established
co-operatives will be treated along the same lines or not,
and even more important, in relation to the economic
viability of co-operatives, the basis upon which commission
will be determined. It appears that the initial idea was to
abolish the NAMB altogether, but certain obstacles prevented 
150this. One of the problems was the need to establish new
co-operative unions in provinces where none existed. The 
NAMB's operations would have to continue while the new
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unions were being organised and the old strengthened.
Another problem was the large number of the Board's
151employees who would have to be laid off. At the time of
field work discussions were continuing as to the fate of the 
Board's employees in those areas where its services had been 
curtailed. Whether the new unions are in a position to 
offer similar terms of employment that the Board offered is 
another matter. It is also questionable whether marketing 
co-operatives established on the government's insistence 
will be any more successful than the statutory body whose 
functions they will have to assume. Whether there will be 
adequate participation by primary societies, a factor which 
is necessary to instil confidence in the marketing 
co-operative and thereby ensure its success, is yet to be 
seen.
It is also important to consider the question of the 
economic viability of the marketing co-operatives under the 
new arrangement. It is clear from the guidelines that the 
co-operatives will operate merely as agencies of the Board 
and the government and as such, they have to look to both 
the government and the Board for reimbursement of their 
costs. According to the present arrangement, the provincial 
co-operative unions will receive payment for expenditure 
incurred for the transporting and handling of produce at 
least as far as the district depots, in addition to the cost 
of the purchasing of produce from farmers. Clearly, in this 
arrangement there is no room for any profit for the 
marketing co-operatives since what will be paid to them will 
correspond to what they have already spent, since the 
producer price for maize, (which is the most important
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crop), is fixed. One area in which some profit could be 
made by the co-operatives is through the sale of 
agricultural requisites on behalf of the Board. In such 
instances the unions may charge an "appropriate” commission 
which may be fixed by agreement among the interested parties 
- the government, the unions and the Board. But, unless the 
Board is in a strong financial position, which it is not, 
such commissions are bound to be small. It is clear, 
therefore, that under the proposed guidelines, the profit 
motive for co-operative marketing unions, which is necessary 
to enable them to expand their operations in their 
respective provinces, has not received adequate attention.
In the absence of a profit motive, the marketing of 
agricultural produce will remain what it has, since 
independence, always been, a service to the farming sector 
and thus a perpetual drain on the resources of the State. 
Little effort has been made to find ways and means of 
encouraging the participation of the private sector although 
such participation may not, by itself, be without its own 
drawbacks.
E. THE LINT COMPANY OF ZAMBIA
The establishment of the Lint Company of Zambia 
followed the change in marketing policy announced by the 
President in 1977. This change was aimed at reducing the
541
responsibility of the NAMB. Although Lintco, incorporated 
on the 29th of March 1978, professes to be the sole buyer of 
all cotton produced in the country, so long as cotton 
remains on the list of controlled products, the NAMB is 
legally the sole marketing body for cotton. The anomaly has 
not been rectified although, in practice, the NAMB does not 
handle cotton.
Unlike the NAMB and the TBZ which are statutory bodies, 
Lintco was incorporated under the Companies Act. This has 
not prevented the State from exercising control over its 
operations. The State appoints the members of the board of 
directors, a proportion of whom are representatives of 
government departments. There are eight members of the 
board of directors, all appointed by the Minister. Five of 
the members are not government officials, but the three are 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry and the Deputy Managing Director of 
the Industrial Development Company (a parastatal body in 
which government owns fifty-one percent of the shares).
Lintco was incorporated to carry out the following 
functions:
1. to improve productivity of cotton growers 
through the provision of inputs and 
extension services;
2. to achieve national self-sufficiency in 
cotton production so as to eliminate the 
importation of lint and cotton cloth; and
3. to achieve exportable surplus to earn 
foreign exchange for the country.
With an authorised capital of K3.1 million and issued
share capital of K1.19 million, Lintco began operations in
1531979. Its operations were, however, confined to Central,
Southern, Copperbelt, Western and Northern Provinces. In
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the North-Western Province cotton was not widely grown, 
while in the Eastern Province, the Eastern Co-operative 
Union acted as the agent. Lintco*s financial record has 
fared better than that of the NAMB. It has been able to 
generate foreign exchange but since the world price has been 
lower than the local price, the government has had to pay 
the company the difference in three successive seasons.
With the dramatic fall in the value of the local currency, 
however, the world price should now be higher than the local 
price and government subsidy should no longer be necessary.
The company has had its own problems, however, namely 
the wide range of cotton farmers, the insufficient number of 
extension officers, and the lack of transport. In the face 
of these problems, the National Commission for Development 
Planning (the NCDP) has advised the government to take two 
measures. First the government should encourage cotton 
production only in those areas in which the cost of the 
operations to Lintco is minimal. Second, government should 
avoid forcing Lintco to operate in areas of high rainfall 
because the areas are not easily accessible and the quality 
of lint cotton produced in such areas is low. In its view, 
cotton production should be confined to the Central,
Southern and Eastern provinces where, it says, there have
been higher profits both for the marketing organisation and
154 jfor the economy as a whole. It has also urged Lintco to
expand its ginning capacity.
Some observers have suggested that "government should
adopt a programme of positive action which will create the
conditions under which private merchants can render the
155greatest service to the economy". In their view such
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actions should include 1) the establishment of regular 
market places and market meetings in areas where there is 
sufficient volume of produce for sale so that buyers and 
sellers can meet, and 2) the provision of support services 
for rural markets in rural growth centres including areas 
for loading and unloading vehicles, accommodation for 
merchants, fuel and mechanical services for trucks, 
telecommunications, packaging materials and credit 
facilities. Regarding the pricing system, they, rightly, 
deprecate the determination of the price by cost of 
production method pointing out that this method failed to 
take into account variables in production costs from one 
farm to another resulting from different technical and 
managerial skills, factor endowments and distance from the 
market. They advocate that the free market should determine 
the price, but if this is otherwise undesirable a floor 
price could be introduced, thus permitting the influence, to 
some extent, of the forces of demand and supply.
Lintco1s performance provides some lessons regarding 
the need for State control and the extent to which the State 
should use institutions to encourage the production of 
agricultural commodities. Lintco*s performance has been 
better than NAMB*s. A number of reasons may be suggested 
for this, among them that it is not a monopoly purchaser of 
cotton. The second lesson is that the greater the emphasis 
on extension services to encourage production, the greater 
the cost. While such cost may be minimised by concentrating 
its services in areas of least cost, in so far as prices are 
determined by government on the basis of non-market forces, 
Lintco can do little to improve its financial position. The
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suggestion that cotton prices be left to market forces is, 
however, unsound because, in view of the underdeveloped 
nature of the country*s textile industry, it would thwart 
the development of cotton production. It would be more 
helpful to set minimum prices only so that market forces 
would play a greater role and as a means of encouraging 
private enterprise without necessarily discouraging cotton 
farmers.
F. CONCLUSIONS
The exercise of State control over the production and 
marketing of agricultural products has a long colonial 
history. Various purposes have been served by such control. 
After independence, the use of statutory marketing bodies as 
the instrument of control, coupled with government*s power 
to determine the price of commodities found favour and the 
marketing bodies established in colonial days continued in 
operation. Statutory boards have played different roles. 
While the NAMB has been a monopoly purchaser of maize and 
agricultural requisites, the TBZ has controlled the 
production and marketing of tobacco. As the operation of 
these boards has expanded inefficiency has arisen and, in 
the case of the NAMB which handles crops whose purchase and
sale prices are set by the government, losses have been
incurred. This is all too common with marketing boards in
545
developing countries elsewhere. Jorgensen and others have 
observed:
"Marketing boards face a variation of 
Parkinson*s law: the bureaucracy expands to 
consume the surplus available. What should 
have been a mechanism for smooth fluctuations 
in government and farmer revenue becomes 
instead a ..self-perpetuating drain on 
revenue. "
From the time of NAMB's creation, there have been persistent 
complaints regarding its performance, some of them 
"well-founded".157
The Board's difficulties are not only the result of 
inefficiency. They are the result of excessive government 
control over its operations which have forced it to operate 
even in areas in respect to which its operations were 
uneconomic, in the hope, on the part of the government, that 
this would encourage peasant farmers to enter the market 
economy. Because of this, the incentive to make a profit 
has been denied to the Board. The Board's initial failure 
has also been attributed to the broad spectrum of controlled 
products which the Board had to handle.
The TBZ has fared better because, among other reasons, 
the government pricing system for tobacco has permitted a 
wider profit margin. While the government sets the floor 
price, the TBZ can count on the market forces on the auction 
floor to enable it to make a profit. Nonetheless, attempts 
at increasing its role, namely encouraging tobacco 
production under various schemes, have proved beyond its 
capacity.
Government's reaction has been to reduce the role of 
both the NAMB and the TBZ, and to create or encourage other 
institutions to participate in the provision of marketing
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services. Whether the decision of the government to leave
marketing (other than the marketing of tobacco) at primary
or rural level to marketing co-operatives is a sound
alternative remains to be seen. Their financial base,
particularly that of the newer ones, has already been
brought into question. In 1984, some of these co-operatives
failed to pay the NAMB for fertilizer. In turn, the NAMB
refused to pay them for the maize delivered to it. The
result was that co-operatives either failed to pay the
158farmers altogether or paid them late. The reason for
their liquidity problem that year was that the government 
did not give co-operatives adequate funds to cover the 
difference between the cost of their services and their 
actual revenue. The payment of the funds itself has been 
necessitated by the fact that government has been setting 
uneconomic prices of many agricultural commodities and 
requisites, a measure which benefits the consumer, but does 
not cover the actual cost of the marketing service. The 
general conclusion that may be made on the basis of Zambian 
experience is that while State control may serve to promote 
increased production of agricultural produce of good 
quality, such an increase in production cannot be maintained 
if other factors such as the participation of private 
entrepreneurs, and the role of market forces are ignored.
The steps, begun in the early seventies, taken to de-control 
some agricultural commodities, illustrate the government's 
realisation of this fact. Additional measures are, however, 
necessary to ensure the economic viability of the NAMB. The 
Board could benefit from the limitation of government's 
power to fix prices of commodities to minimum or floor
547
prices, and the limitation of its own role to that of a 
residuary buyer.
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION
The goal of African governments has been stated to be
economic development, generally understood to mean the
incremental change in the per capita income of the greatest
number of the population. Various kinds of measures have
been introduced to speed up the process of such economic
change. These new measures have included the establishment
of new institutions and legal norms to serve government
economic policy. In this way law has been relied upon, in
part, as a tool to accelerate economic development. Zambia
offers one example of the extent to which African
governments have sought to use law as an intrument for the
realisation of their economic policies. The use of law in
this manner has raised a complex debate as to the role of
law in the development process. It is itself an extension
of the role of law from that of the settlement of disputes
to that of accelerating the social and economic
transformation of society.1
A leading exponent of the role of law in development,
Robert Seidman, explains:
"The legal order is the tool most easily 
available to politically organized society to 
bring about purposive social change. Law does 
this by redefining norms so that if the new 
rules in fact induce the behaviour which they 
prescribe, new patterns of social interaction 
will ensue. Society will be to that extent 
changed."2
The State, therefore, must take the "initiative to determine
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the course of social change - rather than the Church, family
or village” this responsibility being a reflection of
society’s transformation from kin-oriented, agricultural
subsistence communities into exchange societies with a high
degree of specialisation. Society’s demand for development
appears in the form of demands for new legislation
"concerning land tenure, marketing boards, planning
machinery, electoral politics, educational institutions,
monetary systems, taxation".
That law may be an instrument of development draws
considerable support from a wide spectrum of scholars.
Atiyah, for one, says that it is mistaken to think that law
can never be used to change social attitudes and thus to
5lead by example. He states that law is not an independent
autonomous institution with purposes of its own but "merely
a tool, an instrument by which policies and goals otherwise
decided upon can be aimed at by those who make and enforce
the law".6 Elias, for another, identifies four major aims
that could be set for law in Nigeria and these include the
7promotion of economic growth and social well-being. He 
asserts the interdependence of law and economics as 
instruments of social control although the extent of their 
interaction may vary with the type of government in a given 
country.
This conception of the role of law has led to attempts
o
to formulate theories regarding law and development but 
these attempts have merely produced abstract theory divorced
o
from political practice. Little attempt has been made to 
show how state power can be used to overcome 
underdevelopment. It is in this regard that Robert Seidman
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is an exception because he has made some practical proposals 
on how a government can use State power to "solve the 
problems of the poor, poverty and oppression".10 Seidman 
acknowledges that all too frequently law fails to induce the 
prescribed behaviour because those in government lack a 
proper understanding of how law affects behaviour. In his 
view, people to whom the law is addressed (role occupants) 
choose whether or not to obey within the constraints and 
resources of their physical and social milieu as they 
perceive it and the role occupants will consciously conform 
their behaviour to the dictates of the new legal order if 
certain conditions are fulfilled, which are that the law 
states explicitly how they should behave, they learn of the 
rule through a two-way communication channel, they have the 
opportunity and capacity to obey, the rule does in fact and 
it is perceived to serve their interest, and they decide 
whether to obey in a public, participatory, and 
problem-solving process. Consequently, the legal order can 
change the behaviour of role occupants if they have a 
participatory relationship with law makers. The need for 
clarity is particularly stressed because "if a rule or 
policy wallows in ambiguity or vagueness, its addressee must 
behave as he thinks best”.11 Thus the law-makers have a 
dual task: they must accurately predict that the role 
occupant will confront the necessity of choice whether or 
not to obey, and that he will choose to obey, and among the 
several factors that influence the decision whether to obey 
is whether official sanctions will be applied.
At the interface of the law-making process are the 
law-trained professionals. Depicting the importance of
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these professionals in the law making process, Seidman says:
"In every government, there are some actors 
whose roles place them at the interface 
between ends and means, between policy 
formulation and implementation. Very 
frequently, this interface is where policies 
are transformed into law, for it is at that 
point that the generalities are given 
programmatic content. That interface is a 
broad one comprising many actors: those who 
draft the legislation, structure options, 
raise queries, and submit or review drafts, as 
well as those who finally decide 'yea' or 
'nay' on particular formulations. Titles 
vary: permanent secretary, ministerial 
counsel, consultant, civil servant, 
parliamentary draftsman, solicitor general, 
and so on."12
Unless lawyers occupying these positions are aware of both
the policy implications of their contributions to the
decision-making process, and the inherent limits upon the
law, their efforts will meet with mixed results. It would
appear then that those at the interface between policy and
the means of its accomplishment need special training and
understanding of how law affects human behaviour.
The need for specialisation, or what Martin calls
technocracy should not apparently, be over emphasised since
it will limit the participation of the role occupants in the
decision-making process which according to Seidman is
13crucial if they have to obey. Seidman also proposes
certain conditions for development. He says that solving
the problems of poverty requires a new legal order, not the
application of existing rules through existing institutions
or the creation of new institutions such as parastatal
corporations whose managers enjoy great power and
discretion. In his summary of the explanation of the
failure of development efforts in Africa, Seidman says:
"Development paradoxically created elites out 
of programmes that tried to raise the mass.
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They endowed administrators with broad and 
quite uncontrolled discretion; they created 
parastatals in which managers realistically 
need not account to their government 
shareholders; they created governments that 
did not serve parliament and bureaucracies 
that did not serve government. At the same 
time, these programmes did not effect much 
change in favour of the dispossessed.
Development required change; change required 
participation; but development programmes ran 
from the top down. Development required 
unitary, not compartmentalized decision-making 
to solve emergent problems; African 
administration became fragmented.
Development required communication channels to 
the poor; very few such channels existed in
Africa." .14
In order to determine whether there hav/ebeen any 
changes in Zambia calculated to induce development after 
independence the colonial legal and institutional framework 
was discussed. At the beginning of the colonial era, a 
truncated form of English law was introduced into the 
protectorate of Northern Rhodesia with a broad exception 
made for the application of customary law. Customary law 
applied to Africans who largely lived and worked in the 
subsistence sector. It was an appropriate law at the time 
growing, as it did, out of the exigencies of African 
societies dominated by simple technologies and low levels of 
production, specialisation and exchange. English law 
applied mainly to Europeans and provided an appropriate 
legal framework for the development of export-oriented 
modern industries. The colonial government was noted for 
its extensive use of law to achieve various goals. A 
variety of laws - poll tax, hut tax, licensing regulations 
etc., drove Africans into the industrial sector.
The role of the agricultural sector during this period 
was to provide a sufficient food surplus to feed the urban
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community. Given this restricted objective it is not 
surprising that emphasis, until the late forties, was on 
European farmers. Thus, colonial land policy, particularly 
that of native reserves, although ideally meant to preserve 
sufficient land for the use of Africans while the rest would 
be available for European occupation, resulted in the 
carving out of most of the best land for the latter. It was 
only after noting the appalling conditions in the native 
reserves in the late forties that more land was made 
available to Africans under the policy of native trust land.
On Crown Land, however, the colonial government faced a 
dilemma as to whether to continue with the freehold system 
introduced by the BSA Company, or to lay emphasis on the 
leasehold system. The issue was how to encourage European 
farmers under a system that offered maximum security of 
tenure, i.e. freehold, but retain sufficient control to 
impose development requirements through a leasehold system. 
This controversy was not settled until 1959 when, despite 
official government reservations, the freehold system 
carried the day but with the proviso that it would be 
preceded by a period of leasehold during which substantial 
development of the land would be required. But even prior 
to this compromise, land in certain parts of the country had 
been granted in leasehold, particularly agricultural land, 
and in these areas, the selection of tenants was based on 
proven capacity to undertake farming.
The Agricultural Lands Ordinance in which the 
compromise was concretised has been one of the most 
important legacies of the colonial government and to this 
day constitutes one of the instruments of State control of
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land. While these measures were being taken to promote 
agricultural development on Crown Land, no such measures 
were introduced in the Reserves and Trust Land. It was 
apparently felt that the ordinances that sought to preserve 
natural resources, prevent the spread of noxious weeds and 
bush fires were adequate. In fact, there was little, if 
any, enforcement of these ordinances. Consequently, one may 
argue that with respect to customary land, the colonial 
government did not see fit to use law to bring about land 
development.
Credit featured prominently in the establishment of a 
viable agricultural base in Northern Rhodesia. Two features 
emerge from the nature of government intervention in the 
provision of credit during the colonial era. The first is 
that, as with land control, attention was focussed mainly on 
the commercial farming sector. The received English law 
regarding credit, with its emphasis on mortgages of land the 
title to which could be evidenced by certificates of title, 
was not suitable to customary land in respect of which, 
until 1963, there was no system of registration of title. 
Government intervention in the form of the Agricultural 
Credits Ordinance, although meant to facilitate the creation 
of a charge over agricultural implements and livestock had, 
if any, only a marginal effect on subsistence farmers not 
only because, by definition, they were excluded, but also 
because few of them could afford agricultural implements and 
livestock of substantial value. The second feature of 
government intervention was the creation of a specialised 
credit institution, exclusively for the agricultural sector.
The creation of the Land Bank with government funding
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was an attempt to channel funds from the industrial sector 
to the agricultural sector. It was also an extension of the 
role of the State from that of merely creating the 
conditions in which private enterprise could flourish to one 
of providing services which, even in a modern welfare state 
would not form part of government responsibility. As an 
instrument for promoting agricultural development, the 
bank's reliance, in the main, on land as security, rendered 
it vulnerable to changes in land values. From 1959, the 
constitutional future of the country began to cause anxiety 
to many European farmers and the bank experienced 
difficulties finding buyers of the farms mortgaged to it.
The extension of the role of the state also covered the 
marketing of agricultural produce. A certain amount of 
State control over the production and marketing of 
agricultural produce commenced as early as 1935 under the 
Maize Control Ordinance, 1935. By this Ordinance, the 
government established the Maize Control Board. The role of 
this board was the carrying out of the orderly marketing of 
maize along the old line of rail. To this end quotas were 
allocated to European and African producers. Consequently, 
the ordinance made little contribution to agricultural 
development if the expression development is taken to mean 
the general economic progress of the broad masses of the 
farming community. It was, in fact, a retrogressive step as 
it was intended to safeguard the interests of European maize 
growers who felt threatened by competition from African 
subsistence farmers at a time when there was a strong 
probability that there would be over-production. The only 
useful contribution was the idea of the use to which
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government may put statutory boards to achieve a particular 
result - whatever this might be. It was not, however, until 
1964, three months before independence that the idea was 
utilised with the more progressive objective of providing 
marketing services in the rural areas. The idea took the 
form of the Agricultural Rural Marketing Board.
What emerges from the colonial era is the use of law to 
promote development in the European farming sector. A 
question that may be posed is whether the progress of 
African producers which in 1935 prompted the estabishment of 
the Maize Control Board was linked to any legal phenomena.
It has been established that there was little in the way of 
law to assist African producers until towards the close of 
the colonial era. The question that arises then is the 
importance of law in the development process. As far as the 
colonial era is concerned it can be stated that with regard 
to African agriculture, law played no part in its progress, 
and that in fact, progress was achieved by African farmers 
inspite of the laws relating to landholding, credit and 
marketing which prevented African producers from 
participating fully in the cash economy. This is not to 
suggest, however, that progress is possible or can be 
maintained without a proper legal framework. It is probable 
that there would have been greater progress if the law had 
not operated to the disadvantage of African producers or if 
a suitable legal framework to encourage the African producer 
had been evolved. It is, moreover, sufficient for our 
thesis to state that the success of the European farming 
community must be attributed, in part, to the legal 
framework for agricultural production that, by and large,
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favoured it.
Exactly one month after independence, the new 
government appointed a commission of inquiry to look into 
the land policy and furnished the commission with its own 
views as to the goals that land policy roust pursue. The 
commission's report was, however, a dead letter because it 
did not satisfy government aspirations. Consequently, until 
the land reforms introduced in 1975, government exercised 
control only over agricultural land under leasehold tenure, 
a small proportion of which fell under the Agricultural 
Lands Act. Unfortunately, no steps were taken to 
incorporate government policy into the Act. The 
Agricultural Lands Act which had been meant to serve as a 
compromise between the interests of the colonial government 
and those of the powerful, largely expatriate, farming 
community, became the basis of implementation of a new 
government land policy without any evaluation of its 
suitability for the same. Consequently problems have arisen 
between the Agricultural Lands Board and the Minister with 
respect to the exercise of their respective functions. The 
Board has often expressed dissatisfaction with what it has 
seen as unwarranted ministerial interference with the 
exercise of its powers. The reason for this occurrence is 
that the Ministers have sought to implement government 
policy which in many respects is not the same as that in the 
Agricultural Lands Act. The Agricultural Lands Board is 
equally handicapped because it is not able to apply existing 
values or policy within the present framework of the Act. 
Consequently, there are occasional inconsistencies in the 
application of the criteria for land allocation or consent
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to assign, and in some cases express provisions have had to 
be glossed over. This is the result of seeking to implement 
new government policy through existing colonial legislation. 
Consequently it is not surprising that the Agricultural 
Lands Act has not measured up to government development 
goals. In its present form the Act cannot be relied upon to 
achieve what government conceives as its development goals.
Before 1975, outside leasehold land government was 
powerless to control land. One measure introduced in 1970, 
the Lands Acquisition Act gives the State the widest 
possible power to acquire land compulsorily. This power was 
intended to be used to repossess farms left vacant, 
undeveloped or unutilised. That such power should be 
granted to the State was necessary because many European 
farmers had left the country following independence and it 
was hoped that the Act would be used extensively for this 
purpose. In sp'te of the initial optimism the actual result 
was disappointing for various reasons. The Lands 
Acquisition Act failed to serve this purpose because it is 
too complex a piece of legislation to be utilised 
effectively. The ordinary land officer with limited legal 
training is required to make on the spot determination 
whether land is adequately developed in accordance with the 
difficult definitions in the Act. An Act which is vague in 
addition to requiring complex procedures cannot be expected 
to achieve its purpose. The failure of this Act brings out 
the importance of those persons Seidman identifies as being 
at the interface between the formulation of policy and its 
concretisation into law. These are supposed to include 
permanent secretaries, ministerial counsel, parliamentary
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draftsmen, consultants, etc. They are supposed to 
understand how law affects behaviour in this case, whether 
it can be effectively implemented bearing in mind the 
quality of available manpower. It is rather doubtful that 
the civil servants and all those who occupied this position, 
having been appointed during the colonial era, and generally 
wary of the real intentions of the new government did all 
they could to provide a framework through which government 
policy could be implemented. The failure of the Act also 
demonstrates the extent to which the role of law in 
development is ; ‘impeded by practical difficulties such 
as manpower and financial constraints.
The failure of the Lands Acquisition Act prompted the 
government to implement its long-conceived land policy, this 
time without resort to an inquiry. There are defects with 
the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act which require government 
attention and, like all development-oriented legislation, 
its operation requires constant monitoring and gradual 
improvement. The importance of the Act lies in the system 
of control it imposes. This system includes the imposition 
of development conditions and the imposition of the minimum 
size of farms. The latter has not yet been done, but the 
former has been effected through schedules to the Act. This 
system of control has similarities with that binding on 
tenants of scheduled farms under the Agricultural Lands Act. 
The major constraint on the enforcement of development 
covenants is manpower. The present system of land 
administration is too centralised as there are only three 
provincial land offices. The government has, however, begun 
to take steps in the right direction by confering power on
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local authorities to consider applications for land in their 
districts. Because local authority offices are closer to 
fanners, it would be easier for them to monitor the use 
being made of agricultural land and enforce development 
covenants, consequently, it is suggested that the power of 
local authorities be extended so as to involve them in the 
administration of agricultural land. Without effective 
enforcement of development covenants, the impact of the Land 
(Conversion of Titles) Act as an instrument of government 
development policy will be minimal.
Unlike State Land with regard to which government has 
taken bold steps to encourage development, the Reserves and 
Trust Land have remained largely neglected. Despite the 
sweeping provisions regarding the application of the Land 
(Conversion of Titles) Act, practical realisation of its 
objects in the Reserves and Trust Land has not been evident. 
This is rather surprising bearing in mind government policy 
which stresses the subsistence farmers as the basis for 
rural development. Government recognises the danger of land 
accumulation which may result from the customary mode of 
landholding, thereby, impliedly advocating State control in 
the Reserves and Trust Land. No measures, however, have 
been taken so far in the Reserves and Trust Land in 
pursuance of this policy and government has been treading 
very cautiously. Land rights in the Reserves and Trust Land 
remain largely customary.
One of the theses developed is that customary land 
tenure inhibits agricultural development because of the 
degree of uncertainty that surrounds rights in fallow land, 
grazing land and the insecurity felt by "strangers" and
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persons living in their spouse's village. In particular, 
the absence of control over land use has threatened the 
continued fertility of some parts of land among 
cattle-owning communities. Of late there have been 
persistent calls by some farmers for some system of 
registration of title in the hope that they may use the land 
as security for loans. Although the recent Land Commission 
which covered the Southern Province displayed the usual 
caution by declining to make any proposals regarding 
customary land tenure, the demand for registered title to 
land calls for the examination of the present system of 
grants of non-customary interests in the Reserves and Trust 
Land as a possible alternative to wholesale registration of 
title.
Grants of non-customary interests in land in the 
Reserves and Trust Land are being made under the colonial 
Orders-in-Council, such interests having originally been 
provided for to cater for European settlement for a 
temporary period. With the coming of independence these 
orders have been used to enable farmers who are dissatisfied 
with customary land tenure to obtain leases and occupancy 
licences with title deeds. One of the issues that arises is 
whether the system, based as it is on individual initiative 
is better than a systematic adjudication of the rights of 
all members of a given community in a district or region, 
and then registering their rights in such land. There are 
various advantages in relying on individual initiative both 
from the government's standpoint and from that of the 
communities themselves. There is no requirement of 
additional manpower and less controversy as the demand for
I
i
i(
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registered title has been more pronounced on the part of 
those whose ambition is to use land as security. Moreover, 
individual initiative may be defended on the basis of the 
differences in the systems of land use among various ethnic 
communities.
It is, however, also true that ordinary villagers 
cannot take advantage of the system due to complicated 
procedures and the inhibitive costs of surveying the parcels 
of land. On a national level individual initiative is 
unplanned, thus adding to the difficulty that government may 
face in enforcing the terms of the leases and occupancy 
licences. Moreover, individual initiative does not take 
into account the future requirements of the growing 
population in the Reserves and Trust Land and the limitation 
of two hundred and fifty hectares per person is not only
excessive but is not a legal requirement but a mere
administrative practice. To strike a balance between the 
interests of those who demand registered titles and the
interests of those who may still benefit from the
flexibility of customary land tenure, the solution would 
appear to be to introduce registration of title in areas 
where conditions already exist - permanent cultivation and 
scarcity of land, and leave the rest of the areas available 
to registration of title by private initiative. The second 
issue relates to the nature of the rights and obligations of 
lessees and licensees. The obligations, particularly that 
requiring the construction of substantial buildings within a 
period of twenty-four months from the date of the grant, are 
unsuited to ordinary villagers with limited financial 
resources. This is yet another indication of the futility
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of relying on legislation of an earlier vintage meant to 
serve a different purpose.
Unlike customary land with respect to which government 
policy has not been concretised into law, agricultural 
credit policy has found expression through the operation of 
specialised credit institutions, statutory or otherwise.
The need for government intervention through such 
institutions arises from the lack of interest on the part of 
commercial banks to lend directly to small scale farmers who 
lack adequate security. Atpresent, commercial bank lending 
to the agricultural sector may be outstripping their lending 
to the manufacturing sector but much of their investment in 
the agricultural sector is actually directed at commercial 
farmers and government credit institutions.
Earlier government efforts to broaden the range of 
farmers who should have access to credit appear to have 
seriously compromised the economic viability of the credit 
institutions. As credit was seen as the starting point in 
agricultural growth little attention was paid to the 
particular circumstances of the land which was to be farmed 
and the individual applicant's abilities. Although one may 
agree with Seidman's explanation of the failure of public 
corporations (such as government credit institutions) to 
eradicate poverty as the result of the wide discretion with 
which managers of these corporations are vested, in 
practical terms, however, at least in the case of credit 
institutions in Zambia, the problem appears to have been the 
lack of discretion. In the early days of the COZ, for 
instance, government influence in the operation of this 
institution and insistence on lending to rural co-operatives
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as part of the overall government rural development policy 
was very significant. In spite of the drive towards more 
credit to small scale farmers little has been done to 
fortify the interests of the lenders. The remedies 
available are still mainly common law remedies of an action 
for a debt. Even the nature of the security commonly used, 
the stop order, is of doubtful legal significance. Thus, 
stop orders have, in some instances, been largely ignored by 
the marketing agencies to whom they have been addressed.
The idea of participation in the decision-making
process at district or village level which is currently
being practised by the AFC (but has no place on the ZADB
administrative structure) should have served the purpose of
mobilising local knowledge of credit worthiness and
educating prospective borrowers as to the importance of
but
complying with contractual obligations,^has achieved little 
in these directions. Consequently, in an attempt by 
managers of public corporations to operate on sound business 
principles they have circumscribed the range of farmers who 
can be helped. It is now more difficult to obtain a loan 
than it was ten or five years ago.
Government intervention through the operation of public 
corporations has also been extended to the production and 
marketing of agricultural commodities. Government statutory 
boards play different roles, some enjoy monopoly powers 
while others play residuary roles. While, as in the case of 
credit institutions, these statutory boards would appear to 
enjoy too much discretion, in practice, their operations are 
under government control. The initial problems of the NAMB 
were attributed, in part to inefficiency, but also excessive
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government control which forced the NAMB to maintain 
marketing services in areas in which such services could not 
be economically justified even when its operations were as 
broad based (in terms of agricultural commodities they could 
handle) as possible. In the legal context the board's 
functions were too broad while in practice it was denied 
managerial autonomy to operate in a business-like manner.
The operations of the public corporations which have 
been used as instruments of government policy also have a 
bearing on the limit to which law can be used to achieve 
development. However adequate the legal framework within 
which they were to operate, this, by itself would not 
surmount practical difficulties. Credit institutions must 
be able to supervise their borrowers, but if the majority of 
these borrowers are subsistence farmers scattered over a 
wide area this is difficult to achieve. Consequently, the 
returns on their investment will be marginal and the 
institutions will fail. Similar difficulties face marketing 
boards. Distance from farmers mean greater operational 
costs, and if such costs are not recouped, the institution 
will fail.
These practical constraints are not a negation of the 
role of law in development but the inter-dependence between 
law and social, political and economic factors. Law and 
development theories are about how to change human behaviour 
to achieve a given set of policy objectives. These 
objectives must themselves be capable of achievement. 
Zambia's experience with agricultural policy shows the 
contrast between the law in the statute books and the law in 
action. The failure of law in achieving its objectives has
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not been for want of political commitment but for the fact 
that the circumstances in which the law is to operate have 
not been seriously considered.
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